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ETHICS 
GENERAL  AND  SPECIAL 


THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

HKW  YORK  •   BOSTON  •   CHICAGO  •  DAUAS 
ATLAKTA  •   SAN  FKANCISCO 

MACMILLAN  &  CO.,  Limited 

LONDON  •  BOMBAY  •  CALCUTTA 
MELBOURNK 

THE  MACMILLAN  CO.  OF  CANADA,  Ln>. 

TORONTO 


ETHICS 

GENERAL  AND  SPECIAL 


BY 

OWEN  A.  HILL,  S.J.,  Ph.D. 

Lecturer  on  Psychology,  Natural  Theology,  Ethics 
and  Religion,  at  Fordham  University, 
New  York  City,  N.  Y. 


iiaeto  gotfe 

THE  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 

1920 

AU  rights  reserved 


OOPTEIGHT,  1920, 

By  the  MACMILLAN  COMPANY 


Set  up  and  electrotyped.     PubUshed,  July,  1920 


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1 


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i^iy:\.l  "^f    .  'V. 


Jtsqtrimi  patteL 

JOSEPHUS  H.  ROCKWELL,  S.J., 

Praepositus  Prov.  Marylandiae  Neo-Ehoracensis. 


N!1|U  obBtat 

ARTHURUS  J.  SCANLAN,  S.T.D., 

Censor  Librorum. 


Imiiriinatnr. 

PATRITIUS  J.  HAYES,  D.D., 

Archiepiscopus  Neo-Ehoracensis. 

Neo-Ebobaci,  die  15  Aprilis,  1920. 


435851 


FREFACB 

The  whole  trouble  with  all  Modern  Philosophy  is  rank  sub- 
jectivism, and  subjectivism  is,  perhaps,  most  destructive  in 
the  domain  of  Ethics.  Protestantism  and  Modern  Philosophy 
grow  on  the  same  tree,  and  the  root  of  the  tree  is  subjectivism. 
This  fact  accounts  for  all  the  atheism,  all  the  materialism,  all 
the  socialism  in  the  world.  It  is  to  blame  for  all  the  irreli- 
gion,  all  the  injustice,  all  the  tyranny  now  afflicting  large  and 
small  nations;  and  the  World  War  did  not  settle  matters, 
the  Peace  Conference,  in  spite  of  all  its  good  intentions,  prac- 
tically left  things  where  it  found  them.  Evils  persevere  as 
long  as  their  causes;  and  till  men  think  right,  till  Modern 
Philosophy  js  killed  from  men's  minds,  till  Scholastic  Phi- 
losophy gets  everywhere  the  hearing  it  deserves,  these  evils, 
far  from  being  eliminated,  will  prosper,  grow  and  multiply. 
No  body  of  men  can  regulate  mankind,  unless  mankind  itself 
is  amenable  to  direction,  unless  mankind  entertains  correct 
notions  regarding  God,  the  Soul,  and  the  nature  of  author- 
ity. I^aws  are  no  better  than  the  men  who  make  them,  and 
laws  are  little  worth,  unless  subjects  are  minded  to  see  and 
obey  divinity  in  them.  It  is  awfully  hard,  in  fact  it  is  im- 
possible, to  persuade  anybody  to  think  that  any  single  man 
or  any  collection  of  men,  whether  a  majority  or  a  minority, 
possess  independent  right  over  the  free  wills  of  other  men, 
and  are  empowered  to  make  and  execute  laws  on  their  own 
initiative.  God  alone  holds  that  supreme  prerogative;  and 
this  fact  is  clear  proof  not  only  that  all  authority  is  imme- 
diately from  God,  but  also  that  all  authority  passes  imme- 
diately from  God  to  ruler,  without  effective  interference  with 
authority  itself  on  the  part  of  the  people.  God  is  immediate 
maker  of  the  Natural  Law,  He  is  mediate  maker  of  all  civil 
law;  and  the  presence  of  God  in  civil  law  makes  civil  law  a 
sacred  obligation.  Unjust  law  is  no  law  at  all,  because  God 
has  no  part  in  its  making.    Unjust  law  has  all  the  force  men 


VIU 


PREFACE 


can  give  it.  It  has  physical  force  in  its  favor,  because  men 
can  contribute  that;  and  physical  force  never  binds  men's 
free  wills.  Unjust  law  has  no  moral  force,  the  kind  that  God 
gives;  and  free  wills  are  servants  to  moral  force  alone.  All 
the  moral  force  in  civil  law  comes  from  God,  men  are  able 
to  back  it  up  with  physical  force;  but  moral  force,  because 
it  touches  free  wills,  is  beyond  the  jurisdiction  of  mere  men, 
and  necessarily  leans  for  its  validity  on  God  alone. 

Consent  of  the  governed  is  one  thing  before  the  establish- 
ment of  government,  it  is  an  entirely  different  thing  after 
government  is  once  established.  Physical  freedom  is  man's 
birthright,  and  remains  intact  before  and  after  the  establish- 
ment of  government.  Civil  law  is  made  by  the  state,  and 
before  government  is  constituted  there  is  no  state,  and  there- 
fore no  adequate  human  lawmaker.  Before  government  be- 
comes a  fact,  natural  law  is  the  one  restraint  on  moral  free- 
dom ;  and  natural  law  wants  a  multitude  without  government 
to  form  a  government  at  its  earliest  convenience.  A  people, 
therefore,  is  not  morally  free  to  live  with  or  without  govern- 
ment. Nature  wants  men  to  live  in  a  state,  under  law  and 
authority;  and  nature's  wishes  are  what  God  wants,  nature's 
wishes  are  the  Natural  Law. 

A  government  de  jure  and  de  facto  is,  of  course,  better 
than  a  government  merely  de  facto;  but  when  a  government 
de  jure  is  impossible  without  continuous  strife  and  universal 
bloodshed,  a  government  de  facto  is  better  than  no  govern- 
ment at  all.  Even  rights  must  be  prosecuted  with  prudence, 
and  in  case  of  such  a  government  de  facto,  right  must  await 
a  more  favorable  opportunity  to  assert  itself,  it  must  not  work 
with  headlong  rashness  to  its  own  harm  and  the  destruction 
of  order. 

In  common  sense  and  the  natural  law  legitimate  conquest 
is  as  just  and  secure  a  title  to  authority  as  inheritance  or 
suffrage  or  purchase ;  and  in  the  words  of  Suarez  nearly  every 
government  in  modern  times  traces  its  origin  to  right  of  con- 
quest. This  is  far  from  meaning  that  modem  states  are  built 
on  physical  force  for  single  title.  They  are  built  immediately 
on  physical  force,  mediately  on  moral  right.  Physical  force 
when  employed  to  pursue  a  right  has  all  the  sacredness  of 


PEEFACE  ix 

moral  right  itself.  To  take  a  familiar  and  up-to-date  instance, 
the  Allies  had  a  perfect  moral  right  to  impose  on  Germany 
and  Austria  all  the  terms  of  the  armistice.  Whatever  terms 
the  Allies  exacted  from  the  defeated  Germans  they  exacted 
by  force;  but  this  force  was  backed  up  by  clear  moral  right, 
the  indisputable  right  nations  have  to  defend  themselves 
against  an  open,  bold  and  aggressive  oppressor,  to  punish  his 
crime  with  becoming  penalties,  and  to  make  it  effectively  and 
forever  impossible  for  him  to  repeat  his  dastardly  act.  When 
criminals  are  captured  and  convicted,  they  are  not  straight- 
way liberated.  They  are  fined  light  or  heavy  sums,  they  are 
imprisoned  for  short  or  long  terms;  and  if  the  criminal  hap- 
pens to  be  a  murderer,  reason  quite  approves  of  his  utter  de- 
struction. Conquest,  of  course,  can  be  illegitimate  or  legiti- 
mate. Illegitimate  conquest  is  no  valid  title.  Illegitimate 
conquest,  like  everything  else  illegitimate,  is  of  no  value  in 
the  court  of  morality. 

A  government  or  State  always  implies  a  body  of  laws,  or 
a  constitution;  and,  prior  to  the  establishment  of  a  govern- 
ment, the  people  enjoy  full  moral  freedom  to  select  some  set 
form  of  government  and  appoint  a  ruler.  Moral  freedom  is 
removed  by  law,  law  is  the  denial  of  moral  freedom,  because 
law  means  obligation,  and  obligation  means  moral  necessity, 
the  diametrical  opposite  of  moral  freedom. 

Self-determination  implies  full  moral  freedom  to  choose  a 
form  of  government  and  select  a  ruler.  Where  no  government 
exists,  no  civil  law  exists,  no  constitution  exists,  and  this  right 
to  self-determination  is  sacred;  where  government  is  already 
established,  civil  law  exists,  a  constitution  or  fixed  body  of 
civil  laws,  exists;  and  the  principle  of  self-determination  is 
all  wrong.  Correct  Ethics  recognizes  no  such  independent 
right  in  ruler  or  subjects.  Law  restricts  moral  freedom,  and 
the  constitution  is  law.  The  constitution  stands  for  the  Royal 
Compact  championed  by  Suarez.  Neither  ruler  nor  people 
must  override  the  constitution.  This  constitution  embodies 
the  respective  rights  and  privileges  of  ruler  and  subjects,  and 
defines  the  method  of  procedure  to  be  followed  in  case  of  a 
dispute  between  ruler  and  subjects.  As  long  as  the  ruler 
keeps  within  the  terms  of  the  constitution,  his  right  to  author- 


PREFACE 


ity  is  beyond  question,  and  subjects  by  themselves  are  not  at 
liberty  to  change  the  form  of  government  or  curtail  the  ruler's 
prerogatives.  The  ruler  can  at  intervals  make  concessions  to 
his  subjects,  subjects  can  at  intervals  do  the  same  favor  to 
their  ruler;  but  every  such  transaction  must  be  mutual  and 
agreeable  to  both  parties.  The  ruler  can  voluntarily  abdicate 
or  forfeit  his  authority  by  abuse  of  his  prerogative;  and  in 
either  case,  unless  succession  is  otherwise  settled  by  the  con- 
stitution, the  multitude  reverts  to  its  original  condition  of 
no  government,  and  the  people  have  full  moral  freedom  to 
select  a  form  of  government  and  choose  a  ruler.  In  the  prose- 
cution of  an  unjust  war  the  ruler  can  lose  his  authority  by 
legitimate  conquest ;  and  in  this  case  ruler  and  subjects  pass 
under  the  authority  of  the  conqueror.  In  pursuance  of  this 
truth  the  Allies  at  the  Peace  Conference  imposed  a  form  of 
government  on  Germany  and  Austria,  allowing  them  a  small 
measure  of  liberty  in  their  selection  of  rulers,  disarmed  them, 
taxed  them,  and  in  every  way  treated  them  as  subject  peoples. 
The  small  states  previously  belonging  to  Germany  and  Aus- 
tria got  from  the  Allies,  for  purposes  of  peace,  the  right  to 
self-determination,  and  in  granting  this  favor  the  Allies  as 
victors  were  clearly  within  their  rights. 


CONTENTS 

PART  I 

GENERAL  ETHICS 

Introduction- Pages  1-7 

Thesis  I.  Every  agent  worka  unto  an  end.  This  end  is  truly  a 
cause.  The  will  in  all  its  deliberate  movements  has  some 
definite  last  end,  whether  strictly  or  relatively  such    Pages  7-18 

Thesis  II.  Man  of  his  very  nature  desires  complete  happiness. 
Complete  happiness  is  man's  absolutely  last  end  subjectively 
taken.  This  natural  desire  must  be  possible  of  fulfilment. 
No  created  good  can  secure  to  man  complete  happiness. 
The  possession  of  God  is  alone  complete  happiness,  and  God 
is  man's  absolutely  last  end  objectively  taken  .     .     Pages  18--28 

Thesis  III.  Man's  destiny  in  this  life,  his  supremest  happiness 
on  earth,  consists  in  drawing  closer  and  closer  to  his  last 
end  by  the  establishment  of  moral  rectitude  in  his  actions. 
Between  good  and  bad  in  the  moral  order,  between  right 
and  wrong,  an  essential,  intrinsic  difference  exists.  The 
immediate  measure  of  moral  rectitude  is  the  objective  order 
of  things  as  understood  by  the  intellect ;  the  mediate  measure 
is  God's  wisdom  and  goodness Pages  28-41 

Thesis  IV.  A  Natural  Law,  unchangeable,  universal,  eternal, 
has  place  in  man ;  its  complete  and  full  sanction  is  reserved 
for  the  next  life;  and  eternal  punishment  is  not  opposed  to 
God's  goodness.  This  Natural  Law  is  the  foundation  and 
corner-stone  of  all  Positive  Law Pages  41-70 

Thesis  V.    The  five  causes  of  morality,  final,  material,  formal,  . 
model  and   efficient.     Generic   and   specific   morality.     Ob- 
jective and  subjective  morality.     Good,  bad  and  indifferent 
acts.    Morality's  subjective  measure  is  synderesis  and  con- 
science.   Morality's  efficient  case  is  intellect  and  will.    Appe- 


xii  *  CONTENTS 

tite,  the  passions,  and  will.  Morality's  root  is  freedom  of 
will.  Voluntary  and  involuntary  acts.  End  and  intention. 
Morality's  obstacles,  ignorance  and  error  affect  the  intellect ; 
the  passions,  notably  fear,  affect  the  will;  violence  affects 
executive  not  appetitive  faculties,  ordered  not  elicited 
acts Pages  70-92 

Thesis  VI.  A  human  act  gets  its  specific  morality  from  the  ob- 
ject of  the  act,  from  the  agent's  end  or  purpose,  and  from 
circumstances  affecting  both    .......     Pages  92-101 

Thesis  VII.  Probabilism  is  a  safe  and  correct  system  in  mat- 
ters of  conscience Pages  101-110 

Thesis  VIII.    Virtues  and  Vices Pages  110-122 

Thesis  IX.     Character  and  Habits Pages  122-127 

Thesis  X.    Rights  and  Duties Pages  127-137 

Thesis  XI.     Contracts Pages  137-144 

Thesis  XII.    Interest Pages  144-149 

Thesis  XIII.    Merit  and  Demerit Pages  149-152 

Thesis  XIV.  Utilitarianism  is  wrong,  dangerous  and  ab- 
surd    Pages  152-170 

Thesis  XV.    Kant's  autonomy  of  reason  is  wrong  .     Pages  170-175 


PART  II 
SPECIAL  ETHICS 

Introduction Pages  175-177 

Thesis  I.  Religion  is  man's  first  duty,  a  matter  of  essential 
necessity  to  the  individual  and  to  the  state.  Worship,  in- 
terior and  exterior,  public  and  private,  is  God's  due.  Man's 
duty  towards  revelation  is  to  accept  it,  when  known  as  such ; 
to  diligently  seek  and  find  it,  when  hidden,  and  when  he  has 
reason  to  suppose  that  it  exists.  Toleration  in  matter  of 
dogma  is  absurd Pages  177-201 


CONTENTS  xiii 

Thesis  II.  Suicide  is  a  sin  against  nature.  Death  inflicted  in 
self-defense  is  under  certain  conditions  justifiable.  Private 
duels  are  highly  absurd  and  contrary  to  the  Law  of 
Nature Pages  201-225 

Thesis  III.  A  lie  is  always  and  of  its  very  nature  wrong.  To 
safeguard  a  proportionate  right  the  use  of  a  broad  mental 
reservation  is  allowed Pages  225-241 

Thesis  IV.  Man's  right  to  ownership,  whether  temporary  or 
lasting,  is  derived  to  him  not  from  any  formal  compact 
nor  from  any  civil  law,  but  from  nature  .      .     Pages  241-260 

Thesis  V.  Socialism  is  false  in  its  principles,  morally  impos- 
sible in  itself,  and  quite  absurd Pages  260-280 

Thesis  VI.  The  right  remedy  for  labor  troubles  is  union  be- 
tween employers  and  workmen,  based  on  inequality;  con- 
sulting the  interests  of  both  in  such  a  way,  that  they 
enjoy  life  and  its  comforts  along  with  freedom  and 
peace Pages  280-289 

Thesis  VII.    Marriage  is  honorable  and  in  harmony  with  man's 

dignity Pages  289-300 

Thesis  VIII.  Celibacy,  when  love  of  virtue  is  its  motive,  is 
more  excellent  than  marriage      .     .     .     .      .     Pages  300-311 

Thesis  IX.    Polygamy,  though  not  against  strict  Natural  Law, 

little  accords  with  it     .......      .     Pages  311-318 

Thesis  X.  Incomplete  divorce,  or  separation  without  any  at- 
tempt to  contract  a  new  marriage,  is  sometimes  allowable. 
Complete  divorce,  or  separation  affecting  the  marriage  tie, 
though  not  evidently  opposed  to  strict  Natural  Law  in 
every  conceivable  case,  is  nevertheless  out  of  harmony  with 
that  secondary  Law  of  Nature,  which  counsels  the 
proper Pages  318-342 

Thesis  XL    Education  of  children  belongs  to  parents  first; 

to  State,  last Pages  342-358 

Thesis  XII.    Man  is  by  very  nature  a  social  being    Pages  358-366 

Thesis  XIII.  A  multitude  and  authority,  or  subjects  and  a 
ruler,  are  elements  essential  to  civil  society  or  the 
state Pages  366-371 


3UV 


CONTENTS 


:)-V/j! ■  t^-  i^/v* 


Thesis  XIV.  Authority  proceeds  immediately  from  God.  In 
the  nature  of  things  and  ordinarily  authority  is  not  cou' 
ferred  on  the  people.  Ordinarily  and  in  the  nature  of 
things  the  consent  of  the  people  fixes  or  determines  the 
person  in  whom  authority  resides.  It  may  be  implied  or 
expressed;  immediate  or  gradual;  and  cannot  always  b© 
withheld Pages  371-388 

Thesis  XV.     Woman  suffrage,  though  legitimate  in  exceptional 

eases,  is  fraught  with  dangers Pages  388-398 

Thesis  XVI.  The  State  enjoys  full  Legislative  Executive  and 
Judicial  rights,  the  prerogative  of  Eminent  Domain,  and  the 
War-Power Pages  39ft-404 


ETHICS,  GENERAL  AND  SPECIAL 

PART  I 
GENERAL  ETHICS 

INTEODUCTION 

A  WORD  about  the  importance  of  our  subject.  This  work 
is  intended  to  throw  some  additional  light  on  the  topic  of 
morality.  For  Ethics  is  our  theme,  and  Ethics  is  the  science 
of  morality.  And  if  any  detail  of  thought  has  a  vital  bear- 
ing on  man's  destiny,  if  any  branch  of  study  helps  shape  his 
life,  that  detail  of  thought  is  suggested  by  Ethics,  morality 
is  that  study.  Ethics  is  the  science  of  putting  order  in  man's 
free  acts;  and,  when  you  reflect  that  all  sin,  and  much  trouble, 
and  hell  itself  are  only  varying  phases  of  disorder,  it  must 
be  evident  that  this  science,  theoretically  mastered  and  sys- 
tematically reduced  to  practice,  could  effect  a  revolution  in 
the  world.  And  the  revelutionists  would  be  hailed  as  the 
Emancipators  of  mankind.  They  would  go  down  in  history, 
and  they  do  go  down  in  history  as  the  supremest  benefactors 
of  our  race. 

Witness  the  instance  of  our  Lord  and  Saviour  Jesus  Christ. 
Even  His  bitterest  enemies,  even  men  who  deny  Him  every 
other  vestige  of  divinity,  acknowledge  that  the  world  was 
made  better  by  His  presence  among  men,  and  attribute  to 
His  maxims  and  example  an  abiding  influence  for  good.  He 
was  a  teacher  of  Ethics  for  whom  the  world  waited  with  long- 
ing for  full  four  thousand  years.  He  was  a  teacher  of  Ethics, 
whose  like  the  world  of  to-day  misses  exceedingly.  The  wis- 
dom of  His  utterances  even  from  a  purely  human  standpoint, 
without  regard  at  all  to  the  spirit  of  faith  and  grace's  en- 
vironment, in  which  they  ought  to  be  accepted,  is  as  much 
a  subject  of  concern  to  the  learned  of  to-day  as  it  was  in  His 


^lyUym    \  S\  'GENERAL  ETHICS 

own  lifetime  to  the  doctors  in  the  temple,  to  the  Scribes  and 
the  Pharisees  deeply  read  in  the  Law.  The  wisdom  of  His 
utterances  extorts  praise  from  unbelievers,  and  compels  the 
attention  of  the  universe.  Men  who  will  not  worship  Him 
as  God  are  unable,  when  face  to  face  with  His  heavenly  doc- 
trine and  precepts,  to  withhold  the  homage  due  superhuman 
intelligence.  I  insist  upon  this  point  as  a  conclusive  proof 
of  the  deep  importance  attaching  to  Ethics,  because  Christ's 
ethical  teaching  is  the  only  claim  Christ  has  on  the  reverence 
and  respect  of  men  completely  abandoned  by  faith,  and  not 
wholly  bereft  of  reason.  He  has  other  and  far  more  cogent 
claims  on  our  homage;  but  we,  as  well  as  strangers  to  faith, 
can  learn  with  profit  to  appreciate  the  human  side  of  the 
God-man's  character.  And  Christ,  apart  from  His  tran- 
scending dignity  as  God,  ranks  first  among  the  most  consum- 
mate legislators  the  world  ever  entertained,  and  merits  as 
such  unstinted  praise  from  all  mankind,  from  believer  and 
unbeliever  alike.  He  owes  the  homage  wrung  from  unwilling 
unbelievers  not  to  the  influence  of  grace,  nor  yet  to  the 
miracles  of  wonder  He  wrought  in  favor  of  suffering  and 
sickness,  but  mainly  to  the  fact  that  His  discourses  breathe 
an  unerring  love  for  rectitude;  and  half  His  lifework  was 
the  ethical  instruction  of  humanity. 

Teachers,  who  appeal  to  the  curious  in  human  nature,  will 
hold  the  ears  of  men  until  supplanted  by  other  teachers  with 
more  startling  novelties  for  wares;  but  teachers  of  morality 
will  never  be  without  an  audience,  though  they  deal  out 
truths  as  old  as  time.  Such  is  the  passion  of  mankind  for 
what  tends  to  put  men  in  improved  relations  with  themselves, 
with  one  another,  and  with  God,  that,  as  long  as  a  human 
heart  beats,  due  importance  will  be  attached  to  problems  of 
morality,  and  propounders  of  morality  will  have  their  uses 
in  the  universe.  We  men  are  eminently  practical  beings,  and 
the  almost  total  absence  of  pure  theory,  and  of  the  strictly 
academic  discussions  common  in  Logic  and  Metaphysics  from 
Moral  Philosophy,  makes  this  branch  of  the  science  more  in- 
teresting and  absorbing.  After  all,  we  were  equipped  with 
minds  only  to  borrow  light  from  them  for  the  operations  of 
the  will,  the  head  is  servant  to  the  heart,  and  life  takes  all  its 
true  color  from  action,  not  from  knowledge.     To  this  simple 


I 


INTRODUCTION  3 

fact  must  be  ascribed  the  undoubted  superiority  of  Ethics  in 
the  kingdom  of  study.  Then,  too,  we  are  born  with  an  in- 
alienable and  harassing  love  of  happiness.  We  want  to  be 
happy  here,  we  want  to  be  happy  hereafter,  and  the  wish 
lives  of  our  very  life.  Every  glance  of  the  eye  aims  at  the 
discovery  of  happiness'  hiding  place,  every  throb  of  the  heart 
is  an  invitation  to  happiness'  pity,  and  every  single  thought 
of  saint  and  sinner  alike  has  happiness  for  mainspring  and 
motive.  There  is  no  help  for  it ;  we  were  made  that  way ;  and, 
to  lose  the  inclination,  we  should  have  to  get  outside  of  our- 
selves. Moral  Philosophy  professes  to  mark  out  the  lines 
along  which  we  can  without  loss  pursue  this  fleeting  phantom 
of  happiness,  and  at  the  same  time  makes  distinct  record 
of  blunders  to  which  the  history  of  our  race  bears  witness. 
It  puts  on  a  solid  basis  principles,  that,  if  practically  ful- 
filled, can  have  but  one  result,  the  inward  approbation  of  a 
conscience,  working  on  and  up  to  the  right.  And  when  con- 
science approves,  remorse  is  still,  this  life  knows  no  truer 
happiness  than  peace,  and  thorough  blamelessness  is  bonded 
promise  of  eternal  blessedness. 

Moral  Philosophy  puts  us  right  with  the  world  of  being  in 
which  we  move,  and  does  the  thing  in  the  neatest  way  con- 
ceivable. It  first  discusses  general  notions  of  morality;  mo- 
tives for  action,  standards  of  measure,  methods  and  means  of 
discovery,  palliative  circumstances,  characteristics,  responsi- 
bility, merit  and  blame,  helps  and  hindrances,  law.  These 
abstract  questions  pave  the  way  for  more  tangible  and  posi- 
tive considerations.  They  partake  of  the  nature  of  principles, 
that  run  through  the  second  or  practical  part  of  Moral  Phil- 
osophy. A  man's  duties  and  a  man's  rights  are  definitely 
settled  in  this  second  part,  by  applying  to  the  different  emer- 
gencies, in  which  a  man  may  find  himself,  all  the  truths  ac- 
cumulated and  made  good  in  the  first  part.  Thus,  the  first 
condition  that  confronts  us,  when  brought  into  being,  is  that  of 
dependence  on  God.  Moral  Philosophy  takes  hold  of  this  con- 
dition, examines  it  in  every  detail,  and  sternly  decrees  the 
rigid  demands  of  reason  with  regard  to  religion,  worship  and 
revelation.  It  then  lays  down  rules  for  man's  behavior  to- 
wards himself  and  towards  his  fellow-men,  taken  as  indi- 
viduals.    These  rules  are  far  reaching,  and  define  exactly  his 


4  GENERAL  ETHICS 

obligations  with  respect  to  his  body,  his  soul,  his  life,  and  his 
neighbor's  body,  soul  and  life.  They  determine  the  nature 
and  fairness  of  private  property,  and  establish  the  sanctity  of 
contracts.  Society  in  all  its  ramifications  is  the  next  study. 
The  family  and  the  State  are  the  topics ;  and  each  meets  with 
the  fullest  treatment.  The  family  presents  such  vital  ques- 
tions as  marriage,  its  oneness,  its  perpetuity,  its  obligations,  its 
relations  with  the  civil  power,  parents  and  children.  The 
State  leads  to  an  analysis  of  men's  inclination  to  band  them- 
selves together,  of  the  purpose  that  actuates  the  inclination,  of 
the  elements  entering  into  society 's  structure ;  of  authority,  its 
origin,  its  phases,  its  constituents,  and  of  the  mutual  relations 
between  ruler  and  subjects.  Tongiorgi  offers  this  other  di- 
vision of  Ethics  from  its  causes:  1,  Final  cause,  or  man's 
last  end;  2,  Material  cause,  or  man's  moral  acts;  3,  Formal 
cause,  or  good  and  evil;  4,  Model  cause,  or  Natural  Law;  5, 
Efficient  cause,  mind,  will  and  habits,  behavior. 

These,  therefore,  are  some  of  the  topics  destined  to  occupy 
our  attention.  The  field  is  so  vast  that  we  can  hope  to  do  any- 
thing like  justice  to  only  the  leading  points;  and  it  shall  be 
my  endeavor,  while  making  my  treatment  of  the  matter  as 
thorough  as  possible,  to  omit  nothing  of  primary  importance. 
While  devoting  no  little  time  to  the  forward  part  of  Moral, 
or  General  Ethics,  we  intend  to  pay  more  special  attention 
to  the  after-part,  designated  by  some  authors  as  Natural  Right. 
The  spirit  of  Catholicity  will  of  course  pervade  our  whole 
work.  We  shall  never  forget  that  we  are  men  of  faith,  with 
the  light  of  the  Scriptures  as  interpreted  by  the  Church  for 
guide,  with  the  traditions  of  two  thousand  years  at  our  serv- 
ice, and  the  example  of  an  army  of  saints  before  our  eyes. 
We  enter  not  into  this  enquiry  in  the  disposition  of  Rational- 
ists, who  exercise  to-day  so  wide  an  influence  in  the  world 
of  thought,  outside  the  one  true  Church.  We  hesitate  to  re- 
move God's  messages  to  men  from  the  field  of  morality.  We 
refuse  to  regard  man  as  an  absolute,  self-sufficient  being,  in- 
dependent of  his  surroundings,  accountable  to  no  superior  for 
his  conduct,  his  own  guide,  his  own  reward,  his  own  punish- 
ment. We  maintain,  on  the  contrary,  that  every  instant  of 
his  life  is  beset  with  well  defined  relations;  that  he  is  poor, 
and  weak,  and  erring ;  that  he  is  affected  by  his  environment, 


INTRODUCTION  5 

strictly  responsible  before  an  all-wise,  an  all-holy,  and  an  all- 
powerful  God  for  his  thoughts,  his  words  and  his  acts;  and 
a  candidate  for  the  Heaven  or  hell  of  Scripture,  for  the  place 
of  delight  with  golden  streets,  or  the  prison  house  of  fire 
that  knows  no  surcease  of  pain.  Reason  with  us  is  quite  as 
important  a  factor  in  morality  as  it  is  with  the  Rationalists. 
"We  hold  it  in  even  higher  esteem  than  they.  We  follow  as 
far  as  it  leads,  accept  all  its  legitimate  conclusions,  and  allow 
neither  prejudice  nor  passion  to  meddle  with  our  loyalty  to 
its  counsels.  We  take  no  half -measures,  we  journey  not  to 
a  certain  point  and  then  stop  short.  But,  when  reason  makes 
clear  the  undoubted  existence  of  a  teaching  Church,  the  real- 
ity of  a  code  of  law  harassing  in  the  extreme  to  human  na- 
ture, we  adopt  its  teaching  with  all  the  responsibilities  and 
all  the  sacrifices  implied.  When  reason  proclaims  in  a  loud 
voice  its  own  proneness  to  confound  the  false  with  the  true, 
its  inability  to  cope  with  problems,  capable  of  taxing  even 
angelic  minds,  we  take  reason's  word  for  the  statement,  and 
accept  on  God's  authority  what  reason  cannot  even  under- 
stand. Reason  without  a  guide  is  not  sufficient  in  the  deli- 
cate task  of  arranging  the  moral  details  of  a  man 's  life.  Rea- 
son was  made  to  adopt  the  truth,  not  to  fathom  all  truth ;  and 
reason  is  then  exerting  its  proper  activity,  when  in  matters 
beyond  its  grasp  it  humbly  submits  to  instructions  from  a 
superior.  Reason  is  of  its  nature  infallible,  but  it  is  by  acci- 
dent capable  of  mistake,  and  accidents  are  nowhere  so  likely 
to  occur  as  in  the  domain  of  moral  teaching.  IntellectuaJ 
pride  is  the  forerunner  of  unbelief,  unbelief  gives  loose  rein 
to  license,  license  kills  conscience;  and,  when  conscience  is 
once  dead,  man  sinks  lower  than  the  level  of  a  beast,  and 
becomes  a  veritable  monster  of  iniquity. 

There  are  certain  basic  truths  we  take  for  granted  in  all 
these  discussions,  not  because  they  cannot  be  proved,  but  be- 
cause they  belong  to  other  departments  of  philosophy.  They 
are  all  abundantly  proved  elsewhere,  and  we  are  justified  in 
carrying  over  truths  made  good  in  other  portions  of  the  study. 
Chief  among  these  truths  I  should  reckon  the  existence  of 
God;  His  supreme  ownership  of  all  else,  man  not  excepted; 
the  immortality  of  the  soul;  free  will;  and  man's  ability  to 
compass  certainty  in  the  domain  of  knowledge.    Atheism,  Ma- 


6  GENERAL  ETHICS 

terialism,  Determinism,  and  Scepticism  are  theories  opposed 
to  these  several  points  of  doctrine,  and  are  overwhelmingly 
refuted  in  Natural  Theology,  Psychology,  and  Logic.  We 
prove  God  a  living  reality  from  the  need  of  one  unproduced 
actual  being,  to  explain  the  produced  beings  that  fall  under 
our  experience.  Deny  God,  and  the  universe  of  creatures  is 
without  explanation,  an  effect  with  no  cause.  We  prove  God 
a  living  reality  from  the  wonderful  order  apparent  in  the 
physical  universe,  written  large  across  the  sky,  the  earth,  and 
the  sea.  We  prove  God  a  living  reality  from  a  moral  order 
embodied  in  the  voice  of  conscience,  proclaiming  aloud  the 
wishes  of  a  superior  compelling  us  with  threats  and  promises 
to  cherish  right  and  despise  wrong,  to  do  good  and  avoid 
evil.  We  prove  God  a  living  reality  from  the  common  con- 
sent of  mankind,  dating  back  to  the  earliest  ages  of  history, 
and  enduring  with  undiminished  vigor  down  to  our  own  times. 
God  is  supreme  owner  of  all  else  in  virtue  of  the  principle 
that  to  the  maker  belongs  the  thing  he  makes;  and  God  cre- 
ated, made  from  nothing,  the  world  and  all  the  minerals, 
plants,  brutes  and  men  the  world  contains.  Apart  from  other 
compelling  arguments,  the  soul's  immortality  is  settled  by  its 
simplicity  and  spirituality.  It  has  no  parts,  and  is,  therefore, 
in  itself  incorruptible  or  indestructible.  It  is  intrinsically 
independent  of  matter,  and  is,  therefore,  safe  from  accidental 
corruption  or  destruction.  The  omnipotence  of  God  cannot 
annihilate  a  human  soul  without  doing  violence  to  God's  other 
attributes;  and  no  one  attribute  in  God  runs  counter  to  an- 
other. Every  individual  man  is  a  living  witness  to  his  pos- 
session of  free  will.  All  human  intercourse  is  based  on  this 
quality  of  men;  and  in  any  other  hypothesis  law  and  social 
order  would  have  no  meaning;  honesty  and  virtue  would 
perish  from  the  earth ;  reward  and  punishment  would  be  idle 
terms  without  a  show  of  significance.  Scepticism  is  a  huge 
joke  in  philosophy;  a  direct  insult  to  the  goodness  and  wis- 
dom of  God;  and  its  own  completest  refutation.  Therefore, 
with  perfect  right  we  suppose  everywhere  in  these  discussions 
that  God  exists,  that  man  is  His  property  to  dispose  of  as  He 
pleases,  that  man's  soul  will  live  forever,  that  man  is  free, 
and  that  all  doubt  is  a  diseased  condition  of  the  mind  that 
study  and  observation  can  cure. 


THESIS  I 

Every  agent  works  unto  an  end.  This  end  is  truly  a  cause. 
The  will  in  all  its  deliberate  movements  has  some  definite  last 
end,  whether  absolutely  or  relatively  such.  Jomn,  5-19; 
Rickaby,  3-6. 

QUESTION 

By  a  sort  of  paradox  we  begin  our  Ethics  with  the  end. 
Ethics  is  a  set  of  rules  for  conduct,  man's  conduct  is  a  series 
of  his  deliberate  acts,  and  the  beginning  of  every  deliberate 
act  is  some  end  or  purpose  the  man  proposes  to  himself  to 
accomplish  or  effect.  And  so  the  paradox  ceases.  While 
true  to  its  name  in  one  order,  the  end  is  false  to  its  name  in 
another.  It  is  last  in  the  order  of  execution,  first  in  the  order 
of  intention.  The  house  as  a  finished  product  is  the  last  thing 
to  reward  the  builder's  eyes,  after  weeks  and  months  of  work; 
the  same  house,  as  it  existed  in  his  mind  and  will,  was  the  first 
thing  to  suggest  plans  and  operations,  running  all  the  way 
from  cellar  to  roof.  We  are  therefore  justified  in  beginning 
with  the  end,  because  intention  precedes  execution,  and  no- 
body builds  a  house  without  prior  thought  of  plans,  without 
prior  wish  of  a  habitation.  People  never  build  a  house  with- 
out caring  what  will  be  the  result  of  their  endeavors;  they 
never  build  a  house,  when  they  want  an  automobile.  Inten- 
tion is  end  energizing  the  will,  and  on  this  account  intentional 
and  deliberate  are  practically  synonymous.  To  energize  the 
will,  the  end  must  first  fall  under  the  notice  of  the  intellect ; 
and  a  deliberate  act  is  an  act  done  with  full  knowledge  and 
consent.  Unintentional  for  the  same  reason  is  in  our  language 
an  equivalent  for  indeliberate.  The  philosophy  of  the  thing 
is  plain  in  our  expression,  ''Where  no  offense  is  intended,  no 
offense  can  be  taken."  Wise  men  pay  no  attention  to  a  hurt, 
when  the  wrong-doer  has  no  desire  to  hurt,  or  hardly  knows 
that  his  conduct  causes  pain.  Intention,  therefore,  presup- 
poses an  intellect  and  a  will  working  together  in  mutual  har- 

7 


8  GENERAL  ETHICS 

mony,  and  the  use  of  the  word  is  regularly  restricted  to  man. 

In  brutes,  plants  and  minerals  the  same  phenomenon  of 
finality,  or  seeking  an  end,  is  verified  in  every  exertion  of 
their  energy,  and  is  best  named  appetency,  tendency,  nature. 
A  brute  has  instinct  for  guide  and  appetite  for  root  of  de- 
sire, both  are  constrained  faculties  without  a  vestige  of  free- 
dom ;  and  they  base  a  certain  imperfect  deliberation,  a  certain 
show  of  intention,  attributed  in  philosophy  to  brutes.  Brutes 
never  in  reality  choose,  when  of  two  or  more  alternatives  they 
adopt  or  embrace  one ;  the  transaction  is  due  not  to  choice  or 
selection,  but  to  an  inexorable  law  imposed  on  them  by  their 
Maker,  and  instinct  is  with  us  a  handy  term  for  that  law. 
The  whole  process  in  brutes  is  not  intention,  but  appetency; 
and  the  perfect  deliberation  present  in  man's  acts  is  always 
absent  from  the  acts  of  brutes.  Plants  enjoy  neither  sense  nor 
appetite;  and  they  grow,  nourish  and  reproduce  themselves 
without  any  knowledge  whatever  on  their  part,  without  any 
desire  whatever,  but  wholly  in  virtue  of  a  tendency  or  bent 
communicated  to  them  by  their  Maker.  In  their  case,  all 
knowledge  of  end  and  all  desire  of  its  accomplishment  are 
in  God.  And  what  is  true  of  plants  is  true  of  minerals,  with 
this  single  difference  that  capacity  for  self-motion  attaches 
to  plants,  while  it  is  absent  from  minerals.  Minerals,  there- 
fore, prosecute  their  end  by  very  nature,  in  virtue  of  obedi- 
ence to  the  law  of  gravity,  and  to  whatever  other  physical 
and  chemical  laws  obtain  in  creation,  God  imposing  this  duty 
of  obedience. 

Every  agent  works  unto  an  end;  and  the  saying,  when  re- 
stricted to  minerals,  plants  and  brutes,  is  of  small  or  no  im- 
portance in  Ethics,  because  every  such  agent  is  outside  the 
sphere  of  morality.  In  common  with  other  creatures,  man 
works  towards  an  end ;  and,  what  is  more  important  in  Ethics, 
man  in  all  his  deliberate  movements  works  towards  a  definite 
last  end,  whether  absolutely  and  unreservedly  or  only  rela- 
tively such.  God  Himself  is  no  exception  to  this  rule  of 
finality;  and  in  creation  He  must  have  purposed  His  own 
glory,  as  nothing  short  of  God  is  worthy  of  God,  and  God 
can  slave  to  no  unworthy  end.  God's  glory  is,  therefore, 
the  absolutely  last  end  of  all  creatures;  and,  in  the  words 
of  our  catechism,  we  are  all  here  to  praise,  worship  and  serve 


END  AND  DESTINY  9 

God,  and  to  save  our  souls.  God's  glory  is  creatures'  ex- 
ternal last  end,  because  it  is  primarily  for  God,  not  for  crea- 
tures. Besides  this  external  last  end,  we  must  recognize  an 
internal  last  end ;  and  in  the  course  of  our  work  we  shall  see 
that  it  is  for  man  complete  happiness,  the  vision  of  God, 
salvation.  In  the  event  of  wishing  to  create,  God  simply 
had  to  intend  creatures  for  His  glory,  and  we  know  from 
man's  natural  craving  for  complete  happiness  that  God 
meant  man  to  compass  this  surpassing  good. 

And  all  morality  dates  back  to  this  single  fact.  Man  must 
respect  his  Maker's  wishes,  because  it  rests  with  the  maker  to 
dispose  of  his  work  as  an  owner ;  and  God 's  wishes  are  plain ; 
man  must  glorify  God  by  a  life  of  virtue  here,  and  by  com- 
plete happiness  hereafter.  Good  and  evil  must,  therefore,  be 
differentiated,  law  must  be  kept  under  penalty  of  punish- 
ment, and  duties  must  be  fulfilled  with  scrupulous  exactness. 
Hence,  we  begin  with  end,  show  that  while  God's  glory  is 
man's  absolutely  last  extrinsic  end,  the  possession  of  God  is 
man's  absolutely  last  intrinsic  end;  that  virtue  is  his  rela- 
tively last  intrinsic  end;  that  virtue  can  be  differentiated 
from  vice;  that  the  objective  order  of  things  is  the  standard 
or  measure  enabling  men  to  distinguish  virtue  from  vice ; 
that  man  is  under  strict  law  to  avoid  evil  and  do  good,  and 
satisfy  every  relation  in  force  between  himself  on  the  one 
hand,  and  God,  self  and  the  neighbor  on  the  other.  Destiny 
is  end  viewed  as  an  obligation  imposed  by  a  superior;  and 
man's  destiny,  taking  into  account  his  present  and  future 
life,  is  complete  happiness  or  the  intellectual  possession  of 
God;  man's  destiny,  restricting  the  question  to  this  present 
life  alone,  is  virtue,  or  a  closer  and  closer  approach  to  God 
by  the  introduction  of  moral  rectitude  into  his  conduct.  And 
the  enemies  of  finality  want  to  feel  free  from  all  restraint, 
and  escape  responsibility  for  their  misdeeds,  on  the  plea  of 
total  and  complete  independence. 

Finality  is  the  most  obvious  phenomenon  in  nature;  and 
yet,  to  escape  the  manifest  responsibility  resulting  from  final- 
ity, some  philosophers  have  denied  its  existence.  Epicurus 
and  men  of  his  stamp  felt  themselves  hampered  in  their  dreams 
of  pleasure  by  the  unwelcome  notion  of  a  final  cause,  and  in 
their  intellectual  impotence  strove  to  shake  it  off,  by  agreeing 


10  GENERAL  ETHICS 

to  regard  it  an  empty  fancy.  They  maintained  that  every- 
thing happened  by  a  sort  of  unavoidable  chance,  and  claimed 
that  man  trifled  with  himself  in  supposing  that  he  had  any 
destiny  to  fulfil.  Of  course  the  doctrine  would  prove  con- 
venient to  men  set  on  living  at  haphazard,  unwilling  to  bor- 
row any  worry  from  possible  consequences  of  their  rash  con- 
duct. Whatever  obscurity  may  cloak  the  truth  in  the  case 
of  inanimate  and  irrational  agents,  the  thing  is  too  plain  in 
the  case  of  man  to  admit  of  the  slightest  doubt.  Man  knows 
that  he  has  a  destiny  to  fulfil,  and  because  of  his  power  of 
choice,  coupled  with  the  inevitable  conviction,  that  in  his 
every  act  he  is  pursuing  some  definite  purpose,  he  knows 
that  he  will  be  rewarded  or  punished  according  to  his  deserts. 

TERMS 

Every  Agent.  Agents  can  be  separated  into  three  classes, 
beings  without  any  knowledge  whatever,  beings  with  sensible 
knowledge  or  instinct,  and  beings  with  intellects  and  wills. 
Agents  of  the  first  class  work  unto  an  end  under  direction; 
minerals  without  any  motion  of  their  own,  plants  with  self- 
motion.  Agents  of  the  second  class  work  unto  an  end  appre- 
hensively or  with  knowledge,  and  with  motion  of  their  own, 
but  by  instinct  which  is  a  necessary  cause.  Agents  of  the 
third  class  work  apprehensively,  with  motion  of  their  own, 
and  with  the  power  to  select  and  reject  means.  Examples  of 
all  three  are  an  arrow  on  its  way  to  the  target,  a  dog  walk- 
ing home,  a  man  making  money. 

End.  Finis  est  id  propter  quod  aliquid  fit,  id  cujus  gratia 
aliquid  fit.  The  end  is  that  on  account  of  which,  for  the  sake 
of  which  something  is  done.  It  is  what  induces  the  agent  to 
work;  that  towards  which  the  agent  strives,  to  rest  in  it,  to 
quit  the  activity  of  seeking,  not  the  activity  of  enjoyment. 
Ends  are  classified  thuswise:  Last  or  farthest  away;  proxi- 
mate or  closest;  and  intermediate,  between  last  and  proxi- 
mate. Last  is  sometimes  absolutely  and  unreservedly  last, 
sometimes  relatively  last.  An  end  is  absolutely  last,  when  it 
cannot  in  reason  be  referred  to  any  higher  end,  any  end  be- 
yond or  farther  away;  when  the  agent  can  in  reason  devote 
himself  and  all  his  endeavors  to  its  accomplishment;  when 


DIVISION  OF  ENDS  11 

it  is  the  possession  of  God,  and  only  then.  It  is  relatively 
last,  when  it  is  in  reality  referred  to  no  end  heyond,  like  money 
in  the  case  of  a  miser,  though  it  can  he  in  reason,  and  in 
conscience  ought  to  he  referred  to  some  higher  end,  like 
money  in  the  case  of  a  saint;  when  it  cannot  in  reason  claim 
all  a  man's  endeavors,  hut  only  a  certain  corner  of  his  ener- 
gies and  attention.  A  proximate  end  is  virtually  a  means 
to  some  last  or  intermediate  end.  An  intermediate  end  is  a 
means  lying  between  a  proximate  and  last,  the  first  interme- 
diate being  a  means  to  the  second,  and  so  on  to  the  finish. 
In  the  present  classification  we  distinguish  two  orders,  that 
of  execution  and  that  of  intention ;  and  our  division  is  in  the 
order  of  execution.  The  possession  of  God,  or  complete  hap- 
piness, is  first  thing  in  the  order  of  intention,  last  in  the 
order  of  execution.  Thought  of  reward  starts  effort,  reward 
stands  to  the  winner  after  effort  is  over.  Ends  are  likewise 
divided  into  end  which,  end  for  which,  and  end  in  which. 
They  are,  respectively,  the  good  sought,  the  person  advan- 
taged, and  possession.  Examples  are,  learning,  student  and 
education,  in  the  matter  of  study.  An  end  to  he  produced 
is  a  good  without  physical  existence  prior  to  the  agent 's  activ- 
ity; an  end  to  he  ohtained  is  a  physical  reality  prior  to  the 
agent's  effort.  Health  in  the  case  of  a  sick  man,  and  gold 
in  the  ease  of  a  miser  are  instances.  End  of  deed  and  end 
of  doer,  in  Latin,  operis  and  operantis,  are  important.  The 
first  is  that  to  which  the  agent's  work  is  by  its  very  nature 
suited  and  fitted ;  the  other  is  whatever  good  the  agent  selects 
for  purpose  of  his  work.  Ends  of  deed  are,  a  house  with  a 
builder,  a  song  with  a  singer,  time  with  a  watchmaker.  Ends 
of  doer  are,  worship,  fame,  money  with  all  three. 

Cause.  Whatever  produces  another  with  influence  on  its 
very  heing,  the  influence  issuing  in  dependence,  is  a  cause. 
There  are  four  leading  causes,  two  of  them  internal,  material 
and  formal;  two  of  them  external,  efficient  and  final.  Each 
of  the  four  has  its  own  proper  and  peculiar  activity,  each 
producing  the  effect,  each  contributing  in  its  own  special 
way  to  the  production  of  the  effect  or  new  existence.  An 
efficient  cause  has  direct  bearing  on  the  effect,  without  enter- 
ing its  intrinsic  constitution,  and  contributes  of  its  own  to 
the  effect,  whether  its  activity  be  physical  or  moral.    A  final 


12  GENERAL  ETHICS 

cause  directly  affects  the  efficient  cause,  and  through  it  in- 
fluences the  effect,  contributing  of  its  own  to  the  effect  by 
moral  activity  alone.  The  influence  of  an  efficient  cause  is 
exerted  first  and  foremost  on  the  effect;  the  influence  of  a 
final  cause  is  exercised  first  and  foremost  on  the  mind  and 
will  of  the  agent,  and  through  them  on  the  effect.  The 
difference  between  a  physical  efficient  cause  and  a  final  cause 
is  too  plain  to  be  missed,  but  the  same  is  not  true  of  a  moral 
efficient  cause  and  a  final.  Moral  efficients  are  close  images 
of  finals,  and  yet  the  two  must  not  be  confounded  together. 
A  moral  efficient  has  a  more  direct  bearing  on  the  effect  than 
a  final.  One  man  bribes  another  with  money  to  commit 
murder.  The  briber  is  moral  efficient  cause  of  the  murder, 
the  money  offered  is  final  cause  of  the  murder.  The  activity 
of  the  briber  bears  on  the  murder,  he  uses  the  murderer  as 
an  instrument,  and  the  moral  phase  of  the  affair  passes  to 
physical.  The  money  bears  on  the  mind  and  will  of  the  mur- 
derer, and  all  its  activity  remains  moral.  Neither  is  a  final 
cause  a  mere  condition.  Like  all  causes,  it  is  a  condition  too ; 
but  to  the  notion  of  condition  it  adds  the  quality  of  a  thing 
more  intimately  connected  with  the  work  or  effect.  A  condi- 
tion as  such  enters  into  no  part  of  the  effect  proper.  All 
its  ultility  ceases,  when  the  effect  proper  begins.  It  makes 
things  ready,  and  then  disappears.  The  final  cause,  on  the 
contrary,  really  sets  the  agent  in  motion  by  the  influence  it 
exerts  on  his  will,  if  the  agent  is  rational,  or  by  the  influence 
it  exerts  on  the  will  of  the  First  Cause,  God,  if  the  agent  is 
irrational.  Besides,  a  condition  is  no  sufficient  reason  for  the 
effect.  In  the  process  of  burning  compare  the  dryness  of  the 
waste  burnt,  and  its  juxtaposition,  with  a  fire  that  consumes 
it.  Some  final  cause  must  urge  the  builder  to  begin  opera- 
tions, and  this  final  cause  influences  him  all  the  way  from 
beginning  to  finish,  from  cellar  to  roof.  The  end  is  a  cause 
only  in  the  order  of  intention ;  in  the  order  of  execution  it  is 
in  proper  language  an  effect. 

The  Will.  A  spiritual  faculty^  proper  and  peculiar  to 
man,  capable  of  seeking  good  hy  acts  elicited  under  the  di- 
rection of  the  intellect.  Appetite  is  of  three  kinds;  natural, 
proper  to  minerals  and  plants;  sensible,  proper  to  brutes;  and 
intellectual  or  rational,  proper  to  man.    All  three  are  in  man, 


HUMAN  ACTS  13 

natural  and  sensible  alone  are  in  brutes,  natural  alone  is  in 
minerals  and  plants.  The  will  is  rational  appetite,  and  meets 
with  full  and  complete  treatment  in  Psychology. 

Deliberate.  Man  is  capable  of  two  kinds  of  acts,  deliberate 
and  indeliherate.  Toying  with  the  beard  or  aimlessly  rub- 
bing the  chin,  is  the  classical  instance  of  an  indeliberate  act. 
Deliberate  acts  are  so  familiar  that  an  example  would  be 
superfluous.  The  will  aside,  intellectual  knowledge  and  a 
degree  of  attention  are  really  the  distinguishing  characteris- 
tics of  a  deliberate  act,  as  compared  with  an  indeliberate  act. 
Will  separates  it  not  from  indeliberate,  but  from  spontaneous 
acts.  Perfect  deliberation  is  itself  defined  to  be  an  act  of  the 
reason,  by  which,  at  the  instigation  of  the  will,  the  mind 
compares  together  different  ends,  different  means,  with  a  view 
to  making  a  choice.  In  deliberation  it  will  be  noted  that  the 
third  operation  of  the  mind,  not  merely  the  first  or  second, 
has  play.  In  other  words,  a  comparison  is  instituted,  and  this 
process  necessitates  the  employment  of  argumentation.  Phi- 
losophers recognize  a  kind  of  imperfect  deliberation,  which 
they  attribute  to  brute  animals.  The  knowledge  requisite 
is  limited  to  sole  perception  of  the  end  by  means  of  the  ex- 
ternal senses,  aided  principally  by  sensile  discrimination. 
And  men  are  as  capable  as  brutes  of  this  imperfect  delibera- 
tion, or  real  indeliberateness.  It  nowise  reaches,  like  the 
knowledge  of  perfect  deliberation,  to  the  nature  of  the  end, 
or  to  the  connection  between  a  certain  act  and  a  certain  pur- 
pose. In  imperfect  deliberation  the  motion  of  the  agent  is 
ordinarily  quick  and  sudden;  in  perfect  deliberation  it  is 
ordinarily  slow  and  measured.  Human  acts,  distinctively 
such,  have  three  elements,  intellectual  knowledge,  desire  and 
freedom.,  activities  of  intellect  and  will,  man's  two  specific 
functions.  Desire  and  freedom  can  be  expressed  together  by 
the  one  word,  selection.  Selection  always  presupposes  knowl- 
edge, in  much  the  same  way  as  operations  of  the  mind  have 
operations  of  the  senses  for  foundation.  Hence  the  adage, 
''Nil  volitum,  nisi  praecognitum, "  "Things  unknown  are  not 
matter  for  wishes."  Freedom  in  the  same  way  has  for  sup- 
port the  two  faculties  of  intellect  and  will;  and,  in  the  ab- 
sence of  either,  freedom  is  impossible.  A  voluntary  or  delib- 
erate act  is  an  act  proceeding  from  the  will  accompanied  by 


14  GENERAL  ETHICS 

intellectual  knowledge  of  the  end  sought.  Deliberate,  or  vol- 
untary acts  in  strict  sense,  are  arranged  in  different  classes. 

Perfectly  voluntary  acts  are  accomplished  with  full  knowl- 
edge, and  with  fall  consent  of  the  will. 

Imperfectly  voluntary  acts  imply  that  either  knowledge,  or 
consent,  or  both  are  imperfect. 

Absolutely  voluntary  acts  are  accomplished  with  full  delib- 
eration, attention  and  bias. 

Acts  are  relatively  or  after  a  manner  voluntary,  when  con- 
sent is  present,  but  mingled  with  a  certain  aversion  and  lean- 
ing of  the  will  towards  the  opposite  act.  E.g.,  sailors  throw- 
ing cargo  overboard  in  storm. 

A  directly  voluntary  act  turns  on  some  immediate  object  of 
the  will,  intended  in  itself  and  for  its  own  sake.  E.g.,  theft, 
murder. 

Indirectly  voluntary  acts  turn  on  some  object  necessarily 
connected  with  immediate  object.  E.g.,  effect  in  cause,  drunk- 
enness in  excessive  drinking,  death  and  a  thrown  stone. 

In  a  positively  voluntary  act  the  will  acts,  as  in  a  sin  of 
commission. 

In  a  negatively  voluntary  act  the  will  refuses  to  act,  as  in 
a  sin  of  omission. 

Expressly  voluntary  acts  are  clear  from  words  or  signs. 

Tacitly  voluntary  acts  are  gathered  from  facts. 

An  act  is  actually  voluntary,  when  willed  here  and  now, 
without  question  of  break  or  interruption. 

An  act  is  virtually  voluntary,  when  voluntary  by  force  of 
an  original  actual  voluntary,  the  actual  wish  being  broken  or 
interrupted,  without  detriment  to  its  moral  continuity  and 
influence. 

An  act  is  habitually  voluntary,  when  its  original  was  actu- 
ally willed  once,  and  was  never  taken  back;  but  the  actual 
wish  was  broken  or  interrupted  to  such  an  extent  by  sleep, 
or  delay,  or  something  such  that  it  no  longer  lasts  or  influ- 
ences by  way  of  an  act,  but  only  by  way  of  a  habit. 

An  act  is  interpret atively  voluntary,  when  never  actually 
willed,  but  would  be  willed  if  thought  were  had  of  the  thing, 
e.  g.,  desire  of  salvation  combined  with  opposition  to  baptism. 


PROOFS  15 

Division 

Three  parts.     I.  End.     II.  Cause.     III.  Last  end. 
Proofs  I,  II,  III 

I.  Every  agent  works  unto  some  determined  and  well  de- 
fined effect.  Otherwise  all  effects  would  be  indifferent,  or  of 
the  same  attractiveness;  and  there  would  be  no  reason  why 
one  effect  should  be  produced  rather  than  another.  Very  pro- 
duction is  a  sign  that  the  effect  produced  was  more  attractive 
to  the  agent  than  other  effects.  But  such  an  effect  has  all  the 
constituents  of  an  end,  which  is  that  on  account  of  which  the 
agent  works.     Ergo,  every  agent  works  unto  an  end. 

II.  Whatever  produces  another  with  influence  on  its  very 
being,  the  influence  issuing  in  dependence,  is  truly  a  cause. 
But  such  is  the  end.  Ergo,  the  end  is  truly  a  cause.  With 
regard  to  the  Minor.  The  builder's  purpose  contributes  even 
more  to  the  building  of  the  house  than  his  saw  or  hammer,  be- 
cause it  starts  things  and  stays  with  him  to  the  finish.  The 
saw  does  its  own  work,  the  hammer  its  own;  and  that  is  all. 
The  end  is  responsible  for  their  work  and  for  the  work  of 
everything  else  employed  in  the  construction  of  the  building. 
In  rational  agents  the  end's  influence  is  immediate;  in  min- 
erals, plants  and  brutes  it  is  mediate,  directly  influencing 
God,  their  Maker  and  First  Cause,  to  furnish  them  with  such 
and  such  natures,  tendencies  and  faculties,  or  instincts,  in 
preference  to  others,  because  best  suited  and  adapted  to  the 
works  He  intends  them  to  accomplish. 

III.  1°.  In  every  series  of  causes  there  ought  to  be  a  flrst 
cause.  But  if  the  will  had  no  definite  last  end,  there  would 
be  no  first  cause.     Ergo. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  The  second  cause,  to  be  second, 
would  be  an  effect.  But  an  effect  without  a  cause  is  impos- 
sible.    Ergo. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  The  last  end  is  the  first  cause. 
Ergo. 

With  regard  to  this  Antecedent.  The  first  cause  is  what 
first  excites  the  agent  to  activity.  But  this  is  the  office  of  the 
last  end.     Ergo. 

With  regard  to  this  Minor.  Axiom — The  end  is  first  thing 
in  a  man's  intention,  last  thing  in  the  order  of  execution. 


16  GENERAL  ETHICS 

2°.  The  last  end,  with  regard  to  an  act  of  the  will,  fills 
the  place  of  motion's  first  principle.  But  remove  the  first 
principle  of  motion,  and  no  motion  exists.  Ergo,  in  the 
event  of  no  definite  last  end,  no  act  of  the  will  ensues. 

3°.  When  one  thing  in  nature  is  the  reason  why  another 
thing  receives  such  or  such  a  denomination,  the  first  of  the 
two  is  more  deserving  of  the  denomination  than  the  second, 
which  actually  receives  it.  But  all  intermediate  ends  owe 
their  whole  being,  and  consequently  their  every  denomination, 
to  some  last  end;  and  these  intermediate  ends,  at  least,  are 
purposes  worked  unto  by  every  agent.  An  intermediate  is 
sought  only  with  a  view  to  some  corresponding  last  end. 
Otherwise  it  is  not  an  intermediate  end.  Ergo,  the  last  end 
is  all  the  more  so  such  a  purpose;  that  is,  the  will  in  all  its 
deliberate  movements  has  some  definite  last  end,  whether 
strictly  or  relatively  such. 

4°.  Every  particular  or  individual  good  tends  of  its  nature 
to  some  common  or  universal  good,  as  to  its  proper  end.  But 
God,  the  absolute  good,  is  common  or  universal  good,  and 
every  created  good  is  particular  or  individual  good.  Ergo, 
every  created  good,  or  things  in  general  tend  of  their  nature 
to  one  good,  God,  as  to  their  last  end. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  Parts  exist  for  the  sake  of  the 
whole. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  All  good  comes  from,  and  de- 
pends for  its  being  on  God. 

N.B.  This  last  argument  proves  that  nature  wants  man  in 
all  his  deliberate  movements  to  have  God  for  definite  last 
end.  Man's  every  wish  is  implicitly,  if  not  explicitly,  an  ef- 
fort towards  complete  happiness,  and  complete  happiness  is 
the  possession  of  God.  Implicitly,  therefore,  this  definite  last 
end  is  always  the  absolutely  last  or  God ;  and  implicitly  speak- 
ing God  is  necessarily  the  last  end  of  every  deliberate  act  or 
series  of  actions.  What  nature  wants,  God  wants.  We  can- 
not improve  on  God,  and  when  we  try  to  do  so  we  fail. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  The  single  difference  between  a  means  and  an  end  is 
this,  that  the  former  is  striven  after  merely  for  the  sake  of 


PRIiNCIPLES  17 

the  end,  while  the  latter  is  striven  after  for  itself.  In  fact, 
a  means  is  an  end  before  it  is  compassed ;  it  becomes  a  means 
only  after  it  ceases  to  be  an  end  only  after  it  is  compassed. 
Means  in  process  of  making,  means  in  fieri,  is  an  end;  means 
formally  taken,  means  in  facto  esse  is  not  an  end.  Before  it 
can  be  used,  it  has  to  be  compassed  or  sought ;  and  what  the 
will  seeks,  is  the  man's  end.  Hence  the  absurdity  of  writers, 
who  claim  that  Jesuit  philosophers  and  moralists  advocate 
the  wicked  theory,  that  a  laudable  end  justifies  any  means 
whatever,  no  matter  how  immoral  and  wrong.  Jesuits  would 
be  blind,  indeed,  if  they  failed  to  see  at  a  glance  that  such  a 
theory,  because  of  the  unimportant  difference  between  means 
and  end,  would  be  a  virtual  advocacy  of  this  evidently  iniqui- 
tous principle,  that  all  ends,  good,  bad  and  indefferent,  are 
justified ;  and  that  murder  and  forgiving  charity,  robbery  and 
alms-deeds  are  equally  worthy  of  our  aspirations  and  en- 
deavors. 

B.  An  intention  is  an  a-ot  by  which  the  will  embraces  the 
end  as  its  peculiar  good.  Any  reason  urging  the  will  to  this 
act  is  called  a  motive.  Whatever  helps  to  the  possession  of 
the  end  is  a  means ;  and  such  means  as  simply  remove  impedi- 
ments from  the  path  are  remedies. 

C.  The  motion  the  end  communicates  to  the  agent  is  not 
physical,  but  of  equivalent  efficacy  in  another  order,  namely, 
in  the  logical  order,  the  order  of  thought.  Its  whole  effi- 
ciency lies  in  the  love  it  stirs  in  the  agent's  will,  after  its 
presentation  by  the  intellect  of  the  agent;  and  this  love  con- 
tributes as  much  to  the  production  of  the  effect  as  the  physical 
efficient  cause. 

D.  Man  in  his  indeliberate  actions,  works  unto  an  end  much 
as  brutes,  apprehensively,  with  motion  of  his  own,  but  by  in- 
stinct. Such  acts  are  called  acts  of  the  man,  not  acts  of  man 
or  human  acts. 

E.  The  end,  or  final  cause,  considered  in  the  order  of  exe- 
cution, is  no  cause  of  the  effect,  since  its  place  is  behind  that 
of  the  effect,  and  causes  precede  their  ffects.  We  maintain 
only  this,  that  the  end  is  a  true  and  real  cause,  when  con- 
sidered in  the  order  of  intention.  Objectively  speaking,  end 
in  the  order  of  execution  is  a  built  house,  end  in  the  order  of 
intention  is  a  thought  house. 


THESIS  II 

Man  of  his  very  nature  desires  complete  happiness.  Com- 
plete happiness  is  man's  ah&olutely  last  end  subjectively 
taken.  This  natural  desire  must  he  possible  of  fulfilment. 
No  created  good  can  secure  to  man  complete  happiness.  The 
possession  of  God  is  alone  complete  happiness,  and  God  is 
alone  complete  happiness,  and  God  is  man's  absolutely  last 
end  objectively  taken.    Jouin,  5-19 ;  Rickaby,  6-26. 

QUESTION 

Here  on  the  threshold  of  morality  a  multitude  of  questions 
besets  us.  We  know  from  Metaphysics  that  every  agent,  man 
included,  works  unto  some  end.  We  know,  further,  that  man 
excels  all  other  creatures  in  this,  that  he  chooses  his  end  and 
selects  means  to  its  accomplishment.  He  is  not  an  accumu- 
lation of  blind  forces,  working  along  lines  mapped  out  for  him 
by  another.  He  thinks  for  himself,  he  decides  for  himself, 
he  weighs,  examines,  approves,  condemns.  We  have  from 
our  previous  acquaintance  with  philosophy  a  fair  insight  into 
his  faculties.  From  experience  we  have  a  fair  knowledge  of 
the  motives,  that  clamor  for  his  attention  in  the  routine  of 
everyday  affairs.  Some  are  money-makers,  some  are  chiselling 
for  themselves  a  niche  in  the  temple  of  fame,  some  are  in 
continual  search  for  health  or  the  means  to  preserve  it,  some 
keep  busy  nursing  an  appetite  for  palatable  dishes,  and  others 
travel  in  pursuit  of  a  good  they  can  expect  to  come  up  with 
only  after  death.  We  have  to  range  ourselves  in  some  class. 
Nay,  we  are  placed  already.  For  the  present  we  want  to 
look  at  things  with  the  cold,  calculating  eyes  of  reason,  to 
profit  by  our  own  mistakes  and  the  mistakes  of  others,  and 
stand  just  where  common  sense  would  have  us  stand  in  life's 
struggles.  We  want  to  find  out  what  craving  is  in  reality  at 
the  bottom  of  human  d-esires,  and  what  one  object  in  the  uni- 
verse can  sate  the  craving.     Our  thesis  is  the  answer.    Hap- 

18 


COMPLETE  HAPPINESS  19 

piness  is  last  in  the  series  of  wish-factt)rs,  and  God  is  alone 
large  enough,  when  possessed,  to  leave  no  room  for  further 
desire.  We  mean  by  wish-factors  the  reasons  prompting  our 
wishes;  and  money,  pleasure,  honor  are  wished  in  last  analy- 
sis because  they  hold  out  promise  of  happiness.  Man  cannot 
in  reason  want  anything  beyond  God,  man  cannot  in  reason 
rest  in  the  enjoyment  of  anything  this  side  of  God. 

TERMS 

Happiness.  This  is  the  theme  with  which  the  Lord  Christ 
opened  His  sublime  discourse  on  the  Mount.  The  beatitudes 
are  eight  steps  in  the  ladder  to  God ;  and,  when  the  wisest  of 
men  communicated  the  secret  of  success  in  life  to  the  listen- 
ing multitude.  He  knew  best  with  what  word  to  preface  His 
remarks.  Beati,  He  said,  blessed,  happy  are  the  poor  in 
spirit,  and  so  on  through  the  catalogue.  His  mission  was  in 
part  the  instruction  of  mankind  and  the  conquest  of  souls. 
Redemption  and  merit  aside,  He  aimed  in  all  His  movements 
at  spreading  the  kingdom  of  virtue  in  the  hearts  of  men. 
And  the  happiness  born  of  virtue  was  the  most  tremendous 
motive  at  His  command.  He  thought  no  reward  a  more  ap- 
pealing incentive  to  virtue  than  happiness,  and  God's  ideas 
are  right.  He  knew  in  His  infinite  wisdom  that  other  re- 
wards, while  possibly  exerting  a  temporary  influence  over 
men's  minds,  would  in  the  last  resort  fail  of  effect.  He  knew 
that  other  rewards,  from  their  very  nature  and  the  constitu- 
tion of  man,  would  prove  only  partial  incentives,  subject  to 
all  the  varying  phases  of  human  conduct.  He  knew  that 
wealth,  for  instance,  with  all  its  attractiveness  for  some,  would 
act  as  a  deterrent  on  others ;  that  fame  would  appeal  to  the 
instincts  of  a  circle  limited  indeed  in  numbers.  But  happi- 
ness is  a  universal  good,  it  is  at  the  root  of  all  the  world's 
wishes,  it  holds  its  own  against  the  ravages  of  time,  against 
all  the  vicissitudes  with  which  humanity  is  acquainted. 
Boethius  thus  defines  complete  happiness,  ''A  lasting  condi- 
tion blessed  with  everything  good."  ''The  enduring  posses- 
sion of  every  good."  These  are  no  idle  words,  and  their  right 
understanding  will  remove  many  difficulties.  They  vindi- 
cate to  complete  happiness  at  least  two  characteristic  ele- 


20  GENERAL  ETHICS 

ments,  a  Jieaped-iip  measure  of  good,  and  imending  diiration. 
These  elements  are  thoroughly  wanting  in  all  the  varied  joys 
this  earth  affords.  Mundane  or  incomplete  happiness  has 
inseparably  linked  with  itself  a  twofold  curse.  While  it  fills 
one  comer  of  a  man 's  heart  with  pleasure,  it  fills  another  with 
pain.  Its  near  departure  haunts  its  possessor  like  a  spectre. 
Partial  pain  and  possible  loss  are  ingredients  of  all  the  happi- 
ness with  which  this  earth  is  acquainted;  and  no  amount  of 
reasoning,  no  amount  of  care  can  quite  eradicate  them.  St. 
Augustine,  insisting  on  its  fulness,  thus  describes  complete 
happiness,  ^'That  man  is  happy  who  has  all  that  he  wants, 
and  wants  only  what  he  can  hav^  without  sin."  Complete 
happiness  is,  therefore,  an  unending  round  of  delights,  in 
which  no  legitimate  craving  goes  unfulfilled,  in  which  no  ille- 
gitimate craving  has  existence.  This  is  perfect  hliss.  Philos- 
ophers besides  recognize  an  inferior  sort  of  blessedness,  which 
for  clearness'  sake  they  call  imperfect  hliss.  It  is  the  only 
sort  of  incomplete  happiness,  truly  deserving  the  name,  this 
present  life  affords ;  and  it  consists  in  a  close  union  with  our 
last  end  by  the  establishment  of  moral  rectitude  in  our  ac- 
tioTis.  It  is  peace  of  conscience,  it  is  holiness,  it  is  the  inher- 
itance of  the  saints.  It  is  the  initial  step  in  our  progress  to- 
wards complete  happiness,  or  perfect  bliss ;  and,  while  haunted 
with  the  fear  of  loss  and  mingled  with  misery,  wretchedness 
and  pain,  it  procures  in  the  grand  total  of  blessings  and  ills 
a  preponderance  of  blessings.  Philosophers  likewise  distin- 
guish between  objective  or  material  happiness,  and  subjective 
or  formal  happiness.  The  first,  or  objective,  is  the  object  or 
thing,  whose  presence  fills  out  man's  every  desire,  God.  The 
second,  or  subjective,  is  the  actual  possession  of  that  object 
or  thing.  The  first  is  called  the  end  which;  the  second,  the 
end  in  which.  The  definition  quoted  from  Boethius  tallies 
exactly  with  subjective  complete  happiness. 

Of  His  Very  Nature.  This  longing  for  happiness  is  there- 
fore a  natural  craving,  and  things  may  be  natural  to  man  in 
either  one  of  two  ways.  They  may  be  born  and  live  with  him 
in  a  manner  entirely  independent  of  his  free  will,  or  they 
may  be  in  strict  accord  with  his  nature,  and  yet  entirely  de- 
pendent on  his  free  choice  for  their  existence  within  him. 
The  desire  of  which  we  at  present  speak  is  natural  to  man  in 


CREATED  GOODS  21 

the  first  way.  It  is  a  necessity  of  his  nature,  it  cannot  be 
schooled  out  of  his  thoughts,  it  cannot  be  shaken  off  or  gotten 
rid  of.  It  is  as  much  a  part  of  the  man  as  upward  motion  is 
part  of  fire 's  essence.  It  is  different  from  an  acquired  desire, 
which  may  of  course  be  natural  to  man  in  the  second  way. 
Marriage  is  usually  alleged  by  writers  on  the  subject  as  an 
instance  of  something  natural  to  man,  with  full  dependence 
on  his  own  free  choice. 

Desires.  Many  in  their  folly  miss  the  proper  means  to 
make  good  this  desire.  Many  seek  its  accomplishment  in  very 
dubious  occupations,  in  pleasures  decidedly  illegitimate,  and 
are  sadly  disappointed  in  their  expectations.  But,  as  it  is 
possible  of  fulfilment,  it  must  be  within  man's  reach.  There 
must  be  a  line  of  conduct  unfailingly  able  to  lead  to  its  con- 
summation. It  can  never  happen  that  complete  happiness 
will  fail  him,  who  honestly  does  his  utmost  to  win  it,  and 
steadily  keeps  his  record  clean  of  fault  and  defect. 

No  Created  Good.  The  assertion  is  sweeping,  and  excludes 
from  the  dignity  of  man's  last  end  everything  but  God.  In 
the  history  of  philosophy  not  a  few  ancients  went  astray  on 
this  point.  Epicurus  contended  that  pleasure  was  man's  su- 
premest  desire,  his  highest  good.  He  sometimes  bestowed  a 
scant  praise  On  virtue,  only  because  opposite  vices  interfered 
with  the  full  enjoyment  of  physical  pleasure.  Zeno,  a  leader 
among  the  stoics,  reckoned  wisdom  combined  with  virtue  the 
summit  of  man's  aspirations.  Aristotle,  the  founder  of  the 
Peripatetic  school,  contended  for  a  union  of  virtue  and  pleas- 
ure. It  may  be  noticed  that  the  dignity  of  last  end,  or  high- 
est good,  is  ascribed  by  no  one  to  wealth.  Misers  alone  love 
wealth  for  wealth's  sake,  and  misers  are  not  numerous.  Prac- 
tical men  of  sense  regard  wealth  as  only  a  useful  commodity, 
a  means  to  the  acquirement  of  other  blessings  more  eagerly 
coveted.  As  a  merely  useful  good,  wealth  must  of  course 
yield  precedence  to  virtue,  pleasure,  wisdom,  and  every  good 
catalogued  as  either  becoming  or  pleasurable. 

Possession  of  God.  In  purely  ethical  discussions  theology 
of  course  has  no  place,  and  statements  advanced  must  be  made 
good  without  any  reference  to  Holy  Scripture,  as  a  source  of 
argument.  We  Catholics  know  from  our  catechism  that 
Heaven  is  our  last  end,  and  we  know  that  Heaven  is  the  ac- 


22  GENERAL  ETHICS 

cumulation  of  all  good  centered  in  the  beatific  vision,  or 
closest  kind  of  union  with  God.  Bliss  in  Heaven  consists 
entirely  in  seeing  God  face  to  face,  and  this  intellectual  pos- 
session of  God,  supernaturally  accomplished,  constitutes  man's 
supremest  happiness.  Strip  the  beatific  vision  of  its  super- 
natural qualities,  and  you  have  at  once  the  doctrine  of  phi- 
losophy concerning  man's  last  end.  Though  able  to  make 
surmises,  philosophy  teaches  nothing  positive  regarding  the 
resurrection  of  the  body;  but  in  Psychology  we  saw  how 
clearly  it  makes  good  the  immortality  of  the  soul.  There- 
fore, the  only  possession  of  God,  possible  of  conception  to 
unaided  human  thought,  is  intellectual  possession,  based  on 
an  intimate  union  of  intellect  and  will  with  Him. 

Last  End.  This  complete  happiness,  or  possession  of  God, 
is  therefore  the  ultimate  purpose  of  man's  every  movement. 
His  proximate  and  explicit  purpose  may  be  limited  happi- 
ness, but  his  ultimate  and  implicit  purpose  is  always  complete 
happiness.  Its  influence  is  not  always  evident,  because  some- 
what below  the  surface  of  things;  but  its  influence  is  none 
the  less  present.  It  has  a  twofold  value,  implicit  and  explicit. 
Thus,  when,  for  instance,  knowledge  because  of  its  manifold 
advantages  urges  the  student  to  labor,  the  hiding  principle  is 
that  all-pervading  desire  of  perfect  happiness.  Love  of 
knowledge  merely  seems  to  be  the  sole  motive.  Complete  hap- 
piness has  in  this  case  an  implicit  value,  and  its  efficacy  is 
none  the  less  real  than  when  it  explicitly  asserts  itself. 

Proofs  I,  II,  III,  IV,  V 

I.  1st.  Complete  happiness  is  the  satisfaction  of  man 's  every 
legitimate  wish.  But  man  of  his  very  nature  desires  the  sat- 
isfaction of  his  every  legitimate  wish.  Ergo,  man  of  his  very 
nature  desires  complete  happiness. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  Perfect  or  finished  good  is  the 
all  important  and  characteristic  element  of  complete  happi- 
ness; and  since  good  is  subject-matter  of  the  will's  legitimate 
wishes,  complete  happiness  is  the  satisfaction  of  man's  every 
legitimate  wish.  N.B.  Nature  prompts  no  illegitimate  wish. 
Perverted  passion,  wrong  prejudices,  faulty  education  are 
responsible  for  such  wishes. 


PROOFS  23 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Man's  will  would  be  otherwise 
doomed  to  perpetual  unrest,  and  would  become  an  instrument 
of  unending  torture. 

2nd.  Nature,  impediments  aside,  exerts  its  utmost  activity. 
But  human  nature  or  man  is  capable  of  desiring  complete 
happiness,  and  no  impediment  is  conceivable.  Ergo,  man  of 
his  very  nature  desires  complete  happiness. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Man's  mind  is  able  to  grasp 
the  highest  truth.  His  will,  to  keep  equal  pace  with  his  mind, 
must  be  able  to  desire  the  highest  good,  or  complete  happi- 
ness. 

II.  Man 's  last  end  must  have  these  three  qualities :  It  must 
be  the  supremest  good,  fully  equal  to  all  the  wants  of  all  his 
faculties,  even  vegetative  and  sensitive.  Needless  to  say,  it 
must  satisfy  vegetative  and  sensitive  wants  eminently,  not 
formally.  It  must  so  contain  within  itself  all  the  good  resi- 
dent in  other  conceivable  ends,  that  these  other  ends  be  only 
stages  in  man's  progress  toward  its  acquisition.  In  other 
words,  it  must  be  of  such  sort,  as  to  attract  man's  heart  of 
its  own  single  self,  and  be  at  the  same  time  the  thing  of  in- 
terest in  every  object  of  man's  desires.  It  must  be  the  de- 
sire of  every  man's  heart,  whether  formally  and  explicitly,  or 
materially  and  implicitly.  But  complete  happiness  is  the 
only  good  answering  this  description.  Ergo,  complete  happi- 
ness is  man's  last  end. 

III.  A  desire  with  nature  for  origin  and  author,  cannot  be 
impossible  of  fulfilment.  But  man's  desire  for  complete  hap- 
piness is  a  desire  of  this  sort.  Ergo,  it  is  possible  of  fulfil- 
ment. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  Denial  of  this  Major  would  be 
an  open  denial  of  the  axiom,  that  every  effect  demands  a  cor- 
responding cause.  For  the  effect,  or  natural  desire,  is  admit- 
tedly alive  in  every  man's  bosom,  and  its  cause  is  assuredly 
nothing  short  of  at  least  possibility  of  fulfilment.  Besides, 
God,  the  Author  of  our  nature  and  all  its  inborn  longings, 
would  be,  were  complete  happiness  an  empty  dream,  a  most 
consummate  torturer  and  executioner,  not  the  beneficent  cre- 
ator reason  requires  Him  to  be. 

IV.  The  good  things,  proposed  by  adversaries  for  man's 
last  end,  are  signal  failures.     Thus, 


24  GENERAL  ETHICS 

a,  physical  pleasure  ministers  to  only  senses  of  the  body, 
and  neglects  the  soul 's  interests ; 

b,  physical  pleasure  likewise  involves  pain  for  some  member 
or  organ  not  actually  participating  in  it,  and  nearly  always 
threatens  harm  to  the  soul; 

c,  physical  pleasure  is  an  utter  stranger  to  that  endless 
duration,  which  is  happiness'  first  requisite; 

d,  spiritual  delight  is  at  most  an  effect  of  the  good  we  seek, 
and  as  such  inferior  to  the  good  productive  of  this  delight; 
and,  therefore,  an  impossible  last  end; 

e,  spiritual  delight  would  then  be  the  motive  for  search 
after  becoming  good;  and  the  becoming  and  the  agreeable 
would  be  without  distinctive  characteristics ; 

f,  pleasure,  whether  physical  or  spiritual,  is  change  or  mo- 
tion ;  and  man 's  last  end  is  complete  rest ; 

g,  the  wisdom  and  virtue  of  this  life  leave  manj  things  yet 
to  be  desired,  health,  wealth,  beauty,  strength,  long  years. 
Certainly  wisdom  and  virtue,  accompanied  by  these  several 
blessings,  are  more  an  incentive  to  desire  than  wisdom  and 
virtue,  considered  apart  from  them; 

h,  pleasure,  wisdom  and  virtue  combined,  or  the  joint  pos- 
session of  all  the  blessings  this  earth  affords,  is  so  full  of  con- 
flicting elements,  as  to  be  quite  out  of  the  question,  and  im- 
possible of  fulfilment ; 

i,  danger  of  change,  fear  of  loss,  actual  loss,  gnawing  anx- 
iety, toil  and  a  thousand  other  evils  poison  all  the  good  things 
of  this  exile,  and  emphatically  forbid  man  to  look  for  satis- 
faction or  rest  in  their  acquisition; 

j,  virtue  alone  excepted,  every  other  good  with  which  earth 
is  acquainted,  even  life  itself,  may  without  discredit  he  sacri- 
ficed on  the  altar  of  patriotism. 

V.  1st.  Some  good,  created  or  uncreated,  is  man's  last  end, 
or  complete  happiness.  But  no  created  good  is  equal  to  the 
task,  and  God  alone  is  uncreated  good.  Ergo,  God  is  man's 
complete  happiness,  his  last  end. 

2nd.  God,  when  creating  man,  necessarily  appointed  him 
an  end  wholly  worthy  of  Himself.  But  God  alone  is  wholly 
worthy  of  God.  Ergo,  God  is  the  end  appointed  man,  the 
end  established  in  man's  creation.  But  the  end  assigned  by 
God  to  man  is  man's  last  end.     Ergo,  God  is  man's  last  end. 


PRINCIPLES  25 

3rd.  Nothing  short  of  the  universal  and  supreme  good  can 
be  man's  last  end.  But  God  alone  is  the  universal  and  su- 
preme good.  Ergo,  God,  and  nothing  short  of  God,  is  man's 
last  end. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  Man's  last  end,  from  the  very- 
nature  of  things,  must  be  a  good,  whose  possession  leaves 
nothing  further  to  be  desired ;  and  universal  or  supreme  good 
alone  enjoys  this  prerogative. 

With  regard  to  the  Miliar.  Were  there  another  universal 
and  supreme  good,  there  would  be  two  gods. 


PRINCIPLES 

A.  Our  every  desire,  if  we  follow  the  laws  imposed  upon  us 
by  our  Maker,  will  be  abundantly  satisfied  in  the  next  life. 
Some  of  these  desires  will  have  their  fulfilment  formally,  or 
exactly  as  they  are  shaped.  Others,  on  account  of  the  pe- 
culiar circumstances  attaching  to  a  future  state,  will  be  ac- 
complished, as  philosophers  say,  eminently,  in  a  grander  way, 
or  equivalently.  The  possession  of  God  will  be  the  sum  of 
our  delights,  and  God  is  infinite  in  resources  to  make  up  for 
whatever  pleasures  our  future  condition  will  render  impos- 
sible. Thus,  there  will  be  no  eating,  no  drinking  in  Heaven; 
but,  apart  from  the  fact  that  our  lower  nature  will  then  make 
no  clamor  for  sweets  it  now  so  much  covets,  God  will  be  able 
to  pour  into  our  souls  a  measure  of  happiness,  more  than  able 
to  atone  for  these  paltry  losses.  Some  philosophers  think 
they  see,  in  the  completeness  of  good  things  involved  in  this 
natural  desire  of  happiness,  a  proof  of  the  future  resurrec- 
tion of  the  body.  They  contend  that  happiness  would  be 
incomplete,  unless  the  body  somehow  shared  after  death  in 
the  joys  accorded  the  soul.  But  the  time-honored  distinction 
between  intensity  and  extent  is  an  answer  to  their  difficulty. 
Unless  our  Creator  could  in  some  way  make  up  in  intensity 
for  the  loss  extent,  or  number  of  parts  affected  by  bliss,  suf- 
fers, the  body  would  surely  have  to  arise,  and  live  forever 
like  the  soul,  to  enjoy  its  proper  reward.  Reason  throws  no 
light  on  the  body's  destiny  after  death,  because,  in  the  event 
of  its  total  disappearance,  though  man's  happiness  would  be 


26  GENERAL  ETHICS 

less  in  extent,  its  intensity  could  be  so  multiplied,  that  his 
loss  would  become  a  gain. 

B.  God,  because  simple,  and  therefore  without  parts,  must 
be  known  wholly,  if  known  at  all.  This  circumstance  is,  how- 
ever, far  from  rendering  it  necessary  for  the  blessed  in 
Heaven  to  know  Him  totally  or  exhaustively,  or  in  such  a 
way  that  nothing  in  His  nature  escapes  their  knowledge.  God 
is  infinite,  and  to  know  Him  totally  is  the  work  of  an  infinite, 
not  a  finite  intellect  like  man's.  The  familiar  example  of  a 
mountain  seen  in  the  distance  may  serve  to  elucidate  the  point. 
The  whole  mountain  is  seen,  without  being  wholly  seen. 

C.  We  must  in  our  language  guard  against  making  God  a 
means  to  an  end.  He  is  not  the  instrument,  through  which 
we  attain  to  happiness.  He  is  our  happiness.  He  is  not  a 
thing  designed  for  our  use  or  commodity,  but  we  are  things 
designed  for  His  glory;  and,  in  furthering  His  glory,  we 
are  filling  out  our  destiny. 

D.  As  a  principle  of  activity,  man's  intellect  is  of  course 
finite  and  limited;  but,  when  the  objects,  to  which  man's  in- 
tellect can  reach,  are  taken  into  consideration,  no  finite  or 
limited  number  can  represent  them.  Because  of  the  limita- 
tions inherent  in  its  activity,  man's  intellect  can  know  God 
in  only  a  limited  way;  because  of  the  multitude  of  objects,  to 
which  it  can  reach,  man's  intellect  can  be  filled  by  nothing 
created,  and  therefore  by  God  alone.  All  being  is  the  ade- 
quate object  of  man's  intellect,  and  created  being  is  not  all 
being.  Created  and  uncreated  are  that,  and  created  is  con- 
tained in  uncreated,  or  actual  unproduced,  or  God. 

E.  Between  the  mind  and  its  object  some  sort  of  propor- 
tion must  have  place.  But  this  proportion,  or  likeness,  need 
not  necessarily  be  that  of  being,  or  nature.  Proportion  of  fit- 
ness, constituted  by  the  circumstance,  that  God  as  a  being  can 
fill  a  place  in  man's  thoughts,  is  enough. 

F.  Pleasure  is  good  sought  on  its  own  single  account,  and 
in  this  particular  resembles  a  last  end.  It  is  not,  however,  a 
supreme  good,  able  to  satisfy  every  desire;  and,  in  this  par- 
ticular, pleasure  falls  away  from  the  requirements  of  an  abso- 
lutely last  end. 

G.  Individual  men  tend  towards  a  last  end,  not  that  ab- 
straction  called   human  nature.    Pantheists,   therefore,    are 


PRINCIPLES  27 

wrong,  when  they  admit  the  existence  of  a  last  end  for  human 
nature,  and  deny  last  ends  in  connection  with  individuals. 

H.  Man's  natural  desire  for  happiness  is  a  something  he 
cannot  lose.  Its  accomplishment,  because  dependent  on  the 
acts  of  his  free  will,  can  readily  enough  be  frustrated. 

I.  God,  pure  and  simple,  is  the  material  object  of  man's 
thoughts.  God,  as  He  assumes  shape  in  man's  mind,  is  the 
formal  object  of  these  thoughts.  Since,  therefore,  God  is  in- 
finite only  in  Himself,  or  as  material  object,  man's  mind,  to 
have  knowledge  of  Him,  need  not  be  infinite.  The  formal 
object  of  a  faculty,  not  its  material  object,  denominates  it, 
puts  it  in  the  class  of  infinites  or  finites. 

J.  As  long  as  man  obeys  the  dictates  of  reason,  so  long  is 
he  tending  towards  God,  if  not  formally,  at  least  by  inter- 
pretation. He  may  not  advert  to  the  fact  that  he  is  tending 
towards  God,  and  that  would  be  formal  tendency;  but  in  sub- 
stance he  is  doing  what  he  would  do  if  he  formally  tended 
towards  God,  and  this  is  tendency  by  interpretation. 


THESIS  III 

Man's  destiny  in  this  life,  his  supremest  happiness  on  earth, 
his  relatively  last  end,  consists  in  drawing  closer  and  closer  to 
his  absolutely  last  end,  by  the  establishment  of  moral  recti- 
tude in  his  actions.  Between  good  and  bad  in  the  moral 
order,  between  right  and  wrong,  an  essential,  intrinsic  differ- 
ence exists.  The  immediate  measure  of  moral  rectitude  is  the 
objective  order  of  things,  as  understood  by  the  intellect;  the 
mediate  measure  is  God's  wisdom  and  goodness.  Jouin,  5-19; 
Bickaby,  109-126. 

QUESTION 

/Man's  last  end  is  eternal  happiness  in  the  possession  of  God 
Life  is  but  a  stage  in  our  progress  towards  God,  it  is  a  period 
(of  proof  of  trial./ We  are  from  the  outset  vested  with  heads, 
^and  hearts,  and  hands;  with  all  the  needed  light,  and  cour- 
age, and  strength,  to  pursue  our  appointed  journey  without 
mishap.  Our  supremest  happiness  here  below  hinges  en- 
tirely on  our  present  destiny,  and  our  present  destiny  is  of  a 
complexion  with  our  destiny  hereafter.  Man's  history  ex- 
tends beyond  the  grave,  death  is  far  from  closing  the  record. 
This  present  life  forms,  as  it  were,  the  first  chapter,  the  years 
without  end  to  follow  make  up  the  rest  of  the  story.  But 
this  first  chapter  is  a  thing  of  the  utmost  concern,  it  is  a 
thing  of  the  highest  importance.  All  the  succeeding  chapters 
borrow  from  it  their  light  and  shade,  with  it  all  succeeding 
chapters  must  be  fair  or  hideous.  Union  with  God  consti- 
tutes complete  happiness;  and,  unless  a  man's  last  moments 
find  him  close  by  the  ties  of  righteousness  to  his  Maker,  that 
man  can  hope  for  nothing  but  most  wretched  misery.  Unless 
a  man's  every  moment  finds  him  struggling  towards  this 
happy  consummation,  misery  will  not  wait  till  the  hour  of 
death  to  fasten  its  hold  upon  him.  What  for  want  of  a  bet- 
ter term  we  call  imperfect  misery,  is  the  perpetual  lot  of  the 

28 


INCOMPLETE  HAPPINESS  29 

wicked  here  on  earth.  The  graduated  scale  of  happiness  and 
woe  is  the  same.  A  life  lived  in  preparation  for  supreme 
felicity  constitutes  imperfect  beatitude,  the  supremest  pos- 
sible on  earth.  A  life  lived  in  preparation  for  supreme  woe 
constitutes  incomplete  wretchedness,  the  most  irksome  pos- 
sible on  earth. 

The  comparison  is  between  virtue  and  vice,  and  between 
things  inseparably  connected  with  both.  ^$4^eace  of  conscience 
is  the  one  thing  inseparably  connected  with  virtue,  remorse  is 
the  one  thing  inseparably  connected  with  vicey/ Wealth,  pleas- 
ure and  honor  are  inseparably  connected  wifii  neither  virtue 
nor  vice ;  and  must,  therefore,  be  kept  out  of  the  comparison. 
Virtue  with  these  three  concupiscences  of  life  is,  of  course, 
happier  in  point  of  extent  or  quantity  than  virtue  without 
them,  though  their  presence  fails  to  affect  necessarily  the  in- 
tensity or  quality  of  virtue's  happiness.  Vice  with  these  three 
goods  of  life  is  less  unhappy  in  point  of  extent  or  quantity  than 
vice  without  them,  though  their  presence  never  diminishes  the 
annoyance  of  remorse  itself  in  point  of  intensity  or  quality. 
Poverty,  pain  and  obscurity  cannot  destroy  or  diminish  peace 
of  conscience ;  money,  pleasure  and  honor  cannot  cure  or  alle- 
viate remorse.  And  again  we  are  talking  of  normal  minds, 
wide  awake  to  their  condition,  with  a  practical  realization  of 
peace  and  remorse.  In  this  whole  business  intensity  or  qual- 
ity counts  for  more  than  extent  or  quantity.  There  is  more 
money  from  the  viewpoint  of  extent  or  quantity  in  five  one- 
dollar  bills  than  in  a  single  hundred-dollar  bill,  and  yet  every- 
body knows  what  way  a  sensible  person  would  look,  if  invited 
to  choose.  Intensity  or  quality  is  what  makes  the  difference. 
A  bad  life  with  all  the  other  goods  of  earth  except  virtue  is 
more  irksome  in  point  of  peace  and  remorse  than  a  good  life 
without  all  the  other  goods  of  earth ;  and  this  is  sufficient  for 
our  present  purpose.  Peace  of  conscience  is  the  hundred- 
dollar  bill,  wealth  and  the  other  goods  of  life  without  virtue 
are  five  one-dollar  bills.  Even  if  experience  failed  to  bear  us 
out  in  this  statement,  philosophy  itself  is  witness  that  any 
contrary  event  would  imperil  the  fitness  of  things.  /t*repara- 
tion,  then,  for  that  absorbing  union  with  God,  at  the  root  of 
every  human  desire,  is  the  limit  set  by  common  sense  for  well 
directed  act ivity//^ Virtue  is  as  indispensable  to  happiness 


30  GENERAL  ETHICS 


A 


ere  below  as  it  is  to  happiness  in  the  world  to  come;  and 
virtue  is  moral  rectitude,  the  avoidance  of  evil,  the  accom- 
plishment of  good/ 

Unless  we  close  our  eyes  to  the  light,  and  do  to  death  the 
instincts  implanted  within  us,  we  cannot  mistake  vice  for 
virtue,  we  cannot  confound  evil  with  good.  Between  them 
there  is  an  impassable  chasm.  No  merely  accidental,  but  an 
essential  difference  exists  between  one  and  the  other.  And 
the  standard  marking  this  difference  is  plain.  It  is  the  ob- 
jective order  of  things,  things  as  they  are,  things  as  they 
ought  to  seem  to  you  and  to  me,  things  as  they  shall  inev- 
itably seem  to  you  and  to  me,  if  we  only  follow  the  light 
vouchsafed  us,  and  cherish  conscience  for  a  "friend.  This 
standard  never  shifts  place.  Styles  of  dress  change  with 
the  season,  the  etiquette  of  to-day  is  other  than  that  of  our 
forefathers;  bu^/ne  measure  of  moral  rectitude  is  the  same 
to-day,  yesterday  and  forever.  It  is  founded  on  the  good- 
ness and  wisdom  of  God/ and  partakes  of  their  immutability. 

TERMS 

Destiny.  End,  when  viewed  as  a  something  imposed  on  an- 
other by  on'e  in  a  position  to  exercise  this  prerogative,  is 
called  destiny.  Man's  last  end  is  an  inheritance  of  his  na- 
ture, and  as  such  proceeds  from  the  author  of  nature,  God. 
Its  fulfilment  is  a  law  of  nature,  and  the  initial  step  towards 
the  same,  or  the  right  ordering  of  his  life,  may  with  justice 
be  called  his  destiny. 

Happiness  on  Earth.  We  speak  at  present  of  incomplete, 
or  imperfect  happiness,  which  consists  wholly  in  the  fact  that 
the  sum  of  blessings  enjoyed  outweighs  the  sum  of  evils  en- 
dured, considering  only  the  blessings  and  evils  inseparably 
connected  with  virtue  and  vice,  with  intensity  not  extent  for 
standard. 

Moral  rectitude.  Rectitude  is  straightness,  and  the  figure 
of  speech  at  the  root  of  the  word  fits  the  thought.  Moral 
rectitude  is  the  shortest  distance  between  two  points,  our 
present  condition  and  the  felicity  of  bliss  eternal.  Its  duties 
lie  along  a  path  that  never  winds  to  right  or  left,  but  keeps 
straight  on.     Measured  by  its  requirements,  a  man's  exact 


OBJECTIVE  MORALITY  31 

position  in  the  matter  of  living  up  to  his  destiny  is  easily  and 
readily  discernible.  Morality  is  the  badge  of  human  nature. 
A  moral  act  necessarily  calls  for  an  intellect  and  a  will  in  the 
agent.  Intellect  and  will  in  an  agent  necessarily  call  for 
moral  acts.  Acts  are  first  said  to  he  moral,  and  then  good  or 
had  in  the  moral  order.  They  are  moral  from  the  mere  cir- 
cumstance that  they  have  their  origin  in  an  enlightened  rea- 
son, and  a  will  free  in  its  activity.  They  are  good  or  bad, 
they  derive  their  righteousness  or  their  malice  from  their 
agreement  with  or  divergence  from  some  set  standard.  This 
standard  is  primarily  for  us  the  ohjective  order  of  things. 
When  an  act  falls  away  from  this  standard,  it  is  bad ;  when  it 
covers  the  standard,  as  the  rule  covers  a  straight  line,  the  act 
is  good.  Men's  minds  of  course  differ,  and  allowance  must 
be  made  for  differences  of  views  sanctioned  by  Providence. 
But  no  believer  in  God's  wisdom,  and  power,  and  truthfulness, 
can  for  a  moment  suspect  that  men's  minds  in  normal  condi- 
tion can  confound  evil  with  good,  vice  with  virtue.  Had  God 
so  constructed  intellect.  He  would  be  inviting  confusion  into 
the  universe  of  morality.  He  would  be  cursing  our  race  more 
heavily  than  if  He  allowed  the  stars  to  drop  from  their  places, 
the  sun  to  depart  from  its  course,  and  baleful  comets  to  run 
hither  and  thither  at  random  in  the  sky.  Of  course  there  are 
intellects,  dependent  on  diseased  organs,  capable  of  confound- 
ing black  with  white;  but  these  are  beside  the  purpose. 
Philosophy  deals  with  what  is  the  general  rule,  not  with  ex- 
ceptions. She  discusses  men  taken  from  the  busy  walks  of 
life,  she  does  not  go  to  madhouses  for  subjects.  Neither  does 
she  pretend  to  make  models  of  conduct  the  lives  of  unfor- 
tunates, who  would  be  in  strait-jackets,  if  the  madhouse  had 
its  due.  There  is,  however,  such  a  thing  as  subjective  moral- 
ity ;  and  we  must  recognize  the  part  it  plays  in  the  affairs  of 
life.  But,  be  it  remarked  and  well  understood  that  there  is  in 
truth  no  such  thing  as  suhjective  morality,  pure  and  simple. 
My  way  of  thinking,  your  way  of  thinking,  when  they  fail 
to  square  with  the  objective  order  of  things,  are  what  I  mean 
by  subjective  morality,  pure  and  simple;  and  that  kind  of 
morality  is  a  contradiction  in  terms.  Such  morality  is  as 
little  deserving  of  the  name  as  purely  subjective  adhesion  to 
a  false  statement  is  deserving  of  the  name  of  certainty.     Cer- 


32  GENERAL  ETHICS 

tainty  of  that  kind  is  perverse  stubbornness,  has  no  part  with 
the  truth,  and  is  more  lamentable  than  thorough  uncertainty 
or  ignorance.  Even  so,  my  way  of  thinking,  your  way  of 
thinking,  if  not  what  they  ought  to  be,  are  indications  of 
either  monstrous  iniquity  or  ignorance.  I  can  by  repeated 
assaults  on  conscience  reduce  it  to  comparative  silence,  I 
can  by  repeated  abuse  of  the  light,  set  up  within  my  bosom, 
practically  extinguish  it,  I  can  by  constant  contact  with  men 
given  over  to  a  reprobate  sense  put  on  their  ways,  assume 
their  habits  of  thought,  and  sin  almost  without  remorse.^^^ut 
I  cannot,  no  man  can,  make  wrong  right.  No  man  can  by 
any  process  of  thought  make  the  crooked  line  of  wickedness 
identical  with  the  straight  line  of  virtue.  ^ 

The  man  with  a  moral  squint  was  either  born  that  way, 
and  took  no  pains  to  cure  the  defect,  or  acquired  the  habit 
later  in  life  by  repeated  acts  of  disloyalty  to  conscience.  If 
he  was  born  that  way,  and  honestly  tried  without  any  success 
to  better  himself,  he  is  a  moral  imbecile,  an  idiot,  and  irre- 
sponsible. If  he  acquired  the  habit,  he  is  a  monster  of  in- 
iquity ;  he  has  put  himself  into  a  hole  from  which  he  will 
never,  perhaps,  rise;  and  he  is  clearly  responsible,  indirectly 
or  in  cause,  for  every  wrong  he  does  the  laws  of  morality. 
This  suhjective  morality  is  a  modification,  extrinsic  and  super- 
added to  the  action  of  which  there  is  question.  It  depends 
for  all  its  force  on  the  intention,  and  therefore  the  knowledge 
of  the  agent.  It  differs  entirely  from  objective  morality, 
which  resides  wholly  in  the  deed  done,  which  is  a  something 
intrinsic  and  essential  to  that  deed,  and  is  entirely  inde- 
pendent of  the  agent's  intention  and  knowledge.  One  is  mo- 
rality of  the  man,  the  other  is  morality  of  his  acts;  and,  as  a 
man  is  not  good  unless  his  acts  are  good,  subjective  morality 
of  itself  without  objective  morality  is  worth  nothing. 

And  here  new  questions  arise,  those  of  responsibility  and 
merit.  The  man  whose  morality  is  purely  subjective,  who 
does  wrong  without  scruple,  may  be  in  one  of  three  classes. 
He  may  be  an  idiot,  and  is  no  more  responsible  for  his  acts 
than  brute  animals.  He  deserves  no  reward  for  whatever  is 
virtuous  in  his  conduct ;  he  deserves  no  blame  for  what  would 
be  in  another  highly  reprehensible.  He  may  be  the  victim  of 
ignorance  in  no  way  imputable  to  him,  of  ignorance  that  can 


SUMMARY  33 

with  no  amount  of  reasonable  endeavor  be  shaken  off.  In  this 
case,  if  any  such  exists,  he  is  ag'ain  irresponsible  for  his  con- 
dition, and  for  all  the  wrong  it  occasions.  In  neither  of  these 
two  cases  do  the  acts  elicited  cease  to  be  immoral  or  wicked 
from  an  objective  standpoint.  Objective  morality  is  some- 
thing outside  the  agent's  power,  and  no  ignorance,  no  idiocy 
can  destroy  or  change  it.  Of  course  the  insane  and  the  grossly 
ignorant  are  not  responsible  before  the  sovereign  Judge  for 
their  deeds;  but  responsibility,  imputability  and  demerit  are 
not  morality,  and  should  not  be  confounded  with  it.  Last  of 
all,  a  man  may  be  the  willing  victim  of  ignorance,  that  he 
could  have  easily  remedied  at  some  point  in  his  downward 
career,  that  he  on  the  contrary  fostered  and  encouraged  by 
every  means  at  his  disposal.  Such  ignorance  is  of  course 
inexcusable;  and  purely  subjective  morality,  or  immorality, 
based  on  it  is  deserving  of  condign  punishment. 

By  way  of  summary,  therefore,  we  maintain  that  subjec- 
tive morality  of  itself,  without  objective  morality  for  foun- 
dation, is  nothing.  Subjective  morality,  combined  with  in- 
vincible ignorance,  is  of  weight  in  moral  questions ;  but  such 
subjective  morality  is  not  subjective  morality  considered  in 
itself.  Invincible  ignorance  makes  a  wrong  conscience  right, 
it  never  makes  an  objectively  evil  act  objectively  good.  The 
man's  intellect  is  inculpably  wrong,  his  will  is  right.  His 
Jwill  embraces  what  his  intellect  represents  as  right,  and  the 
settlement  of  what  is  right  and  wrong,  subjectively  speaking, 
is  with  the  intellect,  not  with  the  will./  The  cases  in  which 
subjective  morality,  or  the  agent's  intention,  can  justify  or 
condemn  a  course  of  conduct,  are  limited  to  such  sort  of  acts 
as  are  indifferent  in  themselves  to  the  denominations  good 
and  bad.  Thus,  walking  is  a  healthful  exercise  for  the  legs, 
and  depends  entirely  on  purpose  and  circumstances  for  its 
morality.  If  a  man  uses  his  legs  on  an  errand  of  robbery, 
walking  becomes  for  him  morally  culpable.  If  he  uses  them 
on  an  errand  of  mercy,  or  for  purposes  of  worship  in  the 
church,  walking  becomes  a  virtue,  .g^ilful  murder  of  the  in- 
nocent will  forever  continue  to  be  a  crime,  no  matter  what 
view  deluded  men  take  of  the  tiling.  Wilful  murder  of  the 
guilty  by  any  man  or  body  of  men,  not  vested  with  the  right 
of  life  and  death,  resident  in  the  State,  will  never  be  any- 


34  GEJnERAL  ethics 

thing  short  of  murder/  Lynching,  for  instance,  is  on  the  face 
of  the  thing  immoral.  Circumstances  may  indeed  render  its 
authors  more  or  less  responsible  for  their  sin.  Zeal  for  law 
and  order  may  palliate  the  crime,  a  spirit  of  indignation  may 
fan  men's  minds  to  a  fury,  and  rob  them  for  the  time  being 
of  common-sense;  but  their  method  of  procediire  is  wrong, 
and  no  amount  of  zeal,  no  degree  of  excitement,  no  influence 
of  early  education  can  utterly  transform  the  nature  of  things, 
and  invest  crime  with  the  properties  of  virtue,  though  in- 
vincible ignorance  or  insanity  can  free  the  criminal  from 
blame. 

An  Essential  Difference.  This  is  opposed  to  an  accidental 
difference.  Another  name  for  the  same  thing  is  an  intrinsic 
difference,  as  opposed  to  extrinsic.  The  difference  between 
good  and  bad  is  essential,  inasmuch  as  no  power  can  remove 
this  quality  from  good  and  bad  actions.  It  is  intrinsic,  inas- 
much as  the  acts  denominate  themselves,  independently  of  all 
outside  interference.  This  difference  would  be  merely  acci- 
dental, if  it  were  not  wrapped  up  in  the  very  being  of  the  act ; 
if  it  could,  the  act  remaining  to  all  intents  and  purposes 
identically  the  same,  be  present  to  it  to-day  and  absent  from 
it  to-morrow.  It  would  be  merely  extrinsic,  if  it  owed  its 
whole  force  to  something  foreign  to  the  act.  Some  philos- 
ophers, whatever  their  motive,  have  seen  fit  to  set  up  a  merely 
accidental  and  extrinsic  difference  betweeen  good  and  evil. 
Thus,  Hohhes,  Rousseau  and  Hegel  contended-  that  civil  law  is 
the  standard  of  morality.  Saint  Lambert  and  Montaigne 
thought  public  opinion  and  tradition  the  rule.  Von  H&rf- 
mann  ascribed  everything  to  the  stage  of  evolution  compassed 
by  individual  consciences.  We  are  ready  with  good  grace  to 
grant  that  these  several  standards  are  immense  helps  towards 
detecting  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong.  Civil 
law,  for  instance,  though  not  very  universal  in  its  applica- 
tions, though  it  leaves  untouched  many  emergencies  liable  to 
occur  in  a  man's  daily  conduct,  is  nevertheless  uniformly  fair 
in  its  enactments,  and  draws  a  sharp  line  between  good  and 
bad.  Public  opinion  can  generally  be  trusted,  tradition  is  an 
abundant  source  of  correct  moral  notions,  and  conscience  when 
free  from  bias  is  unerring.  But  these  measures  are  all  open 
to  serious  objection  on  more  scores  than  one.     They  are  too 


ESSENTIAL  DIFFERENCE  35 

limited  in  extent.  They  are  too  much  subject  to  change. 
They  are  too  liable  to  shift  with  the  whims  and  fancies  of 
fickle  and  unstable  men.  They  are  entirely  subjective,  and 
deliver  over  to  the  empire  of  man  responsibilities,  more  dread- 
ful than  he  can  with  justice  be  expected  to  acquit  himself  of, 
vesting  him  with  jGod^s  prerogative  as  sole  arbiter  of  right 
and  wrong^Morality,  unless  it  rests  on  the  very  nature  of 
things,  is  settled  on  altogether  too  uncertain  a  foundation. 

Immediate  Measure.  The  measure  nearest  to  hand  for 
practical  use.  The  mediate  measure  is  the  more  remote,  more 
difficult  of  access,  the  last  reason  and  final  support  of  the  im- 
mediate measure,  the  model  according  to  which  the  immediate 
measure  is  shaped.  Room  of  Measures  in  the  Tower  of  Lon- 
don, and  measures  throughout  the  kingdom  can  serve  for 
illustration. 

Objective  Order  of  Things.  Order  is  defined,  ^^the  arrange- 
ment of  two  or  more  units  according  to  certain  definite  rela- 
tions.''  The  order  spoken  of  in  the  thesis  is  moral  order,  not 
physical;  the  units  composing  it  are  moral  beings,  with  intel- 
lect and  free  will,  God  and  men.  This  moral  order  is  two- 
fold, objective  and  subjective.  The  first  depends  altogether 
on  things  themselves,  the  second  adds  to  the  first  the  further 
circumstance  of  reception  into  an  intellect.  The  objective 
order  of  things  is  something  established  by  nature,  or  more 
properly  by  the  Author  of  nature.  Subjective  order  is  ob- 
jective order  grasped  and  recognized  by  the  mind,  or  knowl- 
edge of  things  based  on  the  relations  in  force  between  the 
multiplied  moral  units  of  creation.  Thus,  one  element  of 
objective  order  is  the  place  God  occupies  towards  men  in  the 
universe.  This  order,  the  very  nature  of  things,  requires 
that  men  acknowledge  and  worship  God.  His  prerogatives 
as  first  cause  and  last  end  can  be  satisfied  with  nothing  short 
of  that  twofold  homage.  Parents  are  such  by  nature  that 
order  is  disturbed,  unless  children  pay  them  the  reverence, 
obedience  and  deference  due  their  station.  An  innocent  man 
has  an  inalienable  right  to  his  life,  and  only  the  rankest  kind 
of  disorder  would  refuse  to  respect  his  right.  But  this  objec- 
tive order  would  be  of  little  avail  as  a  rule  of  conduct,  unless 
it  became  part  and  parcel  of  a  man's  intellectual  wares  by 
entering  his  mind.     Hence,  the  standard  of  morality  in  its 


36  ge5teral  ethics 

completeness,  is  said  to  be  the  objective  order  of  things  as  un- 
derstood by  the  intellect. 

Ood's  Wisdom  and  Goodness.  God's  wisdom,  as  far  as  we 
are  at  present  concerned,  is  the  mind  of  God  made  manifest 
to  us  in  creation.  His  goodness  is  His  will  made  manifest  to 
us  in  the  same  mirror. 


Proofs  I,  II,  III 
I.  a,  Man^s  destiny  in  this  life  consists  in  drawing  closer 
and  closer  to  his  last  end. 

b,  His  destiny  is  made  good  by  the  establishment  of  moral 
rectitude  in  his  actions. 

c,  This  moral  rectitude  constitutes  man's  supremest  hap- 
piness on  earth. 

a,  This  life  and  the  future  life  are  integral  parts  of  man's 
whole  duration.  Ergo,  man's  destiny  in  this  life  should  be  as 
far  as  possible  identical  with  that  of  his  future  life.  But 
man 's  destiny  in  the  life  to  come  is  complete  happiness,  or  the 
secure  enjoyment  of  God  forever;  and  the  only  condition  re- 
sembling this  final  state,  and  at  present  possible  to  man,  is  in- 
complete happiness,  or  a  closer  and  closer  union  with  his  last 
end.  Ergo,  man's  destiny  in  this  life  consists  in  drawing 
closer  and  closer  to  his  last  end. 

b,  Near  union  with  God,  as  man's  last  end  or  destiny  in  this 
life,  1st,  ought  to  imply  man 's  highest  perfection ;  2nd,  ought 
to  be  something  in  man's  power;  3rd,  ought  to  contribute  its 
share  towards  the  consummation  of  nature's  universal  end. 
But  such  is  the  establishment  of  moral  rectitude  in  man's 
actions.  Ergo,  man's  destiny  in  this  life  is  the  establishment 
of  moral  rectitude  in  his  actions. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  1st,  Because  every  end  implies 
the  agent 's  good,  the  last  end  implies  the  agent 's  highest  good. 
2nd,  Because^an  is  free,  and  the  working  out  of  his  destiny 
must  depend  on  his  own  efforts./  3rd,  Because  man  is  a  unit 
in  nature,  and  God's  wisdom  makes  it  necessary  for  the  units 
in  nature  to  work  together  in  harmony. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  1st,  Man's  highest  good  affects 
what  is  noblest  in  man,  his  reason;  reason's  most  perfect  work 
is  order;  and  moral  rectitude  or  virtue  is  a  life  in  harmony 


PROOFS  37 

with  objective  order.  2nd,  Gifts  of  body  like  health,  wealth, 
beauty,  are  independent  of  our  wishes ;  but  moral  rectitude  is 
the  man's  own  handiwork.  3rd,  Creatures  inferior  to  man 
work  unto  their  ends  by  nature,  or  instinct,  and  necessarily ; 
man  works  unto  his  end  by  the  use  of  free  will,  with  full  lib- 
erty; and  so  completes  the  graded  scale  of  being  in  the  uni- 
verse. 

/^c,  Man 's  supremest  happiness  on  earth  consists  in  this,  that 
in  the  sum  total  of  evil  and  good,  good  preponderates.  But 
moral  rectitude  in  a  man's  life  procures  this  result.  Ergo, 
moral  rectitude  constitutes  man's  supremest  happiness  on 
earth. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  there 
are  higher  joys  than  delights  of  the  body,  just  men  are  always 
the  least  unhappy.  They  own  a  peace  the  world  knows  not. 
Their  wills  are  developed  in  the  right  direction  by  constant 
exercise  in  the  pursuit  of  good.  Their  minds  are  sharpened 
by  intellectual  employment.  They  escape  all  the  penalties 
of  the  law.  They  are  strangers  to  the  annoyance  of  remorse. 
They  are  free  from  the  pains,  diseases  and  early  death  that 
wickedness  often  engenders. 

Confirmation.  The  happiness  bom  of  moral  rectitude,  is  a 
figure  and  shadow  of  the  happiness  the  blessed  enjoy  in 
Heaven.     Ergo. 

II.  1st,  Were  there  no  essential  and  intrinsic  difference  be- 
tween right  and  wrong,  there  would  be  no  acts  essentially 
and  intrinsically  right  and  wrong.  But  many  such  acts  in 
reality  exist.  Ergo,  between  right  and  wrong  an  essential 
and  intrinsic  difference  exists. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Love  of  God  is  an  act  essen- 
tially and  intrinsically  right.  It  is  right  now,  it  was  always 
right,  and  will  forever  continue  to  be  right,  even  if  the  whole 
world  entered  into  a  conspiracy  to  call  it  wrong.  Hatred  of 
God  is  in  precisely  the  same  way  an  act  essentially  and  in- 
trinsically wrong. 

2nd,  Right  and  wrong  have  characteristics  essentially  dif- 
ferent. Ergo,  between  right  and  wrong  an  essential  dif- 
ference exists. 

With  regard  to  the  Antecedent.  From  proof  of  next  part 
it  will  appear,  that  right  is  harmony  with  the  objective  order 


38  GENERAL  ETHICS 

of  things;  and  wrong,  absence  of  this  harmony.  Harmony 
and  discord  are  essentially  different. 

III.  a,  immediate  measure;  h,  mediate  measure. 

a,  1st,  Acts  are  right,  when  in  perfect  agreement  with  the 
dictates  of  reason ;  acts  are  wrong,  when  beside  these  dictates. 
But  the  dictates  of  reason  are  objective  order,  as  understood 
by  the  intellect.  Ergo,  the  immediate  measure  of  moral  rec- 
titude is  the  objective  order  of  things,  as  understood  by  the 
intellect. 

With  regard  to  the  Major.  Reason  is  the  guide  vouchsafed 
to  man  by  Grod  for  his  safe  conduct,  and  reason's  dictates  are 
the  rule  of  morality. 

With  regard  ta  the  Minor.  Not  to  be  a  purely  subjective 
standard,  the  dictates  of  reason  must  be  founded  on  the  ob- 
jective order  of  things.  Otherwise  the  dictates  are  vagaries 
and  hallucinations. 

N.B.  The  dictates  of  reason  are  moral  obligations  an- 
nounced by  reason,  the  herald  of  the  Natural  Law,  and  they 
get  fuller  consideration  in  our  next  thesis.  They  are  practi- 
cal judgments,  not  mere  speculative  statements,  and  always 
involve  moral  necessity  or  strict  obligation,  denoted  by  the 
word  *'must"  or  ''ought."  God  must  be  worshipped,  par- 
ents must  be  obeyed.  "Must"  means  moral  obligation  or 
necessity,  not  physical.  Free  agents  as  such  are  incapable  of 
physical.  Moral  obligation  means  moral  necessity  of  putting 
or  omitting  a  physically  free  act,  absolutely  required  for  the 
procurement  of  a  good  absolutely  necessary  for  the  mun  in 
the  moral  order.  This  good  is  his  last  end.  Moral  obligation 
arises  from  objective  order  and  divine  command  together. 
Kant  derives  it  from  objective  order  alone  without  God,  and 
this  is  what  his  categorical  imperative  in  substance  means. 
Moral  obligation  arises  in  part  from  objective  order,  because 
virtue  is  way  to  last  end,  and  virtue  is  harmony  with  objective 
order.  Not  every  good  act  is  necessary  to  last  end,  but  only 
such  good  acts  as  cannot  be  omitted  without  detriment  to  ob- 
jective order,  and  reason  acquaints  us  with  them.  Moral 
obligation  arises  in  part  from  divine  command,  because  God 
alone  as  Creator  is  empowered  to  set  man  a  last  end,  tie  him 
with  a  perfect  moral  bond  and  give  him  by  way  of  source  and 
origin  virtue  and  every  other  perfection. 


PROOFS  39 

2nd,  Right  and  wrong  proceed  from  harmony  and  dis- 
agreement with  nature ;  and  the  immediate  measure  of  moral 
rectitude  is  what  primarily  enables  us  to  distinguish  with 
certainty  between  them.  But  to  distinguish  is  to  know,  and 
this  harmony  and  disagreement  with  nature  can  reach  our 
knowledge  only  through  the  intellect,  understanding  things 
just  as  they  are,  or  the  objective  order  of  things.  Ergo,  the 
immediate  measure  of  moral  rectitude  is  the  objective  order 
of  things,  as  understood  by  the  intellect. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  Nature  means  things  as  God 
made  them,  things  just  as  they  are,  the  objective  order  of 
things. 

3rd,  Rejection  of  other  standards.  Not  public  opinion,  be- 
cause opinion  is  rather  measured  by  our  standard;  opinion  is 
uncertain,  changeable  and  unsafe.  Not  civil  law,  because  law 
is  rather  measured  by  our  standard;  law  cannot  make  cer- 
tain acts  good,  certain  acts  bad. 

b,  The  mediate  measure  of  morality  is  that  on  which  the 
immediate  measure  depends.  But  its  immediate  measure,  the 
objective  order  of  things,  depends  on  the  wisdom  and  good- 
ness of  God.  Ergo,  the  mediate  measure  of  moral  rectitude  is 
God's  wisdom  and  goodness. 

With  regard  to  the  Minor.  All  creation,  signified  by  the 
objective  order  of  things,  proceeds  from  the  wisdom  and 
goodness  of  God. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Man's  supreme  happiness  is  absence  of  pain,  sickness, 
sorrow.  Answer.  Man  is  made  up  of  body  and  soul.  His 
body,  or  sense-appetite,  seeks  agreeable  good,  like  animals,  by 
instinct ;  his  soul,  or  rational  appetite  or  will,  seeks  becoming 
good,  desirable  in  itself,  without  heed  to  pain  and  sorrow, 
when  opposed  to  becoming  good.  Soul  surpasses  body,  and 
man's  will  is  man's  highest  faculty  in  the  order  of  morality. 

B.  Senses  ought  to  be  consulted  in  this  life.  A^iswer. 
Complete  happiness  is  impossible  in  this  life.  Man's  highest 
good  appeals  to  what  is  spiritual  within  him,  because  intelli- 
gence is  his  specific  characteristic.  When  sense  wars  against 
reason,  it  must  be  repressed.     Deficiencies  will  be  more  toler- 


40 


GENERAL  ETHICS 


able,  if  in  the  domain  of  sense.  Of  course,  the  less  pain,  the 
better;  the  more  at  ease  the  sense,  the  better;  provided  only 
that  reason,  or  the  spiritual  element  in  man,  suffers  thereby 
no  detriment.  If  pain  of  sense,  want  of  bodily  comfort,  sor- 
row of  soul,  contribute  to  progress  in  morality,  they  are  to  be 
welcomed  with  the  enthusiasm  of  fortitude. 

C.  Fear  of  loss  is  compatible  with  incomplete  happiness, 
not  with  complete. 


THESIS  IV 

A  natural  law,  unchangeable,  universal,  eternal,  has  place 
in  men;  its  complete  and  full  sanction  is  reserved  for  the  next 
life;  and  eternal  punishment  is  not  opposed  to  God's  good- 
ness. This  natural  law  is  the  foundation  and  corner-stone  of 
all  positive  laiv.    Jouin,  36-48 ;  Rickahy,  133-177. 

QUESTION 

We  are  now  satisfied,  that  the  promotion  of  morality's  in- 
terests in  himself  and  others,  is  man's  present  destiny.  For 
the  happiness,  which  righteousness  alone  can  purchase  for 
him,  is  the  nearest  possible  approach  to  complete  bliss  this 
earth  knows.  It  makes  of  life  a  veritable  antechamber  to  a 
blessed  eternity;  it  leads  a  man  right  up  to  the  threshold  of 
God's  presence;  and  God's  enduring  presence  is  the  ne  plus 
ultra  of  man 's  hopes  and  desires.  We  are  likewise  the  happy 
possessors  of  a  standard  sound  and  true,  which  will  infallibly 
enable  us  to  detect  the  ever  present  difference  between  right 
and  wrong.  The  objective  order  of  things,  as  grasped  by  the 
intellect,  is  our  measure;  and  we  feel  secure  in  our  posi- 
tion. For,  in  trusting  our  lot  to  this  rule  or  measure,  we  are 
ultimately  leaning  on  the  wisdom  and  goodness  of  an  all-wise 
and  beneficent  God. 

But  here  a  difficulty  arises.  We  know  that  a  shadow  and 
image  of  complete  happiness  will  result  to  us  from  steady 
compliance  with  the  exactions  of  morality.  We  know  that 
any  falling  away  from  rectitude  will  be  visited  with  punish- 
ment, such  at  least  that  our  days  will  be  more  acquainted 
with  woes  than  with  blessings.  Incomplete  happiness  at- 
taches to  virtue ;  incomplete  misery,  to  vice.  But  beyond  this 
we  are  at  sea.  Unless  we  establish  in  this  matter  of  morality 
the  living  presence  of  law,  framed  and  backed  by  a  being  of 
high  authority,  rectitude  becomes  a  thing  of  mere  taste,  choice 
between  incomplete  happiness  and  incomplete  misery,  its  obli- 

41 


42 


GENERAL  ETHICS 


gations  are  trivial  indeed,  because  self-imposed.  Some  phi- 
losophers venture  an  answer  to  the  difficulty  by  setting  up 
what  they  call  the  autonomy  of  reason.  They  follow  Kant. 
They  wish  wickedness,  pure  and  simple,  to  be  its  own  full 
chastisement,  and  virtue  its  own  reward.  In  other  words, 
they  want  no  external  influence  whatever  brought  to  bear  on 
man,  in  the  problem  of  mapping  out  his  conduct.  They  want 
the  disgust  experienced  in  deeds  of  crime,  the  mind's  ill-ease, 
to  be  sole  bar  to  the  commission  of  wrong.  They  would  rec- 
ognize no  sin  but  that  superior  airy  sort  of  transgression 
styled  philosophic.  Theological  sin,  and  the  unrest  it  occa- 
sions by  fear  of  some  personal  avenger,  they  cry  down,  and 
declare  creatures  of  superstitious  imagination.  But  the  au- 
tonomy of  reason  is  an  afterthought  of  godlessness,  and  has 
atheism  for  single  excuse.  As  a  system,  if  reduced  to  prac- 
tice, it  would  in  one  generation  involve  the  world  in  moral 
ruin.  If  reason  were  its  own  law,  and  judge,  and  headsman, 
our  cities  would  soon  teem  with  cutthroats,  thieves  and  as- 
sassins. They  are  not  a  polite  crew,  and  the  shock  their 
better  instincts  experience,  when  engaged  in  wrong-doing, 
hardly  restrains  their  hands.  The  noise  made  by  mere  con- 
sciousness of  being  out  of  harmony  with  nature,  makes  them 
lose  no  very  appreciable  amount  of  sleep.  Such  sanction 
might  possibly  exert  a  check  on  high-strung,  very  correct  dis- 
positions ;  but  it  would  never  reach  the  multitude  in  anything 
like  an  effective  way. 

Law  alone,  with  its  tremendous  sense  of  obligation,  with 
its  terrifying  dread  of  penalty,  can  hold  our  race  to  the  ob- 
servance of  right  and  the  avoidance  of  wrong.  And  God 
would  be  doing  mankind  an  incalculable  injury,  He  would 
be  raining  down  evils  upon  our  heads,  did  He  not  step  into 
the  breach  as  a  legislator,  and  confirm  us  in  rectitude  by  law 
and  all  the  vast  machinery  of  retributive  sanction.  Were 
man  responsible  to  himself  only  for  his  misdeeds,  he  would 
escape  with  scant  justice,  and  would  deny  himself  in  nothing. 
It  is  our  business  to  prove  that  mere  knowledge  of  wrong 
done,  and  the  confusion  springing  from  such  knowledge,  are 
not  morality's  naked  sanction.  We  have  to  establish  the  ex- 
istence of  a  law,  born  with  the  man,  imperatively  ordering  the 
fulfilment  of  all  justice,  imperatively  forbidding  the  accom- 


DIVISION  OF  LAW  43 

plishment  of  any  evil.  We  intend  to  vindicate  to  this  law 
characteristics  wholly  its  own,  ranking  it  high  above  all  the 
enactments  of  human  positive  law.  We  intend,  further,  to 
make  good  by  positive  argument  the  nature  of  its  sanction, 
and  show  that  it  is  the  root,  foundation  and  support  of  all 
positive  law.  Unless  a  man  approaches  the  work  of  intro- 
ducing rectitude  into  his  conduct  with  the  deepest  respect 
for  natural  law,  and  with  a  live  consciousness  of  its  obliga- 
tions, he  is  not  fully  equipped  for  the  task  imposed  upon  him 
by  nature,  and  will  inevitably  miss  his  destiny.  Hence  the 
importance,  the  necessity,  of  setting  these  notions  on  a  firm 
basis,  of  demonstrating  their  objective  value,  and  placing  it 
beyond  the  reach  of  dispute  and  cavil. 


TERMS 

Natural  Law.  Law,  taken  in  its  widest  sense,  is  a  stand- 
ard or  rule  of  action,  directive  of  the  agent  to  its  proper  end. 
The  following  table  presents  at  a  glance  the  various  possible 
kinds  of  law. 

Law,  3^ 

In  widest  sense,  ? 

In  less  wide  sense,  ^ 

In  strict  and  proper  sense,  ^ 

Divine,  ^ 

Human,  ^ 

Eternal,  ^ 

Natural,  ^ 

Positive,  ^ 

Ecclesiastical,  ^9 

Civil,  11/ 

1?  The  word  law  is  a  derivative  from  the  Latin  ligare,  to 
bind ;  and  invariably  suggests  the  idea  of  obligation. 

^  Standard  or  rule  of  action,  directive  of  agent  to  proper 
end.  E.g.,  laws  of  nutrition,  &c.,  &c.  Applicable  not  only  to 
man  and  beasts,  but  to  dead  matter  as  well. 

N.B.     Action,  or  motion,  from  without  is  not  life. 

5  Standard  or  rule,  directive  of  artistic  efforts.     E.g.,  laws 


44  GENERAL  ETHICS 

of  painting,   sculpture,  poetry,  oratory.     Applicable  to  be- 
ings endowed  with  intellect,  and  therefore  to  man  alone. 

^  An  ordinance  founded  on  right  reason,  drawn  up  and 
promulgated  for  the  common  good  by  him  who  has  charge  of 
the  community  affected.  Applicable  to  moral  acts  alone,  to 
acts  proceeding  from  an  intellect  and  a  free  will.  This  defi- 
nition is  taken  bodily  from  St.  Thomas,  Summa  Theol.  1.  2; 
Q.  90;  a.  4.,  All  four  causes,  material,  formal,  final  and  ef- 
ficient, enter  into  its  composition.  It  separates  law  from 
every  conceivable  notion  resembling  the  same.  It  observes 
due  bounds,  and  keeps  law  within  its  own  limits.  On  ac- 
count of  these  several  qualities  the  definition  is  all  that  can 
be  desired,  and  commends  itself  to  everybody.  Thus,  the 
matter  of  law  is  derived  from  principles  vouched  for  by 
right  reason.  No  other  rule  can  be  of  binding  force  on  men 
possessed  of  intellects.  This  is  so  true  that  a  clearly  unrea- 
sonable law  is  no  law  at  all.  It  may  be  well,  however,  to 
remark  that,  commonly  speaking,  the  only  safe  position  to 
occupy  in  this  matter  is  voiced  in  that  saying  of  moralists, 
^'In  doubt  acquiescence  in  the  will  of  the  superior  is  a  duty.'' 
The  care  of  a  community  is  so  complex  a  thing,  affected  by 
circumstances  so  far  above  the  understanding  and  apprecia- 
tion of  individuals  governed,  that  the  superior  alone,  with 
multiplied  advantages  at  his  disposal,  and  a  clear  vision  of 
intricate  details,  can  best  judge  what  ruling  the  exigencies  of 
the  case  demand.  He  alone  knows  best  the  wants  of  his  em- 
pire. He  alone  knows  best  what  good  results,  in  the  long 
run,  this  or  that  enactment  will,  in  spite  of  appearances  to 
the  contrary,  effect.  His  practised  eye  is  accustomed  to  look 
at  things  from  a  higher  plane.  Individuals  in  the  state  look 
not  beyond  personal  convenience  and  inconvenience,  and 
would,  perhaps,  in  their  selfishness  little  reck  what  fate  be- 
fell the  government,  if  only  they  escaped  unhurt  from  the 
ruins.  Hence,  they  are  wide  awake  to  detect  in  every  new 
ruling  some  semblance  of  injustice.  Men  are  born  rebels, 
and  are  apt  to  be  prejudiced  judges,  when  passing  on  a  law 
that  interferes  with  their  privileges,  or  cuts  down  the  measure 
of  their  liberties.  They  easily  lose  sight  of  the  circumstance, 
that  legislation  is  primarily  for  the  community 's  benefit ;  that 
the  individual  must  on  occasions  retire  into  the  background, 


NATURAL  LAW  45 

and  submit  to  the  indignity  of  being  trampled  upon,  just  to 
push  the  community's  interests  to  the  front.  Hence,  a  law 
is  not  to  be  set  aside  the  very  first  moment  a  cry  of  injustice 
is  raised  against  it.  It  must  be  viewed  on  all  sides,  its  prac- 
tical workings  must  be  followed  down  to  their  minutest  de- 
tails, and  the  common  good,  not  private  advantage,  must  be 
the  standard  of  measurement.  If,  however,  it  plainly  offends 
against  the  demands  of  right  reason,  it  can  be  rated  no  law 
at  all,  and  neglected  as  such.  A  law  is  not  a  precept.  The 
former  affects  equally  the  whole  community,  the  latter  is  re- 
stricted to  this  or  that  individual.  The  distinction  between 
the  two  is  brought  out  in  the  definition.  Of  course  law  is 
binding,  only  when  it  proceeds  from  a  legitimate  source,  from 
the  representative  of  authority,  who  alone  enjoys  legislative 
rights,  as  means  to  the  discharge  of  his  duties.  Due  promul- 
gation may  be  called  a  necessary  property  of  law.  Law  is  in- 
tended for  human  beings;  and,  as  knowledge  is  the  main- 
spring of  all  their  deliberate  acts,  knowledge  of  the  law  must 
precede  its  fulfilment.  This  necessary  condition  must  not  be 
understood  to  run  counter  to  that  common  saying  in  the 
courts,  ''Ignorance  of  the  law  is  no  excuse."  A  law  may  be 
thoroughly  well  promulgated,  and  yet  escape  the  notice  of 
stray  members  in  the  community.  Promulgation  means 
simply  advertisement  sufficiently  public  and  widespread  to 
catch  the  attention  of  citizens  blessed  with  the  ordinary 
amount  of  prudence  and  care.  It  by  no  means  ensures  knowl- 
edge of  the  law  to  such  as  are  too  ignorant  or  too  indifferent 
to  help  themselves.  Sanction,  too,  capable  of  frightening  off 
violators,  and  creating  in  men  a  salutary  respect  for  the  law, 
is  considered  a  requisite  for  every  enactment  meant  to  be  seri- 
ously taken. 

^  Divine  law  has  God  for  author,  and  that  too  in  an  im- 
mediate sense.  All  law  proceeds  from  God  as  origin.  It  is 
strictly  divine,  only  when  God  is  its  framer,  whether  He  ac- 
complishes everything  by  Himself  solely,  or  uses  man  as  His 
mouthpiece. 

?  Human  law  is  framed  by  man  without  immediate  in- 
terference on  the  part  of  God. 

"^  Eternal  law.  St.  Augustine,  contra  Faustum,  122,  c.  27., 
offers  this  definition,  ^* God's  reason  or  will  commanding  the 


46  GENERAL  ETHICS 

preservation  of  natural  order,  forbidding  its  disturbance/' 
God  is  the  supreme  Lord  of  nature.  He  is  King,  with  the 
universe  for  throne,  and  all  the  creatures  of  the  universe  for 
subjects.  He  is,  therefore,  a  legislator  as  well;  and  His 
kingdom  is  under  the  sway  of  laws  chosen  and  appointed  by 
Himself.  But  He  is  unchangeable,  and  what  He  is  to-day, 
He  was  and  is  from  all  eternity.  This  code  of  laws,  therefore, 
for  the  government  of  His  creatures,  had  been  in  His  thoughts 
endless  ages  of  ages  before  creation  proceeded  from  the 
strength  of  His  hands.  Every  lawmaker  first  submits  to  his 
mind  for  approval,  whatever  enactments  he  intends  to  later 
on  promulgate.  He  likewise  lays  before  his  will  tentative 
drafts  of  the  same,  for  rejection  or  adoption.  And,  when  the 
work  of  inspection  is  over,  he  stands  ready  to  acquaint  the 
world  with  his  wishes.  Barring  whatever  imperfection  clings 
to  this  method  of  procedure,  God  is  no  exception  to  the  rule  in 
its  fundamental  points.  The  laws  that  now  govern  nature 
were  first  passed  upon  by  His  wisdom,  and  constitute  in  that 
stage  of  the  process  what  we  call  eternal  law. 

5  Natural  law,  objectively  taken,  that  is,  viewed  with  ref- 
erence to  the  source  from  which  it  proceeds,  is  eternal  law  in 
its  application  to  man,  or  become  evident  in  rational  nature ; 
it  is  man's  half  of  God's  eternal  law.  Subjectively  taken,  that 
is,  viewed  with  reference  to  man,  it  is  an  inborn  habit  of 
mind,  enabling  a  man  to  detect  the  harmony  or  discord  in 
force  between  the  notions  that  constitute  morality's  first  prin- 
ciples. By  principles  of  morality  we  here  mean  statements 
vouched  for  by  reason,  and  indicative  of  right  and  wrong. 
These  principles  are  various,  and  are  rated  in  importance 
according  to  their  different  degi'ees  of  cogency.  Thus,  first  or 
pmmary  principles  are  such  as  have  in  their  favor  the  clearest 
kind  of  evidence,  and  are  so  plain  that  even  at  first  sight  no 
man  of  ordinary  common  sense  can  doubt  their  accuracy. 
Instances  are,  ''Man  must  do  good  and  avoid  evil;  Man  must 
lead  an  orderly  life ;  God  must  be  loved. ' '  Principles  of  this 
first  class  can  under  no  conceivable  supposition  become  void 
of  effect  or  untrue,  and  they  admit  of  no  ignorance,  vincible  or 
invincible.  And  all  this,  simply  because  the  above  statements, 
on  account  of  relations  intervening  between  subject  and  pred- 
icate, contain  necessary  truths.     Principles,  immediately  and 


GLASSES  OF  PRECEPTS  47 

with  little  effort  derived  from  these  first  or  primary  prin- 
ciples, constitute  a  second  class.  The  ten  commandments  of 
the  Decalogue  are  said  to  be  laws  of  this  second  class.  Some 
writers  except  the  third,  because  it  singles  out  the  Sabbath. 
These  principles  admit  of  vincible  not  invincible  ignorance. 
Finally,  a  third  place  is  occupied  hy  principles,  flowing  indeed 
from  first  or  primary  and  secondary  principles,  hut  in  a  some- 
what hidden  and  obscure  way.  They  become  evident  only 
after  mature  consideration,  and  on  this  account,  perhaps,  are 
thoroughly  well  grasped  by  only  the  learned.  Polygamy  and 
divorce  are  examples,  alleged  by  some  authors,  of  laws  con- 
tained in  this  third  class.  These  last  principles  admit  of 
even  invincible  ignorance. 

Eternal  law  provides  for  physical  and  moral  order  alike; 
natural  law,  because  meant  for  men,  provides  for  moral  order 
alone.  Substitute  moral  order  for  natural  order  in  St.  Augus- 
tine's  definition  of  eternal  law,  add  promulgated  or  made 
manifest  in  the  light  of  reason,  and  you  have  at  once  natural 
law  objectively  taken.  Objectively,  then,  natural  law  is  a 
divine  command  issuing  from  God's  reason  or  will,  prescrib- 
ing the  preservation  of  moral  order,  forbidding  its  disturb- 
ance. Natural  law  objectively  taken  is  natural  law  as  it 
exists  in  God,  its  maker ;  subjectively  taken,  it  is  natural  law 
as  it  exists  in  man,  the  person  it  affects  or  binds.  Subjec- 
tively taken,  natural  law  is  an  inborn  habit  of  mind,  enabling 
man  to  know  what  he  must  do  and  what  he  must  avoid.  Man 
must  do  only  what  is  in  harmony  with  moral  objective  order, 
he  must  avoid  what  is  at  discord  with  the  same  order ;  and  we 
already  proved  that  this  objective  order  is  the  measure  of 
morality.  He  must,  therefore,  be  able  to  detect  this  har- 
mony and  discord,  and  natural  law  is  the  means  put  at  his 
disposal  by  God.  Natural  law  objectively  taken  is  made  up 
of  what  we  call  morality's  first  principles,  commands  issuing 
from  the  reason  or  will  of  God;  each  of  the  principles,  like 
all  judgments,  contains  a  subject  and  predicate,  and  the  har- 
mony or  discord  the  natural  law  subjectively  taken  helps  the 
mind  to  detect  is  between  these  subjects  and  predicates  in 
morality's  first  principles.  Instances  are,  God  is  a  person 
who  must  be  worshipped  by  man.  Parents  are  persons  who 
must  be  obeyed  by  their  children.     Worship  is  in  harmony 


48  GENERAL  ETHICS 

with  God,  the  creator.  Obedience  is  in  harmony  with  parents, 
makers  and  guides.  Killing  is  at  discord  with  innocent  per- 
sons. Taking  is  at  discord  with  what  belongs  to  another. 
Untruth  is  at  discord  with  the  purpose  of  language. 

These  principles  of  morality  are  not  mere  speculative  state- 
ments, they  are  practical  judgments,  with  a  must  or  an  ought. 
The  harmony  or  discord  is  between  the  subject  and  predicate, 
the  must  or  ought  is  from  the  divine  command  prescribing  to 
human  nature  the  preservation  of  order,  forbidding  its  dis- 
turbance. This  is  right  or  this  is  wrong,  is  a  mere  speculative 
'statement ;  this  ought  to  be  done,  or  this  ought  to  be  avoided, 
is  a  practical  judgment.  Mind  is  not  the  maker  of  the  nat- 
ural law,  but  its  herald.  God  is  its  maker,  man  is  its  subject, 
and  his  mind  helps  him  to  a  knowledge  of  it,  much  as  the 
medium  that  advertises  state  legislation.  In  this  sense  the 
natural  law  is  said  to  be  written  or  printed  in  the  mind  or 
heart  of  man.  Therefore  principles  of  morality  are  practical 
judgments  vouched  for  by  reason,  and  indicative  of  right  and 
wrong. 

'^Do  good  and  avoid  evil/'  is  the  one  first  principle  by  ex- 
cellence of  the  natural  law,  because  it  implicitly  contains  the 
whole  law,  and  because  from  it  all  a  man's  duties  are  deriv- 
able. Other  principles  are  variously  classified  by  various  au- 
thors as  first,  second  and  third  principles;  as  primary,  sec- 
ondary and  remote  conclusions  from  both;  as  immediate,  prox- 
imate and  remote.  First,  primary  and  immediate  admit  of  no 
ignorance,  vincible  or  invincible ;  second,  secondary  and  prox- 
imate admit  of  vincible  ignorance ;  third  principles  and  re- 
mote conclusions  admit  of  even  invincible  ignorance.  In  every 
principle  of  the  natural  law  the  predicate  is  somehow  con- 
tained in  the  subject.  Otherwise  some  principles  of  the  nat- 
ural law  would  be  false.  In  first  or  primary  principles  the 
predicate  is  contained  in  the  subject,  and  its  presence  cannot 
be  missed  by  normal  minds;  it  can  be  seen  at  a  glance.  In 
second  or  secondary  principles  the  predicate  can  be  discov- 
ered in  the  subject  with  ease,  with  small  or  no  study.  In 
third  principles  or  remote  conclusions  the  discovery  is  made 
with  difficulty  and  at  the  expense  of  considerable  study. 

Worship  of  God  is  a  prescription  of  the  natural  law.  Wor- 
ship of  God  in  general,  without  any  qualifications,  is  a  pri- 


CLASSES  OF  PRECEPTS  49 

mary  principle;  external  worship  is  a  secondary  principle; 
and  worship  on  the  Sabbath,  as  distinct  from  other  days  of 
the  week,  can  be  called  a  remote  conclusion  from  the  other  two 
principles.  No  ignorance,  vincible  or  invincible,  regarding 
the  need  of  worship  in  general  is  possible.  Ignorance  regard- 
ing the  need  of  exterior  worship  is  possible,  but  always  vin- 
cible and  inexcusable.  Invincible  ignorance  regarding  wor- 
ship on  the  Sabbath  is  easily  conceivable.  Lies  are  forbidden 
by  the  natural  law.  The  prohibition  against  lies  in  general, 
without  any  qualifications,  is  a  primary  principle.  '^Tliou 
shalt  not  lie,"  is  a  secondary  principle  easily  deduced  from 
the  first;  and  it  leaves  room  for  vincible  ignorance.  Thou 
shalt  not  lie,  to  save  an  important  secret,  to  avert  war,  to 
prevent  murder,  is  a  remote  conclusion  deducible  with  some 
difficulty  from  primary  and  secondary,  and  it  admits  of  even 
invincible  ignorance.  Theft  and  murder  are  against  the  nat- 
ural law.  Avoid  theft,  avoid  murder  are  primary  principles. 
Thou  shalt  not  steal,  thou  shalt  not  kill  are  secondary  prin- 
ciples. Thou  shalt  not  steal  from  motives  of  kindness  to  the 
poor,  from  motives  of  religion  or  piety,  to  get  an  education, 
is  a  remote  conclusion  from  primary  and  secondary.  Thou 
shalt  not  kill  at  the  request  of  your  victim,  to  do  your  victim 
a  favor,  to  benefit  the  race,  to  send  your  victim  to  Heaven,  to 
propagate  the  true  religion,  is  a  remote  conclusion  from  pri- 
mary and  secondary. 

The  nature  or  substance  of  the  act  forbidden  by  natural  law 
suggests  this  other  division.  Some  principles  turn  on  acts  had 
in  themselves,  on  their  own  account,  absolutely,  in  a  way  in- 
dependent of  every  outside  consideration.  Instances  are, 
hatred  of  God,  blasphemy,  idolatry,  a  lie.  Others  turn  on  acts 
had  in  themselves,  not  on  their  own  account,  hut  on  account  of 
a  violated  right  involved  in  the  act  itself;  not  ahsolutely,  hut 
conditionally;  not  independently,  hut  with  dependence  on  the 
right  in  question.  Instances  are,  theft  and  murder.  Others 
again  turn  on  acts  had  in  themselves,  not  on  their  own  account, 
hut  on  account  of  moral  risk  or  danger  involved  in  the  act. 
Instances  are,  px)lygamy,  divorce,  heretical  and  impure  read- 
ing. Things  wrong  the  first  way  admit  no  change  of  matter 
and  are  always  and  everywhere  wrong.  Things  wrong  the 
second  and  third  waj^s  admit  change  of  matter;  and,  the 


50  GENERAL  ETHICS 

change  made,  they  cease  to  be  wrong.  God  can  take  away 
the  right  involved  or  the  owner  can  lose  it.  God  can  remove 
the  risk  and  danger  or  a  proportionate  cause  can  justify  the 
risk  or  danger. 

In  their  attempts  to  explain  God's  approval  of  polygamy 
in  the  Old  Law,  writers  experience  trouble,  and  have  recourse 
to  various  interpretations  of  natural  law.  One  school  recog- 
nizes three  different  types  of  precepts  urged  hy  the  natural 
law.  These  types  are  much  the  same  in  nature  as  the  precepts 
just  explained,  and  are  called  most  universal,  remote  and  more 
remote;  or,  with  Meyer,  primary,  secondary  and  more  remote. 
Examples  are,  *'Do  good,  and  avoid  evil."  "Honor  thy 
father  and  mother."  "Be  a  man  of  one  wife."  The  Thom- 
ists,  who  insist  on  this  classification,  teach  that  God  can  dis- 
pense with  the  natural  law  in  precepts  of  the  third  class. 
Suarez  objects  to  the  statement,  that  God  is  at  liberty  to  dis- 
pense with  the  natural  law  in  any  of  its  enactments.  Since 
we  have  agreed  to  regard  the  natural  law  as  a  mere  manifesta- 
tion of  the  eternal  law,  his  position  is  well  taken ;  and  we  hold 
with  him  that  God  in  sanctioning  polygamy  nowise  inter- 
fered with  the  operation  of  the  natural  law.  He  procured 
such  a  change  of  circumstances  and  conditions,  that  polygamy 
fell  outside  of  matter  under  the  ban  of  the  natural  law. 

Another  school,  to  meet  the  same  difficulty,  assigns  three 
ways  in  which  things  can  run  counter  to  the  natural  law.  It 
is  agreed  on  all  sides  that  natural  law  forbids  whatever  is  in 
itself  and  intrinsically  wrong,  not  merely  in  its  consequences, 
not  in  virtue  of  some  outside  prohibition,  like  civil  law  or  the 
injunction  of  a  parent.  Then  come  the  distinctions.  A 
thing,  they  say,  can  be  in  itself  and  intrinsically  wrong  in  a 
threefold  way.  First,  it  can  he  wrong  in  itself,  and  abso- 
lutely; like  blasphemy,  idolatry  and  lying.  The  moral  dis- 
order in  this  case  is  something  wrapped  up  in  the  physical 
being  of  the  act.  Secondly,  it  can  be  wrong  in  itself,  not  on 
its  own  account,  and  not  absolutely;  like  theft  and  murder. 
The  moral  disorder  results  not  precisely  from  the  physical 
act,  but  from  the  presence  of  some  right  connected  with  it,  and 
violated.  The  self-same  physical  act  can  be  entirely  blame- 
less, when  exerted  to  come  into  one's  own  property,  or  to 
kill  a  criminal  condemned  by  the  state  to  death.     Thirdly,  it 


CLASSES  OF  PRECEPTS  51 

can  he  wrong  in  itself,  not  on  its  own  account,  hut  on  account 
of  moral  risk  or  danger  it  involves,  like  the  perusal  of  un- 
chaste or  irreligious  literature.  The  moral  disorder  results  in 
this  case  from  the  danger  to  faith  and  morals  attendant  on 
such  reading.  With  regard  to  these  divisions,  it  must  be 
remarked  that  even  natural  law  has  no  application,  when  the 
matter  of  the  act  undergoes  a  certain  change.  Thus,  the 
forcible  removal  of  what  was  another 's  property  will  cease  to 
be  theft,  if  the  intruder  is  first  invested  with  a  sound  claim 
to  it.  The  midwives  of  Israel  committed  no  wrong,  when 
they  carried  off  the  vessels  and  ornaments  of  the  Egyptians, 
simply  because  God,  who  is  the  absolute  Lord  of  everything, 
transferred  to  them  through  Moses  dominion  or  ownership. 
The  same  remark  holds  good  in  the  case  of  an  executed  crim- 
inal. Students  of  theology  and  medicine  are  obliged  by  their 
calling  to  read  books,  the  mere  curious  perusal  of  which 
would  be  highly  sinful,  and  the  need  of  such  reading  in  their 
case  justifies  the  risk. 

The  first  of  the  classes  just  enumerated  includes  only  such 
cases  as  admit  no  change  of  matter.  God  Himself  cannot 
render  blasphemy,  lying,  idolatry  commendable.  With  re- 
gard to  polygamy,  all  writers  grant,  and  must  maintain,  that 
it  is  not  a  crime  against  the  natural  law  in  the  first  way,  and 
in  the  same  sense  as  blasphemy,  idolatry  and  lying.  Some 
contend  that  it  resembles  theft,  inasmuch  as  the  woman's 
rights  are  not  respected.  It  must  be  evident  that,  were  this 
supposition  true,  God  could  have  made  polygamy  in  the  Old 
Law  legitimate  by  depriving  the  woman  of  whatever  rights 
it  would  otherwise  violate.  The  most  approved  writers,  how- 
ever, agree  to  regard  polygamy  a  wrong  against  the  natural 
law,  inasmuch  as  it  menaces  the  well-being  of  marriage,  and  so 
damages  the  race  in  its  origin.  It  is  fraught  with  danger  to 
the  stability  and  happiness  of  wedlock,  and  exposes  children 
to  heavy  evils.  Discontent,  jealousy  and  attendant  quarrels 
are,  naturally  speaking,  sure  to  reign  where  polygamy  is  a 
recognized  practice.  God  favored  the  patriarchs  and  their 
wives  with  dispositions  above  petty  grievances  of  this  sort, 
and  in  removing  danger  rendered  the  condition  legitimate. 

A  third  school  professes  to  find  all  the  sinfulness  attaching 
to  polygamy  in  the  single  circumstance,  that,  God's  prohihi- 


52  GENERAL  ETHICS 

tion  presupposed,  the  polygamist  invades  the  rights  of  God, 
and  runs  counter  to  His  express  wishes.  A  Catholic  eating 
meat  on  Friday,  would  in  this  supposition  be  no  less  an  of- 
fender against  the  natural  law  than  the  Mormon  with  a  house 
full  of  wives.  A  fourth  school,  finally,  distinguishes  between 
enactments  of  the  natural  law  strictly  so  called,  and  mere  rec- 
ommendations urged  hy  nature  as  highly  becoming,  though  not 
of  binding  necessity.  They  group  under  enactments  of  the 
first  class  universal  maxims,  like,  "Do  good  and  avoid  evil"; 
conclusions  readily  and  plainly  derivable  from  these  maxims, 
like  the  Ten  Commandments;  and  precepts  ordaining  the 
avoidance  of  things  intrinsically  and  absolutely  bad,  like  blas- 
phemy. Under  recommendations  urging  the  proper  they 
group  conclusions  derivable  after  some  study  from  univer- 
sal maxims,  like  the  statutes  against  polygamy  and  divorce; 
precepts  ordaining  the  avoidance  of  things  bad  in  themselves, 
not  because  of  themselves,  but  because  of  danger  attached,  like 
the  perusal  of  immoral  literature. 

To  choose,  now,  between  the  different  schools,  I  venture  to 
think  that  the  explanation  offered  by  the  second  school  is 
clearest,  best  defined,  and  most  to  the  point.  Natural  laWj 
therefore,  is  a  mandate  of  reason,  ordering  the  performance  of 
whatever  is  good  intrinsically  and  in  itself,  forbidding  things 
intrinsically  and  in  themselves  bad.  Seeming  exceptions  made 
in  the  Old  Law  in  the  cases  of  Isaac's  intended  slaughter,  the 
Hebrew  midwives,  and  polygamy  among  the  patriarchs  were 
simply  no  violations  at  all  of  the  natural  law.  God  worked 
a  change  in  the  matter  on  which  these  acts  turned.  He  in- 
vested Abraham  with  full  dominion  over  his  son's  life;  He 
transferred  to  the  Hebrew  women  rights  in  property  that 
once  belonged  to  the  Egyptians;  He  removed  from  polygamy 
all  the  dangerous  abuses  that  naturally  surround  such  a  con- 
dition, and  so  rendered  it  as  salutary  and  secure  as  mo- 
nogamy. 

?  Positive  divine  law  is  a  decree,  proceeding  with  full  free- 
dom from  the  mind  of  God,  in  the  interests  of  common  good. 
The  ceremonial  prescribed  in  the  Old  Law  was  positive  divine 
law  for  the  chosen  people.  The  utterances  in  the  gospels  for- 
bidding absolute  divorce  and  polygamy,  are  positive  divine 
law  in  the  new  dispensation.    Natural  law  is  separated  from 


POSITIVE  DIVINE  LAW  53 

positive  divine  law  by  the  absence  of  freedom  in  the  legisla- 
tor, and  by  the  nature  of  the  promulgation  it  demands.  God 
is  not  free  to  make  lying  sinful  or  virtuous,  and  the  same  is 
true  of  theft,  murder,  polygamy  and  divorce,  when  no  change 
of  matter  has  taken  place.  While  ordaining  certain  rites  and 
ceremonies  for  use  in  His  service,  He  remained  entirely  free  to 
select  some  and  reject  others.  The  natural  law  is  such  that 
its  actual  promulgation  has  place  in  the  very  fact  of  a  hu- 
man being's  existence.  Up  to  that  hour  it  is  still  possessed 
of  what  philosophy  calls  promulgation  in  aptitude.  Knowl- 
edge of  the  natural  law  escapes  a  man  during  the  period  of 
infancy,  but  knowledge  of  the  law  must  not  be  confounded 
with  its  promulgation-.  Positive  divine  law  on  the  contrary 
has  all  its  effect,  only  when  received  by  the  subject  bound  to 
its  -observance,  and  necessarily  supposes  some  such  subject 
actually  existent,  and  capable  at  least  of  grasping  its  content. 
Natural  law  is  a  means  indispensably  necessary  to  the  end  of 
man.  Positive  divine  law  is,  indeed,  a  means  more  or  less 
necessary  to  man's  end,  but  nohow  indispensably  necessary. 
This  or  that  positive  divine  law  need  never  have  existed,  and 
man  could  still  compass  his  end.  This  or  that  positive  divine 
law  can  at  any  time  cease  to  ex:ist,  without  in  the  least  jeopar- 
dizing man 's  final  interests. 

Natural  law  is  the  eternal  law  in  its  application  to  creatures^ 
endowed  with  reason,  and  as  such  cannot  long  remain  hidden 
from  an  enquiring  mind.  Its  decrees  are  not  inscribed  on 
tsfblets  of  stone,  or  wood,  or  written  pages,  but  on  a  man's 
heart.  Its  promptings  are  ever  present,  and  defy  forgetting. 
The  light  vouchsafed  by  nature  to  all  her  sons  is  able  to  con- 
vey notions  of  the  natural  law,  and  interpret  its  dictates.  No 
training  in  the  schools  is  needed,  no  labor  over  long  lists  of  ^^ 
rules  and  regulations.  These  features,  peculiar  to  natural 
law,  constitute  another  vast  difference  between  itself  and  posi- 
tive law,  whether  human  or  divine.  Positive  law  is  of  no 
avail  whatever,  unless  promulgated  or  brought  to  man's  no- 
tice by  some  such  external  sign  as  language,  written  or  spoken. 
Any  body  of  positive  laws  can  of  course  include  obligations 
and  restrictions  already  imposed  by  the  natural  law.  In  fact, 
owing  to  the  weakness  inherent  in  men's  minds  and  wills,  it 
is  eminently  proper  for  legislators  to  insist  in  clearer  terms 


54  GENERAL  ETHICS 

on  points  already  defined  by  the  natural  law.  This  method 
has  a  twofold  advantage.  It  makes  ignorance  less  excusable, 
and  adds  to  the  sanction,  already  awaiting  in  the  next  life 
every  violence  done  the  natural  law,  the  further  punishment 
of  immediate  fine,  pain  or  imprisonment.  Law  is  only  then 
purely  and  simply  positive,  when  it  decrees  things  not  pre- 
viously settled  by  natural  law ;  when  it  turns  on  acts,  which, 
in  themselves  indifferent,  become  right  or  wrong  according  to 
the  good  pleasure  or  wishes  of  a  superior.  Positive  divine 
law  has  God  for  immediate  author.  Human  positive  law 
has  man  for  immediate  author.  This  human  law  is  either 
ecclesiastical  or  civil. 

19  Ecclesiastical  law  is  law  uttered  hy  the  Church. 

^^  Civil  law  is  law  uttered  hy  the  state;  or  hy  him  in  whose 
person  the  authority  of  the  state  resides. 

TJnchangeahle.  The  first  or  primary  principles  of  natural 
law  are  absolutely  unchangeable.  God  Himself  cannot  re- 
verse them.  All  its  other  principles,  of  an  inferior  order,  are, 
strictly  speaking,  as  unchangeable  as  these  first  or  primary 
principles.  God,  however,  as  absolute  Lord  of  the  universe, 
can  introduce  into  the  matter,  with  which  these  inferior  prin- 
ciples are  concerned,  changes  that  modify  the  whole  face  of 
things,  and  leave  no  room  for  the  law's  application.  E.g., 
Isaac,  midwives,  capital  punishment. 

Universal^  in  a  Twofold  Sense.  It  hinds  all  without  excep- 
tion. It  is  within  the  reach  of  every one^s  knowledge.  There 
can  be  no  ignorance  of  primary  principles.  Whatever  igno- 
rance exists  regarding  secondary  principles,  is  due  entirely  to 
personal  and  private  negligence.  It  is  therefore  voluntary, 
can  be  readily  overcome,  and  is  utterly  inexcusable.  Invinc- 
ible ignorance  is  conceivable  in  the  case  of  remote  conclusions. 
The  essence  of  human  nature  is  the  same  in  all  mankind,  and 
this  essence  is  the  foundation  of  the  natural  law.  We  con- 
tend merely  that  the  natural  law  is  within  easy  reach  of  every 
man's  knowledge.  We  by  no  means  maintain  that  nations 
made  up  of  men,  whom  long  centuries  of  crime  have  practi- 
cally changed  into  beasts,  necessarily  retain  a  clear  knowledge 
of  nature's  requirements  in  the  matter  of  morality.  Neither 
do  we  intend  to  prove  that  natural  law  is  universally  ob- 
served, or  that  its  principles  in  their  application  invariably 


SANCTION  55 

fare  well.  These  first  principles  of  morality  may  be  firmly 
fixed  in  the  minds  of  a  pjeopla,  and  thearetically  respected, 
without  at  all  hindering  that  people  from  making  serious  mis- 
takes in  their  application  and  practical  emplojonent. 

Eternal.  It  is  of  as  long  duration  as  its  counterpart  or 
model,  eternal  law.  It  had  of  course  no  practical  application, 
until  rational  creatures  appeared  on  the  scene;  but  the  law 
itself  had  being  from  all  eternity  in  the  mind  of  God.  No 
enactment  ceases  to  be  a  law,  simply  because  actual  subjects 
are  wanting  to  observe  it.  It  is  enough  if  it  can  later  on  have 
such  subjects;  if,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  certainly  going  to 
have  such  subjects  at  some  future  period.  Eternal  law  and 
natural  law  differ  not  in  point  of  duration,  but  in  point  of 
subjects.  The  distinction  between  the  two  laws  is  real  and 
inadequate.  In  point  of  subjects  from  eternity  natural  law 
is  no  worse  off  than  eternal. 

Sanction  Means  Bernard  or  Punishment  Fixed  hy  the  Law- 
maker for  the  Observance  or  Violation,  of  His  Law.  This 
sanction  can  be  of  many  kinds.  It  is  internal,  when  the  re- 
ward or  punishment  is  wholly  within  the  man  himself,  not 
due  to  outside  influences.  E.g.,  joy  of  a  good  conscience,  and 
remorse.  It  is  external,  when  some  outside  agent  rewards  or 
punishes.  E.g.,  Heaven  or  hell.  With  regard  to  its  effi- 
ciency, a  sanction  may  be  sufficient  or  insufficient,  and  that  too 
either  absolutely  or  relatively.  It  is  absolutely  sufficient,  when 
it  is  of  itself  motive  enough  to  urge  a  man  in  every  case  to  the 
law's  observance.  It  is  relatively  sufficient,  when,  of  some- 
what less  force,  it  avails  only  to  urge  certain  kinds  of  men 
in  certain  kinds  of  cases  to  the  law's  observance.  From  this 
description  one  can  easily  derive  the  notion  of  absolutely  and 
relatively  insufficient  sanction.  Sanction  is,  besides,  perfect 
or  imperfect.  Perfect,  when  the  due  proportions  of  justice 
are  kept  between  a  man's  deserts  and  his  reward  or  punish- 
ment. When  the  contrary  happens,  when  sanction  falls  short 
of  justice,  it  is  called  imperfect.  All  sanction  has  a  twofold 
end  or  object.  It  is  designed  on  the  one  hand  to  promote 
the  reign  of  moral  order,  to  keep  men  to  their  duty;  on  the 
other,  to  reinstate  justice  when  dethroned  by  wrong;  to  dis- 
charge the  debts  of  justice,  when  men  deserve  well  of  her  by 
the  performance  of  right.     Meyer  derives  the  difference  in 


56  GENERAL  ETHICS 

force  between  penalties  inflicted  from  the  object  this  or  that 
sanction  proposes  to  itself.  All  depends,  he  says,  on  the  order 
at  stake.  If  punishment  is  meted  out  with  reference  pri- 
marily and  principally  to  procuring  order  in  the  moral  af- 
fairs of  a  private  individual,  the  sanction  will  consist  of  pains 
destined  almost  wholly  to  cure  and  correct.  Sanction  of  this 
sort  is  proper  to  boys  receiving  instruction  at  the  hands  of 
a  tutor,  and  is  called  medicinal.  If  punishment  is  meted 
out  primarily  and  principally  to  procure  social  or  political 
order  in  the  state,  the  sanction  will  consist  of  penalties  in- 
flicted almost  wholly  with  a  view  to  avenging  social  wrongs, 
and  is  called  punitive.  The  amendment  of  the  transgressor, 
because  the  common  good  is  in  this  case  of  paramount  im- 
portance, occupies  only  a  secondary  place.  It  can  be  entirely 
neglected,  if  any  attempt  to  secure  it  runs  counter  to  the 
common  good.  This  observation  of  Father  Meyer  is  emi- 
nently correct,  and  can  be  of  service  later  on,  when  the  moral- 
ity of  capital  punishment  is  in  question. 

Next  Life.  We  are  far  from  wishing  to  deny  that  viola- 
tions of  the  natural  law  meet  with  heavy  punishment  in  this 
life,  or  that  compliance  with  its  precepts  has  a  reward  even 
in  this  life.  Seneca  says,  Epist.  22,  ' '  AVickedness  takes  a  big 
swallow  of  its  own  poison."  St.  Augustine,  Confess.  I,  ''It  is 
thy  good  pleasure,  0  Lx)rd,  and  it  is  a  fact,  that  every  soul 
out  of  harmony  with  right  is  its  own  greatest  tormentor." 
We  merely  hold  that  the  sanction,  as  a  matter  of  fact  attend- 
ant on  the  natural  law  here  below,  is  wholly  inadequate,  and 
far  from  satisfying  the  demands  of  justice.  The  immortal- 
ity of  the  soul  is  warrant  for  the  reality  of  a  future  exist- 
ence; and  reason,  apart  from  revelation,  even  if  solid  proofs 
are  wanting,  hints  darkly  at  a  place  of  eternal  torments. 
From  revelation  the  prison-house  of  fire,  denominated  hell, 
is  an  established  fact.  Philosophy  can  proceed  no  farther 
than  prove  the  need  and  the  compatibility  of  such  a  place  of 
torment  with  God's  attributes. 

Positive  Law.  About  the  justice  and  binding  force  of  God's 
positive  enactments  there  can  be  no  controversy.  He  is  in- 
finitely wise,  infinitely  just,  and  cannot,  in  virtue  of  these  two 
attributes,  impose  on  men  obligations  lacking  any  essential 
or  necessary  characteristic.     His  true  Church,  strengthened 


CIVIL  LAW  57 

by  reiterated  promises  of  guidance  and  assistance,  can  make 
no  mistake  in  the  field  of  legislation.  But  that  branch  of 
human  positive  law  denominated  civil,  because  subject  to  the 
immediate  influence  of  men,  swayed  by  prejudice  and  pas- 
sion, open  to  moments  of  forgetfulness  and  ignorance,  can 
readily  enoug^h  admit  of  blunders,  and  can  carry  on  its  rec- 
ords rules  and  regulations  decidedly  wrong  and  opposed  to 
reason.  Such  laws,  as  we  have  already  seen^  are  laws  only 
in  appearance,  and  have  in  reality  no  binding  force  what- 
ever. It  may  be  well,  then,  to  discuss  what  qualities  are 
needed  to  render  any  positive  law,  notably  civil,  worthy  of 
consideration,  respect  and  obedience.  A  law,  to  be  worthy 
of  the  name,  must,  along  with  due  and  sufficient  promulga- 
tion, fulfil  certain  conditions  classified  under  three  heads. 
Some  affect  the  lawmaker;  others,  the  matter  contained  in  the 
law.  The  lawmaker  must  he  possessed  of  genuine  authority 
over  the  persons,  for  whom  he  legislates,  in  points  the  law 
touches.  The  vitality  of  all  law  has  its  origin  in  God,  and 
God  can  seal  with  His  approval  only  such  mandates  as  pro- 
ceed from  legitimately  constituted  superiors.  In  the  matter 
of  its  prescriptions  the  law  must  he  just  and  possihle.  It 
must  be  just,  because  otherwise  it  would  not  have  natural 
law  for  foundation  and  support.  It  must  be  possible,  in 
accordance  with  that  worn  truth,  ''Ad  impossible  nemo  tene- 
tur."  "No  man  is  bound  to  do  the  impossible."  Justice 
brands  as  worthless  whatever  law  conflicts  with  a  citizen's 
higher  duty,  whatever  law  is  neither  necessary  nor  useful 
for  the  common  good.  Natural  law  cries  out  against  any- 
thing like  the  sacrifice  of  a  higher  duty  to  lower  offices,  and 
the  very  essence  of  law,  as  set  forth  in  its  definition,  makes  the 
common  good  an  indispensable  requisite.  The  common  good 
must  be  sought,  too,  in  a  fair  way.  To  secure  this  fairness, 
the  law  must  with  an  impartial  hand  distribute  burdens  over 
the  whole  commonwealth.  It  must  not  enrich  the  wealthy 
at  the  expense  of  the  poor.  It  must  not  rob  the  rich,  to 
confirm  the  idle  in  their  wicked  ways.  But  everything  must, 
as  far  as  possible,  be  so  nicely  adjusted  that  neither  the  rich, 
nor  the  poor,  nor  the  idle  can  with  justice  complain.  Jus- 
tice likewise  brands  as  worthless  whatever  law  imposes  obli- 
gations impossible  of  fulfilment.     Impossibility  is  either  phys- 


58  GENERAL  ETHICS 

ical  or  moral.  An  obligation  is  physically  impossible  of  ful- 
filment, when  it  simply  surpasses  the  physical  strength  at  a 
man's  disposal,  e.g.,  a  law  ordering  subjects  to  push  moun- 
tains into  the  sea.  It  is  morally  impossible  of  fulfilment, 
when  its  observance  is  beyond  measure  difficult.  Liberty  can 
have  no  play,  when  a  man 's  physical  force  is  unequal  to  some 
task  assigned;  and  law  without  liberty  is  a  dead  letter. 
Suarez  remarks  that  the  difficulty  involved  in  compliance  with 
voluntary  poverty,  chastity  and  obedience,  induced  God,  per- 
haps, to  make  these  several  virtues  matter  of  counsel,  not  law, 
in  the  new  dispensation.  Several  maxims  well  worth  re- 
membering flow  as  corollaries  from  the  doctrine  just  made 
good.  A  human  enactment  at  open  variance  with  God's  law 
is  no  law  at  all,  and  entirely  void  of  value.  An  enactment 
favoring  injustice  is  no  law.  Rulers  have  no  right  to  impose 
unjust  laws  on  their  subjects.  Despotism  and  absolutism  are 
species  of  government  opposed  to  these  maxims;  and  some 
philosophers,  untrue  to  their  calling,  have  upheld  systems 
favoring  these  crimes.  MachiavelU,  for  instance  (1469-1527), 
allows  the  advantage  of  men  in  power  to  usurp  the  place  of 
justice.  Hohhes  (1588-1679)  is  of  opinion  that  supreme  au- 
thority can  make  no  mistake,  incur  no  blame.  Spinoza  (1632- 
1677),  because  of  his  pantheistic  notions,  is  guilty  of  the  same 
folly.  Rousseau  (1712-1778)  attributes  to  democracy  the 
prerogatives  ascribed  by  Hobbes  to  monarchy.  Hegel  and 
his  followers  make  the  state  God,  and  pass  by  easy  steps  to 
the  absurdity  of  a  public  conscience,  the  standard  and  rule 
of  private  morality.  We  who  advocate  the  right  are  accused 
of  introducing  into  public  affairs  baneful  subjectivism,  deroga- 
tory to  the  majesty  of  the  law,  and  subversive  of  its  efficacy. 
But  the  accusation  is  a  vile  slander.  Our  enemies  are,  on 
the  contrary,  subjectivism's  most  steadfast  allies,  they  degrade 
law  to  the  level  of  conscienceless  bullying,  substitute  might 
for  right,  and,  robbing  law  of  all  moral  efficacy,  arm  it  with 
the  force  and  violence  of  unprincipled  coercion  and  tyranny. 
Our  platform  rests  on  the  eternal  principles  of  justice,  founded 
on  the  eternal  law  of  God,  and  manifest  to  man  in  his  reason. 
These  principles  are  certainly  a  more  objective  reality  than 
the  empty  whims  and  selfish  enactments  of  greedy  rulers. 
To  clothe  an  unjust  enactment  with  a  majesty  borrowed  from 


CIVIL  LAW  59 

so  sacred  a  thing  as  law,  is  like  blasphemy ;  and  to  set  might 
over  right  is  to  step  from  civilization  to  savagery.  To  avoid 
mistakes  in  practice,  too  much  stress  cannot  be  laid  on  that 
principle  advanced  earlier  in  the  course  of  these  remarks, 
'\In  doubt y  acquiescence  in  the  will  of  a  superior  is  a  duty." 
Duly  constituted  authority  is  always  in  possession,  and  its 
rulings  must  be  considered  just  and  fair,  until  their  injus- 
tice and  unfairness  are  solidly  and  incontrovertibly  proved. 
If,  however,  there  can  be  no  doubt  about  a  law's  injustice, 
resistance  to  the  law  may  become  a  duty  or  a  privilege.  If 
it  antagonises  some  divine  good,  if  it  stands  up  against  some 
law  of  God,  we  enjoy  no  liberty  in  the  matter ;  we  are  bound 
to  disregard  the  unjust  law,  and  die  martyrs  rather  than 
observe  it.  ''We  must  obey  God  rather  than  men.'*  A.A.4. 
If  it  plainly  antagonises  some  human  good,  whether  it  tends 
to  promote  private  greed  at  the  expense  of  the  public  wel- 
fare, or  oversteps  the  bounds  of  authority  to  work  harm,  or 
fosters  favoritism  to  the  detriment  of  justice,  disobedience  be- 
comes a  privilege,  of  which  subjects  may  avail  themselves  or 
not,  as  they  please.  Such  a  law  certainly  has  of  itself  no 
claims  on  the  conscience.  Conscience,  however,  may  exact 
the  personal  inconvenience,  arising  from  obedience,  as  a  lesser 
evil  than  the  consequent  scandal  and  disturbance.  But  in  that 
case  the  obligation  arises  not  from  the  unjust  law,  but  from 
the  natural  duty  men  lie  under  of  at  times  sacrificing  their 
own  interests  to  further  the  interests  of  society. 

Foundation  and  Corner-stone.  This  question  has  a  more 
important  bearing  on  Ethics  than  might  at  first  sight  be  sup- 
posed. We  are  at  present  grounding  ourselves  in  principles, 
that  will  afterwards  serve  us  in  the  solution  of  difficulties,  aris- 
ing from  the  post  we  occupy  in  affairs.  As  citizens,  we  shall 
be  amenable  to  the  law ;  and,  unless  we  recognize  God  in  the 
law,  we  shall  be  possessed  of  only  half  the  truth,  and  little  able 
to  faithfully  discharge  our  duties.  Every  enactment  emanat- 
ing from  legitimate  authority  has  God  at  its  back,  and  phi- 
losophy is  witness  to  the  fact.  If,  as  we  hope  to  prove,  nat- 
ural law  is  the  foundation  and  corner-stone  of  all  positive 
law,  and  if  natural  law  is  God's  own  decree,  men  cannot  do 
violence  to  civil  or  ecclesiastical  law  without  dishonor  to 
God.     Law,  therefore,  has  a  double  avenger,  God  and  the 


60  GENERAL  ETHICS 

State;  and  good  citizenship  becomes  a  matter  of  conscience. 
Law  owes  only  half  its  efficacy  to  the  legislator's  will,  the 
other  half  descends  from  Heaven.  Fear  of  God 's  wrath  must 
act  along  with  dread  of  fine  and  imprisonment,  to  exercise 
a  salutary  restraint  on  the  passions  of  men. 

In  law,  as  in  everything  else,  we  can,  with  the  Scholastics, 
consider  matter  and  form.  Its  matter  is  the  substance  of  the 
order  it  contains.  Its  form  is  that  binding  force  it  possesses, 
that  moral  necessity  it  imposes.  We  cannot  contend  that  the 
body  or  substance  of  every  positive  law  is  contained  in  the 
natural  law.  Many  positive  laws  have  for  object  the  per- 
formance of  acts  in  themselves  quite  indifferent,  about  which 
natural  law  has  not  a  word  to  say.  But  no  matter  how  in- 
different in  itself  an  act  prescribed  by  positive  law  may  be, 
we  hold  that  natural  law,  after  human  legislation  has  spoken, 
vests  the  act  with  all  the  binding  force  any  dictate  of  the 
natural  law  owns.  We  further  hold  that,  by  a  process  of 
reasoning,  every  ruling  made  by  positive  law  is  reducible  to 
a  principle  hidden  somewhere  in  the  natural  law. 

Pkoofs 

I.    A  natural  law  has  place  in  man. 

II.  This  natural  law  is,  ^  unchangeable,  ^  universal,  °  eter- 

nal. 

III.  Its  complete  and  full  sanction  is  reserved  for  the  next 

life. 

IV.  Eternal  punishment  is  not  opposed  to  God's  goodness. 
V.    Natural  law  is  the  foundation  of  all  positive  law. 

I.  1st,  Experience  is  witness,  through  the  medium  of  con- 
science, that  certain  rules  of  conduct,  exacting  obedience,  wring 
acknowledgment  from  the  mind  by  their  clearness.  But  laws 
of  the  kind  constitute  what  we  call  natural  law.  Ergo,  nat- 
ural law  has  place  in  man. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  Worship  God,  honor  parents, 
do  unto  others  as  you  would  have  others  do  unto  you. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  These  rules  have  their  origin 
in  human  nature,  not  in  prejudice,  education  or  ignorance. 
They  carry  authority,  and  impress  man  with  a  sense  of  re- 
sponsibility and  obligation. 


PROOFS  FOR  PROPERTIES  61 

2nd,  Every  force  in  nature,  to  produce  its  own  proper  ef- 
fect, must  be  furnished  with  a  certain  determinant  suited  to 
itself,  holding  it  to  a  fixed  line  of  action.  But  natural  law  is 
to  the  human  will  such  a  determinant.  Ergo,  natural  law 
has  place  in  man. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  The  most  holy  will  of  God 
and  His  wisdom  demand  as  much.  God  cannot  be  indifferent 
to  the  promotion  of  order  in  the  universe;  and,  in  any  hy- 
pothesis but  that  set  down  in  the  Major,  He  would  have  been 
at  too  small  pains  to  promote  order. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  Natural  law  alone  exercises 
proper  and  becoming  restraint  over  man.  As  a  free  agent  no 
chain  but  law  can  bind  him.  Other  agents  are  limited  to 
this  or  that  effect  by  a  something  implanted  in  their  very  na- 
ture. Man,  therefore,  should  be  held  in  check  by  a  law 
bound  up  in  his  nature,  born  with  him,  and  antecedent  to  all 
the  declarations  of  divine  and  human  positive  law. 

3rd,  The  whole  world  is  willing  witness  to  the  reality  of  a 
natural  law.  The  noblest  among  the  minds  of  antiquity, 
poets,  philosophers  and  statesmen,  have  left  us  their  senti- 
ments, couched  in  the  choicest  and  sublimest  language,  e.g., 
Oedipus  Rex,  line  863-871;  Antigone,  lines  446-460.  Plato, 
Apologia,  par.  29,  D.  Ch.  17.  Republic,  Bk.  4,  par.  427. 
Gorgias,  par.  483,  E;  par.  4^8,  b;  par.  491,  E;  Cicero,  pro 
Milone,  Ch.  4,  §  10.  Philippics  XI,  C.  12,  §  28.  De  Legibus, 
I,  c.  6 ;  II,  c.  4.     Lactantius,  Institut  VI,  8. 

II.  a,  b,  c.  That  is  unchangeable,  universal  and  eternal, 
which  is  necessarily  connected  with  the  essence  of  rational 
creatures,  which  is  contained  in  God's  wisdom.  But  the  nat- 
ural law  fulfils  this  twofold  condition.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  ^'  Essences  are  unchangeable, 
i.e.,  that  by  which  a  thing  is  what  it  is,  cannot  change,  as 
long  as  the  thing  remains  what  it  is,  for  instance,  a  man. 
^'  Essences  are  universal,  i.e.,  wherever  a  man  exists,  there 
also  a  man's  essence  exists.  N.B.  The  natural  law  is  for 
this  reason,  at  least  in  point  of  being  or  reality,  universal. 
It  is  universally  known,  from  the  fact  that  no  human  being 
can  be  unequal  to  the  task  of  acquainting  himself  with  his 
own  nature.  Ignorance,  therefore,  of  the  natural  law  is  the 
result  of  accident,  not  a  necessity.    Besides,  no  one  is  ignorant 


62  GENERAL  ETHICS 

of  a  certain  few  very  evident  principles.  ^'  Essences  are 
eternal  metaphysically,  not  physically ;  in  the  sense  that  they 
have  a  being  without  beginning  and  without  end  in  God's 
thoughts.  Law  can  exist  before  its  actual  subjects  exist,  as 
happens  when  kings  make  laws  with  intent  that  they  go  into 
effect  a  year  after  their  promulgation. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  Natural  law  is  reason's  inter- 
pretation of  the  eternal  law,  and  reason  combined  with  ani- 
mality  is  man's  essence.  The  eternal  law  is  God's  wisdom, 
and  the  natural  law  is  a  reflection  of  the  eternal.  Objectively, 
natural  law  is  eternal  law,  restricted  to  rational  creatures,  and 
in  this  sense  it  is  eternal.  Subjectively,  natural  law  is  rea- 
son's interpretation  of  eternal  law,  and  in  this  sense  it  is  tem- 
poral. 

III.  N.B.  That  some  sanction  is  necessary,  must  be  evi- 
dent from  elementary  notions  of  justice,  holiness,  wisdom  and 
providence.  God  could  not  consistently  with  His  attributes 
impose  on  mankind  so  serious  an  obligation  as  the  natural 
law,  and  then  view  with  indifference  its  fulfilment  and  con- 
tempt. He  would  be  unjust  to  men,  if  He  failed  to  reward 
the  doers  of  the  law,  and  punish  its  violators.  Men  can  merit 
de  condigno  with  God  because  of  the  implicit  promise  in  God 's 
gift  of  free  will.  This  supposed  indifference,  resulting  from 
the  absence  of  all  sanction,  would  likewise  be  a  blot  on  His 
sanctity.  He  would  be  decidedly  unholy,  if  He  treated  alike 
sinner  and  saint,  rebel  and  servant.  His  wisdom  could  be 
called  into  question,  and  His  providence  would  be  empty  as 
a  dream.  Even  human  legislators  are  far-seeing  enough,  and 
zealous  enough  for  law  and  order,  to  visit  with  punishment 
every  infraction  of  their  behests.  When  discussing  Kant's 
autonomy  of  reason,  we  agreed  that  mere  consciousness  of 
duty  done  is  not  a  sufficient  reward  for  virtue,  and  that  mere 
consciousness  of  a  quarrel  with  ourselves  is  not  an  effective 
bar  against  crime.  To  prove,  therefore,  that  complete  and 
full  sanction  is  reserved  for  the  next  life,  we  argue  thus. 

^'  Virtue's  complete  and  full  reward  cannot  be  contained 
in  things,  that  must  on  occasions  be  sacrificed  for  virtue's 
preservation.  But  all  the  good  things  of  this  life,  yea,  life 
itself,  must  on  occasions  be  sacrificed  for  virtue 's  preservation. 
Ergo,  complete  and  full  sanction  is  reserved  for  the  next  life. 


HELL  AND  BOD'S  GOODNESS  63 

N.B.  Reward  must  be  more  attractive  than  the  sacrifice. 
Cause  cannot  be  inferior  to  effect.  The  sum  of  499  dollars 
could  never  be  full  and  complete  return  for  500  dollars. 

^'  Punishment  must  be  such,  that  within  reason  no  greater 
can  be  devised,  because  an  infinite  person  is  seriously  offended. 
But  present  punishment  falls  short  of  this.  Ergo,  sanction 
is  reserved  for  next  life.  N.B.  The  Major  could  read.  Sanc- 
tion, while  not  unduly  severe,  must  be  efficacious. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  Defects  of  present  punish- 
ment. 

The  just  in  this  life  suffer  grievous  ills,  the  wicked  flourish. 

The  pangs  of  conscience  are  trivial  compared  with  the  ad- 
vantages reaped  from  crime.  The  good  always  enjoy  a  pre- 
ponderance of  blessings  over  ills.  This  preponderance  ad- 
mits of  degrees.  It  would  be  greater  than  it  now  is,  if  the 
prosperity  of  the  wicked  and  the  grievous  ills  of  the  just  were 
interchanged. 

An  eternal  hell  is  weak  at  times  to  stay  the  arm  of  sin; 
any  threat  of  temporal  punishment  would  on  such  occasions 
prove  empty  and  worthless. 

The  wicked,  who  die  in  their  sins,  would  be  able  to  boast 
for  all  eternity  of  their  superiority  over  God. 

IV.  1st,  From  the  Very  Meaning  of  God's  Goodness.  In- 
finite goodness  consists  in  a  willingness  to  so  far  share  itself 
with  free  beings  as  free  beings  desire  union.  But  eternal 
punishment  is  not  opposed  to  this  willingness.  Ergo,  eternal 
punishment  is  not  opposed  to  God's  infinite  goodness. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  If  free  beings  deliberately  put 
themselves  out  of  condition  for  union  with  God,  the  fault  lies 
with  themselves  alone.  God's  goodness  must  not  interfere 
with  man's  freedom.  God  stands  ever  ready  to  lavish  His 
affections  on  the  sons  of  men,  and  pour  Himself  out  on  them. 
He  is  not  otherwise  minded  even  towards  sons  who  have  for- 
feited their  inheritance,  and  consort  with  the  damned.  But 
these  sons  are  now  unfortunately  capable  of  hatred  only,  and 
utter  strangers  to  emotions  of  love.  They  have  rejected  God, 
the  universal  good.  Outside  of  universal  good  nothing  but 
evil  exists,  and  evil  is  the  formal  object  of  hatred.  God's 
readiness,  therefore,  meets  with  an  insuperable  impediment, 
and  is  destined  to  remain   forever  void  of   effect.     If  the 


64  GENERAL  ETHICS 

damned  could  love  God,  there  would  be  no  hell.  Confirma- 
fiQfi — God  need  not  give  to  free  creatures  favors  which  they 
deliberately  refuse.  God  wishes  all  to  be  saved  with  antece- 
dent will. 

2nd,  From  the  Absurdity  Apparent  in  the  Opposite  Doc- 
trine. The  denial  of  eternal  punishment  involves  an  absurd- 
ity. Ergo,  eternal  punishment  is  not  opposed  to  God's  good- 
ness. 

With  Regard  to  the  Antecedent.  Union  with  God  and  per- 
severance in  hatred  of  God  are  conflicting  notions;  and, 
were  the  punishment  of  sin  anything  short  of  eternal  pain, 
sinners  would  after  death,  at  some  point  of  time  or  other, 
enjoy  union  with  God  and  remain  His  enemies.  Since  man's 
period  of  probation  closes  with  death,  no  power  can  avail 
him  to  change  the  relation  he  holds  with  God  in  his  last  mo- 
ment. Any  other  view  of  probation  would  encourage  crime 
in  this  life  by  unduly  exalting  God's  mercy  at  the  expense  of 
His  justice  and  holiness. 

3rd,  From  the  Very  Meaning  of  Sanction.  Complete  and 
full  sanction  necessarily  calls  for  eternal  punishment.  Ergo, 
eternal  punishment  is  not  opposed  to  God's  goodness. 

With  Regard  to  Antecedent.  Complete  and  full  sanction 
calls  for  penalties,  severe  enough  to  ensure  observance  of  the 
law.  But,  in  the  present  order  of  things,  nothing  short  of 
eternal  pains  can  effect  this  result.  Even  with  hell  open 
before  them,  men  daily  commit  crimes,  and,  driven  by  pas- 
sion, take  the  dread  risk. 

4th,  God's  goodness  suffers  no  loss,  when  He  allows  free 
beings  to  choose  what  they  will.  But  free  beings,  when  they 
spurn  aside  their  true  end,  make  deliberate  choice  of  ever- 
lasting pains.  Ergo,  eternal  punishment  is  not  opposed  to 
God's  goodness. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  They  make  choice  of  God's 
eternal  hatred,  without  any  chance  of  remedy;  and  hell  is 
nothing  more,  nothing  less,  than  God's  eternal  hatred. 

V.  Positive  law  derives  from  natural  law  its  binding 
force,  it  is  void  of  all  effect  when  opposed  to  natural  law, 
and  is,  in  the  main,  only  an  application  of  natural  law  to 
particular  places,  times  and  persons.  Ergo,  natural  law  is 
the  foundation  and  corner-stone  of  positive  law. 


PRINCIPLES  65 

With  Regard  to  the  Antecedent,  God  alone  is  vested  with 
full  and  independent  right  to  impose  obligations  on  free- 
born  men;  and,  if  natural  law  contained  no  injunction  re- 
garding the  duty  of  subjects  to  their  superiors,  positive  law 
would  be  little  better  than  an  idle  waste  of  words.  The  chief 
reason  why  most  sensible  men  submit  to  the  requirements  of 
positive  law,  is  found  in  the  circumstance  that  they  recog- 
nize divinity  at  its  back.  They  know  themselves  smart  enough 
to  break  the  law  without  falling  into  the  law's  clutches,  they 
regard  it  a  too  easy  matter  to  cheat  the  law  of  imprisonment 
and  chains ;  but  they  fear  with  a  wholesome  dread  that  eternal 
avenger  of  the  law,  whose  eye  never  sleeps,  whose  prison- 
house  never  yields  up  its  dead. 

All  human  positive  law,  from  whatsoever  source  its  matter 
is  derived,  gets  its  form  or  binding  force  from  natural  law. 
Some  positive  laws  urge  matter  already  prescribed  by  the 
natural  law,  others  urge  matter  in  itself  indifferent;  and 
even  in  the  latter  case  some  natural  law  counsels  the  law- 
maker to  legislate.  We  are  talking  in  the  main  of  positive 
laws  belonging  to  the  first  class,  though  what  we  say  is  in  a 
measure  true  of  so-called  purely  positive  laws.  All  author- 
ity is  immediately  from  God;  and,  the  gift  once  made,  nat- 
ural law  prescribes  obedience.  Without  this  authority  from 
God,  no  ruler  has  the  right  to  make  laws  for  free  men  against 
their  consent,  that  is  a  prerogative  of  God  alone;  and  God's 
connection  with  authority  makes  the  presence  of  natural  law 
imperative.  As  a  matter  of  right,  positive  law  without  nat- 
ural law  for  support,  is  not  worth  the  paper  it  is  written 
on.  A  king  may  have  all  the  physical  force  needed  to  exe- 
cute his  rulings;  but  might  is  not  right,  and,  unless  natural 
law  sustains  him,  he  has  no  right  whatever  to  impose  his  wishes 
on  a  free  people.  More  men  and  better  men  are  kept  from 
theft  and  murder  by  fear  of  God  than  by  fear  of  fine  and  im- 
prisonment ;  and  the  few  restrained  by  these  lesser  considera- 
tions alone  are  beneath  our  notice.  They  are  not  good  citi- 
zens in  the  full  sense  of  the  word. 

Principles  I,  II,  III,  IV,  V 

I.  A.  God  depends  not  on  eternal  law,  and  yet  He  owes  it 
to  His  wisdom  to  work  in  harmony  with  order;  and  order  is 


* 


66  GENERAL  ETHICS 

eternal  law.  Self-imposed  dependence  is  no  real  dependence, 
and,  therefore,  no  imperfection.  Dependence  implies  two,  and 
God  is  one.  The  lawmaker  is  superior  to  his  law,  but  can 
elect  to  observe  it.  God  must  choose  to  observe  His  law,  be- 
cause He  enjoys  no  freedom  of  contrariety  regarding  virtue 
and  sin. 

B.  Reason  is  not  the  natural  law.  It  makes  the  law 
manifest  to  men.  The  New  York  Sun  is  not  the  law,  though 
it  prints  and  publishes  the  law.  Were  reason  the  natural  law, 
each  individual  would  be  a  law  to  himself;  and  law  is  an 
obligation  imposed  by  another. 

C.  The  natural  law  leaves  room  for  civil,  because  it 
omits  details;  and  two  sanctions  are  better  than  one.  Some 
principles  in  the  natural  law  are  obscure,  particularly  in  sec- 
ond and  third  classes. 

D.  The  natural  law  depends  not  on  the  free  will  of  God, 
but  on  His  wisdom  or  essence. 

E.  First  principles  of  the  natural  law  are  the  same  with 
all  men.  Men  differ,  when  they  come  to  apply  these  first 
principles.  We  instance  the  treatment  some  savages  accord 
their  parents  and  wives. 

F.  Before  creation  there  was  no  actual  subject  for  nat- 
ural law.  Possible  subjects  destined  to  become  actual  were 
enough.  Distinguish  between  natural  law  objectively  taken, 
and  subjectively  taken. 

G.  Natural  law  is  against  man's  nature,  because  it  de- 
stroys his  freedom. 

Answer:  It  destroys  his  moral  freedom,  not  his  physical 
freedom;  the  licere,  not  the  posse. 

H.  Natural  law  would  be  inseparable  from  man 's  nature. 
And  yet  it  is  separate  from  infants  and  madmen. 

Answer:  It  is  separable  from  them  in  nearest  first  act, 
and  in  second  act ;  not  in  farthest  first  act.  Second  act  means 
actual  judgment;  nearest  first  act  means  readiness  due  to 
habits;  farthest  first  act  means  intellect. 

I.  God  is  free;  and,  therefore,  natural  law  is  not  neces- 
sary. 

Answer:  God  is  free  to  create,  not  free  to  impose  law  in 
the  hypothesis  of  creation.    Absolutely  speaking,  God  is  free ; 


PRINCIPLES  67 

hypothetically  speaking,  He  is  not  free.    No  outside  force 
compels  Him,  but  His  infinite  perfection. 

II.  J.  Principles  of  natural  law.  Three  classes.  First, 
evident;  second,  easily  deducible  from  first;  third,  deducible 
froan  fir^t  and  second  with  some  difficulty.  Examples  are, 
Do  good  and  avoid  evil;  worship  God,  honor  your  parents; 
fight  no  duel,  tell  no  lie.  Principles  of  first  and  second 
classes  are  called  more  general,  and  cannot  be  invincibly 
unknown  to  any  man  vested  with  the  use  of  reason.  Prin- 
ciples of  first  class  are  known  per  se  and  with  evidence.  Their 
matter  is  evident  from  study  of  terms ;  their  obligation,  from 
study  of  human  nature,  inasmuch  as  man  is  a  being  ab  alio, 
not  a  being  a  se. 

K.  Whole  nations  went  astray  regarding  theft,  suicide, 
murder. 

Answer:  They  knew  the  natural  law,  and  went  wrong  in 
its  application  to  particular  cases.  They  killed  their  parents, 
to  save  them  from  greater  evils.  Parents  asked  children  to 
slay  them,  not  to  be  old  and  decrepit  in  next  life.  Theft  was 
reputed  skill;  suicide,  bravery;  wives  were  sent  ahead  to 
be  company  for  husbands. 

L.  God  can  change  physical  laws.     Ergo,  natural  law. 

Answer:  No  parity.  Not  against  the  nature  of  a  phys- 
ical force  to  refuse  it  cooperation,  or  oppose  impediments,  or 
use  it  for  a  contrary  purpose,  like  fire  for  cooling.  Physical 
forces  are  mere  means,  and  can  be  howsoever  employed.  Man 
is  more  than  a  mere  means.  He  is  free,  and  has  initiative  of 
his  own.  To  put  an  act  intrinsically  wrong,  is  against  his 
nature,  and  God  cannot  hinder  the  thing.  If  God  allowed  it 
approvingly,  He  would  be  running  counter  to  His  wisdom 
and  holiness. 

M.  In  the  cases  of  Abraham  and  Isaac,  the  midwives  and 
Egyptian  property,  the  patriarchs  and  polygamy,  God 
changed  the  matter  of  the  law.     He  did  not  dispense. 

III.  N.  There  would  seem  to  be  no  sanction  in  this  life, 
because  pleasure  attaches  to  vice,  injustice  is  profitable,  and 
virtue  begets  pain. 

Answer:  The  pleasures  of  vice  are  not  straight,  but 
blended  with  manifold  evils,  that  the  wicked  are  little  able 


68  GENERAL  ETHICS 

to  bear.  Profit  attaches  to  injustice,  not  essentially,  but 
accidentally.  Injustice  on  occasions  proves  most  unprofitable. 
The  pain  virtue  begets  is  easily  borne,  with  the  help  of  a  good 
conscience  and  hope  of  future  ble^edness.  One  reward  is 
essential  to  virtue,  and  can  never  be  absent.  It  is  a  help 
to  honorable  conduct.  Three  rewards  are  connatural,  su- 
premacy of  reason,  resulting  peace,  and  health  of  body.  Re- 
wards of  a  third  class  morally  speaking  accrue  to  virtue ;  and 
they  are  wealth,  honor,  esteem,  and  the  like.  Such  rewards 
as  naturally  and  morally  speaking  fall  to  the  lot  of  virtue, 
can  by  accident  fail,  though  not  regularly.  Virtue,  besides, 
procures  untold  social  advantages,  touching  family,  state  and 
Church.  God  sometimes  visits  His  friends  with  adversity  in 
the  capacity  of  a  Father,  not  a  lawmaker.  He  sometimes  re- 
wards the  wicked  in  this  life,  because  the  future  life  will 
admit  of  no  recompense  for  the  little  good  they  do. 

IV.  0.  Heaven  and  hell  encourage  men  to  work  from  an 
imperfect  motive.  But  God  recommends  these  motives  not 
in  an  absolute  way,  but  only  in  the  supposition  that  other 
motives  fail  of  influence  with  human  imperfection.  The  proc- 
ess is  negatively  imperfect,  or  less  perfect;  not  positively, 
or  altogether  imperfect. 

P.  There  would  seem  to  be  no  proportion  between  a 
momentary  sin  and  an  eternal  hell. 

Answer:    No  proportion  of  time,  but  of  justice. 

Q.  The  purpose  of  sanction  is  to  correct  the  criminal, 
or  restrain  him  from  wrong.  Eternal  punishment  defeats 
purpose. 

Answer:  Sanction  can  be  viewed  as  a  threat  or  an  actual- 
ity. Its  purpose  as  a  threat  is  secondary;  its  purpose  as  an 
actuality  is  primary.  Its  complete  or  combined  purpose  is 
the  preservation  of  order.  Before  order  takes  harm,  it  threat- 
ens; after  order  takes  harm,  it  punishes,  and  so  restores 
things  to  primitive  condition  of  equity.  The  pendulum 
swings  back.  In  this  life  sanction  has  for  secondary  purpose 
the  correction  of  the  criminal  and  restraint  of  others.  Here 
we  are  in  probation.  In  the  next  life  probation  is  at  an  end, 
and  sanction  strikes  a  balance.  Sinners,  who  refused  God 
glory  here,  do  unwilling  homage  to  His  holiness  and  justice 
hereafter. 


PRINCIPLES  69 

R.  Many  atheists  know  nothing  of  hell.     Ergo,  no  hell 
for  them. 

Answer:  They  doubt  regarding  hell,  and  by  their  own 
fault.  They  are  not  certain  regarding  its  non-existence.  It 
is  enough  for  the  criminal  to  put  an  act  deserving  the  pen- 
alty. Murderers  are  hanged,  whether  they  know  the  penalty 
or  not. 

S.  Hell  itself  is  not  sufficient  sanction.     Ergo. 

Answer:  It  furnishes  motive  enough  for  the  law's  observ- 
ance, though  it  fails  to  coerce  free  men. 

V.  T.  Every  offense  against  positive  law  is  against  nat- 
ural law,  mediately  not  immediately.  A  fault  against  positive 
law  is  not  necessarily  against  natural  law,  because  natural 
law  is  the  remote,  not  the  near  cause  of  positive  law.  In 
every  such  case  no  natural  law  would  be  broken,  were  it  not 
for  the  positive  law. 


THESIS  V 

VARIOUS  MORAL  NOTIONS 

The  five  caUses  of  morality,  final,  material,  formal,  model 
and  efficient.  Generic  and  specific  morality.  Objective  and 
subjective  morality.  Good,  bad  and  indifferent  acts.  Moral- 
ity's subjective  measure  is  synderesis  and  conscience.  Moral- 
ity's efficient  cause  is  intellect  and  will.  Appetite,  the  pas- 
sions, and  will.  Morality's  root  is  freedom  of  will.  Volun- 
tary and  involuntary  acts.  End  and  intention.  Morality's 
obstacles,  ignorance  and  error  affect  the  intellect;  the  pas- 
sions, notably  fear,  affect  the  will;  violence  affects  executive 
not  appetitive  factdties,  ordered  not  elicited  acts.  Jouin,  19- 
28;  48-56;  Bickaby,  27-64. 

Ethics  is  the  science  of  putting  order  in  man's  free  acts, 
with  principles  derived  from  reason  for  ultimate  basis,  the 
principles  themselves  being  of  the  rock-bottom  variety,  last, 
farthest  away,  remotest  from  the  student.  Ethics  is  the  study 
of  morality  in  its  last  causes,  compassed  in  the  light  of  rea- 
son. Like  everything  else,  morality  has  five  causes,  final,  ma- 
terial, formal,  efficient  and  model.  Its  final  cause,  its  pur- 
pose, what  the  agent  seeks  in  its  prosecution,  is  happiness, 
complete  and  incomplete;  and  this  phase  of  morality  was 
discussed  in  our  first  three  theses.  Its  end  of  deed  is  order 
in  man's  free  acts,  its  end  of  doer  is  resulting  happiness. 
Recall  clock  and  clockmaker.  Its  material  cause,  its  subject- 
matter,  its  content,  the  determinable  element  of  which  moral- 
ity is  made,  like  the  body  in  a  man,  the  bricks  and  mortar 
in  a  house,  is  distinctively  human  acts,  acts  proceeding  from 
a  free  will  and  an  intellect,  adverting  to  the  moral  good  or 
evil  in  a  thing.  And,  though  we  gave  these  acts  some  notice 
in  our  first  thesis,  we  delayed  their  full  discussion  to  this 
present  occasion,  because  persuaded  that  we  can  now  under- 

70 


OBJECT,  END,  CIRCUMSTANCES  71 

stand  them  better.  Its  formal  cause  is  good  and  evil  in  the 
moral  order;  and  these  notions  await  fuller  development. 
Good  and  evil  in  the  moral  order  are  regularly  designated 
right  and  wrong.  The  second  and  third  paragraphs  of  our 
third  thesis  deal  with  the  formal  cause  of  morality,  inas- 
much as  they  establish  an  essential,  intrinsic  difference  be- 
tween right  and  wrong  acts,  and  supply  us  with  a  standard 
of  measurement,  enabling  us  to  detect  this  essential,  intrinsic 
difference.  In  other  words,  some  acts  are  so  right,  that  they 
get  their  rightness  from  nothing  outside  themselves ;  so  right, 
that  viewed  in  themselves  they  cannot  be  made  wrong  by  Al- 
mighty God  Himself ;  so  right,  that  rightness  is  of  their  very 
essence  and  inamissible.  Other  acts  are  so  wrong,  that  irreg- 
ularity is  in  their  very  substance,  irremovable  therefrom  by 
God  Himself,  and  beyond  being  changed  by  law,  custom,  con- 
science or  whatever  else.  Instances  of  the  two  classes  are, 
love  of  God,  worship,  obedience  to  parents;  and  hatred  of 
God,  blasphemy,  a  lie.  We  distinguish  between  generic 
morality,  and  specific.  Generic  merely  denominates  an  act 
moral;  specific  morality  denominates  it  good  or  bad,  virtue 
or  vice.  The  generic  morality  of  an  act,  making  it  moral,  is 
settled  by  its  origination  in  an  intellect  and  a  will.  The  spe- 
cific morality  of  an  act,  making  it  good  or  bad,  is  gotten  from 
its  harmony  in  whole,  or  discord  in  part,  with  the  objective 
order  of  things.  The  determinants  of  an  act's  morality, 
specifically  considered,  are  its  object,  its  agent's  end  or  in- 
tention, its  circumstances.  If  all  three  are  in  harmony  with 
the  objective  order,  the  act  in  question  is  morally  good;  if 
any  one  of  the  three  is  at  discord  with  the  objective  order, 
the  act  is  morally  bad.  This  last  statement  remains  to  be 
proved,  and  it  will  get  our  attention  later.  For  the  better 
understanding  of  generic  and  specific  morality,  it  may  prove 
a  help  to  recall  animal,  man  and  brute,  with  their  endless 
varieties.  Animal  is  the  genus;  man  and  brute,  the  species; 
races  of  men  and  breeds  of  brutes  are  classes,  not  species. 
In  much  the  same  way,  moral  acts  are  the  genus;  good  and 
bad  acts,  or  virtues  and  vices,  are  the  species;  while  virtues 
and  vices,  grouped  under  particular  names,  are  classes,  not 
species. 

Moral  acts,  constituted  by  the  fact  that  they  proceed  from 


72  GENERAL  ETHICS 

intellect  and  will,  are  a  genus  capable  of  division  into  the 
two  species,  good  and  bad  acts.  Harmony  and  discord  with 
the  objective  order  are  their  specific  differences.  Ethics  is 
practical,  and  there  is  question  always  of  an  individual  con- 
crete act,  and  we  want  to  know  to  what  species  it  belongs. 
We  say  that  object,  end  and  circumstances  are  its  specific 
determinants,  and  we  are  practically  saying  that  the  act  is 
morally  good  or  bad  inasmuch  as  the  whole  individual  moral 
act  is  in  harmony,  or  part  of  it  is  at  discord  with  the  objec- 
tive order.  "Whole  individual  moral  act  means  object,  end 
and  circumstances.  Ohject  means  act,  end  means  moral,  cir- 
cumstances mean  individual.  Different  virtues  and  different 
vices  are  not  species  properly  so  called.  They  are  classes 
under  species.  Like  man  and  brute  in  Porphyry's  Tree  vir- 
tues and  vices  are  infimae  or  lowest  species.  They  admit  of 
different  classes,  but  not  of  different  species.  An  infima 
species  cannot  be  conceived  as  a  genus  containing  different 
species,  but  only  as  a  species  containing  different  individ- 
uals, and  these  in  turn  constitute  different  classes.  There 
are  no  different  species  of  men,  though  there  are  different 
races  or  classes  of  men;  and  so  there  are  no  different  species 
of  virtue  or  vice,  but  only  different  classes  or  kinds.  Man 
and  brute  are  different  species  of  animal,  because  they  differ 
in  essence.  Justice  and  charity  are  not  different  species  of 
virtue,  because  they  do  not  differ  in  essence,  inasmuch  as  they 
are  moral  goods.  Their  essences,  namely  genus  and  specific 
difference,  are  the  same,  moral  acts  in  harmony  with  objective 
order.  Different  species  must  have  different  essences,  differ- 
ent classes  have  the  same  essence  and  different  accidents.  No 
one  act  can  belong  to  two  different  species,  but  the  same  act 
can  belong  to  two  different  classes.  One  act  cannot  be  at  the 
same  time  virtuous  and  vicious,  though  one  act  ordered  by 
the  will  can  be  at  the  same  time  justice  and  charity,  as  when 
a  man  owes  five  dollars  and  gives  ten.  It  is  quite  possible 
for  a  charitable  man  to  become  a  just  man,  without  ceasing 
to  be  charitable;  it  is  quite  impossible  for  a  rational  animal 
or  a  man  to  become  an  irrational  animal  or  a  brute.  And 
what  is  true  of  man  as  a  lowest  species,  is  true  of  virtue  as  a 
lowest  species.  Though  we  are  not  now  specially  concerned 
with  the  classification  of  the  different  virtues  and  different 


J 


OBJECT,  END,  CIRCUMSTANCES  73 

vices,  but  with  the  specification  of  generically  moral  acts, 
it  is  quite  true  to  say  that  object,  end  and  circumstances 
classify  virtues  and  vices  as  well  as  specify  moral  acts.  Ob- 
ject, end  and  circumstances  are  not  the  specific  differences 
of  good  and  bad  acts,  but  the  specific  determinants  limited 
or  determined  by  the  specific  differences,  harmony  and  dis- 
cord with  the  objective  order.  All  three  must  be  in  har- 
mony with  the  objective  order  to  constitute  a  good  act,  dis- 
cord in  any  one  of  the  three  with  the  objective  order  constitutes 
a  bad  act.  In  conjunction  with  harmony  and  discord  they 
determine  the  specific  morality  of  a  generically  moral  act. 
They  contribute  jointly  with  harmony  and  discord  to  the 
whole  essence  of  a  morally  good  or  a  morally  bad  act.  There 
are  no  different  species  of  moral  good  and  moral  evil,  though 
tliere  are  different  species  of  morally  good  and  morally  evil 
acts.  Justice  is  a  species  of  morally  good  acts,  it  is  not  a 
species  of  moral  good,  because  no  moral  good  is  contradic- 
torily opposed  to  it.  Man  is  a  species  of  animal,  because 
brute  is  contradictorily  opposed  to  him.  Justice  and  injus- 
tice are  not  species  of  virtue,  because  virtue  is  not  common 
to  the  two.  Justice  and  charity  are  not  species  of  virtue, 
'because,  though  virtue  is  common  to  the  two,  their  specific 
differences  are  the  same,  and  one  is  not  contradictorily  op- 
posed to  the  other. 

St.  Thomas,  S.  T.  1,  2,  q.  19,  a.  1,  contends  that  acts  get  their 
specific  morality  from  object  alone,  to  later  share  the  preroga- 
tive with  end  and  circumstances.  Therefore  object  must 
admit  of  several  meanings.  In  one  sense  or  Avide  sense  it 
includes  end  and  circumstances,  in  the  other  it  excludes  them. 
In  wide  sense  object  of  act  means  the  whole  term  of  the  man's 
wish,  the  whole  good  thing  known  to  the  intellect  and  sought 
or  chosen  by  the  will,  with  every  attendant  circumstance. 
Like  every  whole  the  whole  term  or  whole  good  has  parts, 
and  these  parts  are  what  we  call  the  object  in  strict  sense, 
end  and  circumstances.  Object,  therefore,  in  strict  sense,  is 
what  the  will  on  its  own  account  and  primarily  wishes  with 
a  bearing  on  morality.  Circumstances  are  accidents  morally 
affecting  the  act,  whether  by  way  of  object  or  by  way  of 
agent;  and  they  are  what  the  will  wishes,  not  on  their  own 
account  primarily,  but  on  account  of  object  or  end  and  sec- 


74  GENERAL  ETHICS 

ondarily.  They  are  answers  to  the  questions,  quis,  quid,  ubi, 
quibus  auxiliis,  cur,  quomodo,  quando;  meaning  who,  what, 
where,  with  what  helps,  why,  how,  when.  Some  circum- 
stances physically  affect  the  act,  and  we  are  not  talking  of 
them.  An  instance  would  be  to  give  an  alms  with  the  left 
hand  or  the  right  hand.  Person  is  a  circumstance,  quis,  or 
who,  and  it  means  here  not  the  bare  substance  of  a  person,  a 
mere  man,  a  mere  woman,  a  mere  child,  but  a  person  as  af- 
fected with  modifications  that  base  moral  relations,  like  a 
father,  a  mother,  a  son,  a  laymam,  a  priest.  Some  circum- 
stances, like  quantity,  leave  their  acts  in  the  same  class  of 
virtues  or  vices,  as  &ve  or  ten  dollars  in  the  case  of  theft; 
others,  like  place,  put  their  acts  in  different  classes,  as  theft 
in  a  church  becomes  theft  and  sacrilege.  End  is  itself  a  cir- 
cumstance, cur  or  why,  and  the  same  is  true  of  object,  quid 
or  what;  but  just  as  quid  or  what,  taken  as  a  circumstance, 
is  made  to  mean  quantum,  how  much,  or  quale,  of  what  sort, 
so  cur  or  why  taken  as  a  circumstance  is  made  to  mean  end 
of  deed  or  finis  operis,  reducible  itself  to  object.  End  as  dis- 
tinguished from  circumstance  means  end  of  doer,  finis  operan- 
tis,  an  intrinsic  accident  of  the  agent,  not  an  intrinsic  acci- 
dent of  the  deed;  not  the  purpose  nature  attached  to  the 
work,  but  the  purpose  actuating  the  agent  to  perform  it. 
Think  of  clock,  time  and  money,  with  time  for  end  of  deed, 
or  thing  made,  and  money  for  end  of  doer  or  person  making. 

To  constitute  an  act  good  all  the  determinants  must  be 
good,  to  constitute  an  act  evil,  only  one  of  the  three  need  be 
evil;  and  St.  Thomas  sees  in  this  circumstance  another  proof 
of  the  difficulty  attaching  to  virtue  as  compared  with  vice, 
declaring  that  the  surpassing  value  of  virtue  makes  the  trou- 
ble worth  while.  This  fact  is  gathered  up  in  the  terse  say- 
ing, ^'Bonum  ex  Integra  causa,  malum  ex  quocunque  defectu.^' 
Good  results  from  a  complete  and  total  cause ,  evil  from  any 
defect  in  the  cause.  What  the  agent  chooses  must  be  right,  the 
reason  why  he  chooses  it  must  be  right,  and  the  circum- 
stances attaching  to  what  and  why  must  be  right.  If  any 
of  the  three  happens  to  be  wrong,  the  whole  act  is  morally 
wrong. 

Object  is  finis  operis,  end  of  deed;  end  is  finis  operantis, 
end  of  doer.     The  object  of  murder  is  the  destruction  of  an 


OBJECTIVE  AND  SUBJECTIVE  MORALITY        75 

innocent  man's  life,  the  object  of  theft  is  the  seizure  of  an- 
other's property  against  his  rational  wishes,  the  object  of  a 
clock  is  the  indication  of  time.  The  end  of  murder  may  be 
revenge,  or  plunder,  or  removal  of  an  unfriendly  witness, 
removal  of  a  Church  persecutor,  kindness  to  a  parent,  and 
the  like.  The  end  of  theft  may  be  the  purchase  of  an  auto, 
alms  to  the  poor,  gift  to  a  benefactor,  payment  of  a  debt  and 
the  like.  Circumstances  affect  both  object  and  end.  Murder 
of  a  father  by  his  son,  in  a  church,  to  keep  him  from  sin. 
Object  can  likewise  mean  the  term  of  the  act,  terminus  ac- 
tionis;  the  person  or  thing  the  act  touches  or  affects,  God, 
self,  the  neighbor,  creatures  without  reason.  When  God  is 
object,  because  He  is  good,  without  any  admixture  of  evil, 
no  concrete  act  can  be  indifferent  with  regard  to  object,  be- 
cause turning  towards  complete  good  is  necessarily  good,  turn- 
ing away  from  complete  good  is  necessarily  evil.  With  self, 
neighbor  and  irrational  creatures  it  is  different;  they  are 
mixtures  of  good  and  evil,  and  turning  towards  them  is  not 
necessarily  good,  turning  away  from  them  is  not  necessarily 
evil.  To  turn  towards  the  good  in  them,  and  to  turn  away 
from  the  evil  in  them  are  good  acts;  to  turn  away  from  the 
good  in  them,  and  to  turn  towards  the  evil  in  them  are  bad 
acts.  Therefore,  acts  bearing  on  creatures,  even  in  the  con- 
crete, are  of  indifferent  morality  on  the  part  of  object  of  the 
act.  This  is  far  from  meaning  that  individual  acts  in  the 
concrete  are  ever  indifferent.  They  are  always  definitely 
good  or  evil,  but  they  get  their  specific  or  definite  morality 
not  from  object  of  act,  but  from  end  of  agent,  and  no  indi- 
vidual concrete  act  is  without  its  definite  and  determined 
purpose.  Hatred  is  all  right,  when  aversion  from  evil  in- 
volves tendency  towards  good;  hate  is  all  wrong,  when  aver- 
sion from  evil  involves  aversion  from  good.  To  walk,  to 
drink,  to  talk,  are  acts  with  self  for  object,  and  these  acts 
are  never  put  without  a  purpose  or  motive  different  from  and 
prior  to  the  acts  themselves.  Walking,  drinking  and  talking 
cannot  be  motives  for  the  wish  to  walk,  drink  or  talk,  because 
they  do  not  exist  before  the  wish  is  conceived,  and  cause  must 
precede  effect.  Therefore,  some  motive  prior  to  the  wish 
inspires  these  several  acts,  and  changes  these  morally  indiffer- 
ent acts  on  the  part  of  object  to  specifically  good  or  evil  acts 


76  GENERAL  ETHICS 

on  the  part  of  agent.  Purposes  like  prayer,  health,  temper- 
ance, kindness,  make  these  acts  morally  good;  purposes  like 
theft,  gluttony,  drunkenness,  anger  make  these  acts  morally 
evil.  And  what  is  true  of  acts  with  self  for  object,  is  true 
of  acts  with  the  neighbor  and  irrational  creatures  for  object. 

Again,  we  distinguish  between  objective  morality  and  sub- 
jective morality,  much  as  we  distinguish  between  objective 
certainty  and  subjective;  and,  just  as  purely  subjective  cer- 
tainty, without  objective  for  basis  and  foundation,  is  error 
rather  than  truth,  so  purely  subjective  morality,  or  subjec- 
tive goodness  without  objective  goodness  for  basis  and  founda- 
tion, is  badness  or  vice  rather  than  goodness  or  virtue.  Hence, 
a  man  can  be  good,  though  he  puts  a  bad  act,  he  can  be  bad 
though  he  puts  a  good  act,  meaning  always  in  the  matter  of 
conscience,  or  subjectively.  He  can  tell  a  lie  and  think  it  a 
duty.  His  will  is  right,  his  mind  is  wrong.  He  can  tell  the 
truth  and  think  it  a  sin.  His  mind  and  will  are  both  wrong. 
One  is  morality  of  the  man,  conscience  apart  from  act;  the 
other  is  morality  of  his  act,  act  apart  from  conscience.  Objec- 
tive morality  is  in  the  whole  deed  or  act  itself,  without  any 
reference  whatever  to  the  truth  or  falsehood  of  the  doer's 
knowledge ;  and  of  this  kind  of  morality  there  was  question  in 
the  second  and  third  paragraphs  of  our  third  thesis.  The  only 
kind  of  subjective  morality,  that  regularly  deserves  notice,  is 
the  kind  based  on  objective ;  and  of  this  we  speak  when  we  say 
that  the  specific  determinants  of  morality  are  the  act's  object, 
its  doer's  end  or  intention,  and  the  circumstances  affecting 
both.  Conscience  is  the  measure  of  pure  subjective  morality, 
and  will  get  our  attention  later. 

Certainty  is  entirely  a  matter  of  intellect,  morality  is  a 
matter  of  intellect  and  will  together.  Certainty  turns  on 
truth,  morality  on  conduct,  and  the  will  has  more  to  do  with 
conduct  than  the  intellect.  The  intellect  is  true,  objectively 
and  subjectively  certain,  only  when  it  grasps  things  as  they 
are,  only  when  it  sees  murder  as  murder,  theft  as  theft.  It 
is  false,  subjectively  certain,  objectively  ignorant  or  wrong, 
when  it  grasps  things  otherwise  than  as  they  are,  when  it  views 
murder  as  charity,  theft  as  commendable  skill.  Intellect  is 
only  one  factor  in  morality,  will  is  the  other  and  more  im- 
portant. 


MORAL  ACTS  77 

All  three  determinants,  object,  end  and  circumstances,  have 
their  own  objective  and  subjective  morality.  Their  objective 
morality  is  like  a  fact,  and  quite  independent  of  the  agent's 
thinking ;  their  subjective  morality  is  not  a  fact,  but  the  view 
the  agent 's  mind  takes  of  them.  Per  se,  and  therefore  regu- 
larly, man's  mind  hits  the  truth;  per  accidens,  and  therefore 
in  rare  and  exceptional  cases,  the  mind  can  miss  the  truth. 
In  such  exceptional  cases  subjective  morality  is  at  variance 
with  objective,  and  ignorance  is  usually  responsible  for  the 
mistake.  This  ignorance  is  either  vincible  or  invincible, 
within  the  thinker's  control  or  beyond  it.  Some  degree  of 
carelessness  attaches  to  vincible  ignorance,  and  carelessness 
is  blameable  and  punishable.  No  such  carelessness  attaches 
to  invincible,  and  it  is  therefore  without  blame  and  unpun- 
ishable. 

Objective  morality,  as  distinguished  from  subjective,  is  the 
morality  of  the  object  of  the  act  in  strict  sense,  and  end, 
and  circumstances,  viewed  as  facts,  as  they  are  in  themselves; 
subjective  morality  is  morality  of  the  same  three  determinants, 
as  they  are  viewed  by  the  mind  of  the  agent.  And  this. is 
what  we  mean  when  we  say  that  subjective  is  the  morality  of 
the  man,  objective  is  the  morality  of  his  act.  A  man  is  not 
good,  unless  his  purpose  and  its  attendant  circumstances  are 
good,  as  well  as  the  object  of  his  act.  Neither  is  he  good, 
unless  the  object  of  his  act  is  good,  as  well  as  his  end  and  its 
attendant  circumstances.  Every  act  implies  two  things,  a 
cause  and  an  effect.  A  moral  act  implies  a  cause  viewed 
morally,  and  an  effect  viewed  morally.  A  cause  viewed  mor- 
ally involves  intellectual  knowledge  and  free  will  with  a  bear- 
ing on  moral  right  and  wrong.  An  effect  viewed  morally  is 
what  results  from  the  activity  of  a  cause  viewed  morally;  it 
is  a  physical  act  proceeding  from  a  free  agent,  not  consid- 
ered merely  in  itself,  but  in  its  bearing  on  right  and  wrong. 
In  every  moral  act  the  effect  or  term  of  the  act  fixes  its  objec- 
tive morality;  the  cause,  a  composite  of  intellectual  knowl- 
edge and  free  will,  fixes  its  subjective  morality. 

Only  free  acts  are  matter  for  moral  acts,  choice  is  exercise 
of  freedom,  and  choice  is  impossible  without  prior  intellectual 
knowledge.  Man's  one  free  faculty  is  his  will.  His  intellect, 
senses,  appetite,  locomotion  are  all  necessary  faculties,  and 


78  GENERAL  ETHICS 

they  borrow  whatever  freedom  we  attribute  to  them  from  the 
will.  Therefore,  in  strict  sense  only  acts  elicited  by  the  will, 
only  wishes  as  such,  only  internal  acts  of  the  will,  begun  and 
finished  in  the  will,  elicited  and  executed  by  the  will,  deserve 
and  get  the  appellation,  moral.  Every  act  external  to  the 
will,  whether  it  be  a  thought,  or  a  sensation,  or  a  passion, 
murder,  or  theft,  viewed  as  proceeding  from  intellect,  sense, 
appetite,  or  hands,  is  a  necessary  act,  and  therefore  without 
its  own  proper  morality ;  and  every  such  act  borrows  morality 
from  intimate  connection  with  the  will,  from  dependence  in 
its  first  origin  on  the  will,  from  the  fact  that,  while  it  is  fin- 
ished or  executed  by  another  faculty,  it  is  begun,  elicited  in 
the  shape  of  a  wish,  ordered,  commanded,  prescribed  by  the 
will. 

Hence  our  distinction  between  acts  elicited  by  the  will  and 
acts  ordered  by  the  will.  Elicited  acts  are  internal  acts, 
ordered  acts  are  external.  Both  are  moral  acts,  but  after  a 
different  manner.  Internal  acts  have  their  own  independent 
morality,  ordered  acts  have  no  morality  of  their  own,  but 
a  morality  derived  from  and  dependent  on  the  influence  of 
the  will,  the  part  played  by  the  will  in  their  accomplishment. 
Murder  and  theft  are  always  done  in  the  will  before  they  are 
done  by  the  hands,  and  as  outward  or  external  acts  their 
morality  is  exactly  the  same  as  that  of  the  wish  or  internal 
act  prompting  them.  In  murder  the  outward  act  is  in  itself 
necessary,  free  by  participation;  the  inward  act  is  free  in 
itself.  The  will  makes  the  murderer  kill,  much  as  instinct 
makes  the  bird  fly,  with  this  difference,  that  while  the  will 
is  free,  instinct  is  a  necessary  agent. 

In  the  concrete,  and  viewed  as  products  of  an  individual 
man,  all  acts  are  either  good  or  bad.  In  real  life  there  is  no 
such  thing  as  an  indifferent  human  act,  a  deliberate  act 
neither  good  nor  bad,  but  between  both.  In  the  abstract,  and 
in  the  field  of  theory,  walking,  singing,  and  a  thousand  such 
acts  are  indifferent  in  themselves;  but  in  practical  every-day 
life  all  such  acts  are  necessarily  good  or  bad.  Ethics  has 
nothing  to  do  with  indifferent  acts,  because  they  fall  outside 
its  sphere.  It  is  a  practical,  not  a  theoretical  study.  There 
never  was  an  animal,  without  its  being  a  man  or  a  brute ;  and 
there  never  was  a  moral  or  distinctively  human  act,  without 


SUMMARY  79 

its  being  definitely  good  or  bad,  from  a  moral  point  of  view. 
Acts  are  morally  good  or  bad,  when  they  respectively  help 
or  hinder  a  man  in  his  progress  towards  his  last  end,  the 
possession  of  God  in  Heaven,  the  practice  of  virtue  on  earth. 
Man's  destiny  is  the  fulfilment  of  God's  wishes  in  his  regard, 
and  we  gather  God's  designs  on  man  from  a  study  of  man's 
nature.  Complete  happiness  is  last  factor  in  man's  wishes; 
and,  therefore  his  last  end,  because  there  is  no  good  beyond. 
Because  it  leads  to  God  or  complete  happiness,  virtue  consti- 
tutes incomplete  happiness,  the  highest  possible  on  earth. 
Virtue  in  turn  means  order  in  man's  free  acts,  it  means  the 
performance  of  duty ;  duty  springs  from  man 's  relations  with 
the  other  moral  units  in  the  universe,  God  and  neighbor ;  and 
these  relations  are  based  on  the  objective  order  of  things, 
things  as  God  made  them,  things  as  God  views  them. 

And  now  to  sum  up,  an  act  is  first  moral,  then  good  or  bad. 
All  distinctively  human  acts  are  moral.  Some  are  good, 
others  bad;  good,  when  they  square  with  the  objective  order 
of  things,  as  grasped  by  the  intellect ;  bad,  when  they  are  at 
angles  with  this  order.  Objective  order  is  embodied  in  the 
eternal  law,  made  manifest  to  man  in  the  natural  law,  and 
pushed  to  the  limit  of  clearness  in  positive  law;  and  for  this 
reason,  the  natural  law  is  morality's  model  cause.  Eternal 
law  is  God's  reason  or  will,  commanding  the  preservation  of 
natural  order,  forbidding  its  disturbance.  Natural  law  is 
eternal  law,  become  evident  in  rational  nature;  or,  an  inborn 
habit  of  mind  enabling  man  to  detect  the  harmony  or  discord 
in  force  between  notions  constituting  morality's  first  prin- 
ciples. Positive  law  is  an  obligation  founded  on  right  rea- 
son, drawn  up  and  promulgated  for  the  common  good  by  him 
who  has  charge  of  the  community  affected.  Creatures  in- 
ferior to  man,  from  minerals  to  brutes,  always  keep  the  eternal 
law,  the  law  set  them  by  God,  that  aspect  of  eternal  law 
applicable  to  irrational  nature.  A  stone  miraculously  sus- 
pended in  the  air,  is  keeping  the  law  of  gravity  as  far  as  in 
it  lies.  Man  is  the  only  rebel  in  the  universe,  because  man 
alone  is  free.  Morality's  efficient  cause  is  man,  viewed  as  an 
intelligent,  free  being.  Morality  is  restricted  to  man,  intel- 
lect and  will  are  the  two  faculties  in  man  directly  concerned 
with  morality,  and  of  the  two  will  is  the  more  vitally  impor- 


80  GENERAL  ETHICS 

tant.  It  is  the  work  of  the  intellect  to  know  right  and  wrong, 
it  is  the  work  of  the  will  to  choose  between  them.  In  the  -field 
of  knowing  synderesis  and  conscience  are  man's  mentors, 
they  are  functions  of  the  intellect  in  its  bearing  on  morality, 
they  are  reason  restricted  to  the  department  of  right  and 
wrong.  Synderesis  is  the  hahit  of  morality's  first  principles; 
and  we  saw  in  our  fourth  thesis  that  synderesis  is  unerring. 
The  natural  law  is  universally  known,  as  well  as  universally 
existent.  Conscience  is  the  application  of  synderesis  to  per- 
sonal and  concrete  acts;  and  conscience  can  be  false  as  well  as 
true,  wrong  as  well  as  right.  Synderesis  is  intellect  as  it 
comes  from  the  hand  of  God,  conscience  is  intellect  as  modi- 
fied hy  man;  and  the  whole  truth  is  summed  up  in  that  state- 
ment from  Major  Logic,  the  intellect  is  per  se  infallible,  and 
fallible  per  accidens.  Synderesis  elicits  a  speculative  judg- 
ment only,  conscience  elicits  a  speculative  and  a  practieal  judg- 
ment. One  is  Major ;  the  other  theoretically  viewed  is  Minor 
in  the  Moral  Syllogism,  practically  viewed  it  is  the  conclu- 
sion. One  regulates  our  thinking,  the  other  our  doing.  One 
is  truth,  the  other  is  morality ;  and  they  are  related  like  Logic 
and  Ethics,  inasmuch  as  Logic  lays  down  rules  for  right 
thinking,  Ethics  lays  down  rules  for  right  conduct.  An  ex- 
ample may  make  things  clearer.  Murder  is  wrong  and  a 
thing  to  be  avoided.  This  particular  killing  I  contemplate 
would  be  murder.  Therefore  I  must  avoid  this  particular 
killing. 

Intellect,  therefore,  and  will,  or  knowing  and  choosing,  are 
what  give  being  and  essence  to  our  moral  acts,  and  they 
deserve  most  serious  attention.  They  get  full  and  complete 
treatment  in  Psychology;  but,  for  present  purposes,  we  must 
be  pardoned  introducing  here  certain  truths,  there  proved 
beyond  dispute.  We  begin  with  the  consideration  of  man, 
as  composed  of  body  and  soul.  The  two  appetitive  faculties 
in  man  are  appetite  and  will ;  the  passions  are  manifestations 
of  appetite,  and  are  nine  in  number.  The  will's  freedom, 
the  different  classes  of  voluntary  acts,  the  different  kinds  of 
intentions  need  to  be  explained.  The  parts  ignorance  and 
error,  the  passions  and  violence  play  in  morality  are  questions 
to  be  settled. 

Composition  of  Man.    Man  is  a  mystery.     He  is  the  mi- 


APPETITE  AND  WILL  81 

crocosm;  a  mineral,  a  plant,  a  brute  and  an  angel.  He  is  a 
body  and  soul,  matter  and  spirit.  He  is  one  complete  sub- 
stance and  nature,  made  up  of  two  incomplete  substances 
and  natures.  Only  live  bodies  are  human  bodies,  and  they 
alone  are  one  incomplete  substance.  A  dead  body  is  no  hu- 
man body,  it  is  an  aggregate  of  many  different  complete  sub- 
stances. 

The  incompleteness  of  the  body,  as  a  substance,  is  situate  in 
the  circumstance,  that  it  unites  with  the  soul  to  form  the 
complete  substance,  man.  Its  incompleteness,  as  a  nature,  is 
due  to  the  fact  that  it  derives  its  activity  from  the  soul.  The 
whole  man  is  a  complete  substance,  because  he  stands  by  him- 
self, and  enters  into  no  combination  with  another.  He  is  a 
complete  nature,  because  he  is  the  root  and  principle  of  all 
his  operations.  Body  and  soul  are  incomplete  after  different 
manners.  The  body  is  incomplete  and  non-subsistent.  With- 
out the  soul  it  falls  away  and  perishes.  The  soul  is  incom- 
plete and  subsistent.  Without  the  body  it  goes  on  living 
and  acting.  And  yet  the  soul  is  no  angel,  because  its  sub- 
sistence is  incomplete;  accompanied  always  by  a  connatural 
capacity  for  union  with  the  body,  to  constitute  one  complete 
substance,  man.  An  angel's  subsistence  is  complete,  and  void 
of  every  such  connatural  capacity.  Only  as  a  composite  of 
body  and  soul  is  man  a  complete  substance  and  a  complete 
nature.  As  such  he  is  not  a  body,  nor  yet  a  soul;  but  a 
man.  He  is  not  a  body-substance  or  nature,  nor  yet  a  soul- 
substance  or  nature ;  but  a  human  substance  and  nature,  with 
activities  partaking  of  the  two  kingdoms  of  matter  and  spirit. 

Hence,  he  has  sense  as  well  as  intellect;  he  has  appetite  as 
well  as  will.  In  man's  present  condition  his  soul  is  root  and 
principle  of  his  thoughts  and  wishes,  but  with  extrinsic  de- 
pendence on  his  body,  and  this  dependence  is  far  from 
interfering  with  the  soul's  spirituality.  This  extrinsic  de- 
pendence on  the  body,  in  a  mediate  way  follows  the  soul  to 
the  next  life,  because  in  even  its  separated  condition  it 
thinks  and  wishes  with  the  mediate  help  of  species  or  images 
it  carries,  and  these  owe  their  first  origin  to  phantasms,  them- 
selves products  of  the  composite  man. 

Appetite  and  Will.  But  we  are  now  concerned  with  man 
in  this  present  life ;  and,  because  our  topic  is  Ethics,  his  will 


82  GENERAL  ETHICS 

demands  most  immediate  attention.  In  this  business  of 
morality  the  will  is  the  thing,  and  a  man's  will  is  his  heart. 
The  will  is  best  defined  as  a  spiritual,  inorganic  faculty  of  the 
soul,  appetitive  of  good  at  the  instigation  of  the  intellect. 
It  is  a  blind  faculty,  and  gets  light  from  the  intellect.  It 
can  act  with  or  against  the  light.  Good  is  its  object,  and 
that  is  the  quality  intellect  calls  to  its  notice.  Greater  and 
lesser  have  weight  of  course  with  the  will,  but  no  determining 
or  absolute  weight.  It  is  free,  and  can  reject  the  greater 
good  to  select  the  lesser,  and  all  this  with  an  abiding 
knowledge  of  their  relative  worth.  Experience  is  proof,  and 
facts  are  more  stubborn  than  wrong  principles,  doped  out  to 
strengthen  the  weak  limbs  of  a  lame  theory.  As  soon  as  the 
smallest  conceivable  particle  of  good  sails  into  the  mind's 
vision,  the  will  is  ready  to  exert  its  energy.  The  will  is  free, 
we  say,  and  the  world  agrees  with  us.  We  mean  the  world 
of  common  sense.  There  are  a  few  restless  spirits,  who  stand 
for  determination  of  will.  But  they  are  off  the  right  track, 
they  purposely  go  wide  of  common-sense,  they  are  chasing 
rainbows  in  a  wild  search  for  novelty,  no  sober  study  of  the 
truth.  The  truth  of  the  thing  is  that  the  will  is  free,  and 
Determinists  are  well  acquainted  with  the  fact.  They  feel 
free  to  reject  as  attractive  a  good  as  the  truth,  and  actions 
are  louder  than  words.  When  a  man  says  one  thing  and 
does  another,  we  claim  the  privilege  of  gathering  his  real 
sentiments  from  his  deeds;  and  these  idle  philosophers  talk 
Determinism  to  do  freedom.  The  will  then  is  free,  and  it  is 
too  late  in  the  day  to  endeavor  to  correct  the  notion. 

Omitting  for  the  present  the  soul's  executive  energies,  we 
attribute  to  the  soul  the  power  to  know,  and  the  power  to 
wish;  and  this  twofold  power  we  denominate  its  cognoscitive 
and  appetitive  faculties.  Man  wishes  as  he  knows,  and  his 
knowledge  covers  two  kingdoms,  that  of  sense  and  that  of 
intellect.  His  soul  is  the  root  of  all  his  activity.  Sight  and 
hearing  are  just  as  much  rooted  in  his  soul  as  understanding 
or  thought.  But  here  again  there  is  a  difference.  In  opera- 
tions of  sense  the  soul  is  intrinsically  dependent  on  matter, 
in  thought  its  dependence  is  merely  extrinsic.  Had  man  no 
higher  faculty  than  sense,  his  soul  would  be  just  as  material 
as  the  brute's.     But  he  has  a  higher  faculty,  that  of  thought; 


THE  PASSIONS  83 

its  operations  are  intrinsically  independent  of  matter,  spirit- 
ual, inorganic ;  and  what  is  highest  in  a  thing  gives  the  thing 
its  name.  For  present  purposes  we  can  call  thought  the 
soul's  superior  knowledge,  sensation  its  inferior  knowledge, 
with  intellect  and  sense  for  corresponding  faculties.  Becmise 
man  wishes  as  he  knows,  we  must  recognize  a  double  capacity 
for  willing,  a  superior  will  and  an  inferior  will,  rational 
appetite  and  sensile  appetite,  one  intrinsically  independent 
of  organs,  the  other  intrinsically  dependent  on  same.  Both 
are  wills,  both  are  appetites ;  but  for  the  sake  of  clearness  we 
call  the  first,  will  simply ;  the  second,  appetite.  The  passions 
are  displays  of  the  appetite,  wishes  are  displays  of  the  will. 

The  Passions.  Our  passions  are  as  dependent  on  the  body 
as  our  senses;  our  wishes  are  as  clear  of  the  body  as  our 
thoughts.  The  passions,  like  appetite  their  root,  turn  always 
on  some  particular  good  or  its  opposite;  and,  like  sensation 
as  compared  with  thought,  are  more  manifest  and  closer 
to  hand  than  wishes  or  acts  of  the  will  proper.  The  will 
has  universal  good  for  object,  and  it  always  embraces  particu- 
lar goods  under  the  aspect  of  universals.  Man  wishes  the 
office  of  president,  not  inasmuch  as  it  is  the  office  of  presi- 
dent, but  inasmuch  as  it  is  honor;  he  wishes  the  salary,  not 
inasmuch  as  it  is  a  set  sum  of  money,  but  inasmuch  as  it 
is  money.  A  hungry  man  wants  food  of  any  kind,  food  in 
general.  A  hungry  horse  wants  this  or  that  particular  food, 
oats,  or  corn,  or  hay. 

Passion,  if  we  consult  the  word's  origin,  means  suffering, 
a  modification  induced  by  impact  from  another.  In  oratory 
the  passions  are  stimulations  of  pain  or  pleasure,  meant  to 
shape  or  color  a  man's  opinions.  In  ethics  passions  are  move- 
ments of  the  appetite,  set  on  foot  by  the  actual  presence,  or 
vivid  representation,  of  an  object  wearing  the  appearance 
of  good  or  evil.  They  are  acts  of  the  appetite,  and  have  no 
part  in  angels  or  separate  souls.  And  yet  these  passions 
have  their  counterparts  in  the  thoughts  and  wishes  of  angels. 
Love,  hate,  desire  are  as  native  to  angels  as  they  are  to  brutes ; 
but  in  angels  they  exist  without  any  admixture  of  appetite; 
they  are  affairs  of  the  soul,  not  affairs  of  the  body.  Man  is 
capable  of  the  love  peculiar  to  angels,  and  of  the  love  peculiar 
to  brutes.     His  will  is  affected  by  the  senses  as  well  as  by 


84 


GENERAL  ETHICS 


the  intellect.  Orators  reach  the  hearts  of  their  listeners  by 
the  passions  as  well  as  by  arguments.  And  in  his  own  case 
a  man  can  be  orator  and  audience.  Passion  always  manifests 
itself  in  body-change,  ''the  diffusive  wave  of  emotion."  All 
passion  is  emotion,  but  not  all  emotion  is  passion.  Surprise, 
laughter,  shame,  are  not  passions,  because  they  are  impos- 
sible without  intellect.  Passions  turn  on  good  and  evil 
affecting  sense. 

The  ancients  enumerated  nine  passions.  They  are  all 
species  of  the  generic  passions,  love  and  hate.  Love  has  good 
for  object;  hate,  evil.  Hate  is  the  negation  of  love,  as  evil 
is  the  negation  of  good. 


Desire  has  absent  good  for  ob- 
ject. 

Delight  has  present  good  for 
object. 

Hope  has  hard,  but  possible 
good  for  object. 

Despair  has  hard  and  impos- 
sible good  for  object. 


Love;  good  is  object,  no  limit 


Abhorrence  has  absent  evil 

for  object. 
Displeasure  has  present  evil 

Hate;  evil  is  object,  no  limit^  ^  ^^^  ^^J^^t- 

Fear  has  hard  and  unavoid- 
able evil  for  object. 

Courage  has  hard,  but  avoid- 
able evil  for  object. 

Anger   is   a   mixture   of   desire,    displeasure,    hope. 

.  Desires  are  physical  and  psychical.  Both  are  from  senses. 
Imagination  has  wider  play  in  latter.  Physical  craves  for 
quantity;  psychical,  for  quality,  e.g.  A  thirsty  man  crav- 
ing water  and  champagne.  Physical  craves  for  limited  ob- 
jects ;  psychical,  for  unlimited,  not  in  sense  of  universal,  but 
in  sense  of  colossal  particulars,  e.  g.  A  thirsty  man  wants, 
not  ocean,  but  enough;  a  miser'  wants  all  gold.  Psychical 
desires  are  not  intellectual  desires.     These  last  contemplate 


FREEDOM  OF  WILL  85 

immaterial  goods  and  material  goods  viewed  in  an  immate- 
rial way.     Desire  of  perfect  happiness  is  intellectual. 

Delight,  like  desire,  may  be  sensual  or  intellectual.  The 
passion  is  sensual  delight.  Like  desire,  delight  may  be  phys- 
ical or  psychical.  Play  of  imagination  makes  difference,  e.  g. 
a  wine-taster.  Intellectual  delights  are  superior  to  sensual, 
where  minds  and  hearts  are  cultivated.  Regarding  the  mor- 
ality of  an  act  done  for  pleasure,  there  is  a  difference  between 
acting  for  pleasure  and  living  for  pleasure.     The  first  is  right. 

Delight,  like  desire,  may  be  sensual  or  intellectual.  The 
second  is  wrong. 

Anger  is  a  mixed  passion;  it  is  desire  of  open  vengeance  for 
an  open  slight,  attended  with  displeasure  at  slight.  Hatred 
is  usually  chronic,  anger  is  frequently  acute.  Hatred  wishes 
evil  as  it  is  evil ;  anger,  as  it  is  just.  Anger  regularly  wishes 
evil  in  sight  of  all ;  hatred  is  not  seldom  content  with  hidden 
evil.     Anger  stops,  hatred  continues. 

The  Will's  Freedom.  And  now  we  leave  the  passions,  these 
affections  of  appetite,  to  return  to  the  will.  Again,  the  will 
is  a  spiritual,  inorganic  faculty  of  the  soul,  appetitive  of  good 
at  the  instigation  of  the  intellect.  A  voluntary  act  is  such 
as  proceeds  from  the  will  with  a  purpose  in  mind.  Voluntary 
acts  may  be  necessary  or  free ;  necessary,  when  the  will  is  cut 
off  from  all  choice;  free,  when  choice  is  in  its  power.  In 
Heaven  love  of  God  is  a  voluntary  necessary  act.  In  this  life 
all  our  deliberate  voluntary  acts  are  free.  Every  good  in  our 
acquaintance  is  a  mixture  of  good  and  evil,  it  falls  short  of 
the  summum  bonum  or  God,  who  is  alone  unmixed  good.  The 
good  in  the  object  stirs  desire;  the  &vil  in  the  object  stirs 
aversion.  To  desire  is  to  select,  to  turn  aside  from  is  to 
reject.  Therefore,  whatever  created  good  falls  under  our 
notice  is,  because  of  its  mixed  nature,  capable  material  for 
selection  or  rejection,  for  desire  or  aversion;  and  when  the 
will  is  able  to  wish  or  not  wish,  its  act  is  free.  Freedom  is 
an  attribute  of  the  will,  enabling  it,  after  equipment  with 
every  needed  prerequisite,  to  still  wish  or  not  wish,  to  choose 
this  or  choose  that.  This  attribute  follows  the  will  all  the 
way  up  to  actual  exertion  of  its  energy.  When  it  once 
makes  choice,  its  freedom  regarding  this  particular  act  is 
straightway  at  an  end.     It  cannot  wish  a  thing,  and  at  the 


86  GENERAL  ETHICS 

same  time  remain  free  to  wish  or  not  wish  it.  But  up  to 
the  precise  moment  wherein  it  wishes,  it  certainly  remains 
free  to  do  one  thing  or  the  other.  In  perhaps  plainer  words, 
it  enjoys  antecedent  not  consequent  freedom.  When  freedom 
turns  on  the  power  to  will  or  not  will,  it  is  known  as  freedom 
of  contradiction.  When  it  turns  on  the  power  to  positively 
wish  or  positively  reject  a  certain  thing,  it  is  known  as  free- 
dom of  contrariety.  When  it  turns  on  the  power  to  wish 
this  or  wish  that,  it  is  known  as  freedom  of  specification. 
Thus,  when  I  choose  between  reading  and  not  reading,  I  am 
exercising  my  freedom  of  contradiction;  when  between  lov- 
ing and  hating  a  person,  my  freedom  of  contrariety;  when 
between  reading  and  singing,  my  freedom  of  specification. 
The  most  obvious  meaning  of  freedom  is  separation  or 
immunity  from  something.  Freedom  of  will  is  immunity 
from  determination,  from  necessary  adhesion  to  some  set 
line  of  conduct.  The  determining  force  can  be  conceived 
as  intrinsic  or  extrinsic  to  the  will.  Immunity  from  a  de- 
termining force  intrinsic  to  the  will  is  called  freedom  from 
necessity.  The  other  is  called  freedom  from  violence.  In  our 
present  condition,  the  will  in  all  its  deliberate  acts  enjoys 
freedom  of  the  first  sort.  Things  would  be  different,  if  we 
saw  God  face  to  face.  The  will  in  its  elicited  acts,  in  acts  it 
begins  and  finishes,  in  acts  the  will  itself  executes,  always 
enjoys  freedom  of  the  second  kind.  In  ordered  acts,  in  acts 
it  begins,  to  leave  to  another  to  finish,  in  acts  it  commands 
another  agent  to  execute,  freedom  of  the  second  sort  may  be 
present  or  absent.  When  it  is  absent,  the  ordered  act  is  not 
free.  A  prisoner  in  his  cell  is  free  to  wish  as  he  likes,  and 
the  law  has  no  restraining  influence  over  his  will  in  the 
matter  of  its  elicted  acts.  It  can,  however,  with  chains  pre- 
vent him  from  walking,  and  so  spoil  him  of  freedom  in 
ordered  acts,  dependent  on  his  legs  for  execution.  No  elic- 
ited act  of  the  will  can  be  forced,  because,  in  that  case, 
the  will  would  object  and  not  object,  a  contradiction  in  terms. 
Freedom  from  necessity  is  the  kind  we  vindicate  to  the 
will,  and  it  is  called  freedom  of  indifference^  freedom  of 
choice,  free  will,  freedom  simply.  A  spontaneous  act  is 
opposed  to  a  forced  act,  and  force  is  extrinsic.  All  vital 
or  immanent  acts  are  of  such  sort.     Acts  proceeding  from 


VOLUNTARY  ACTS  87 

appetite,  whether  natural  in  minerals  and  plants,  sensitive 
in  brutes,  or  intellectual  in  man,  are  spontaneous.  The  high- 
est spontaneity  of  man  on  earth  is  freedom,  the  highest  spon- 
taneity of  inferior  agents  is  necessity.  Man's  indeliberate 
acts  are  spontaneous  with  necessity.  A  voluntary  and  fully 
deliberate  act  proceeds  from  the  will,  with  knowledge  of  end 
as  such,  and  may  be  either  necessary  or  free.  A  free  act  is  an 
act  of  the  will  held  to  no  set  shape  by  anything  in  the 
will's  nature  or  constitution.  In  this  life,  elicited  acts  of 
the  will  are  free,  not  because  they  are  elicited,  but  because 
their  every  object  is  a  mixture  of  good  and  evil.  Love  of 
God  in  Heaven  is  an  elicited  act  and  necessary.  Necessity  is 
compatible  with  elicited  acts  of  the  will,  as  is  plain  from  the 
case  of  the  blessed  in  Heaven.  Freedom  of  indifference  or 
choice,  or  free  willy  consists  in  passive  and  active  capacity 
to  wish  or  not  wish  in  the  presence  of  every  needed  prerequis- 
ite for  wishing;  or  it  is  a  power  of  choice,  enabling  us  in 
the  event  of  several  alternatives  to  freely  choose  one  and 
neglect  or  reject  the  others.  Freedom  belongs  formally  and 
intrinsically  to  the  will  alone.  The  intellect  is  not  free  in 
the  presence  of  immediately  evident  truth.  Acts  of  other 
faculties  are  free  in  cause  and  extrinsically,  inasmuch  as  the 
will  orders  or  commands  them.  The  will  is  superior  to 
whatever  preponderating  influence  or  inclination  urges,  it 
can  choose  what  we  here  and  now  know  to  be  worse  in  pref- 
erence to  what  we  here  and  now  know  to  be  better,  in  spite 
of  what  Leibnitz  says  to  the  contrary. 

Voluntary  Acts.  Whether  free  or  necessary,  all  elicited 
acts  of  the  will  are  voluntary.  No  elicited  acts  of  the  will  are 
altogether  involuntary.  Ordered  or  commanded  acts,  viewed 
in  their  execution,  may  be  altogether  involuntary,  e.  g.  im- 
prisonment or  upright  position  with  arm  extended.  Elicited 
acts  of  the  will  begin  and  end  in  the  will,  ordered  acts 
begin  in  the  will  and  end  in  another  faculty.  Hence,  we 
distinguish  between  acts  altogether  voluntary  or  involuntary, 
and  acts  partly  voluntary  or  involuntary.  When  the  act 
turns  on  an  object  desired  in  itself,  and  on  its  own  account, 
it  is  wholly  voluntary.  When  it  turns  on  an  object  desired 
in  no  way  whatever,  it  is  wholly  involuntary.  When  it  turns 
on  an  object  desired  indeed,  not  however  on  its  own  account, 


88  GENERAL  ETHICS 

but  on  account  of  another  closely  connected  object,  it  is 
partly  voluntary  and  partly  involuntary.  In  a  partly  vol- 
untary act  the  will  embraces  its  object,  but  would  never  em- 
brace it,  if  it  could  otherwise  avoid  some  evil  or  compass 
some  good.  Sailors,  unloading  their  cargo  into  the  sea  dur- 
ing a  storm,  are  the  classical  example.  We  likewise  dis- 
tinguish between  a  directly  voluntary  and  an  indirectly 
voluntary  act.  The  first  turns  on  an  object  wished  imme- 
diately and  on  its  own  account ;  the  other,  on  an  object  wished 
not  on  its  own  account,  but  because  it  follows  necessarily  in 
the  wake  of  the  wisher's  purpose.  An  indirectly  voluntary 
act  differs  from  a  partially  voluntary  act  in  this,  that  the 
former  has  for  object  a  good  consequent  on  the  wisher's  pur- 
pose, while  the  latter  has  for  object  a  good  antecedent  to  the 
wisher's  purpose,  a  means  to  his  end.  Examples  may  serve 
to  make  things  clearer.  Sailors  in  a  storm  lighten  their 
ship  of  its  cargo  as  a  means  to  securing  their  safety.  Drunk- 
enness is  the  indirect  voluntary  of  excessive  drinking.  Indi- 
rect voluntary  and  voluntary  in  cause  are  of  a  kind.  The 
omission  of  an  act  likewise  constitutes  an  indirect  voluntary. 
Intentions.  Whatever  influences  the  will  is  called  an  end 
or  purpose.  This  end  or  purpose,  viewed  as  energizing  the 
will,  is  called  the  man's  intention;  and  it  may  be  formal  and 
actual  or  virtual,  explicit  or  implicit,  habitual  or  interpreta- 
tive. It  is  formal  and  actual,  when  actually  known  and 
wished,  in  a  distinct  way.  Ordinarily  our  intentions  are  of 
this  sort.  It  is  virtual,  when,  ceasing  to  be  actual,  it  goes  on 
shaping  our  conduct  with  force  borrowed  from  its  original 
impulse  as  an  actual  intention.  In  the  course  of  a  journey 
our  intention  insensibly  passes  from  actual  to  virtual.  A 
priest  baptizing  with  distractions  is  another  example.  It  is 
explicit,  when  it  keeps  in  view  some  distinct  object ;  and  our 
intentions  are  regularly  such  at  the  first.  It  is  implicit,  when 
it  keeps  in  view  some  object  not  known  with  distinctness, 
but  involved  in  another.  Thus,  to  explicitly  purpose  a  jour- 
ney is  to  implicitly  purpose  car-fare.  It  is  habitual,  when 
once  entertained  it  falls  from  memory,  without  being  repu- 
diated or  knowingly  withdrawn.  The  Morning  Offering 
influences  after  this  manner  all  the  day's  acts.  The  inten- 
tion perseveres  not  in  act  or  in  effect,  but  in  habit;  and  it 


IGNORANCE,  ERROR,  PASSIONS  89 

influences  subsequent  acts.  It  is  interpretative,  when,  of  no 
actual  or  virtual  or  explicit  habitual  force,  it  would  influence 
our  conduct,  if  recognized  with  distinctness.  Interpreta- 
tive is  same  as  implicit  habitual,  e.g.,  desire  to  be  saved  is 
interpretative  desire  to  be  baptized.  Such  an  intention  suf- 
fices for  the  valid  reception  of  Baptism,  when  intention  of  a 
superior  kind  is  impossible.  Virtual  at  least  is  always  re- 
quired in  minister. 

Ignorance  and  Error.  Intellect  and  will  combine  to  pro- 
duce free  acts.  Choice  pertains  to  the  will,  knowledge  to  the 
intellect.  Freedom,  therefore,  can  be  diminished  by  hind- 
rance to  choice  and  hindrance  to  knowledge.  Ignorance  and 
error  can  affect  our  minds,  passion  and  fear  can  affect 
our  wills.  Ignorance  is  described  as  absence  of  knowledge. 
It  is  that  state  of  mind  wherein  no  judgment  or  idea  is  had 
of  the  thing  unknown.  If  a  man  ought  to  have  the  knowl- 
edge in  question,  his  ignorance  is  positive.  If  no  such  obli- 
gation exists,  his  ignorance  is  negative.  Examples  of  neg- 
ative are  ignorance  of  medicine  in  a  farmer  and  of  philoso- 
phy in  a  Freshman.  Examples  of  positive  are  ignorance  of 
medicine  in  a  physician  and  of  philosophy  in  a  Senior.  Ig- 
norance is  vincible,  if,  with  the  amount  of  study,  to  which  a 
man  is  held,  it  can  be  set  aside;  if  such  a  measure  of  study 
is  of  no  avail  to  set  it  aside,  the  man's  ignorance  is  invin- 
cible. Vincible  ignorance  is  culpable;  invincible,  inculpable. 
Antecedent  ignorance  has  place  before  the  man  wakes  up  to 
the  duty  of  investigation,  and  it  is  invincible  as  well  as  in- 
culpable. Consequent  ignorance  has  place  after  the  man 
wakes  up  to  the  duty  of  investigation,  and  it  may  be  vin- 
cible as  well  as  culpable.  Vincible  ignorance  is  of  three 
kinds ;  simple^  when  some  study  is  employed,  but  not  enough ; 
stupid  or  lazy,  when  little  or  no  study  is  employed;  and. 
affected,  when  one  purposely  avoids  every  source  of  infor- 
mation to  continue  in  his  perverse  ways.  Acts  are  rendered 
involuntary  by  invincible  ignorance;  not,  of  course,  invol- 
untary under  every  respect,  but  under  such  respect  alone 
as  the  ignorance  affects  or  touches  them;  vincible  ignorance 
leaves  them  voluntary,  but  in  a  diminished  degree.  Invin- 
cible ignorance  is  wished  in  no  way;  neither  in  itself  nor  in 
cause.     Vincible  ignorance  is  wished  in  cause.     To  strike  a 


90  GENERAL  ETHICS 

priest,  thinking  him  a  layman,  is  no  sacrilege.  To  eat  meat 
on  Friday,  without  taking  means  to  clear  up  a  suspicion,  is 
sinful.  When  no  such  suspicion  is  present,  no  sin  is  com- 
mitted. To  studiously  avoid  enquiry  about  a  fast-day,  for 
the  purpose  of  enjoying  a  full  meal,  is  to  incur  guilt.  Error 
is  positive  want  of  conformity  between  mind  and  object,  it  is 
that  state  of  mind  wherein  a  false  judgment  is  had  of  some- 
thing. It  is  material  and  formal.  Material  turns  on  wrong 
appearances  of  things.  Formal  confounds  appearances  with 
facts.  Formal  error  is  the  acceptance  of  the  false  for  the 
true,  and  admits  of  distinctions  parallel  with  those  of  ignor- 
ance. 

Examples  of  material  and  formal  are,  men  seem  trees,  and 
men  are  trees. 

Passion.  Passion  is  sensile  appetite,  and  we  have  already 
enumerated  its  different  kinds.  With  consent  of  the  will  for 
point  of  departure,  passion  is  antecedent  or  consequent. 
When  passion  turns  on  moral  good,  it  is  altogether  honorable. 
When  it  turns  on  moral  evil,  antecedent  passion  is  involun- 
tary and  without  moral  blame.  Consent  of  the  will  changes 
antecedent  to  consequent  passion,  and  such  passion  is  volun- 
tary ;  directly,  when  the  will  urges  or  commands  it ;  indirectly, 
when  disturbance  ensues  from  will 's  vehemence.  Motus  primo 
primus  is  altogether  antecedent  passion.  Motus  secundo  pri- 
mus means  incomplete  consent ;  it  is  passion  adverted  to,  and 
not  resisted.  Motus  secundus  means  full  consent  and  conse- 
quent passion. 

Fear  and  Violence.  We  single  out  fear,  because  it  is  less 
a  home-product  than  the  other  passions,  and  therefore  more 
compelling. 

Fear  can  be  serious  or  light,  intrinsic  or  extrinsic.  Fear 
is  dread  of  a  threatening  evil,  apprehended  as  unavoidable. 
Serious  dreads  a  great  evil,  certain  or  very  probable,  e.  g. 
death,  wounds,  property,  imprisonment. 

Absolutely  serious  fear  affects  an  ordinary  person.  Rela- 
tively serious  fear  affects  a  person  of  a  certain  age,  sex  or 
disposition.     Absolutely  light  can  be  relatively  serious. 

Light  dreads  a  lesser  evil,  or  a  great  evil  barely  probable. 
Reverential  awe  can  become  relatively  serious  fear,  especially 
in  girls. 


FEAR  91 

Fear  is  intrinsic  when  its  cause  is  a  necessary  agent  whether 
extrinsic  or  intrinsic  to  the  person  who  fears,  e.  g.  a  con- 
tracted disease,  meditation  on  hell,  earthquake. 

Fear  is  extrinsic,  when  its  cause  is  outside  the  man  and  a 
free  agent,  e.  g.  enemy,  highwayman,  threats. 

Free  fear  resembles  extrinsic  and  is  caused  by  the  free  act 
of  a  human  being,  e.  g.  highwayman.  Free  fear  is  just  if 
the  person  causing  it  seeks  to  repel  harm.  Free  fear  is  un- 
just, if  the  person  causing  it  seeks  to  inflict  harm.  Nec- 
essary fear  resembles  intrinsic  and  is  prompted  by  a  neces- 
sary cause,  e.  g.  earthquake,  volcano,  lightning. 

Solutions:  In  case  reason  is  not  dethroned,  fear,  no  matter 
how  serious,  leaves  the  act  voluntary  in  a  diminished  degree, 
e.  g.  martyrs  and  apostates.  Serious  fear  excuses  from  posi- 
tive law,  especially  human.  Unjust  fear  makes  law-instru- 
ments invalid.  Light  fear  is  generally  neglected  before  the 
law;  in  conscience  it  can  have  some  weight  in  questions  of 
compensation  for  loss.  Violence  cannot  be  done  the  will. 
Under  violence  the  man  makes  free  choice  of  escape  from  pain. 
An  external  act  due  entirely  to  violence  is  no  crime  in  the 
unwilling  agent. 


THESIS  VI 

A  human  act  gets  its  specific  morality  from  the  object  of 
the  act,  from  the  agent's  end  or  purpose,  and  from  circum- 
stances affecting  both. — Jouin,  32-36;  Rickaby,  31-41. 

QUESTION 

This  present  thesis  fixes  the  specific  determinants  of  moral- 
ity. It  ai  '>vvcrs  the  question,  What  makes  a  moral  act  good 
or  bad,  what  makes  a  moral  act  the  act  of  one  particular  vir- 
tue or  vice  rather  than  the  act  of  another? 

TERMS 

Specific  Morality.  Specific  morality  is  opposed  to  generic. 
Specific  makes  an  act  good  or  bad,  an  act  'of  this  or  that 
particular  virtue  or  vice.  All  virtuous  acts  are  specifically 
the  same  in  first  sense,  because  harmony  with  objective  order 
is  the  specific  difference.  All  virtuous  acts  of  different  par- 
ticular virtues  are  specifically  different  in  second  sense,  be- 
cause each  particular  virtue  has  its  own  specific  difference; 
justice  being  specified  by  another's  due;  charity,  by  kindness 
to  another ;  humility,  by  right  esteem  of  self ;  and  so  of  all  the 
different  virtues. 

Object,  End,  Circumstances.  All  three,  object,  end  and 
circumstances  are  specific  determinants,  and  in  both  senses, 
fixing  classes  as  well  as  species.  In  the  briefest  language 
possible,  objective  morality  arises  from  the  object  of  the  act, 
subjective  morality  from  the  agent's  purpose,  and  circum- 
stances modify  object  and  purpose.  Circumstances  are 
summed  up  in  the  Latin  verse,  Quis,  quid,  ubi,  quibus  auxiliis, 
cur,  quomodo,  quando  ?  The  verse  means.  Who,  what,  where, 
with  what  helps,  why,  how,  when?  Circumstances  are  ob- 
jective, when  they  modify  the  matter  or  substance  of  the  act ; 
subjective  when  they  modify  the  purpose  of  the  agent.     The 

92 


OBJECT  93 

object  contributes  essential,  intrinsic  morality  to  the  act;  the 
end  contributes  accidental,  extrinsic  morality;  circumstances, 
when  limited  to  the  object,  contribute  accidental,  intrinsic 
morality;  when  limited  to  the  agent,  accidental,  extrinsic 
morality.  The  end  contributes  essential  intrinsic  morality 
to  the  agent,  circumstances  contribute  essential  intrinsic 
morality  to  object  and  agent ;  and  therefore  end  and  circum- 
stances are  as  much  specific  determinants  as  object,  because 
a  moral  act  is  not  object  alone,  but  object,  agent  and  circum- 
stances taken  together.  To  be  a  moral  act,  it  must  be  an  in- 
dividual free  act,  voluntary  and  deliberate;  and  this  quality 
implies  end  and  circumstances. 

Acts  indifferent  in  themselves,  because  neither  good  nor 
bad  from  the  viewpoint  of  object  or  matter,  get  all  their 
morality  from  the  agent's  purpose  and  from  circumstances. 
No  deliberate  act  of  the  individual  is  indifferent.  To  walk 
and  to  write  are  in  themselves  indifferent ;  but  no  individual 
can  deliberately  walk  or  write  without  a  purpose  and  circum- 
stances, that  commend  or  vitiate  the  act. 

Object.  When  discussing  the  natural  law  in  fourth  thesis, 
we  already  described  acts  good  or  evil  in  themselves.  They 
are  opposed  to  morally  indifferent  acts,  which,  having  no 
morality  in  themselves,  get  all  their  morality  from  purpose 
and  circumstances.  Acts  are  good  in  themselves,  their  object 
is  good,  when  positive  harmony  with  the  objective  order  en-^ 
ters  their  constitution;  they  are  bad  in  themselves,  when 
discord  with  same  attaches  to  them.  We  distinguish  between 
inward  acts  and  outward,  or  overt  acts.  The  will  is  the  moral 
faculty  in  man,  the  intellect  is  only  its  helper;  and  all  a  man's 
acts  get  their  moral  color  from  his  will.  Inward  acts  are 
acts  elicited  and  executed  by  the  will,  they  begin  and  end  in 
that  faculty;  outward  acts  are  acts  elicited  by  the  will  and 
executed  by  another  faculty ;  they  begin  in  the  will  and  finish 
in  some  other  faculty.  Elicited  or  inward  acts  have  their  own 
independent  morality,  gotten  from  object,  end,  and  circum- 
stances. Ordered  or  outward  acts  derive  all  their  morality 
from  their  corresponding  elicited  or  inward  acts.  Murder 
and  theft  are  perpetrated  in  the  heart,  before  they  are  ac- 
complished by  the  hands.  In  every  moral  act  three  distinct 
things  are  wished,  the  object  of  the  act,  the  end  or  purpose 


94  GENERAL  ETHICS 

selected^  and  attendant  circumstances,  objective  and  sub- 
jective. Briefly,  all  three  things  are  wished,  object,  end  and 
circumstances.  All  the  three  things  wished  must  be  morally 
good,  to  constitute  the  act  a  morally  good  act.  An  act  is 
bad,  when  any  one  of  the  three  is  bad.  Hence  the  axiom, 
**Bonum  ex  Integra  causa,  malum  ex  quocunque  defectu.** 
*'Good  results  from  a  full  and  complete  cause,  evil  results 
from  a  defective  cause.''  In  plain  English,  an  act  is  good, 
when  all  three  constituents  or  determinants  of  morality  are 
good;  it  is  bad,  when  any  one  of  the  three  is  bad.  A  moral 
act  is  a  chain  made  up  of  three  links;  it  is  good,  when  all 
three  links  are  good;  it  is  bad,  when  any  one  of  the  three  is 
bad.  A  chain  is  no  stronger  than  its  weakest  link,  and  this 
moral  chain  is  no  better  than  its  worst  link.  Therefore,  the 
fact  that  a  deed  is  good  in  object,  is  far  from  settling  its 
morality.  A  wrong  intention  can  make  the  best  thing  in  the 
world  wicked.  The  fact  that  a  deed  is  bad  in  object,  quite 
settles  its  morality,  no  intention  in  the  world  can  save  it  from 
blame.  When  discussing  the  natural  law  in  our  fourth  thesis, 
we  described  acts  good  or  bad  in  themselves;  and  we  were 
talking  about  object,  as  distinct  from  end  and  circumstances. 
Whatever  good  act  gets  its  morality  solely  from  end  and 
circumstances,  is  in  itself  morally  indifferent.  It  is  not  mor- 
ally good  in  itself,  because  in  that  case  object  would  contribute 
to  its  morality.  It  is  not  bad  in  itself,  because  in  that  case 
it  could  never  become  good.  Whatever  act  is  good  or  bad 
prior  to  end  and  circumstances,  is  good  or  bad  in  itself,  be- 
cause end  and  circumstances  are  the  only  other  sources,  the 
only  moral  coefficients  other  than  the  act  itself.  Acts,  there- 
fore, are  good  or  bad  in  themselves,  when,  abstracting  from 
end  and  subjective  circumstances,  they  are  in  harmony  or  at 
discord  with  the  objective  order;  when,  morally  speaking, 
they  are  or  are  not  what  they  ought  to  be.  Physical  good  is 
divided  into  becoming,  agreeable  and  useful,  and  moral  good 
admits  of  the  same  division.  All  three  physical  goods  can  be 
basis  for  moral  good,  and  they  eventuate  in  moral  good,  only 
when  reason's  controlling  influence  vests  them  with  the  qual- 
ity of  becoming  good. 

Viewing  man  as  a  moral  being,  his  one  true  and  real  good 
is  virtue,  because  it  alone  appeals  to  the  morally  specific  por- 


END  AND  CIRCUMSTANCES  95 

tion  of  his  being,  the  will  as  arbiter  of  good  and  evil.  Even 
study,  in  itself  becoming  and  real  physical  good,  can  by  abuse 
readily  become  moral  evil,  and  sink  to  the  level  of  apparent 
good.  Pleasure  and  wealth,  in  themselves  apparent  good, 
can,  under  the  control  of  reason  and  an  orderly  will,  rise  to 
the  dignity  of  true  and  real  goods.  Acts  can  be  morally  good 
or  evil  in  themselves  in  a  three-fold  way.  In  themselves,  on 
their  own  account,  and  absolutely ;  in  themselves,  on  their  own 
account,  but  not  absolutely;  in  themselves,  not  on  their  own 
account,  nor  absolutely.  Familiar  examples  of  such  goods 
are  worship,  charity  and  pious  reading.  Familiar  examples 
of  such  evils  are  blasphemy,  theft  and  dangerous  reading. 
Good  and  evil  of  the  first  kind  admit  no  change  of  matter. 
There  is  a  something  in  the  physical  act  of  worship  that 
makes  its  acceptance  by  the  will  a  moral  good,  and  this  some- 
thing cannot  possibly  be  separated  from  the  act.  There  is  a 
something  of  the  same  kind  in  the  physical  act  of  blasphemy, 
and  this  something  makes  blasphemy  irremediably  and  neces- 
sarily bad.  Charity  and  pious  reading  become  evil,  when  the 
money  given  as  alms  is  stolen,  when  pious  reading  interferes 
with  some  higher  duty.  Theft  and  dangerous  reading  admit 
change  of  matter ;  and,  this  change  supposed,  they  cease  to  be 
bad.  What  belonged  to  another  may  become  mine,  and  its 
seizure  by  me  is  no  theft.  What  would  otherwise  be  danger- 
ous reading  and  wrong,  may  become  a  necessary  help  to  the 
acquisition  of  medicine  or  theology  and  entirely  right. 

And  now  to  explain  what  we  mean  by  in  themselves,  on 
their  own  account  and  absolutely.  Blasphemy,  theft  and  dan- 
gerous reading  are  wrong  in  themselves,  because  of  wrong- 
ness  involved  in  the  three  physical  acts,  because  of  native  and 
inborn  discord  with  the  objective  order  of  things.  Blasphemy 
and  theft  are  wrong  on  their  own  account,  not  on  account  of 
an  outside  cause,  like  the  prohibition  of  a  superior.  Danger- 
ous reading  is  wrong  not  on  its  own  account,  but  on  account 
of  nature's  decree  against  incurring  danger  without  good  and 
sufficient  reason.  Absolutely,  implies  no  possibility  of  change 
in  matter,  and  of  the  three  blasphemy  alone  is  absolutely 
wrong.  In  no  hypothesis  can  the  physical  act  of  blasphemy 
fail  of  turpitude.  The  physical  act  of  deliberately  taking 
something  in  theft  is  wrong,  only  in  the  hypothesis  that  it 


96  GENERAL  ETHICS 

is  concerned  with  property  belonging  to  another.  The  pByS 
ical  act  of  deliberate  dangerous  reading  is  wrong,  only  in  the 
supposition  that  the  risk  is  taken  without  due  and  sufficient 
reason.  In  the  case  of  a  child,  play  on  the  street  against  a 
parent's  wishes,  is  not  wrong  in  itself,  or  on  its  own  account, 
or  absolutely.  The  wrongness  is  not  in  the  play,  but  in  dis- 
obedience; the  wrongness  is  due  to  the  parent's  prohibition, 
and  with  the  parent's  permission  it  would  be  entirely  right. 

End.  In  question  of  ends  we  hold  discourse  primarily  of 
the  end  designated  operantis,  not  operis;  the  end  of  doer,  not 
the  end  of  deed.  The  finis  operis  is  independent  of  the  doer, 
the  finis  operantis  is  wholly  under  his  control.  Recall  the 
example  of  clock  and  clockmaker.  The  finis  operis  of  a  clock 
is  to  tell  time,  whether  the  clockmaker  likes  it  or  no.  In  fact, 
the  end  of  deed  cannot  be  entirely  absent  from  the  end  of  doer. 
The  clockmaker  can  hardly  make  a  clock  without  intending 
it  to  measure  the  flight  of  time.  These  two  ends  are  like  a 
combination  of  the  object  of  the  act  and  the  agent's  purpose, 
if  the  act's  goodness  in  itself  or  badness  in  itself  is  conceived 
as  the  clock.  The  end  of  doer  can  be  best  called  intention, 
or  end  energizing  the  agent.  It  gives  morality  to  an  act  in- 
different in  the  abstract,  making  it  a  morally  good  or  evil 
act  in  the  concrete.  An  evil  intention  vitiates  an  act  morally 
good  in  point  of  object  or  circumstances.  A  good  intention 
cannot  change  the  evil  nature  of  an  act  bad  in  point  of  object 
or  circumstances.  And  all  this  is  true  of  good  and  evil  cir- 
cumstances, with  regard  to  good  and  evil  objects  and  inten- 
tions. The  agent's  intention  is  his  act  inwardly  taken,  and 
our  outward  acts  get  their  morality  from  their  corresponding 
inward  acts.  Intention  is  an  elicited  act  of  the  will,  its  exe- 
cution is  an  ordered  act  of  the  will;  and  ordered  acts  of  the 
will  get  their  morality  from  corresponding  elicited  acts. 

Circumstances.  They  are  modifications  of  the  act  and  agent 
due  to  person,  quantity,  place,  helps,  motives,  manner  and 
time.  That  circumstances  alter  the  morality  of  an  act,  is 
evident  from  the  following  familiar  examples.  The  execution 
of  a  condemned  criminal  by  some  private  citizen,  and  by  the 
proper  public  official.  The  circumstance  of  person  makes  the 
execution  in  one  case  an  act  of  legal  justice ;  in  the  other,  an 
act  of  murder.     To  steal  five  cents,  and  to  steal  five  dollars. 


SPECIFIC  MORALITY  97 

Quantity  makes  one  sin  venial ;  the  other,  mortal.  To  eat  and 
drink  in  a  hotel,  and  to  eat  and  drink  in  a  church.  Place 
makes  the  difference  between  a  meal  and  a  sacrilege.  To  lie, 
and  to  confirm  the  lie  with  an  oath.  Manner  adds  perjury 
to  falsehood.  To  drink,  and  to  drink  to  excess.  Quantity 
changes  temperance  to  drunkenness  or  gluttony.  Time  makes 
eating  meat  on  Friday  a  sin,  likewise  the  omission  of  com- 
munion during  the  Paschal  season.  The  circumstance,  *'in 
church,'*  is  as  identical  with  ''meal  in  church,"  as  meal  it- 
self, circumstance  is  as  identical  with  individual  act  as  object. 

Specific  Morality.  A  moral  act  is  an  act  making  its  agent 
good  or  bad,  making  its  agent  worthy  of  praise  or  of  blame. 
There  are  three  elements  in  every  moral  act.  It  must  be  in 
the  power  of  the  agent,  subject  to  his  ownership,  to  make  him 
worthy  of  praise  or  of  blame.  It  must  possess  goodness  or 
badness,  to  communicate  the  quality  good  or  bad  to  the  agent. 
It  must  be  known  for  good  or  bad  to  the  agent,  to  stir  the 
agent's  mil.  Because  of  the  first  element,  the  agent  must  be 
able  to  do  or  not  do  the  act,  and  the  act  itself  must  originate 
in  free  will.  The  second  element  is  required,  because  nothing 
gives  but  what  it  first  possesses,  and  the  act  must  be  in  har- 
mony or  at  discord  with  the  objective  order.  The  third  ele- 
ment is  needed,  to  stir  the  will,  which  is  blind,  and  wishes 
only  what  the  intellect  first  offers.  A  father's  care  of  his 
child  is  a  moral  act,  because  it  is  in  his  power ;  a  bird 's  care 
of  its  young  is  not  a  moral  act,  because  it  is  a  matter  of  in- 
stinct and  beyond  the  bird's  control.  The  man  is  physically 
free  to  care  for  or  neglect  his  child;  the  bird  is  not  free,  it 
is  physically  necessitated  by  instinct  to  care  for  its  young, 
or  in  certain  contingencies  to  neglect  its  young.  Instinct  in 
man  is  subject  to  the  control  of  his  will. 

Generic  morality  is  the  feature  common  to  good  and  bad 
acts,  like  animality  in  man  and  horse;  and  origination  in  in- 
tellect and  will  is  the  one  thing  common  to  good  and  bad  acts. 
Specific  morality  is  one  thing  for  good  acts,  another  thing 
for  bad  acts,  like  reason  in  man,  and  sense  in  horse ;  harmony 
and  discord  with  the  objective  order  being  the  two  differences. 
Higher  species  can  be  considered  genera  with  regard  to  lower 
species;  and  the  one  thing  common  to  all  the  virtues  is  har- 
mony with  the  objective  order  of  things ;  the  one  thing  com- 


98  GENERAL  ETHICS 

mon  to  all  the  vices  is  discord  with  the  same  order.  Charity, 
justice,  humility  are  species  of  the  genus,  virtue;  injury,  in- 
justice, pride  are  species  of  the  genus,  vice.  Virtue  and  vice 
are  themselves  species  of  the  genus,  moral  acts. 

Object  in  our  thesis  means  object  in  strict  sense,  term  of 
the  wish,  finis  operis.  End  means  intention,  and  intention 
means  the  agent 's  apprehension  and  choice  of  the  act  in  ques- 
tion. Circumstances  mean  modifications,  whether  of  object  or 
of  end.  These  things  premised,  we  are  now  ready  to  prove 
that  a  human  act  gets  its  specific  morality,  that  a  moral  act 
gets  its  goodness  or  badness,  that  the  act  of  a  set  virtue  and 
the  act  of  a  set  vice  get  their  denomination  from  the  object  of 
the  act,  from  the  agent  ^s  end  or  purpose,  and  from  circum- 
stances affecting  both. 

PROOF 

Acts  are  specified  by  their  formal  objects,  and  moral  acts 
are  no  exception  to  the  rule.  But  the  formal  object  of  a 
generically  moral  act  is  an  object  good  or  bad  in  substance, 
with  all  its  objective  circumstances;  apprehended  as  such  by 
the  intellect,  and  chosen  as  such  by  the  will,  with  all  its  sub- 
jective circumstances;  not  the  object  simply,  nor  yet  the 
agent  ^s  apprehension  or  choice  of  it,  but  all  three  things  to- 
gether. Ergo,  human  acts  get  their  specific  morality  from 
object,  end  and  circumstances. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  The  truth  is  clear  in  physical 
acts.  Sight  is  sight  because  of  color,  hearing  is  hearing  be- 
cause of  sound.  To  use  the  eyes  on  sweetness,  or  smoothness, 
or  sound  is  not  to  see ;  to  use  the  ears  on  color  is  not  to  hear. 
In  moral  acts  good  and  evil  play  the  parts  of  color  and  sound 
in  vision  and  hearing.  Freedom  demands  knowledge  and 
choice,  or  purpose;  individuality  of  act  demands  circum- 
stances. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  The  object  is  the  subject-mat- 
ter, substance  of  the  act ;  the  agent 's  apprehension  and  choice 
of  same  are  his  end  or  intention;  objective  circumstances  are 
identified  with  the  object;  subjective  circumstances,  with  the 
agent 's  end  or  intention.  When  the  eye  sees  green,  a  particu- 
lar and  present  green  is  its  formal  object,  and  the  eye  makes 


I 


PROOF  99 

the  green  object  its  own  by  entering  into  knowledge-relations 
with  it.  Its  formal  object  is  not  red  or  an  absent  green,  or 
a  green  with  which  it  has  no  intimate  relations.  In  a  parallel 
way,  when  the  will  elicits  a  moral  act,  it  chooses  a  particular 
good  or  evil  object,  represented  to  it  as  such  by  the  intellect. 
Its  formal  object  is  not  an  object  viewed  as  true,  or  one,  or 
beautiful,  but  an  object  viewed  as  good  or  evil;  not  a  good 
or  evil  object,  that  never  through  the  intellect  appealed  to  the 
will;  not  a  good  or  evil  object,  that,  after  word  from  the 
intellect,  the  will  never  concerned  itself  with.  When  end 
vitiates  a  good  object,  the  will  puts  a  good  thing  to  bad  use, 
and  the  intellect  is  its  accomplice.  When  circumstances 
vitiate  an  object  good  in  substance  and  good  in  purpose,  some 
accidental  badness  resided  in  object,  or  purpose,  or  both. 

P.S.  Examples  Wherein  One  or  Several  Elements  are  Pres- 
ent: To  collect  money  from  a  debtor,  for  the  purpose  of  get- 
ting drunk ;  and  to  steal  money  from  a  neighbor  for  the  same 
purpose.  To  deny  self  for  the  purpose  of  giving  dinner  to 
a  beggar.  To  walk  to  church  for  purposes  of  prayer.  To  give 
alms  to  a  poor  man,  with  the  design  of  making  him  an  accom- 
plice to  murder.  To  give  an  alms,  that  a  simple  lie  may  be 
told.  Firm  will,  purposing  the  lie,  vitiates;  not  inefficax 
velleitas,  mere  advertence  to  wish,  caring  little  whether  the 
lie  be  told  or  not,  ready  to  give  the  alms  anyhow.  Alms  from 
pity  and  from  vainglory;  antecedent  purpose  vitiates,  not 
concomitant  or  consequent.  A  person  moved  by  vainglory 
to  practise  daily  communion ;  intention  disappears  at  the  altar ; 
non  est  in  executione,  sed  fuit.  To  give  an  alms  when  for- 
bidden, or  though  forbidden,  or  because  forbidden;  against 
poverty,  against  obedience. 

N.B.  No  good  end  can  justify  a  bad  act ;  good  end  never 
justifies  a  bad  means ;  murder  of  a  Church  persecutor,  to  help 
religion;  defiance  of  Constitution,  to  promote  Catholic  educa- 
tion. Every  bad  end  vitiates  a  good  act.  A  good  or  bad 
end  changes  an  indifferent  act  to  a  good  or  bad  act  respec- 
tively; and  this  is  the  one  case  where  end  justifies  means. 
It  is  lawful  at  times  to  put  a  good  act,  though  evil  by  accident 
results.  The  times  are,  when  the  good  surpasses  the  evil, 
and  the  evil  is  neither  directly  nor  indirectly  intended.  The 
evil  is  not  even  indirectly  intended,  when  the  good  is  equally 


100 


GENERAL  ETHICS 


immediate  with  the  evil,  and  not  accomplished  with  the  evil 
for  means.  The  good  act  is  not  lawful,  if  any  of  the  above 
conditions  fail  of  verification.  A  general  in  time  of  war  is 
allowed  to  lay  waste  the  enemy's  territory  to  the  harm  of 
innocent  citizens.  A  drunken  man  is  guilty  of  the  curses  he 
utters,  if  he  foresees  them  in  some  confused  way  when  sober. 
Cursing  is  in  this  case  an  indirect  voluntary,  a  voluntary  in 
cause.  A  doctor  is  not  allowed  to  kill  the  child  to  save  the 
mother.  He  may  remove  a  certainly  dead  fetus,  not  a  prob- 
ably dead  fetus.  He  must  never  expose  the  child  to  danger 
of  death  without  Baptism.  He  is  allowed  to  administer  medi- 
cine, that  may  by  accident  result  in  the  child's  death.  His 
whole  purpose  must  be  to  cure  the  mother,  not  to  kill  the 
child. 


THESIS  VII 

Prohabilism  is  a  safe  and  correct  system  in  matters  of  con- 
science.   Jouin,  51-56;  Rickahy,  152-159. 

QUESTION 

Rigorism  or  Absolute  Tutiorism,  Moderate  Tutiorism,  Prob- 
abiliorism,  uEquiprobabilism,  Probabilism  and  Laxism  are 
systems  in  Ethics  meant  to  help  a  man  choose  the  right  line 
of  conduct,  when  doubt  about  right  and  wrong  agitates  his 
mind.  As  long  as  the  doubt  remains,  he  must  do  nothing, 
because  it  is  highly  immoral  to  even  expose  oneself  to  the 
danger  of  doing  wrong.  It  would  be  in  any  case  to  sin,  to 
act  with  this  principle  in  mind,  ^'I  don't  know,  but  I'll  take 
the  risk."  To  act  with  a  doubtful  conscience  is  to  sin,  he- 
cause  it  involves  contempt  of  the  law.  The  man  acting  with 
a  doubtful  conscience  cares  not  whether  he  keeps  the  law  or 
breaks  it.  Among  all  the  above  systems,  Laxism  excepted, 
Probabilism  apparently  savors  most  of  a  risk ;  but,  as  we  shall 
see,  the  Probabilist  runs  no  risk,  enters  on  no  uncertainty, 
though  he  neglects  the  so-called  safer  course.  He  is  certain 
that  he  is  right,  because  a  doubtful  law  certainly  has  no  bind- 
ing force.  Rigorism  and  Laxism  have  been  condemned  by 
the  Church  in  the  persons  of  Alexander  VII,  in  1656,  and 
Innocent  XI,  in  1679.  Rigorism  was  taught  by  the  Jansen- 
ists,  and  held  that  the  opinion  favoring  the  law  must  be  fol- 
lowed as  long  as  the  opposing  view  is  not  certain.  In  doubt 
about  Friday,  you  must  abstain  from  meat,  till  certain  it  is 
not  Friday.  Laxism  held  that  any  opinion,  with  small  or 
no  sound  reason  in  its  favor,  may  be  followed.  In  doubt 
about  Friday,  with  no  good  reason  for  the  doubt,  you  may  eat 
meat.  Tenuiter  probabile  non  est  probabile  pro  prudenti. 
In  the  case  of  a  prudent  man,  what  is  only  slightly  probable 
is  not  probable  at  all.    Moderate  Tutiorism  and  Prohahilior- 

101 


^''^'''^^<^'  '^'(jiNBRAL  ETHICS 

ism  have  no  advocates  to-day,  and  can  be  neglected.  The  first 
held  that  the  opinion  favoring  the  law  must  be  followed,  un- 
less the  opposing  view  is  most  probable ;  the  second  prescribes 
the  same  course,  unless  the  opposite  opinion  is  more  probable. 
Mquiprdbdbilism  allows  departure  from  the  law,  if  reasons 
for  its  non-existence  are  as  strong,  or  nearly  as  strong,  as  rea- 
sons for  its  existence.  Things  are  reversed,  if  doubt  turns 
on  the  lapse  or  cessation  of  a  law.  Many  Redemptorists  pro- 
fess to  derive  this  last  system  from  St.  Alphonsus,  though  the 
saint  is  Probabilism 's  staunch  defender.  Prohdbilism  teaches 
that,  in  doubt  whether  an  act  is  permissible  or  not,  true  and 
real  probability  in  favor  of  the  act  or  its  omission  makes  one 
or  other  quite  legitirmite,  though  greater  probability  attaches 
to  the  contrary  or  so-called  safer  course.  If  you  have  good 
and  solid  reasons  for  thinking  that  the  day  of  the  week  is 
not  Friday,  you  may  eat  meat,  even  if  you  have  better  and 
stronger  reasons  for  thinking  that  it  is  Friday,  provided 
only  that  you  are  not  really  and  truly  certain  that  it  is  Fri- 
day. If  certain  that  it  is  Friday,  of  course  you  have  no  good 
and  solid  reason  for  thinking  that  it  is  not  Friday.  Your 
reasons  must  be  good  and  solid,  even  if  weaker  than  their 
opposites,  because  slight  reasons  are  reckoned  no  reasons  by 
the  prudent,  and  Laxism  is  condemned  by  common  sense  as 
well  as  by  the  Church. 

TERMS 

Probabilism.  Probabilism  is  as  old  as  Christianity,  and  was 
in  common  use  with  the  early  Fathers  and  Doctors  of  the 
Church.  Years  ago  it  was  called  into  question  by  decisions 
rendered  against  Laxism  by  Alexander  VII  and  Innocent  XI ; 
but  it  always  counted  among  its  defenders  the  most  cele- 
brated theologians.  More  recently  a  wrong  understanding 
of  St.  Alphonsus  gave  rise  to  ^quiprobabilism,  and  the 
Church  has  not  directly  settled  the  controversy  between  ^qui- 
probabilism  and  Probabilism.  In  ^quiprobabilism,  if  one  of 
the  two  views  is  less  probable  than  the  other,  it  must  not  be 
followed;  if  the  two  views  are  equally  probable,  either  may 
be  chosen.  In  some  few  passages  of  St.  Alphonsus,  because 
of  his  zeal  against  Laxism,  the  less  probable  view  is  rated 


CONSCIENCE  103 

slightly  probable  and  negligible  in  itself;  and,  therefore,  its 
opposite  becomes  morally  certain.  Even  with  Probabilists, 
when  moral  certainty  arises,  only  one  course  of  conduct  is 
open,  because  conscience  is  in  that  case  certain  and  not  doubt- 
ful. Moral  certainty  is  firm  assent  of  mind  without  dread 
of  opposite,  all  based  on  laws  governing  human  nature.  Phys- 
ical certainty  is  a  parallel  state  of  mind,  based  on  laws  gov- 
erning physical  nature.  Metaphysical  certainty  is  a  parallel 
state  of  mind  based  on  connection  of  identity  between  ideas 
in  subject  and  predicate.  Therefore,  there  are  three  kinds 
of  certainty,  metaphysical,  physical  and  moral;  and  all  three 
kinds  imply  firm  assent  of  the  mind,  and  exclude  dread  of 
the  opposite,  possibility  of  the  opposite.  In  the  abstract, 
physical  and  moral  admit  of  the  dread  of  possibility,  due  to 
a  miracle,  or  to  a  departure  from  the  laws  governing  human 
acts.  In  the  concrete  and  in  particular,  even  physical  and 
moral  as  completely  exclude  this  dread  and  possibility  as 
metaphysical.  Abstract  possibility  of  the  opposite  is  com- 
patible with  concrete  impossibility  of  the  same;  and,  unless 
circumstances  rule  out  the  concrete  possibility  of  a  miracle 
or  of  a  departure  from  said  laws,  physical  and  moral  certainty 
are  out  of  the  question.  Moral  certainty  is,  therefore,  just 
as  tight  and  solid  as  metaphysical,  in  point  of  excluding  dread 
of  the  opposite;  and  prohahility  never  rises  to  the  dignity 
of  moral  certainty.  Probability  always  leaves  the  opposite 
a  concrete  possibility.  Moral  certainty,  in  strict  sense,  ex- 
cludes possibility  of  opposite ;  in  wide  sense,  it  excludes  posi- 
tive probability  of  opposite,  admitting  its  negative  probabil- 
ity, based  on  slender  reasons,  accounted  none  at  all  by  the 
prudent. 

Conscience.  Conscience  is  from  cum  and  scientia,  and 
means  knowledge  with  a  bearing  on  the  good  or  evil  of  a  par- 
ticular human  act.  It  is  the  subjective  element  in  law's 
application,  it  is  the  immediate  and  proximate  measure  of  a 
man's  moral  conduct.  It  is  the  work  of  the  intellect  in  what 
we  already  established  as  the  standard  of  morality,  namely 
the  objective  order  of  things  as  grasped  by  the  intellect. 
Consciousness  is  likewise  from  cum  and  scientia,  and  means 
knowledge  with  a  bearing  on  the  operations  of  the  soul's 
other  faculties.     Conscience  is  not  consciousness,  nor  is  it 


GENERAL  ETHICS 


synderesis,  which  is  the  habit  of  morality's  first  principles. 
Conscience  is  rather  the  application  of  synderesis  to  concrete 
and  particular  acts.  Both  are  applications  of  law  to  moral 
acts,  both  measure  man's  conduct  with  law  for  standard; 
but,  while  synderesis  in  an  academic  way  and  out  of  court 
decides  that  murder,  for  instance,  is  wrong  and  must  be 
avoided,  conscience  in  a  practical  way  and  in  court  decides 
that  this  particular  act,  because  murder,  must  be  avoided. 
The  object  of  the  particular  act,  with  end  and  circumstances, 
and  their  harmony  or  discord  with  the  objective  order  of 
things  embodied  in  the  law,  are  the  objective  element  in  law's 
application;  and  this  objective  element  is  quite  independent 
of  morality's  subjective  element  or  conscience.  When  the 
moral  value  of  a  man*s  act  is  under  consideration,  objective 
order  measures  conscience;  when  the  moral  value  of  the  man 
himself  is  under  consideration,  things  are  reversed,  and  con- 
science measures  objective  order.  Morally  speaking,  a  man's 
act  has  its  matter  and  form  from  the  act  itself,  without  any 
reference  to  conscience;  a  man's  conduct  has  its  matter  from 
his  acts,  its  form  from  his  conscience.  A  materially  bad  act 
is  likewise  a  formally  bad  act;  but  materially  bad  conduct 
can  easily  be  fonnally  good  conduct,  and  vice-versa.  God  can 
reward  a  wicked  deed  and  punish  an  act  of  virtue,  when  con- 
science is  invincibly  false.  He  looks  not  to  the  act  but  to 
the  heart  of  the  agent ;  and  material  virtue,  when  accompanied 
by  formal  wickedness,  is  unspeakably  worse  than  material  sin 
accompanied  by  formal  righteousness.  Beyond  doubt,  the 
lay-brother,  who  drowned  Chinese  babies,  after  baptizing  them, 
wafi  rewarded  for  material  and  formal  murder,  and  the  igno- 
rant fellow  who  lied,  because  invincibly  persuaded  that 
charity  demanded  it,  was  rewarded  for  a  material  and  formal 
untruth.  Their  acts  were  wrong,  their  conduct  was  right. 
They  were  false  to  objective  order,  but  true  to  conscience, 
and  conscience  measures  objective  order  when  a  man's  con- 
duct is  in  question,  not  his  acts.  Conscience  is  antecedent, 
when  it  turns  on  present  or  future  acts,  and  discharges  the 
functions  of  a  guide.  It  is  consequent,  when  it  turns  on  past 
acts,  and  plays  the  part  of  a  judge.  Conscience  in  strict 
sense  is  antecedent.  Conscience  is  reason  decreeing  the  law- 
fulness or  unlawfulness  of  a  particular  act.     Its  decree  al- 


CONSCIENCE  106 

ways  assumes  the  shape  of  a  practical  judgment,  the  conclu- 
sion of  a  moral  syllogism,  therefore  I  must  do  this  or  avoid 
that.  Distinguish  between  conscience  and  its  decree.  Con- 
science is  the  mind  exercising  a  particular  function.  Its 
decree  is  an  act  of  the  mind,  a  judgment.  In  strict  sense, 
conscience  has  to  do  with  acts  on  the  eve  of  being  accom- 
plished here  and  now.  ThB  Major  in  a  moral  syllogism  rep- 
resents synderesis,  the  Minor  represents  conscience  theoret- 
ically viewed,  the  conclusion  represents  conscience  practically 
viewed;  and  therefore  the  conclusion  best  deserves  the  title, 
decree  of  conscience.  The  Major  is  remote  principle  or  syn- 
deresis, the  Minor  is  conscience  in  actu  primo  proximo,  the 
conclusion  is  conscience  in  second  act.  With  truth  or  har- 
mony with  objective  order  for  viewpoint,  conscience  is  true 
or  false,  right  or  wrong.  If  the  premisses  are  true,  or  if  they 
are  invincibly  false,  conscience  is  right.  If  the  premisses  are 
vincibly  false,  conscience  is  wrong.  With  degree  of  certainty, 
or  mind's  acquiescence,  for  measure,  conscience  is  certain, 
probable  or  doubtful.  Recall  the  states  of  mind  discussed  in 
Logic,  certainty,  opinion^  doubt.  Doubt  may  be  positive  or 
negative.  Positive  has  weighty  reasons  in  its  favor;  nega- 
tive has  slight  or  no  reasons  in  its  favor.  In  matters  of  con- 
science negative  doubt  is  neglected,  because  it  is  of  no  weight 
with  the  prudent.  Doubt  may  be  juris  or  facti.  The  first 
turns  on  a  law's  existence;  the  second,  on  some  particular 
fact.  Similar  expressions  are  de  jure  and  de  facto  in  ques- 
tions of  property  and  authority ;  owner  de  jure  and  owner  de 
facto ;  king  de  jure  and  king  de  facto.  A  doubtful  conscience 
is  in  reality  no  conscience  at  all,  because  no  actual  decision 
is  made.  Darkness  is  the  absence  of  light.  In  question  of 
lawfulness  or  unlawfulness,  not  in  question  of  validity  or 
invalidity,  in  question  of  law  not  of  fact,  Probabilism  with 
the  help  of  a  reflex  principle  changes  a  doubtful  conscience 
to  a  certain  conscience,  and  opens  the  way  to  action.  A  per- 
plexed conscience  sees  sin  in  both  alternatives,  tender  is  se- 
vere with  the  slightest  defects,  lax  unduly  favors  freedom. 

Here  is  the  whole  truth  about  the  bearing  of  conscience  on 
morality.  To  be  right,  a  man  must  act  with  at  least  a  morally 
certain  conscience  in  strict  or  wide  sense,  his  final  practical 
judgment  regarding  the  lawfulness  of  an  act  must  be  at  least 


lOe  GENERAL  ETHICS 

morally  certain.  His  final  practical  judgment  must  admit 
no  sound  or  positive  doubt,  because  to  act  otherwise  would  be 
to  expose  oneself  deliberately  to  the  danger  of  doing  wrong; 
and  moral  certainty  in  wide  sense  is  the  highest  we  regularly 
reach  in  daily  life.  Without  detriment  to  the  moral  certainty 
of  his  final  practical  judgment,  his  remote  practical  judgment 
can  be  even  positively  doubtful  or  probable,  because  his  con- 
duct is  not  based  on  his  remote  practical  judgment,  but  on  his 
final  practical  judgment;  and  with  the  help  of  a  reflex  prin- 
ciple he  can  transform  his  probable  remote  judgment  into  a 
morally  certain  final  practical  judgment;  and  this  in  sub- 
stance is  Probabilism.  By  supposition,  then,  in  Probabilism 
a  man^s  remote  practical  judgment  is  positively  doubtful  or 
probable,  the  doubt  is  based  on  good  and  sound  reasons  in 
the  eyes  of  the  wise,  the  doubt  cannot  be  removed  by  study 
or  investigation ;  one  or  other  course  must  be  taken ;  he  must 
not  even  doubtfully  go  against  the  law;  with  the  help  of  a 
reflex  principle  he  changes  his  conscience  from  doubtful  to 
certain,  and  neglects  the  doubtful  law.  As  long  as  the  law 
remains  doubtful,  he  is  of  course  at  liberty  to  keep  it.  He 
is  likewise  at  liberty  to  neglect  it  without  wrong. 

PROOFS 

When  conscience  returns  a  clear  and  positive  answer,  it 
must  be  followed.  When  conscience  is  perplexed,  a  man's 
first  duty  is  to  enquire  and  seek  information.  If  doubt  re- 
mains after  due  enquiry,  he  is  not  held  to  the  so-called  safer 
course,  he  is  not  held  to  suppose  an  obligation.  Neither  is  he 
allowed  to  act  with  a  doubtful  conscience.  The  Probabilist 
runs  no  risk,  enters  on  no  uncertainty,  though  he  neglects  the 
safer  course  so-called.  Lacking  available  direct  principles,  he 
calls  a  reflex  principle  to  his  aid.  A  direct  principle  lays 
down  the  law,  when  conscience  returns  a  clear  and  positive 
answer.  A  direct  principle  is  no  help  in  this  man's  case. 
He  judges  of  his  own  act,  taking  into  account  his  imperfect 
knowledge  and  limited  powers.  He  makes  no  attempt  to 
determine  what  another  man  with  clear  and  positive  knowl- 
edge ought  to  do.  He  calls  to  his  aid  this  reflex  principle, 
^*A  doubtful  law  has  no  binding  force/'    This  is  a  reflex  or 


PROOF  AND  PRINCIPLES  107 

mind-principle,  because  objectively  and  outside  of  the  mind 
nothing  is  doubtful.  The  question  is,  not  the  law  absolutely, 
but  the  law  as  far  as  I  can  make  it  out.  Liberty  is  prior  to 
the  law.  Liberty  is  in  possession.  The  law,  to  bind,  must 
with  certainty  restrict  liberty.  Besides,  no  law  binds,  till 
promulgated.  Promulgation  connotes  certain  knowledge,  not 
doubtful  or  probable  merely;  and,  as  long  as  doubt  remains, 
the  law  is  not  promulgated  for  me,  and  the  fault  is  not  on  my 
side.  Authority  is  overwhelmingly  on  the  side  of  Probabil- 
ism,  and  it  would  be  long  to  quote  authors.  St.  Alphonsus 
seems  to  favor  ^quiprobabilism  and  Tutiorism,  but  he  can 
be  explained  aright.  With  St.  Alphonsus  the  safer  course  is 
alone  morally  certain;  the  safe  course  is  not  probable  at  all, 
and  he  is  talking  against  Laxism. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  My  doubt  must  be  serious,  and  hold  out  against  argu- 
ments for  the  existence  of  an  obligation.  No  indulgence  must 
be  shown  laxity  of  conscience,  which  leans  on  slender  doubt. 
My  doubt  must  persevere  after  due  enquiry,  and  must  be 
based  on  positive  reasons  against  the  obligation.  My  doubt 
must  not  be  simple  ignorance,  it  must  be  able  to  tell  why. 
Some  minds  doubt  without  being  able  to  give  their  reasons 
why.  These  minds  must  have  recourse  to  others  in  moral 
questions.  My  reason  for  doubt  can  be  an  intrinsic  or  extrinsic 
argument.  Hence  another's  opinion,  when  creative  of  solid 
probability,  can  suffice.  The  probability  must  be  compara- 
tive, it  must  hold  ground  in  face  of  opposing  arguments. 
After  all  has  been  said,  it  must  be  not  unlikely.  It  need  not 
be  more  likely.  That  means  more  probable,  not  probable 
simply.  My  doubt  must  be  practical,  not  speculative,  because 
Ethics  is  a  matter  of  conduct,  not  a  matter  of  theorizing. 
Theoretically  speaking,  a  man  can  be  saved  with  confession 
once  a  year ;  practically  speaking,  and  when  easy  opportunity 
offers,  he  must  approach  the  sacrament  oftener  to  be  saved. 
All  the  difficulty  turns  on  the  varying  amount  of  diligence 
necessary  in  enquiry  to  constitute  it  moral  diligence.  Deeper 
investigation  is  needed  when  matter  in  question  is  of  vital 
interest,  like  confession,  than  when  mere  observance,  like  a 


108  GENERAL  ETHICS 

fast-day.  In  question  of  rolling  stones  over  a  precipice,  the 
doubt  must  be  about  the  act  itself,  not  about  its  consequences. 
It  is  certainly  wrong  to  take  any  such  risk,  and  Probabilism 
has  no  play. 

B.  Frohahilism  is  availahle  only  in  cases  involving  the  law- 
fulness or  unlawfulness  of  an  act,  never  in  cases  involving 
validity  or  invalidity;  in  cases  of  law,  never  in  cases  of  fact; 
because,  while  doubtful  laws  are  a  reality  on  account  of  need- 
ful knowledge  and  promulgation,  facts  are  nothing  unless 
sure  and  certain.  Lawfulness  has  an  element  of  suhjectivityy 
which  is  altogether  absent  from  validity.  The  phase  of  mind 
of  the  agent  has  no  influence  on  the  validity  or  invalidity  of 
an  act,  or  on  the  reality  of  a  fact ;  it  has  a  very  perceptible 
influence  on  the  binding  force  of  a  law.  A  law  binds  only 
when  known,  a  fact  is  a  fact  whether  it  is  known  or  not. 

Examples  of  lawfulness  are  abstinence  on  Friday,  Mass  on 
Sunday,  the  Lenten  fast.  Examples  of  validity  are  marriage, 
ordination,  baptism,  real  bread  and  real  wine,  wills,  medi- 
cine. Examples  of  facts  are  utterance  of  a  vow,  seven  years 
of  age,  baptism,  priesthood,  fast  broken,  debts  paid.  When 
a  certainly  valid  sacrament  is  impossible,  a  dubiously  valid 
sacrament  is  better  than  no  sacrament  at  all,  e.g.,  baptism  with 
perfume,  especially  when  necessity  urges,  and  the  sacrament 
can  be  afterwards  repeated  either  conditionally  or  absolutely. 
Sometimes  doubt  regarding  the  lawfulness  of  an  act  arises 
from  doubt  regarding  validity,  and  Probabilism  is  of  no  avail ; 
because  such  conduct  would  betray  contempt  of  virtue  and 
too  small  fear  of  sin.  To  be  husband  and  wife,  a  man  and 
woman  must  be  certainly  married;  and  a  doubtful  marriage 
never  makes  a  man  and  woman  husband  and  wife;  it  leaves 
them  single  from  the  viewpoint  of  morality.  Doubt  regard- 
ing facts  must  be  settled  some  other  way,  usually  by  an  appeal 
to  fixed  principles,  deriving  their  certainty  from  authority. 
Some  principles  of  the  kind  follow.  ''Possession  is  nine- 
tenths  of  the  law,"  for  money  in  hand.  ''Apart  from  ques- 
tions of  justice,  the  probable  fulfilment  of  a  law  is  on  a  level 
with  its  certain  fulfilment,"  for  sins  told  or  omitted  at  con- 
fession. "Facts  must  not  be  presumed,  they  must  be 
proved,"  for  fast  before  communion  and  for  utterance  of  a 


PROOF  AND  PRINCIPLES  109 

vow.  ''In  doubt  stand  to  presumption,"  ''Doubts  must  be 
settled  with  the  help  of  what  ordinarily  happens,"  for  a 
priest  at  Communion  afraid  that  he  has  omitted  the  Pater 
Noster,  for  parts  of  Office. 


THESIS  VIII 

VIRTUES  AND  VICES 

Jouin,  56-70 ;  Rickahy,  64^-109. 

Virtue  is  a  Jiahitus  operativus  bonus,  vice  is  a  habitus 
operativus  mains.  To  translate,  virtue  and  vice  are  good 
and  had  habits  with  a  bearing  on  work.  The  expression,  with 
a  bearing  on  work,  serves  to  separate  virtue  from  grace.  Vir- 
tue in  simple  and  strict  sense  belongs  exclusively  to  the  will ; 
in  qualified  and  wide  sense  it  is  applicable  to  whatsoever  fac- 
ulty in  the  man.  Though  prudence  resides  in  the  mind,  it  is 
directive  of  the  will.  A  man  is  simply  and  in  strict  sense 
good,  when  his  will  is  right.  He  is  good  in  qualified  and  wide 
sense,  when  his  legs  are  swift,  when  his  eye  and  hand  are 
ready  to  art,  when  his  wit  is  quick ;  and  we  call  him  not  good 
without  any  qualification,  but  a  good  runner,  a  good  painter, 
a  good  scholar.  Virtue  is  not  said  of  irrational  agents,  be- 
cause their  conduct  is  fixed  for  them  by  instinct.  Virtue 
postulates  free  will,  because  it  helps  to  choose  between  good 
and  evil.  Silence  is  no  virtue  in  a  dumb  person,  temperance 
in  food  and  drink  is  no  virtue  in  an  angel,  because  the  dumb 
person  and  the  angel  are  without  any  power  to  choose  in 
these  particulars.  Silence  in  a  talkative  person,  and  temper- 
ance in  a  man  are  very  decided  virtues.  Virtue,  therefore, 
is  a  habit;  and  Aristotle  describes  habit  as  a  quality  super- 
added to  a  faculty,  rendering  it  well  or  ill  disposed  towards 
itself  or  something  else.  Virtue,  whether  in  strict  or  wide 
sense,  dwells  in  some  faculty  of  the  soul,  and  favorably  dis- 
poses that  faculty  towards  itself  or  towards  another. 

The  soul  is  remote  principle  of  all  the  man's  activities; 
faculties  are  proximate  connatural  principles,  superadded  by 
nature  to  the  soul;  habits  are  proximate  acquired  principles, 
superadded  not  by  nature  but  by  personal  endeavor  to  the 
faculties.    Therefore,  the  soul  helps  the  man,  faculties  help 

110 


VIRTUES  AND  VICES  111 

the  soul,  and  habits  help  the  faculties.  Suarez  offers  this  defi- 
nition of  a  faculty -habit,  a  quality  hard  to  remove,  super- 
added to  the  faculty,  and  meant  of  itself  and  primarily  to 
assist  the  faculty.  This  definition  separates  a  faculty-habit 
from  a  soul-habit,  from  faculty,  from  act,  from  passing  dis- 
positions, and  assigns  its  purpose  and  efficiency.  Habits  re- 
side in  faculties,  that  are  vital  and  somehow  intellectual. 
Infused  or  supernatural  habits  are  communicated  to  the  fac- 
ulty by  God,  and  procure,  not  readiness  in  supernatural 
activity,  but  the  very  activity  itself.  Faith  as  a  natural 
habit,  and  faith  as  a  supernatural  habit  can  serve  for  ex- 
planation. Natural  or  acquired  habits  result  from  reiterated 
acts  of  some  one  kind;  they  confer  not  the  power  to  act,  but 
the  power  to  act  with  ease  and  readiness.  The  faculty  with- 
out the  habit  is  simple  power  to  act,  the  faculty  with  the  habit 
is  power  to  act  with  ease  and  facility.  Custom,  because  par- 
ent to  habit,  gets  the  name  second  nature.  Faculty  is  first 
nature,  habit  is  second  nature.  Habits  of  sense  and  habits 
of  appetite  explain  themselves,  likewise  habits  of  mind  and 
habits  of  will.  Habits  of  will  are  moral  habits,  and  are  good 
or  bad,  virtues  or  vices.  Physical  habits  are  of  indifferent 
moral  worth,  like  study,  talk,  walk,  thought.  To  include 
virtue  in  qualified  and  wide  sense,  as  well  as  virtue  in  simple 
and  strict  sense,  virtue  is  in  general  defined  a  habit  perfect- 
ing, improving,  rounding  out  a  rational  faculty  and  bend- 
ing it  towards  good.  Good  here  means  physical  as  well  as 
moral  good  for  the  faculty,  and  good  in  the  sense  of  con- 
duct ;  good  for  any  faculty,  and  good  for  the  will  exclusively. 
Virtue  in  simple  and  strict  sense  perfects  the  will,  and  in- 
clines it  to  moral  good.  Virtue  in  qualified  and  wide  sense 
perfects  any  other  faculty,  and  inclines  it  to  its  own  improve- 
ment. A  habit  that  never  betrays  itself  in  acts  is  no  virtue, 
because  it  falls  away  from  its  purpose.  It  is  for  facility,  and 
facility  without  acts  is  impossible.  Prudence,  recta  ratio 
agibilium,  right  order  in  conduct,  is  a  practical,  intellectual 
virtue ;  and  for  that  reason,  a  moral  virtue.  It  has  a  directive 
bearing  on  the  will,  and  virtues  concerned  with  the  will  are 
moral  virtues.  Here  are  four  definitions  of  virtue,  taken  in 
simple  and  strict  sense.  St.  Thomas  defines  virtue  as, 
''habitus  operativus  bonus,"  a  good  faculty-habit,   a  good 


112  GENERAL  ETHICS 

habit  bearing  on  activity;  and  good  means  moral  good,  not 
physical.  Aristotle  defines  virtue  as  a  habit,  that  makes  its 
owner  and  his  work  good.  Aristotle  again  defines  virtue  as 
a  habit,  that  chooses  the  middle  course  with  respect  to  our- 
selves, said  middle  course  being  fixed  by  reason,  as  a  man 
of  prudence  would  determine  it;  a  habit  of  avoiding  what 
would  be  excess  or  defect  in  the  esteem  of  a  prudent  man. 
St.  Augustine  defines  virtue  as  a  good  quality  of  will,  a  help 
to  right  living,  and  no  help  to  wrong.  When  St.  Augustine 
adds,  ''produced  in  us  by  God  without  our  assistance,"  he 
is  talking  of  infused  virtue.  Like  freedom,  virtue  resides  in 
the  will  as  in  subject,  and  in  other  faculties  only  inasmuch 
as  they  work  in  connection  with,  under  motion  from,  or  under 
control  of  the  will.  Prudence  directs  the  will.  Virtue  is  a 
moral  habit,  moral  habits  result  from  moral  acts,  and  moral 
acts  are  one  way  or  another  acts  of  the  will.  Scattered  acts 
of  virtue,  no  result  of  habit,  never  make  a  man  simply  and  un- 
qualifiedly good.  They  make  him  good  with  a  qualification 
and  circumstances.  The  regularity  and  constancy  secured  by 
habit,  alone  constitute  a  man  simply  and  unqualifiedly  good. 
As  St.  Thomas  says,  regularity  and  constancy  in  good  demand 
that  good  acts  be  elicited  with  readiness,  with  unbroken  uni- 
formity, and  with  delight;  and  these  requisites  are  verified 
only  when  virtuous  deeds  become  a  habit,  a  species  of  second 
nature. 

The  moral  virtues  are  divided  into  the  four  cardinal  vir- 
tues, prudence,  justice,  fortitude  and  temperance.  St.  Thomas 
offers  these  two  reasons  for  the  division.  Objective  order  is 
the  standard  of  morality,  reason  must  discover  this  order  and 
propose  its  commands  to  the  will;  the  will  in  turn  must  exe- 
cute these  commands  in  its  own  field  and  in  the  field  of  the 
passions,  whether  they  tend  towards  good  or  away  from  evil, 
whether  concupiscible  or  irascible,  desire  or  aversion.  Pru- 
dence, the  habit  of  doing  the  right  thing  at  the  right  time,  is 
reason 's  helper ;  justice,  the  habit  of  giving  everybody  his  due, 
is  helper  to  the  will  in  its  own  operations;  temperance  helps 
the  will  in  its  management  of  appetite's  desires;  fortitude 
helps  to  manage  appetite's  aversions.  Four  faculties  con- 
tribute to  man's  moral  acts,  intellect,  will,  appetite  of  desire 


VIRTUES  AND  VICES  113 

and  appetite  of  aversion;  and  the  four  cardinal  virtues  in 
order  keep  these  faculties  right.  Circumspice,  age,  ahstine, 
sustine.  Be  sure  you're  right,  then  go  ahead.  These  virtues 
are  called  cardinal,  because  they  are  to  all  the  other  virtues 
what  the  hinges  are  to  the  door;  their  support,  basis  of  their 
utility,  and  surpassing  them  all  in  point  of  worth  and  neces- 
sity. All  the  other  virtues  can  be  referred  to  these  four  as 
parts  to  a  whole.  It  is  easy  to  see  that  no  moral  virtue  is 
complete  and  perfect  without  these  others.  Obedience,  for 
instance,  is  hard  because  of  pride,  sensuality,  laziness,  dread ; 
and  complete  obedience  is  next  to  impossible  without  humility, 
temperance,  diligence,  courage.  Want  of  temperance  and 
avarice  are  often  responsible  for  injustice,  and  there  is  no 
justice  where  these  vices  are  in  control. 

Vice  is  virtue's  contrary.  It  is  habitus  operativus  malus, 
a  habit  helping  a  faculty  to  moral  evil.  We  must  distinguish 
in  an  evil  habit  or  vice,  as  we  distinguish  in  an  evil  act,  a 
positive  entity  and  a  negative.  The  negative  entity  is  its 
malice,  and  lies  in  its  lack  of  moral  goodness,  its  lack  of  har- 
mony with  the  objective  order.  The  formal  object  of  a  vice 
is  some  aspect  of  inferior  good,  at  odds  with  the  objective 
order,  and  inseparably  connected  with  malice.  Every  virtue 
can  count  at  least  two  opposite  vices,  one  by  way  of  excess, 
the  other  by  way  of  defect.  The  seven  capital  or  cardinal 
sins  are  rooted  in  the  seven  good  things  most  calculated  to 
excite  the  will  to  rebellion  against  reason  or  the  objective 
order.  They  are  vainglory,  gluttony,  lust,  avarice,  sloth, 
envy  and  anger.  The  first  four  seek  good  in  a  disorderly 
way,  the  other  three  shun  good  because  of  some  evil  connected 
with  it.  Goods  of  soul,  like  praise  and  honor,  excite  vain- 
glory; goods  of  body  with  a  bearing  on  the  race's  preserva- 
tion, like  unholy  pleasure,  are  matter  for  lust ;  goods  of  body 
with  a  bearing  on  the  individual's  preservation,  like  food 
and  drink,  excite  gluttony ;  outside  goods  like  wealth  provoke 
avarice.  The  good  shunned  may  bo  one's  own  or  another's. 
Sloth  shuns  one's  own  good  to  avoid  labor;  envy  shuns  an- 
other's good  without  thought  of  revenge,  it  is  sadness  at  an- 
other's good  because  rated  an  obstacle  to  one's  own.  Anger 
shuns  another's  good  with  thought   of  revenge.    Pride  is 


114  GENERAL  ETHICS 

queen  of  all  the  vices.  In  the  order  of  intention  pride  is 
first  of  all  the  vices,  in  the  order  of  execution  avarice  enjoys 
the  prerogative. 

Prudence.  Aristotle  defines  prudence  as  recta  ratio  agi- 
bilium,  right  decision  in  things  to  do,  habit  of  practical  not 
speculative  reason,  helping  to  right  decisions  in  question  of 
moral  conduct.  Art  is  different,  it  is  recta  ratio  factihilium, 
right  decision  in  things  to  make.  Art  tends  to  make  some 
outside  work  right  in  physical  sense,  prudence  tends  to  make 
some  act  of  the  man  morally  good.  Lessius  defines  prudence 
as  a  habit  of  intellect  helping  us  to  know  in  every  emergency 
what  is  right  and^  what  is  wrong.  There  are  two  kinds  of  pru- 
dence, personal  and  political  or  state  prudence.  The  chief 
functions  of  prudence  are  euboulia,  synesis,  gnome,  which 
mean  habit  of  taking  advice,  habit  of  giving  advice,  habit 
of  interpretation.  The  integral  parts  of  prudence  are  mem- 
ory, intellect,  foresight,  argumentation,  skill,  openness  to  in- 
struction, caution,  and  wide  range  of  vision. 

Christ  in  the  mystery  of  His  loss  in  the  temple  is  teaching 
a  profound  lesson  in  prudence.  St.  Luke  tells  the  story  in 
the  ten  last  verses  of  his  second  chapter.  ''Did  you  not  know 
that  I  must  be  about  my  Father's  business?"  Prudence  in 
practice  is  the  art  of  doing  the  right  thing  at  the  right  time. 
Wisdom  is  her  handmaid,  her  counsellor.  She  guides  pru- 
dence in  her  choice  of  conduct.  Wisdom  is  in  the  mind,  pru- 
dence directs  the  will ;  and  both  together  hath  a  perfect  work. 
In  the  realm  of  conduct  the  will  knows  nothing,  wishes  every- 
thing; the  mind  knows  everything,  wishes  nothing.  The  will 
stings  the  mind  to  industry  and  borrows  in  turn  from  its 
servant  the  light  it  needs.  Prudence,  then,  with  the  help  of 
wisdom,  enables  its  owner  to  choose  aright,  when  two  lines  of 
conduct  are  submitted  to  him  for  selection.  Generally  it 
manifests  itself  in  a  fixed  phase  of  mind  and  will,  perpetually 
ready  to  abandon  the  less  for  the  greater.  In  the  case  under 
consideration  Jesus  had  to  choose  between  His  Heavenly  Fa- 
ther's business  and  His  Mother's  pleasure.  His  infinite  pru- 
dence saw  only  one  way  open;  and  He  tarried  three  days  in 
the  temple,  in  spite  of  the  pang  His  stay  inflicted  on  Mary's 
heart  and  Joseph's.  A  mere  man,  abandoned  in  the  same 
predicament  by  prudence,  would  go  terribly  wrong  and  jour- 


JUSTICE  115 

ney  down  to  Nazareth  with  his  parents.  All  our  mistakes  are 
due  to  want  of  prudence.  Every  duty  we  neglect  betokens 
absence  of  the  quality.  Every  law  we  break  is  a  departure 
from  its  salutary  promptings.  We  are  abandoning  the  greater 
for  the  less ;  we  are  sacrificing  the  service  of  God  for  sloth, 
for  selfishness,  for  personal  comfort.  It  must  have  cost  the 
Child  Christ  a  heavy  pang  to  inflict  this  pain  on  His  Mother 
and  St.  Joseph.  He  was  as  desirous  of  their  holy  company 
as  they  were  of  His,  His  sorrow  was  an  answering  echo  to 
theirs.  But  His  Father's  business  beckoned  Him  from  afar, 
and  He  had  to  follow.  Everything  must  yield  before  God's 
service.  Next  to  virtue,  life  is  man's  supremest  good  on 
earth,  and  the  martyrs  surrendered  that.  In  the  catalogue 
of  present  goods,  parents,  home  and  friends  rank  next  to  life ; 
and  religious  surrender  them,  making  every  vocation  to  the 
monastery  or  convent  a  re-enactment  of  the  sacred  mystery 
we  study. 

Justice.  Justice  is  a  constant  and  lasting  readiness  to  ren- 
der to  everybody  his  due,  it  is  a  habit  of  will  prompt  and 
ready  to  render  to  everybody  his  due.  Constant  and  lasting 
are  implied  in  the  word,  habit.  One  act  of  justice  never  makes 
a  just  man,  because  justice  is  a  habit.  Justice  is  divided  into 
commutative,  distributive  and  legal.  St.  Thomas  calls  legal 
justice  general;  he  calls  commutative  and  distributive,  par- 
ticular justice.  St.  Thomas  treats  this  virtue  of  justice  in 
his  Summa  2.2.  between  Questions  57  and  122.  Legal  justice, 
he  says,  makes  a  good  citizen,  commutative  and  distributive 
make  a  good  man.  2.2.  Q.58.  a.6.  Justice  is  directive  of  a 
man's  conduct  towards  others,  under  the  aspect  of  what  is 
due  these  others.  Man  can  be  taken  as  an  individual  or  as 
a  unit  in  the  state.  He  has  relations  with  the  state  as  a  whole, 
and  legal  justice  helps  him  fulfil  them.  The  state  as  a  whole 
has  relations  with  him,  and  distributive  justice  manages 
them.  He  has  relations  with  individuals  in  the  state  as  men, 
and  not  as  citizens,  and  commutative  justice  is  the  virtue 
concerned.  Legal  justice  is  in  the  ruler  effectively,  in  the 
subject  executively.  The  ruler  makes  the  laws,  the  subject 
keeps  them.  The  ruler  is  rendering  the  state  its  due,  when 
he  makes  laws;  the  subject,  when  he  keeps  them;  both  con- 
tributing to  the  common  good.     Distributive  justice  is  di- 


116  GENERAL  ETHICS 

rective  of  the  state  or  its  head  in  the  distribution  of  priv- 
ileges and  duties,  dignities  and  burdens,  rewards  and  pen- 
alties, influencing  citizens  to  accept  one  and  the  other  with 
satisfied  content.  Commutative  justice  is  directive  of  the 
individual  in  transactions  with  his  neighbor,  involving  sale 
and  purchase  and  kindred  processes,  designated  in  a  general 
way  as  exchange.  Commutare  means  to  exchange,  as  dis- 
tribuere  means  to  distribute. 

Justice  makes  equality  between  two.  In  commutative  the 
transaction  is  between  two  individuals,  buyer  and  seller,  or 
thief  and  his  victim,  as  the  case  may  be.  One  gives  money 
and  gets  wares,  the  other  gives  wares  and  gets  money,  and 
there  is  equality  or  justice.  One  gets  wares  and  gives  noth- 
ing, the  other  gives  wares  and  gets  nothing;  and  there  is  in- 
equality or  injustice.  The  equality  and  inequality  are 
arithmetical,  like  5  and  5,  because  such  equality  and  inequal- 
ity are  possible  in  commutative.  In  distributive  the  trans- 
action is  between  state  and  citizens.  The  citizens  give  serv- 
ice and  get  office,  the  state  gets  service  and  gives  office.  Dis- 
tributive is  less  concerned  with  rewarding  citizens  than  with 
rewarding  them  in  a  proportionate  way.  If  the  state  with- 
holds reward,  it  is  offending  against  legal  and  commutative 
rather  than  against  distributive  justice.  Distributive  is  hurt, 
only  when  some  citizen,  as  compared  with  another  citizen, 
gets  a  reward  out  of  all  proportion  with  his  deserts.  In  dis- 
tributive two  citizens  deserve  well  of  the  whole  community 
or  state  in  different  degrees.  John  is  worth  4  degrees  to  the 
state  in  point  of  meritorious  service,  and  gets  in  return  8 
degrees  of  reward  in  the  shape  of  honor,  dignity  or  office. 
If  James  deserves  well  of  the  state  to  the  extent  of  2  degrees, 
distributive  justice  demands  that  he  get  in  return  4  degrees 
of  reward,  not  6.  John  gets  4  more  degrees  than  he  gave, 
James  gets  only  2  more  than  he  gave.  The  citizens  give  of 
their  persons  and  get  things,  the  state  gets  of  their  persons 
and  gives  things;  and,  as  between  persons  and  things,  the 
only  equality  possible  is  geometrical  or  proportional,  in  this 
case,  4:8::2:4.  Arithmetical  equality  is  possible  between 
things  and  things,  and  commutative  justice  is  concerned  ex- 
clusively with  things.  In  legal  justice  the  transaction  is  be- 
tween citizen  and  state.     The  state  gives  law  securing  com- 


JUSTICE  117 

mon  good,  and  gets  obedience.  The  citizen  gives  obedience, 
and  gets  common  good.  Here  there  is  question  of  things; 
and,  because  of  arithmetical  equality,  if  the  ruler  makes  4 
laws,  every  citizen  has  to  keep  all  4.  The  ruler  as  seat  and 
centre  of  authority  is  the  state  formally  taken,  citizens  are 
the  state  materially  taken,  and  the  ruler  in  his  capacity  of 
citizen  is  part  of  it.  In  distributive  the  debt  is  owed  the 
citizen,  and  the  state  pays  it.  In  legal  the  debt  is  due  the 
ruler  or  state,  and  the  citizen  pays  it.  Law  is  a  debt  the 
ruler  owes  the  community,  obedience  is  a  debt  the  community 
owes  the  ruler.  The  ruler  gets  obedience,  and  gives  common 
good;  the  citizen  gets  common  good,  and  gives  obedience. 

Of  the  three  kinds  of  justice,  distributive  and  legal  are  the 
least  definite;  and,  because  restitution  is  practically  impos- 
sible, they  are  of  less  importance  than  commutative  in  the 
event  of  infringement.  They  are  in  the  main  observed,  when 
the  ruler  does  his  utmost  to  distribute  favors  and  burdens 
with  a  fair  and  even  hand,  when  citizens  abide  by  the  law 
in  all  its  details.  If  worthy  citizens  fail  of  their  due  reward, 
the  ruler  cannot  make  amends  without  doing  injustice  to 
others  already  in  possession  of  dignities;  and  to  make  resti- 
tution out  of  his  own  pocket  would  not  be  distributive  justice, 
which  is  concerned  with  the  state's  property,  offices  and 
such,  not  with  the  ruler's  private  property.  Favoritism  and 
nepotism  are  offenses  against  distributive,  and  they  meet  with 
full  treatment  in  the  Summa,  2.2.  Q.63.  God  plays  no  fa- 
vorites, He  is  not  a  respecter  of  persons,  A.A.IO,  34.  Pen- 
alties are  restitution  in  the  case  of  offended  legal  justice,  and 
the  law  never  expects  a  criminal  to  bear  witness  against  him- 
self. Offenses  against  commutative  justice  are  clear-cut  and 
well  defined,  the  amount  of  restitution  is  a  matter  of  arith- 
metic, and  the  obligation  stands  till  the  last  penny  is  paid. 

Commutative  justice  is  a  process  of  exchange,  and  all  ex- 
changes are  voluntary  or  involuntary.  Voluntary  exchanges 
constitute  business,  and  base  the  virtue  of  justice;  involun- 
tary exchanges  base  the  vice  of  injustice.  With  this  twofold 
fact  in  mind,  St.  Thomas  in  his  Summa,  2.2.  Q.61,  a.3,  fur- 
nishes us  with  a  list  of  ordinary  business  transactions  with  a 
bearing  on  justice,  and  a  list  of  ordinary  offenses  against  jus- 
tice.    Voluntary  exchanges  are  involved  in  buying  and  sell- 


118  GENERAL  ETHICS 

ing,  usufruct,  lending  and  borrowing,  renting  and  hiring, 
pawning,  bailing.  Involuntary  exchanges  are  theft,  robbery, 
murder,  assault,  imprisonment,  blows,  wounds,  lies,  detrac- 
tion, false  witness,  insult,  adultery  with  wife,  seduction  of 
slave.  The  whole  of  Question  62  deals  with  restitution  in  8 
articles.  Between  Questions  64  and  77,  involuntary  ex- 
changes, or  species  of  injustice,  are  discussed  and  explained. 
Between  Questions  77  and  79,  voluntary  exchanges  are  treated, 
with  special  attention  to  buying,  and  selling,  and  interest. 
Question  79  deals  with  the  integral  parts  of  justice,  do  good 
and  avoid  evil,  give  everybody  his  due,  and  refuse  nobody 
his  due.  From  Question  80  to  Question  123,  virtues  closely 
connected  with  justice  are  discussed,  and  they  are  nine  in 
number;  religion,  filial  piety,  esteem,  truthfulness,  gratitude, 
defense,  all  enumerated  by  Cicero  in  his  De  Inventione,  Book 
2,  along  with  friendship,  generosity  and  equity.  Connected 
virtues  in  part  differ  from,  and  in  part  resemble  justice.  Jus- 
tice gives  everybody  his  due  according  to  equality.  Equality 
is  absent  from  religion,  filial  piety  and  esteem;  due  is  want- 
ing in  the  other  six.  Religion  or  duties  to  God  cover  QQ. 
81-101;  filial  piety,  101;  esteem,  101-106;  gratitude,  106- 
108;  defense,  108;  truthfulness,  109-114;  friendship  or  af- 
fability, 114-117 ;  generosity,  117-120 ;  equity,  120.  He  closes 
with  a  brief  discussion  of  the  Ten  Commandments,  or  pre- 
cepts of  justice,  122.  Equity  or  epikeia,  supra  justum,  is  a 
superior  kind  of  legal  justice,  because  it  interprets  law  not 
according  to  words,  but  according  to  the  mind  of  the  law- 
maker. No  lawmaker  can  formulate  a  law  able  to  touch 
every  single  occurrence.  He  legislates  for  ordinary  contin- 
gencies, for  what  commonly  happens ;  and  circumstances  can 
quite  change  cases. 

Fortitude.  Cicero  defines  fortitude  as  a  judicious  encoun- 
ter with  danger,  and  sufferance  of  trouble,  or  endurance  of 
effort.  It  regulates  the  irascible  passions  embodying  diffi- 
culty, just  as  temperance  has  to  do  with  the  concupiscible 
passions.  Fear  and  courage  are  the  two  passions  with  which 
fortitude  is  especially  concerned,  keeping  them  both  within 
the  bounds  of  reason.  Fear  is  dread  of  an  evil  conceived  as 
unavoidable,  courage  is  dread  of  an  evil  avoidable  only  at 
the  expense  of  great  effort.     Fortitude  is  conspicuous  in  mar- 


FORTITUDE  AND  TEMPERANCE  119 

tyrdom,  and  naturally  speaking  fear  of  death  is  the  greatest 
of  all  fears.  Fortitude  is  more  prominent  in  repressing  fear 
than  in  exciting  courage.  It  is  harder  to  bear  trouble  than 
to  attack  it ;  because,  in  bearing  trouble,  the  victim  is  weaker 
than  trouble;  in  attacking  trouble,  the  threatened  victim  is 
stronger  than  trouble.  Besides,  trouble  in  the  case  of  fear  is 
nearer  being  present,  in  courage  trouble  is  future  and  farther 
in  the  distance.  Fear  is  long,  courage  is  short.  Fear  is  a 
sin,  when  against  order;  when  it  flees  evils  that  ought  to  be 
met  in  the  performance  of  duty.  Fear  is  no  sin,  when  it  flees 
evils  that  ought  to  be  avoided,  evils  that  can  be  avoided  with- 
out detriment  to  duty.  Timidity  is  excessive  fear,  rashness 
is  excessive  courage. 

The  four  virtues  connected  with  fortitude  are  spirited- 
nesSy  grandeur,  patience  and  perseverance.  Inasmuch  as  it 
is  a  judicious  encounter  with  danger,  fortitude  displays  it- 
self as  spiritedness  by  way  of  preparation,  and  as  grandeur 
by  way  of  execution.  Inasmuch  as  it  is  a  judicious  endur- 
ance of  effort,  fortitude  displays  itself  as  patience  when  trou- 
ble is  short,  and  as  perseverance  when  trouble  is  long.  Mag- 
nanimity is  grandeur  in  general,  magnificence  is  grandeur  in 
the  department  of  expense.  The  latter  moves  men  to  make 
large  outlays  of  money  to  ensure  some  grand  project.  Con- 
fidence and  security  are  parts  of  spiritedness.  Presumption 
is  an  excess  of  spiritedness.  So  is  ambition,  or  inordinate 
greed  of  honor.  Vainglory  is  likewise  an  excess  of  spirited- 
ness. Desire  of  glory  is  not  in  itself  wrong,  when  the  glory 
sought  is  solid  and  true,  when  the  seeker's  purpose  is  right, 
and  the  means  he  uses  are  legitimate.  Desire  of  vain  or  empty 
glory  is  wrong ;  and  glory  is  vain  or  empty,  when  based  on  a 
thing  that  deserves  no  praise,  when  tribute  from  a  man  whose 
judgment  is  little  worth,  when  turned  to  wrong  account,  not 
directed  to  the  glory  of  God  or  the  neighbor's  salvation. 
Vainglory  is  one  of  the  capital  sins,  and  counts  for  daughters* 
disobedience,  boastfulness,  hypocrisy,  novelty,  stubbornness  of 
opinion,  contrariness  of  will,  and  disputatiousness.  Want  of 
spirit  is  opposed  to  spiritedness  by  way  of  defect ;  presump- 
tion, by  way  of  excess.  One  attempts  less  than  it  ought  to 
attempt;  the  other,  more;  while  spiritedness  attempts  what 
it  ought  to  attempt.     Stinginess  is  opposed  to  magnificence. 


120  GENERAL  ETHICS 

One  rates  the  cost  and  neglects  results;  the  other  rates  re- 
sults and  neglects  the  cost.  Extravagance  is  the  opposite 
of  stinginess.  One  makes  man  a  spendthrift,  the  other  makes 
him  a  miser.  Patience  is  a  remedy  against  sadness.  All  the 
moral  virtues  are  helps  to  prevent  the  passions,  in  the  pres- 
ence of  good  or  evil,  from  dragging  reason  to  wrong.  Pa- 
tience, therefore,  enables  us  to  bear  ills  with  an  even  mind, 
and  not  desert  the  right  in  an  attempt  to  escape  them.  It  is 
a  virtue  inferior  to  prudence,  justice,  fortitude  and  temper- 
ance, as  well  as  to  the  theological  virtues.  Perseverance  is 
part  of  fortitude,  because  it  weakens  fear  and  strengthens 
courage,  always  with  a  view  to  length  of  duration.  Forti- 
tude can  be  the  work  of  a  minute,  perseverance  is  the  work 
of  years.  Softness  and  stubbornness  are  opposed  to  perse- 
verance by  way  of  defect  and  excess  respectively.  St.  Thomas 
deals  with  fortitude  in  his  Summa,  2.2.  QQ.  123-141. 

Temperance.  Fortitude  controls  the  irascible  passions  in 
their  retreat  from  evil,  temperance  controls  the  concupiscible 
passions  in  their  pursuit  of  good.  Pleasure  is  the  one  great 
good  appealing  to  the  concupiscible  passions;  and  God,  as  a 
reward  and  incentive,  attaches  pleasure  to  conservation  of 
the  race  and  conservation  of  the  individual.  Pleasures  of 
touch  contribute  to  the  conservation  of  the  race,  pleasures  of 
taste  to  that  of  the  individual.  Therefore,  temperance  is  most 
conspicuous  in  control  of  pleasures  of  the  flesh,  and  pleasures 
of  the  table.  Temperance  restrains  impurity  and  gluttony. 
Temperance  is  not  abstinence.  One  uses  pleasure  within  the 
bounds  prescribed  by  reason,  the  other  refrains  from  pleas- 
ure altogether.  Naturally  speaking,  abstinence  from  all  food 
and  drink  would  be  wrong,  because  use  of  some  food  and 
drink  is  a  law  of  nature  imposed  on  the  individual.  Absti- 
nence from  some  certain  food  or  drink  would  not  be  wrong, 
because  no  set  food  or  drink  is  necessary  to  conservation  of 
the  individual.  Abstinence  from  all  the  pleasures  of  the 
flesh  would  not  be  wrong  in  any  individual,  because  conserva- 
tion of  the  race  is  a  law  imposed  on  no  individuals  in  par- 
ticular, but  on  the  race  in  general.  If  scattered  individuals 
refuse  to  propagate,  the  race  can  still  continue;  if  any  in- 
dividual refuses  to  eat,  he  will  die.  Others  can  propagate  the 
race  in  our  stead,  nobody  can  eat  for  us.     Therefore,  while 


FORTITUDE  AND  TEMPERANCE  121 

total  abstinence  from  wine  is  quite  right  and  highly  com- 
mendable in  any  individual,  the  moderate  use  of  wine  is  far 
from  wrong.  Total  abstinence  from  pleasures  of  the  flesh 
is  the  only  line  of  conduct  open  to  individuals  outside  the 
condition  of  marriage,  because  these  pleasures  of  the  flesh  are 
for  the  conservation  of  the  race,  and  marriage  is  the  one 
process  appointed  by  God  and  nature  for  the  propagation 
of  the  race.  Moderate  use  of  these  pleasures  with  a  view  to 
reproduction  is  temperance,  and  peculiarly  a  virtue  of  the 
married.  No  use  of  these  pleasures,  whether  moderate  or 
excessive,  is  alone  legitimate  with  the  unmarried.  Temper- 
ance is  abstinence  from  illegitimate  pleasure,  it  is  the  mod- 
erate and  sensible  use  of  legitimate  pleasure.  Fasting  in 
food,  sobriety  in  drink,  chastity  in  pleasures  of  the  flesh  are 
forms  of  temperance.  Shame  is  a  kind  of  chastity.  Purity 
and  decency  are  parts  of  temperance.  Continence,  humility, 
modesty,  mildness,  mercy,  moderation,  politeness  have  family- 
resemblances  with  temperance.  St.  Thomas  treats  temper- 
ance in  his  Summa,  2.2.  QQ.  141-171. 


THESIS  IX 

CHAKACTER  AND  HABITS 

Morally  speaking,  character  is  the  man;  every  man's 
character  is  his  own  work;  and  our  destiny  for  weal  or  woe 
is  in  our  own  hands.  Character  is  no  very  profound  mys- 
tery, it  is  the  plainest  of  problems.  All  has  been  said,  when 
we  remark  that  character  is  compounded  of  temperament  and 
habits.  Our  temperaments  are  common  with  other  hereditary 
qualities  we  get  from  our  parents ;  and,  whether  they  are  helps 
or  hindrances  to  virtue  and  honesty,  we  must  be  content  to 
employ  them  with  thankfulness  when  they  are  helps,  and 
supplement  them  with  an  abundant  measure  of  good  will  when 
they  are  hindrances.  No  mortal  can  shift  on  temperament 
the  blame  for  mediocrity.  Parents  are  indeed  responsible 
for  tendencies  and  traits  their  children  inherit,  they  are  not 
responsible  for  their  children's  crimes.  No  man  can  allow 
temperament  to  bind  him  hand  and  foot  and  drag  him  to 
ruin,  without  proclaiming  himself  an  abject  slave,  without 
trailing  his  dignity  in  the  mire,  without  surrendering  his 
birthright  of  liberty.  Free  will  holds  the  key  to  the  situa- 
tion. Temperament  is  not  omnipotent.  It  is  a  mighty  factor 
for  good  or  evil,  but  it  is  far  from  settling  the  question.  Free 
will  is  mightier  than  temperament;  the  man  born  for  con- 
spiracy, treason  and  murder,  can  by  dint  of  assiduous  care 
become  conspicuous  for  honorable  valor,  a  red-hot  patriot,  a 
martyr  in  the  cause  of  charity.  The  temperament  of  a  de- 
generate, when  free  will  is  not  yet  submerged,  is  as  much  an 
instrument  for  good  as  the  temperament  of  a  saint.  The  de- 
generate has  a  harder  road  to  travel;  he  has  to  walk  with 
more  care,  more  circumspection  and  more  courage;  but  his 
feet  are  mercifully  fitted  for  rough  as  well  as  smoother  roads, 
and  the  precautions  enumerated  are  within  his  power.  Tend- 
encies and  traits  he  inherited  from  his  progenitors  can  bend, 

122 


CHARACTER  AND  HABITS  123 

without  being  able  to  break,  his  will;  and  with  the  iron  in 
his  nature  he  can  stiffen  his  courage  to  meet  whatever  strain. 
Temperament  is,  therefore,  no  insuperable  hindrance  to  the 
cultivation  of  character;  and  of  the  two  elements  making  up 
character,  temperament  is  less  within  our  power  than  habit. 
Our  temperament  we  never  make,  we  receive  it ;  but  free  will 
is  its  mistress,  and,  when  the  heart  is  alert,  temperament  never 
slips  control. 

Our  habits  we  make  for  ourselves,  they  are  the  growth  of 
scattered  acts ;  and  we  form  habits  with  our  eyes  wide  open  to 
the  process  and  its  consequences.  Habits  are  even  less  a 
mystery  than  temperament.  They  are  facilities  along  certain 
lines  due  to  the  frequent  repetition  of  separate  and  distinct 
acts.  Nobody  knows  with  certainty  the  exact  number  of  times 
an  act  has  to  be  repeated  to  form  a  habit ;  but  everybody  is 
agreed  that  a  habit  of  music,  for  instance,  is  out  of  the  ques- 
tion without  days,  and  weeks,  and  years  of  practice.  And 
what  is  true  of  music  is  true  of  painting,  oratory,  honesty, 
veracity,  all  the  arts  and  all  the  virtues,  our  moral  as  well  as 
our  physical  activities.  Even  walking  is  a  habit ;  and,  though 
men  and  women  pass  from  point  to  point  in  space  with  small 
reflection  and  less  endeavor,  it  would  pay  the  philosopher  to 
know  what  mental  exertion  it  costs  baby  to  master  this  simple 
habit. 

But  what  we  would  most  of  all  insist  on,  is  the  circum- 
stance that  our  habits  are  distinctively  home-products.  We 
make  them,  we  never  receive  them ;  and  we  are  entirely  and 
utterly  responsible  for  the  part  they  play  in  our  lives.  Even 
when  habits  are  once  formed,  our  wills  are  free,  and  quite 
able  to  resist  them;  and,  before  they  are  formed,  our  wills 
are  absolute,  and  supreme,  and  omnipotent  lords  of  the  sep- 
arate and  distinct  acts  that  originate  them.  Hence,  nobody 
can  hide  behind  habit  for  excuse.  The  criminal  who  is  such 
from  habit,  is  even  more  blameworthy  than  the  criminal  such 
by  surprise.  Habitual  crime  is  the  growth  of  misspent  years, 
and  betokens  an  accumulation  of  shame.  Wrong  not  rooted 
in  habit  may  result  from  defective  vigilance,  want  of  experi- 
ence, overwhelming  temptation;  and  the  law  is  more  lenient 
with  first  offenders  than  with  veterans  in  vice. 

Though  not  omnipotent,  habit  is  a  mighty  factor  in  the 


124  GENEEAL  ETHICS 

formation  of  character  and  consequent  conduct;  and,  there- 
fore, our  habits  call  for  supremest  care.  Education  is  little 
worth,  unless  it  contributes  to  the  formation  of  mental  and 
moral  habits  bej^ond  reproach.  Family  is  a  wasted  blessing, 
unless  boys  and  girls  come  out  of  it  better  prepared  for  the 
battle  of  life.  Government  is  a  curse,  unless  its  representa- 
tives are  a  perpetual  incentive  to  the  mental  and  moral  uplift 
of  its  citizens.  Church  itself  and  religion  are  of  little  use, 
unless  their  professing  members  are  bettered  by  contact  with 
their  aspirations  and  ideals.  An  ideal  father  and  an  ideal 
mother  are  mortals,  whose  behavior  uniformly  provokes  chil- 
dren to  the  cultivation  of  every  virtue,  domestic,  civic  and 
religious.  The  education  that  ministers  merely  to  the  mind, 
with  little  or  no  concern  for  the  heart,  is  as  empty  as  a  game 
of  hazard,  and  bound  to  work  equal  harm  to  familj^,  state 
and  Church.  Our  years  at  school  are  the  critical  period  in 
our  lives.  Men  and  women  are  made  and  unmade  during 
this  all-important  season^  and,  if  we  leave  school  with  wrong 
habits,  we  are  in  imminent  danger  of  ultimate  loss,  and 
strenuous  endeavor  becomes  the  price  of  salvation. 

Therefore,  we  ought  to  be  supremely  solicitous  about  the 
quality  of  our  habits,  and  we  ought  to  take  serious  thought 
of  our  equipment  in  habits.  Measures  must  be  taken  to 
break  with  undesirable  habits,  and  precautions  must  be  em- 
ployed to  strengthen  and  multiply  right  tendencies  in  our 
character.  We  must  encourage  the  good  in  us,  keep  down  the 
evil;  and  the  whole  process  is  summed  up  in  the  one  word, 
control.  Nothing  so  develops  character  as  self-control.  Good 
habits  result  from  repeated  acts  of  virtue,  bad  habits  are 
broken  by  repeated  victories  over  temptation  to  wrong;  and 
control  is  fully  equal  to  the  double  task.  It  is  a  two-edged 
sword,  it  cuts  both  ways.  Man,  as  now  constituted,  is  in- 
clined to  evil  from  his  youth;  he  leans  towards  vice  and 
away  from  virtue;  he  is  swift  to  one,  slow  to  the  other;  and 
self-control,  while  it  keeps  him  from  slaving  to  base  instincts, 
urges  him  to  develop  the  better  side  of  his  character.  With- 
out an  abiding  habit  of  self-control,  success  in  life  is  abso- 
lutely out  of  the  question.  Without  it,  you  cannot  hope  for 
Heaven;  without  it,  you  cannot  reasonably  expect  to  escape 
hell.     Self-control  is  what  makes  men  temperate,  pure  and 


SELF-CONTROL  125 

honest ;  want  of  this  quality  is  responsible  for  the  drunkards, 
the  libertines  and  the  thieves  that  infest  our  large  and  small 
cities.  No  one  agency  that  I  know  is  more  conducive  to  the 
cultivation  of  self-restraint  than  family-discipline,  school- 
discipline  and  the  discipline  of  government  or  society.  Every 
time  a  boy  obeys  his  parents  at  home,  he  is  adding  a  new 
asset  to  his  worth  as  a  man.  Every  time  he  breaks  off  play 
at  the  sound  of  the  bell,  he  is  laying  deep  and  strong  the 
broad  foundation  for  the  towering  edifice  of  a  splendid  career. 
These  instances  of  self-control  are  but  the  small  and  humble 
beginnings  of  future  greatness ;  and,  if  the  habit  accompanies 
the  boy  into  the  world  of  industry,  politics  and  business,  he 
will  as  a  rule  be  soon  discovered,  he  will  prove  a  winner,  and 
the  world  will  love  him,  the  world  will  load  him  with  the 
highest  honors  at  its  disposal. 

Self-control,  then,  is  the  readiest  measure  of  a  man's  char- 
acter, and  this  sober  truth  deserves  a  large  place  in  your 
thoughts.  It  is  the  one  bit  of  advice  I  would  impress  on  your 
hearts.  "Whatever  books  you  read  or  study  in  after-life,  read 
and  study  them  with  a  view  to  growth  in  self-control.  Cul- 
tivate a  close  acquaintance  with  the  sturdy  heroes  of  ancient 
and  modern  times,  men  of  stout  character,  able  to  encounter 
and  overcome  hardships  in  their  campaign  for  the  right. 
Have  nothing  but  contempt  for  the  mean  specimens  of  hu- 
manity, glorified  in  the  modern  novel  and  the  morning  news- 
paper, men  and  women  that  weak  they  cannot  withstand 
temptation,  men  and  women  at  the  mercy  of  every  vile  de- 
sire that  stirs  in  their  bosoms.  Have  high  ideals,  live  always 
a  little  superior  to  your  environment,  and  never  strike  your 
colors  to  degraded  public  opinion.  Know  the  right,  and  do 
it.  Choose  your  friends  with  care,  be  citizens  in  the  republic 
of  saints,  and  keep  company  with  heroes.  To  achieve  great- 
ness, is  an  arduous  task,  we  need  every  little  help;  and  the 
example  of  the  illustrious  is  a  tonic  for  activity  in  the  up- 
ward process.  Scorn  to  borrow  your  religion  or  morality 
from  the  world.  The  Church  is  their  appointed  teacher,  and 
to  look  elsewhere  for  guidance  is  like  drawing  water  in  a 
sieve,  or  planting  pumpkins  for  a  harvest  of  roses.  Be  men 
of  principle.  Be  the  hero  described  by  Horace.  If  the  world 
falls  in  ruins  at  your  feet,  present  a  bold  front  to  the  crash. 


126 


GENERAL  ETHICS 


Map  out  your  lives  along  a  line  of  conduct  approved  of  by- 
faith  and  reason,  and  then,  whatever  happens,  keep  your 
course  undaunted.  You  may  fail  of  success,  as  the  term 
goes;  you  cannot  fail  of  honor;  and  to  go  down  to  defeat 
with  right,  is  better  than  to  be  crowned  a  winner  with  wrong. 


THESIS  X 

RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES 

Jouin,  71-75;  Bickahy,  244-253. 

Rights  are  meant  by  nature  to  shield  men  from  harm  in 
their  intercourse  with  others,  and  they  accomplish  this  pur- 
pose by  creating  duties  in  others.  They  procure  the  same 
advantage  for  God,  and  prevent  men  from  wronging  their 
Creator.  Right  equips  its  owner  with  the  moral  power  to 
do  or  exact  something,  duty  compels  its  subject  to  render 
another  his  due.  Right  has  at  least  three  meanings,  justice, 
law,  moral  power.  Because  right  is  opposed  to  wrong  or  in- 
justice, right  itself  is  justice  or  the  just  thing ;  and,  because 
justice  is  a  man's  due,  discharge  of  duty  is  the  consumma- 
tion of  justice.  Right  is  a  man's  due,  duty  is  respect  for 
another's  rights;  and,  therefore,  any  refusal  to  fulfil  a  duty 
is  an  injustice  or  wrong.  Because  the  essential  purpose  of 
all  law  is  the  establishment  of  justice,  law  itself  has  a  claim 
to  the  title,  right.  In  fact  law,  when  couched  in  language, 
is  but  the  concrete  expression  of  a  right;  and  this  is  true  of 
every  single  law,  of  every  collection  of  laws,  and  of  whatever 
law  borrows  part  of  its  compelling  force  from  sources  ex- 
traneous to  the  subject  affected  by  the  law.  Civil  law  is 
largely  a  collection  of  rights  the  state  undertakes  to  safe- 
guard; canon  law  discharges  the  same  function  in  matters 
ecclesiastical ;  and  a  law  against  burglary,  with  imprisonment 
for  penalty,  is  concerned  with  a  man's  right  to  his  property. 
Last  of  all,  and  in  strict  sense,  right,  viewed  in  its  owner  or 
possessor,  is  the  moral  and  legitimate  power  to  do  something 
oneself,  or  exact  its  doing  from  another;  the  moral  power  to 
demand  something,  to  hold  something,  or  to  use  something 
as  one's  own.  We  have  thus  far  taken  three  views  of  right. 
Viewed  as  justice  or  the  right  thing,  it  is  a  something  to  be 

127 


128  GENERAL  ETHICS 

rendered  by  another.  Viewed  as  law,  it  is  a  something  out- 
side the  owner  and  compelling  others.  Viewed  as  a  moral 
power,  it  is  a  something  in  the  owner ;  and  from  this  circum- 
stance right  has  all  its  practical  value  and  worth. 

Right  primarily  means  justice.  Law  is  called  right,  be- 
cause it  is  an  expression  of  justice.  The  moral  power  to  do 
or  exact  something  is  called  right,  because  justice  vindicates 
to  everybody  his  due.  Suarez  calls  law  preceptive  right;  the 
moral-power,  dominion-right.  A  right,  therefore,  is  man's 
moral  power  over  what  is  due  him.  Duty  is  not  a  power,  but 
an  obligation.  Right  means,  I  can ;  duty  means,  I  ought.  A 
right  is  called  a  moral  power  to  distinguish  it  from  might, 
which  is  physical  power.  Right  touches  only  what  is  due 
the  man,  because  justice  is  its  foundation,  and  justice  gives 
to  everybody  only  his  due,  only  what  belongs  to  him.  A  thing 
is  said  to  belong  to  a  person,  when  the  objective  order  of 
things  makes  it  his,  when  between  him  and  it  a  necessary  re- 
lationship of  connection  ensues.  This  connection  is  physical 
and  substantial  in  the  case  of  a  man  and  his  life,  a  man  and 
parts  of  his  body;  it  is  physical  and  accidental  in  the  case 
of  health,  knowledge  and  the  like ;  it  is  moral,  when  between 
the  man  and  things  external  to  him,  like  money,  land,  repu- 
tation, esteem,  glory  or  fame. 

A  right  would  be  little  worth  unless  it  created  a  duty  in 
others.  A  right  is,  therefore,  a  relation,  with  its  subject,  title 
and  term.  The  subject  is  owner,  the  title  is  whatever  fact 
creates  connection  between  the  owner  and  the  thing  he  owns, 
and  the  term  is  the  subject-matter  of  the  right,  as  well  as  the 
person  in  whom  the  corresponding  duty  resides.  Holland 
distinguishes  in  every  right  a  person  of  inherence,  a  person 
of  incidence,  a  thing  and  a  fact.  He  omits  title,  and  makes 
fact  mean  the  peculiar  use  of  the  thing  or  matter  conferred 
on  the  owner  by  the  right.  God  has  no  duties  strictly  so 
called,  because  duty  taken  that  way,  connotes  a  superior. 
Therefore,  as  between  right  and  duty,  right  comes  first.  In 
the  case  of  men,  right  in  the  person  of  inherence  causes  duty 
in  the  person  of  incidence;  and,  therefore,  right  precedes 
duty  in  the  order  of  nature,  though  as  regards  the  order  of 
time  both  are  simultaneous.  Duty  in  the  person  of  inherence 
always  causes  right  in  the  same;  and,  therefore,  restricting 


3 


RIGHT  AND  MIGHT  129 

the  question  to  the  person  of  inherence,  duty  always  pre- 
cedes right  in  the  order  of  nature. 

Right  is  reducible  to  justice ;  and,  because  justice  is  three- 
fold, commutative,  legal,  distributive,  rights  are  of  three 
kinds  with  distinctively  peculiar  purposes.  In  commutative 
justice,  the  purpose  of  right  is  liberty  and  independence  in 
the  disposal  of  one's  goods.  In  legal  justice,  the  purpose  of 
right  is  the  common  welfare.  In  distributive  justice,  it  is  to 
safeguard  the  citizen  against  state-wrongs.  A  right  in  com- 
mutative justice  can  be  surrendered,  because  no  law  forbids 
a  man  to  submit  to  private  wrong.  Hence  the  axioms,  "No 
harm  is  done  a  willing  victim,"  and  ''Nobody  is  obliged  to 
use  his  rights."  In  legal  justice  the  ruler  cannot  legitimately 
cede  his  right,  because  laws  are  made  and  executed  not  for 
the  ruler's  advantage,  but  for  the  welfare  of  citizens.  Hence 
the  ruler  is  obliged  to  use  his  right. 

Right  connotes  the  moral  power  to  employ  physical  force 
in  its  realization,  because  order  demands  that  the  inferior, 
or  physical  force  be  always  at  the  call  of  the  superior,  or 
moral  power.  In  society,  to  guard  against  abuses,  the  ap- 
plication of  this  physical  force  is  reserved  to  the  state,  and 
is  not  left  to  the  caprice  of  individuals.  Physical  compulsion, 
in  potency  or  in  act,  is  not  of  the  essence  of  a  right,  it  is  a 
complementary  property.  Rights  persevere  in  the  absence 
of  physical  compulsion.  No  citizen  is  allowed  to  urge  his 
rights  against  the  state  with  the  help  of  physical  force,  though 
the  state  enjoys  this  prerogative  as  against  a  citizen.  Right 
order  demands  as  much.  In  commutative  justice,  where  help 
from  the  state  is  beyond  reach,  one  citizen  is  allowed  to  use 
force  against  another,  when  his  rights  are  endangered.  Other- 
wise wrong  would  be  without  remedy. 

When  talking  about  good  and  bad  acts,  we  contended  and 
proved  that  some  acts  are  intrinsically  and  essentially  good 
or  bad ;  that  they  get  their  goodness  or  badness  from  nothing 
outside  of  themselves,  like  law,  or  custom,  or  opinion;  and 
that  they  are  good  or  bad  always,  everywhere  and  in  what- 
ever circumstances.  Moral  Positivism  is  opposed  to  our  doc- 
trine, and  maintains  that  nothing  is  good  or  bad  in  itself  and 
unchangeably,  but  that  good  and  bad  acts  are  made  such  by 
something  outside  of,  and  extraneous  to  the  acts  themselves. 


130 


GENEKAL  ETHICS 


Hohhes  ascribes  all  the  difference  to  civil  law;  Lambert,  to 
custom  and  public  opinion;  Mandeville,  to  the  research  of 
eminent  scholars;  Nietzsche,  to  pity  for  the  weak;  Descartes 
and  Puffendorf,  to  the  will  of  God ;  Darwinists  and  Positivists 
in  general,  to  evolution. 

Because  rights  are  but  prescriptions  of  justice,  naturally 
enough  they  get  the  same  treatment  as  good  and  bad  acts,  at 
the  hands  of  these  enemies  to  morality.  Their  sytsem  is 
called  Juridical  Positivism;  and,  in  a  very  few  words,  while 
refusing  independent  validity  to  natural  rights,  it  vindicates 
validity  to  only  whatever  rights  are  declared  such  by  vested 
authority.  All  Moral  Positivists  belong  to  this  school,  along 
with  men  like  Hobbes,  Bentley,  Lasson,  Hartmann,  who  make 
the  state  sole  and  single  cause  of  all  rights.  Rousseau  and 
his  followers  ascribe  right  to  tacit  or  expressed  agreement 
among  men.  Savigny,  the  founder  of  the  historical  school, 
refers  everything  to  history,  public  law,  and  a  people's  cus- 
toms. According  to  him  natural  rights  are  no  rights  at  all, 
but  only  rules  and  standards  for  the  establishment  of  rights. 
With  him  rights  begin  and  grow  in  much  the  same  way  as  a 
people's  language. 

Against  all  such  false  philosophers  we  contend  for  a  defi- 
nite collection  of  natural  rights,  vested  with  a  validity  inde- 
pendent of  all  positive  law.  Life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of 
happiness  are  three  such  rights,  enumerated  and  acknowledged 
by  our  Constitution.  These  rights  and  a  multitude  of  others 
descend  to  man  from  his  Creator,  and  positive  law  has  noth- 
ing to  do  with  their  creation  or  production.  Its  whole  busi- 
ness is  to  safeguard  these  rights,  by  hemming  them  round 
with  the  physical  force  at  its  abundant  disposal.  Bight  is 
reducible  to  justice,  justice  gives  everybody  his  due,  gives 
everybody  what  belongs  to  him ;  and  life  is  ours  not  by  favor 
of  the  state,  but  by  the  free  gift  of  God.  The  state  has  its 
right  to  make  laws  and  insist  on  their  observance,  not  from 
consent,  or  agreement,  or  history;  but  from  God,  who  gave 
being  to  the  state,  and  equipped  it  with  all  the  means  it  needs 
to  fulfil  its  purpose.  God  never  imposed  a  duty  on  anybody, 
without  investing  him  with  a  right  to  all  needed  means.  He 
has  imposed  a  multitude  of  duties  on  men ;  and,  just  as  these 
duties  bind  men  without  reference  to  positive  law,  so  the 


JURIDICAL  POSITIVISM  131 

rights  attaching  to  them  are  quite  independent  of  human 
legislation  and  authority.  Positive  law,  without  prior  nat- 
ural law,  is  a  house  without  a  foundation.  Kings  could  make 
laws  till  doomsday  without  any  appreciable  effect,  beyond 
physical  force,  unless  natural  law  held  subjects  to  reverence 
for  authority,  and  obedience  to  legitimate  rulers.  Agreements 
and  compacts  would  be  empty  scraps  of  paper,  if  fidelity  to 
promises  were  not  a  prescription  of  the  natural  law.  No  in- 
ternational law  would  be  possible,  because  there  would  be  no 
competent  legislator.  Every  civil  law  and  every  custom  would 
be  by  the  very  fact  just,  law  could  make  murder  right,  cus- 
tom could  make  impurity  a  virtue. 

And  just  as  every  positive  law  borrows  all  its  efficacy  from 
prior  natural  law,  even  so  every  positive  right  borrows  all 
its  strength  and  force  from  prior  natural  right.  Positive  law 
is  an  application  of  natural  law,  it  makes  natural  law  clearer, 
it  adds  to  the  moral  sense  of  obligation  and  future  sanction, 
attaching  to  natural  law,,  the  physical  sense  of  present  pen- 
alty in  the  shape  of  fine  or  imprisonment,  attaching  to  every 
positive  law  enacted.  When  Kant  distinguishes  between  ju- 
ridical rights  and  ethical  rights,  when  he  separates  the  jurid- 
ical order  from  the  ethical  order,  he  forgets  that  ethical  rights, 
as  compared  with  juridical  rights,  are  the  same  as  natural 
law,  as  compared  with  positive  law.  When  he  attributes 
greater  efficacy  and  sacredness  to  juridical  rights  than  he  at- 
tributes to  ethical  rights,  he  is  virtually  declaring  positive  law 
superior  to  natural  law,  man  superior  to  God;  he  is  putting 
tlie  cart  before  the  horse,  subordinating  cause  to  effect,  attach- 
ing more  importance  to  the  roof  than  to  the  foundation.  Na- 
ture confers  ethical,  or  natural  rights;  law  confers  juridical 
rights.  Ethical  or  natural  rights  are  unchangeable  at  the 
hands  of  men,  they  do  allegiance  to  God  alone,  and  God  is 
their  single  executive.  Juridical  rights  are  open  to  change 
with  change  of  legislators,  and  are  in  force  only  as  long  as  the 
laws  creating  them  remain  on  the  statute-books.  Law  is  law, 
only  when  based  on  justice ;  and  juridical  rights,  opposed  to 
ethical  rights,  are  no  rights  at  all.  Juridical  order  is,  there- 
fore, only  an  integral  part  of  moral  or  ethical  order,  and 
no  more  separable  from  the  same  than  the  head  is  from  the 
man.     The  head  cannot  be  separated  from  the  man,  without 


132  GENERAL  ETHICS 

changing  its  entire  complexion  and  substance.  Juridical  or- 
der, separated  from  ethical  order,  ceases  altogether  to  be  moral 
order;  and  rights  conferred  by  law,  in  opposition  to  rights 
conferred  by  nature,  are  no  rights  at  all. 

God  the  author  of  nature  seems  destined  to  get  small  notice 
and  smaller  reverence  from  present-day  writers  on  Ethics, 
thanks  to  the  atheistic  and  irreligious  trend  of  our  times. 
And  natural  law,  which  has  God  for  its  maker,  meets  with  the 
same  full  measure  of  contempt.  One  writer  on  Jurisprudence, 
Holland  by  name,  wants  law  in  strict  sense  limited  to  human 
positive  or  civil  law;  barring  from  the  title  natural  law,  di- 
vine positive  law  in  Scripture,  and  Church  law.  He  bars 
natural  law,  because  it  is  formulated  by  an  indeterminate 
authority;  Scriptural  law,  because  it  is  formulated  by  a  su- 
perhuman authority ;  Church  law,  because  it  is  formulated  by 
a  politically  subordinate  authority.  All  this  is  purely  arbi- 
trary, and  betrays  the  man's  atheistic  tendencies.  We  grant 
that  law  in  strict  sense  cannot  be  formulated  by  an  indetermi- 
nate authority,  but  God  in  nature,  God  in  Scripture,  and 
Church,  are  no  indeterminate  authority,  unless  we  want  to 
turn  atheists  and  infidels.  Natural  law  and  Scriptural  law 
are  divine  law,  divine  law  is  as  much  law  as  civil  law,  God 
is  its  formulating  authority,  God  is  no  indeterminate  being, 
and  only  atheists  and  infidels  can  think  the  thing.  Church 
law  is  as  much  law  as  civil  law,  the  true  Church  is  no  inde- 
terminate authority;  and,  whatever  may  be  said  of  other 
churches,  the  true  or  Catholic  Church  is  in  its  own  sphere 
quite  independent  of  the  state,  and  it  never  presumes  to  legis- 
late outside  its  own  sphere.  True,  God  is  a  superhuman  au- 
thority; but  even  civil  law,  without  superhuman  authority 
at  its  back,  is  a  dead  letter  and  nothing  worth.  No  mere  man 
has  a  right  to  legislate  for  other  men.  All  men  are  born  free 
and  equal,  nobody  is  born  a  king;  and  the  authority  he  gets 
immediately  from  God  is  what  makes  the  ruler's  pronounce- 
ments law.  Without  this  authority,  his  pronouncements  are 
empty  words,  and  of  no  more  worth  than  mine  or  yours. 
Therefore,  God  must  not  be  denied  the  quality  of  lawmaker, 
simply  because  He  is  a  superhuman  authority.  Therefore 
God's  law,  whether  natural  or  Scriptural,  is  more  law  than 
civil  law. 


HOLLAND,  KANT  AND  POSITIVISM  133 

What  Mr.  Holland,  perhaps,  means  is  that  God  and  the 
Church  are  less  visible  and  less  tangible  than  the  state.  But 
that  is  his  own  view  of  the  thing.  To  the  religious  mind,  and 
the  man  of  faith,  God  and  the  Church  are  more  solemn  reali- 
ties than  the  state.  With  Thomasius,  Holland  wants  us  to 
keep  our  sickles  out  of  theology,  forgetting  that  natural  theol- 
ogy is  as  much  philosophy  as  logic  or  psychology  or  Ethics, 
and  that  no  part  of  philosophy,  which  is  knowledge  of  things 
in  their  last  cause,  can  be  rightly  understood  without  a  fair 
knowledge  of  God,  the  first  and  last  cause  of  all  things.  To 
doubt  the  propriety  of  conceiving  God  as  a  lawmaker,  as  Mr. 
Holland  ventures  to  do,  is  not  to  keep  one's  sickle  out  of 
theology,  but  to  assail  all  theology  and  all  religion  with  an 
axe.  God  is  more  than  a  mere  information-bureau,  equally 
well  satisfied  whether  His  children  accept  His  doctrine  or  not. 
He  teaches  with  authority,  and  He  wants  His  lessons  learned ; 
He  is  eminently  a  lawmaker,  and  sanctions  His  legislation  with 
hell.  He  is  a  Father  of  too  wise  a  kind  to  allow  His  sons  to 
go  what  way  they  will.  He  wants  their  full  obedience ;  and, 
if  they  refuse  it,  they  know  what  to  expect.  And  all  this  is 
clear  from  Natural  Theology,  without  any  appeal  whatever  to 
Supernatural  Theology  or  revelation.  Law  in  strict  sense  is 
an  obligation  or  ruling  founded  on  right  reason,  drawn  up 
and  promulgated  for  the  common  good  by  him  who  has  charge 
of  the  community  affected ;  and  this  definition  is  as  fully  veri- 
fied in  natural.  Scriptural  and  Church  law  as  it  is  in  civil 
law.  Natural  law  is  from  eternity;  positive  law,  whether  di- 
vine or  human,  is  made  or  placed  in  time. 

Holland  is  imitating  Kant  when  he  makes  a  difference  be- 
tween Ethics  and  Nomology.  Ethics,  he  says,  touches  the  will, 
the  interior  act,  and  it  is  a  matter  of  conscience;  Nomology 
touches  the  outward  act,  exterior  conduct.  Civil  law  belongs 
to  Nomology,  and  it  cannot  fathom  a  man's  thoughts  or  in- 
tentions with  any  degree  of  certainty,  and  very  sensibly  leaves 
them  alone.  It  agrees  to  interpret  them  with  the  help  of 
external  acts.  Divine  law  has  God  for  author,  and  men's 
thoughts  as  well  as  their  intentions  are  no  mystery  to  God. 
Juridical  legality  is  a  different  thing  from  Ethical  morality. 
An  act  can  be  all  right  in  the  eyes  of  the  law,  and  all  wrong 
in  the  eyes  of  conscience.     Civil  law  makes  only  indifferent 


134  GENERAL  ETHICS 

acts  good  or  bad,  it  leaves  other  acts  where  it  finds  them,  and 
makes  them  merely  legal.  Ethics  makes  an  act  morally  good 
or  bad,  prior  to  and  independent  of  all  civil  law ;  and  this  is 
the  big  difference  between  natural  law  and  positive  law. 

The  ethical  order  must  not  be  separated  from  the  juridical 
order,  because  the  latter  is  an  integral  part  of  the  former. 
Ethical  order  is  like  the  whole  man,  juridical  order  is  like 
his  head.  Natural  law  prescribes  civil  law  as  a  necessary 
requisite  for  the  welfare  of  the  state,  and  therefore  all  civil 
or  positive  law  is  but  an  emanation  from  natural  law.  The 
juridical  order  is  right,  taken  as  positive  law;  and  all  posi- 
tive law  is  a  derivation  from  natural  law,  which  in  turn  is 
right  in  the  ethical  order.  When  Kant  separates  the  jurid- 
ical order  from  the  ethical  or  moral  order,  when  he  ascribes 
all  the  force  and  efficacy  of  juridical  rights  to  positive  law, 
without  any  reference  whatever  to  natural  law,  he  virtually 
reduces  all  right  to  preceptive,  and  rejects  dominion-right. 
Preceptive  right  is  a  prescription  of  positive  law ;  and,  without 
the  support  of  natural  law,  positive  law  has  no  binding  force. 
Dominion-right  is  a  prescription  of  the  natural  law,  and  nat- 
ural law  binds,  whether  positive  law  supports  it  or  not. 

Kant  denies  all  ethical  or  moral  right,  to  admit  only  jurid- 
ical right;  and,  therefore,  he  denies  dominion-right  to  admit 
only  preceptive  right.  It  is  wrong  to  say  that  laws  urged  by 
civil  authority  are  not  in  themselves  binding  on  conscience. 
Civil  law  looks  to  the  external  act,  without  a  care  for  the 
motive;  natural  law  looks  to  external  act  and  motive  both. 
No  matter  what  his  motive,  civil  law  certainly  binds  the  man 
in  conscience  to  put  the  prescribed  external  act.  Penal  laws 
exert  no  strain  on  conscience  beyond  the  acceptance  of  the 
penalty  incurred;  but  that  is  due  to  the  mercy  of  the  law- 
maker, and  a  matter  of  common  understanding  between  ruler 
and  subjects.  Obligation  to  the  law  is  no  product  of  the 
man  himself,  it  is  imposed  on  him  by  another,  and  proceeds 
from  the  natural  law  and  its  author,  God.  Therefore,  every 
illegal  act  is  wrong;  and  yet  not  every  legal  act  is  right,  be- 
cause the  juridical  order  is  only  a  part  of  the  ethical  or  moral 
order,  and  not  the  whole  of  it.  A  man's  head  can  be  sound, 
while  the  rest  of  his  body  is  unhealthy. 

Right  as  law  is  preceptive  right,  right  as  a  moral  power 


DIVISION  OF  RIGHTS  '  135 

is  dominion-right;  and  the  two  admit  of  many  divisions. 
Law  is  private,  public,  international.  Law  is  private,  when 
the  two  parties  to  the  action  are  citizens,  and  the  state  is 
arbiter;  public,  when  the  state  has  action  against  the  citizen 
or  the  citizen  against  the  state,  the  state  in  both  cases  being 
arbiter ;  international,  when  the  parties  to  the  action  are  two 
independent  states,  and  the  world  is  arbiter.  Private  law  is 
substantive  and  adjective,  normal  and  abnormal,  antecedent 
and  remedial,  in  rem  and  in  personam.  Private  law  is  be- 
tween citizen  and  citizen.  Substantive  law  defines  the  rights 
of  individuals,  adjective  law  indicates  the  process  of  their  en- 
forcement. Normal  law  is  for  persons  of  ordinary  type,  ab- 
normal is  for  deviations  from  ordinary  type.  Antecedent  law 
is  for  cases  before  wrong  has  been  committed,  remedial  is  for 
cases  after  wrong  has  been  committed.  Law  in  rem  is  against 
the  world,  law  in  personam  is  against  some  definite  individual. 
The  six  normal  antecedent  rights  in  rem  are,  1,  right  to  per- 
sonal safety  and  liberty;  2,  right  to  society  and  control  of 
family;  3,  right  to  good  name;  4,  right  to  advantages  of  life 
in  community  and  free  exercise  of  profession;  5,  right  to 
property;  6,  right  against  fraud  and  deceit.  The  first  of  the 
six  secures  owner  against  threats,  assault,  wounds,  imprison- 
ment, dangerous  things  and  dangerous  places.  The  second 
secures  owner  marital  rights  of  husband  over  wife,  parental 
rights  of  father  over  child,  tutelary  rights  of  guardian  over 
ward,  dominical  rights  of  master  over  servant.  The  third 
secures  owner  against  libel  and  such  like  injury.  The  fourth 
secures  owner  a  livelihood,  use  of  harbors  and  rivers,  free- 
dom from  malicious  prosecution.  The  fifth  secures  owner  in 
his  possessions.  The  sixth  secures  owner  against  damage 
accruing  from  fraud  and  deceit.  The  two  normal  antecedent 
rights  in  personam  are  quasi-contract  and  contract.  Quasi- 
contract  embraces  these  four  headings,  domestic,  fiduciary, 
meritorious,  officious.  Domestic  means  one  member  of  the 
family  against  another  member.  Fiduciary  means  trusts, 
matters  of  confidence,  executors.  Meritorious  means  right  to 
indemnity  for  services  rendered.  Officious  means  use  of  pub- 
lic officials  like  postmen.  Contracts  are  principal  and  acces- 
sory. Principal  contracts  imply  no  ulterior  object,  accessory 
imply  security  for  another  contract.     Principal  contracts  are 


136 


GENERAL  ETHICS 


six,  alienation,  permissive  use,  marriage,  service,  negative 
service,  aleatory  gain.  Accessory  contracts  are  seven  in  num- 
ber, suretyship,  indemnity,  pledge,  warranty,  ratification,  ac- 
count stated,  for  further  assurance.  Remedial  law  deals  with 
offenses  against  rights  in  rem  and  in  personam.  Abnormal 
law  is  for  deviations  from  ordinary  type.  Adjective  law  is 
opposed  to  substantive.  Substantive  creates  rights,  adjective 
enforces  them.    Adjective  law  is  procedure. 


THESIS  XI 

CONTRACTS 
Jouin,  140-154;  Eickdhy,  253-255. 

The  jurisprudence  of  contracts  is  a  large  question,  and 
cannot  obviously  be  treated  here  in  detail.  We  are  studying 
ethics,  not  law ;  and  we  necessarily  restrict  ourselves  to  what 
natural  law  has  to  say  on  the  subject,  leaving  the  question 
of  positive  or  civil  law  in  its  bearing  on  contracts  to  the 
school  of  law.  A  contract  is  an  agreement  and  consent  be- 
tween several  persons  regarding  some  set  object.  A  one-sided 
or  unilateral  contract  is  in  itself  a  mere  promise ;  and,  because 
of  its  nature  it  obliges  or  binds  only  one  of  the  two  parties 
to  the  transaction,  hardly  deserves  the  name.  Its  fulfilment 
is  regularly  a  matter  of  fidelity  to  one's  word,  not  a  matter 
of  justice.  When,  however,  it  raises  the  hopes  of  the  prom- 
isee, and  induces  him  to  incur  expense,  it  assumes  the  pro- 
portions of  a  two-sided  contract,  and  involves  strict  justice. 
Justice  likewise  intervenes  when  the  promiser  means  to  bind 
himself  in  justice.  Contract  in  strict  sense  creates  a  mutual 
obligation  between  two  or  more;  and,  therefore,  only  two- 
sided  or  bilateral  contracts  deserve  the  name  in  its  completest 
significance.  A  contract  creates  rights  and  duties  in  both 
parties  to  the  transaction.  Take,  for  example,  the  common- 
est form  of  contract,  that  of  buying  and  selling.  The  buyer 
assumes  the  duty  of  paying  the  price,  and  is  invested  with  the 
right  to  receive  the  goods  purchased.  The  seller  assumes  the 
duty  of  delivering  the  purchase,  and  is  vested  with  the  right 
to  receive  the  price.  The  two  persons  are  the  efficient  cause 
of  the  contract,  the  set  object  is  its  material  cause,  consent 
and  agreement  are  its  formal  cause ;  and  all  three  causes  must 
fulfil  certain  conditions.  The  persons  must  be  fit  agents, 
they  must  enjoy  the  use  of  reason,  and  they  must  have  full 
and  free  dominion  over  what  they  dispose  of  in  the  contract. 

137 


138  GENERAL  ETHICS 

Natural  law  is  sponsor  for  these  two  conditions.  A  contract 
means  free  consent,  and  that  demands  the  use  of  reason.  A 
contract  is  a  function  of  ownership,  and  nobody  gives  but 
what  he  first  possesses. 

Civil  law  can  for  the  common  good  prescribe  other  condi- 
tions, and  their  discussion  belongs  to  the  school  of  law.  The 
matter  of  the  contract  must  be  possible,  morally  as  well  as 
physically;  and,  for  obvious  reasons,  it  must  be  legitimate. 
The  consent  given  must  be  of  such  a  nature  that  it  really  and 
truly  creates  an  obligation.  In  other  words,  it  must  be  true 
internal  consent  as  well  as  external,  and  it  must  be  entirely 
free.  Natural  law  stands  for  the  invalidity  of  feigned  con- 
tracts, empty  ceremonies  without  any  intention  to  form  a  con- 
tract or  assume  an  obligation,  because  natural  law's  avenger, 
or  God,  sees  the  heart  as  well  as  external  facts.  Civil  law, 
because  its  maker's  vision  is  restricted  to  external  facts,  counts 
valid  every  such  feigned  contract.  It  argues  that  the  deceiver 
has  violated  another's  rights,  and  must  indemnify  him  even 
to  the  extent  of  putting  true  internal  consent.  Besides,  the 
party  deceived  is  never  obliged  to  believe  the  deceiver,  when 
he  says  that  he  made  no  true  contract.  A  contract  made  with 
a  full  sense  of  obligation,  and  a  determination  to  never  fulfil 
it,  is  valid  even  in  natural  law. 

Freedom  is  interfered  with  by  want  of  knowledge  or  mis- 
take, by  fear  and  by  violence.  Substantial  mistake  invalidates 
a  contract,  e.g.,  wine  and  vinegar  in  a  purchase.  Accidental 
mistake,  when  responsible  for  the  transaction,  renders  gratui- 
tous contracts  invalid,  -onerous  contracts  repudiable.  Ex- 
ternal violence  invalidates  contracts.  Internal  fear,  as  long 
as  it  leaves  freedom  unimpaired,  never  invalidates.  External 
fear,  induced  unjustly  to  effect  contract,  invalidates  gratui- 
tous, makes  onerous  repudiable. 

Quasi-contracts  get  their  validity  from  law,  rather  than 
from  self-imposed  obligation.  Law  imposes  the  obligation, 
not  parties  to  the  contract.  No  contract  is  made,  law  sup- 
plies, and  deals  with  case  in  much  the  same  way  as  if  a  con- 
tract had  been  made.  Law  casts  duty  on  person  of  incidence 
without  his  agreement.  Its  four  kinds  are,  family,  trust, 
meritorious,  officious. 

Savigny  defines  a  contract,  as  the  union  of  several  in  ac- 


DIVISION  OF  CONTRACTS  139 

cordant  expression  of  will,  to  create  an  obligation  between 
them.  Hence  his  analysis  of  a  contract  into  these  four  ele- 
ments, several  parties,  agreement  of  wills,  mutual  communi- 
cation of  agreement,  intention  to  create  legal  relations.  About 
expression  of  agreement.  Pollock  says,  ''Courts  hold  men  to 
fulfilment  of  intention,  only  when  expressed  in  a  manner  that 
would  convey  to  an  indifferent  person,  reasonable  and  rea- 
sonably competent  in  the  matter  in  hand,  the  sense  in  which 
the  expression  is  relied  on  by  the  parties  claiming  satisfac- 
tion." Justice  Blackburn,  1871,  says,  "Whatever  a  man's 
real  intention,  if  he  so  conducts  himself  that  a  reasonable 
man  would  believe  he  was  assenting  to  another's  terms,  and 
that  the  other  party  agrees,  the  man  would  be  equally  bound 
as  if  he  had  intended  to  agree."  Therefore,  not  what  the 
man  intended,  not  what  the  other  party  supposed  him  to 
intend,  hut  what  a  reasonable  man,  i.e.,  judge  or  jury,  would 
put  upon  such  acts.  This  is  the  objective  theory  of  contracts. 
Holland  sees  these  six  elements  in  a  contract,  1,  several  par- 
ties; 2,  two-sided  act  expressing  agreement;  3,  matter  agreed 
upon  both  possible  and  legal;  4,  agreement  of  a  nature  to 
produce  a  legally  binding  result;  5,  such  a  result  as  affects 
the  relations  of  the  parties  to  one  another;  6,  very  generally 
a  solemn  form,  or  some  fact  affording  a  motive  for  the  agree- 
ment. A  formal  contract  observes  formalities  prescribed  by 
law,  usually  writing.  An  informal  contract  is  without  pre- 
scribed formalities,  but  is  based  on  some  fact  or  considera- 
tion. The  result  of  a  contract  is  obligation  between  parties, 
conferring  rights  on  one,  imposing  duties  on  other,  partly 
stipulated  in  agreement,  partly  implied  by  law. 

Holland  divides  contracts  into  principal  and  accessory,  and 
we  already  enumerated  them.  Under  permissive  use  he 
groups  loan  for  consumption,  loan  for  use,  and  loan  for  hire. 
In  olden  times  loan  of  money  ranked  as  loan  of  food,  and  it 
was  a  species  of  permissive  use,  the  kind  called  loan  for  con- 
sumption, as  opposed  to  the  kind  called  loan  for  use.  Inter- 
est then  fell  under  the  contract  denominated  permissive  use 
for  consumption.  Such  a  contract  calls  for  mere  return  of 
the  food  or  money  borrowed,  or  their  equivalent ;  it  is  of  its 
nature  gratuitous,  and  the  right  to  interest  depends  on  special 
agreement.     Hence  the  Church's  condemnation  of  interest  in 


140  GENERAL  ETHICS 

olden  times.  All  interest  was  considered  usury  or  excessive 
interest,  because  increment,  to  which  the  lender  was  not  en- 
titled. 

Cathrein  divides  contracts  into  gratuitous  and  onerous. 
Gratuitous  are  made  in  the  interest  of  one  party;  onerous, 
in  the  interest  of  both.  In  gratuitous  all  the  burden  is  on 
one  party,  in  onerous  both  parties  assume  burdens.  Gratui- 
tous contracts  are  promise,  gift,  loan,  deposit.  Onerous  con- 
tracts are  buying  and  selling,  letting  for  hire,  partnership, 
interest.  In  a  contract  of  buying  and  selling  two  mutually 
agree  on  merchandise  to  be  received  or  given  for  a  set  price, 
and  price  usually  means  money.  Between  value  received  and 
price  given  there  must  be  some  equality,  because  people  are 
not  supposd  to  be  making  presents,  when  assuming  onerous 
contracts.  A  thing's  value  is  fixed  in  great  measure  by  its 
perfection  or  usefulness  in  the  eyes  of  men.  We  distinguish 
between  use-value  and  exchange-value.  Use-value  is  abso- 
lute, and  depends  on  the  thing's  substantial  usefulness.  Ex- 
change-value is  relative,  and  depends  on  the  thing's  worth,  as 
compared  with  other  salable  articles.  Air,  water,  light  have 
great  use-value,  small  exchange-value.  Price  is  exchange- 
value  expressed  in  terms  of  money.  To  be  fair  and  just,  a 
thing's  price  and  its  value  ought  to  be  equal.  Prices  go  into 
legal,  natural  and  conventional.  Law  fixes  the  legal  price, 
many  circumstances  fix  the  natural  price,  mutual  agreement 
fixes  the  conventional  price.  Natural  price,  because  depend- 
ent on  circumstances,  admits  of  a  certain  latitude;  and  can 
be  high,  medium  or  low.  These  circumstances  are,  the  use- 
fulness of  an  article,  its  scarcity,  multitude  of  buyers,  abun- 
dance of  money.  It  is  quite  fair  and  proper  to  charge  a 
price  rated  just  by  common  opinion.  Where  law  and  opin- 
ion fail  to  fix  prices,  agreement  must  settle  things. 

Among  other  applications,  the  contract  of  letting  for  hire 
has  place  between  employer  and  employee.  This  species  of 
the  contract  is  peculiar,  inasmuch  as  the  energies  of  a  hu- 
man being  are  involved  in  the  transaction.  Besides  the  pay- 
ment of  just  and  fair  wages,  the  employer  must  impose  on  his 
workman  no  condition  or  burden  derogatory  to  his  dignity 
as  a  human  being.  The  workman  has  no  right  to  dispose  of 
his  energies  in  a  way  unsuited  to  his  dignity  as  a  man,  and 


EMPLOYER  AND  WORKMAN  141 

whatever  employer  compels  him  to  do  so  is  guilty  of  injus- 
tice. A  just  wage  is  a  living  wage,  and  that  means  money 
enough  to  enable  the  workman  to  live,  and  to  live  comfort- 
ably; to  procure  not  only  the  necessaries  of  life,  but  a  mod- 
erate share  of  its  luxuries.  The  workman  has  no  right  to  a 
fixed  percentage  of  his  employer's  profits,  because  he  is  not 
precisely  a  partner;  and  yet,  other  things  equal,  the  more 
an  employer  derives  from  a  workman's  labor,  the  higher  are 
the  wages  due  the  workman,  if  price  is  to  be  regulated  by  the 
usefulness  of  the  commodity  purchased.  It  is  extortion  pure 
and  simple,  to  coerce  a  workman  into  selling  his  labor  at  a 
price,  altogether  out  of  proportion  with  its  value  to  the  pur- 
chaser. And  the  immense  fortunes,  amassed  by  employers 
in  short  intervals  of  time,  quite  satisfy  me  that,  whether 
awake  to  the  fact  or  not,  most  employers  are  enriching  them- 
selves at  the  expense  of  their  workmen,  and  actually  stealing 
from  the  poor. 

Law,  public  opinion,  agreement,  unaided  by  religion,  will 
never  be  able  to  establish .  justice,  as  between  employer  and 
workman;  because  money  can  buy  labor-leaders  as  well  as 
lawmakers,  capital  can  afford  to  laugh  at  public  opinion,  and 
free  agreement  is  out  of  the  question,  when  labor  has  to 
choose  between  low  wages  and  starvation.  The  chiefest  rem- 
edy for  injustice  is  religion  and  dread  of  a  future  punish- 
ment. ''All  things  obey  money."  Eccles.  10.19.  God  is 
the  only  judge  industrial  thieves  need  to  be  absolutely  afraid 
of,  because  they  can  on  occasions  switch  human  judges  with 
money,  nearly  everybody  having  his  price;  and  the  one  way 
to  escape  fear  of  God  and  fear  of  hell,  is  to  shake  off  all 
allegiance  to  religion.  This  labor-problem,  because  of  its  bear- 
ing on  morality,  is  as  much  an  affair  of  the  Church  as  it  is 
of  the  state.  Till  this  problem  is  satisfactorily  settled,  it 
must  remain  a  menace  to  the  salvation  of  menu's  souls;  and  it 
is  the  Church's  business  to  fight  every  such  menace  to  a  fin- 
ish. All  the  world  is  her  kingdom,  workmen  and  employers 
alike  belong  to  her  jurisdiction;  they  are  children  in  her 
house,  and  like  a  good  mother  she  must  keep  down  quarrels 
in  the  family. 

And  here  is  the  plan  our  Church  proposes.  She  counsels 
employers  to  cultivate  with  enthusiasm  the  two  virtues  of 


142  GENERAL  ETHICS 

justice  and  charity;  she  counsels  workmen  to  cultivate  with 
no  smaller  enthusiasm  the  two  virtues  of  honest  content  and 
conscientious  industry.  In  the  matter  of  pay,  justice  means 
a  living  wage  for  all,  defectives  out  of  the  question,  and  for 
workmen  of  superior  ability  a  corresponding  increase.  A 
living  wage  means  money  enough  to  decently  support  the 
workman  and  his  family,  without  extraordinary  labor  on  the 
part  of  his  wife  and  young  children.  His  wife  must  care  for 
his  home,  his  young  children  must  get  an  education,  and 
strengthen  their  weak  bodies  by  play  and  exercise  for  the 
years  ahead. 

The  employer,  who  holds  his  workman  to  starvation  wages, 
is  guilty  of  injustice;  and  the  workman's  consent  to  the 
unholy  transaction  relieves  the  employer  of  no  moral  re- 
sponsibilitiy.  To  take  advantage  of  a  poor  man's  needs,  is 
to  rob  him ;  and  to  force  a  hungry  man  to  choose  a  half  loaf, 
when  a  whole  loaf  is  his  due,  differs  only  a  little  from  holding 
up  a  traveler  with  a  pistol.  The  traveler  yields  up  his  purse, 
to  escape  with  his  life ;  and  the  oppressed  workman  yields  up 
his  whole  loaf,  to  escape  from  starvation.  In  the  one  case 
it  is  the  surrender  of  the  purse  or  death;  in  the  other  it  is 
surrender  of  the  whole  loaf  or  no  bread  at  all. 

And  charity  is  an  altogether  different  virtue  from  justice. 
Justice  is  close  and  tight,  charity  is  a  stranger  to  narrow 
notions;  it  is  as  wide  as  the  sea.  Charity  is  more  than  mere 
justice;  to  coin  a  word,  it  is  super  justice.  Justice  gives 
everybody  his  due,  no  more  no  less;  and,  if  it  leans  at  all,  it 
leans  toward  severity.  Charity  leans  towards  leniency,  and 
its  donor  glories  in  his  dishonesty  towards  himself.  It  gives 
to  everybody  more  than  his  due,  in  the  matter  of  wages  as 
well  as  of  praise ;  less  than  his  due,  in  the  matter  of  penalties 
as  well  as  of  blame.  Charity,  therefore,  is  a  species  of  divine 
superjustice,  mercifully  meant  to  correct  the  shortsighted  jus- 
tice of  men. 

The  employer  is  not  absolute  owner  of  his  wealth,  when  God 
is  taken  into  account.  No  man  can,  in  the  name  of  justice 
or  of  charity,  appropriate  to  himself  a  dollar  of  the  employ- 
er's legitimate  wealth;  but  God  is  first  owner,  God  has  prior 
rights,  and  God  can  stipulate  to  what  uses  the  employer  must 
put  his  wealth.     The  rich  are  God's  almoners  to  the  poor. 


EMPLOYER  AND  WORKMAN  143 

It  is  their  sacred  and  solemn  duty  to  relieve  the  wants  of  the 
needy  with  their  superfluous  wealth,  and  to  give  their  work- 
men sometimes,  not  in  the  name  of  justice,  but  in  the  name 
of  charity,  a  little  more  than  they  earn.  When  employers 
heed  the  demands  of  justice  and  charity,  workmen  will  have 
no  cause  to  complain,  honest  content  and  conscientious  in- 
dustry will  be  as  easy  as  they  are  natural,  differences  between 
employers  and  workmen  will  disappear,  and  strife  will  be 
at  an  end. 


THESIS  XII 

INTEREST 

Jouin,  154-160;  Bickahy,  255-263. 

Loan  is  regularly  a  gratuitous  contract,  whether  loan  for 
consumption  or  loan  for  use.  Thus,  when  a  person  borrows 
a  loaf  of  bread  to  eat  it,  he  is  obliged  to  return  to  the  lender 
only  another  loaf  of  bread  of  the  same  quantity  and  quality. 
When  a  person  borrows  a  book  to  read  it,  he  is  obliged  to 
return  only  the  book.  In  olden  times,  because  money  was 
borrowed  only  for  the  purpose  of  purchasing  food  and  the 
like,  things  consumed  in  their  use,  without  producing  new 
wealth,  money-lending  was  a  purely  gratuitous  contract,  and 
all  interest  ii^as  rightly  considered  usury  or  extortion  from 
the  poor.  Hence,  St.  Thomas  and  all  Church  writers  up  to 
his  time  are  violently  opposed  to  the  interest,  considered  per- 
fectly legitimate  in  present  economic  circumstances. 

All  the  difference  is  due  to  the  different  uses  of  money  in 
their  times  and  ours.  With  them  money  was  reckoned  a  good 
consumed  in  its  use,  a  good  productive  of  no  new  wealth. 
With  us,  money  is  a  good  not  consumed  in  its  use,  a  good 
decidedly  productive  of  new  and  greater  wealth,  when  com- 
bined with  human  endeavor.  Capital  was  of  no  practical  use 
in  olden  times,  to-day  it  is  one  of  the  chief  factors  in  business 
of  whatever  sort.  Money-lending  has  passed  from  loan  to 
letting-for-hire  in  the  catalogue  of  contracts,  from  gratuitous 
to  onerous,  and  all  because  of  different  economic  conditions. 
People  now  rent  money  to  another,  as  they  rent  a  house ;  and 
they  have  a  perfect  right  to  any  just  rate  of  interest  they 
demand.  And  yet  the  frauds  and  thefts,  perpetrated  in  mod- 
ern times  under  cover  of  interest,  almost  persuade  one  to 
think  that  the  world  was  certainly  more  honest,  even  if  worse 
off  materially,  when  all  interest  was  condemned  as  usury,  and 

144 


INTEREST  AND  CHURCH  145 

injustice  and  extortion ;  and,  in  the  esteem  of  religious  minds, 
growth  in  material  prosperity  is  small  recompense  for  moral 
degeneracy. 

To  make  interest  universally  legitimate,  there  must  be  a 
something  in  money,  that  makes  use  of  it  by  lender  or  bor- 
rower profitable,  or  productive  of  ulterior  wealth.  In  other 
words,  money  must  be  fruitful,  not  barren ;  it  must  resemble 
a  field  ready  for  planting,  not  a  loaf  of  bread  ready  for  a 
hungry  man.  The  money-lender  must  have  a  title  to  the 
interest  he  claims,  and  that  title  must  somehow  or  other  be 
intrinsic  to  the  money  itself.  A  title  extrinsic  to  the  money, 
might  suffice  to  justify  interest  in  the  event  of  some  agree- 
ment between  lender  and  borrower;  but  nothing  short  of  a 
title  intrinsic  in  some  way  to  the  money,  can  justify  interest 
in  the  event  of  no  agreement  whatever ;  and  we  contend  that 
money  loaned  demands  interest  to-day  of  its  very  nature. 

Four  extrinsic  titles  justified  interest,  even  when  the  Church 
was  loudest  in  its  condemnation  of  the  practice ;  and  they  were, 
1,  loss  of  opportunity  to  make  money  incurred  by  the  loan, 
or  interruption  of  profit,  lucrum  cessans;  2,  damnum  emerg- 
ens; unusual  risk;  3,  penalty  for  delay  in  payment;  4,  legal 
reward  meant  for  incentive  to  business.  The  Church  always 
recognized  the  legitimacy  of  these  several  titles.  Besides,  peo- 
ple of  great  wealth  could  buy  the  right  to  farm  revenues,  and 
they  could  enter  partnership,  wherein  without  personal  labor 
their  money  could  earn  an  increment.  It  must  be  remarked 
that  these  several  titles  are  extrinsic  to  the  money  loaned,  and 
never  created  a  right  to  compensation  without  prior  agree- 
ment. 

Hence,  the  Church  regularly  and  consistently  considered 
interest  wrong,  and  branded  all  interest  usury.  It  defined 
usury  as  any  attempt  to  draw  profit  and  increment  without 
labor,  without  cost,  and  without  risk,  out  of  the  use  of  a  thing 
that  does  not  fructify.  It  forbade  a  man  to  lend  his  horse 
to  a  neighbor  as  a  gratuitous  gift,  and  then  without  any  warn- 
ing charge  him  for  the  use  of  it,  changing  a  purely  gratuitous 
contract  into  an  onerous  contract.  Men  of  early  times  saw 
only  one  value  in  money,  its  substantial  value;  and  interest 
was  something  in  excess  of  that  value.  They  saw  no  fruitful- 
ness  in  money,  it  was  Shakespeare's  "barren  breed  of  metal" ; 


146  GENERAL  ETHICS 

and  to  charge  extra  for  fruitfulness,  it  was  on  all  sides  con- 
ceded not  to  have,  was  robbery,  injustice,  extortion. 

To-day  all  is  changed.  Commerce  is  so  easy  and  extensive, 
remote  regions  are  so  close  together  because  of  steam  and 
electricity,  communication  is  so  rapid  because  of  telegraph 
and  telephone,  that  for  purposes  of  business  the  whole  world 
is  no  larger  than  a  single  trading  block  in  any  city;  and 
money  has  uses  it  never  before  enjoyed.  Money  is  become  a 
species  of  seed,  a  dollar  judiciously  planted  can  grow  a  thou- 
sand; and  the  seed-dealer  is  justified  in  charging  one  price 
and  another  for  different  varieties  of  seed,  not  precisely  be- 
cause of  their  substance,  but  because  of  the  flowers  or  fruits 
they  produce.  And  whereas  in  olden  times  the  only  legiti- 
mate titles  to  interest  were  extrinsic  to  the  money  itself,  the 
four  enumerated  and  explained  awhile  ago,  to-day  the  title 
to  interest  is  intrinsic  to  the  money  itself;  not,  indeed,  simply 
and  without  any  qualification  intrinsic,  hut  after  a  manner 
and  with  a  qualification,  accruing  to  money  from  modern 
methods  of  business.  This  kind  of  intrinsic  title  partakes  of 
the  nature  of  extrinsic  and  intrinsic  titles.  It  is  extrinsic, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  not  rooted  in  the  nature  of  money  itself, 
independent  of  all  circumstances.  It  is  intrinsic,  inasmuch 
as  it  attaches  to  money  in  fixed  economic  conditions  like  our 
own. 

Therefore,  the  right  to  interest  is  not  dependent  on  any 
civil  law,  but  on  the  nature  of  things.  For  the  common  good, 
law  can  regulate  rates  of  interest,  it  has  no  jurisdiction  over 
the  legitimacy  or  the  illegitimacy  of  interest.  Laws  regulat- 
ing interest  may  be  just  or  unjust,  and  the  state  framing  such 
laws  must  consult  the  objective  order  of  things.  In  general, 
a  fair  rate  of  interest  would  be  that  portion  of  the  profit, 
made  by  the  borrower,  left  after  deducting  a  fair  recompense 
for  his  skill,  labor  and  industry ;  and,  in  the  main,  that  is  the 
ratio  just  laws  everywhere  try  to  determine.  Law  cannot 
make  wrong  right,  and  plainly  exorbitant  rates,  though  sanc- 
tioned by  law,  continue  offenses  against  justice.  And  yet, 
because,  in  the  matter  of  justice,  the  presumption  is  always 
in  favor  of  law,  nobody  need  as  a  rule  be  disturbed,  when  he 
keeps  within  the  limits  of  the  law. 

Money  itself  is  only  a  medium  of  exchange,  a  standard  or 


INTEREST  AND  CHURCH  147 

measure  of  value.  When  business  was  small,  all  trade  was 
simply  an  exchange  of  one  article  for  another,  and  the  trans- 
action was  called  barter.  As  business  grew,  some  set  article 
was  chosen  as  a  general  medium;  and  it  became  a  standard, 
a  unit  for  the  measurement  of  value  resident  in  other  articles. 
A  sheep  could  be  made  the  standard ;  and  horses,  cows,  houses, 
everything  could  be  valued  in  terms  of  sheep.  After  cen- 
turies of  experience  the  world  seems  to  have  settled  on  the 
precious  metals,  gold  and  silver,  as  money  or  media  of  ex- 
change. Animals,  shells,  skins,  wheat,  tobacco,  and  a  multi- 
tude of  other  objects  have  been  employed  in  history  as  money; 
but  all  have  yielded  place  to  silver  and  gold,  or  to  paper, 
entitling  its  owner  to  a  definite  quantity  of  silver  and  gold, 
when  presented  to  proper  authorities.  Gold  and  silver  were 
chosen  because  of  becoming  qualities  they  possess.  They  are 
durable,  and  wear  well ;  their  scarcity  adds  to  their  intrinsic 
value,  and  gives  greater  worth  to  small  portions ;  they  can  be 
carried  with  ease  from  place  to  place ;  they  are  readily  di- 
vided, measured  and  shaped ;  they  are  homogeneous  through- 
out, and  the  Same  the  world  over.  Coinage,  reserved  to  the 
ruler,  secures  citizens,  regarding  the  genuine  quality  of  the 
realm's  money. 

Money,  therefore,  has  a  twofold  value,  material  and  formal, 
or  moral.  Its  material  value  is  its  use  in  the  arts  and  the 
trades.  Gold  and  silver  dollars  can  be  turned  into  jewelery 
and  the  like.  Its  formal  or  moral  value  is  its  use  as  a  me- 
dium of  exchange,  its  purchasing  power.  In  olden  times 
money's  purchasing  power  was  restricted  to  things  consumed 
in  their  use ;  when  loaned,  it  was  lent  to  purchase  things  of 
the  kind;  and  so  money  never  rose  to  the  dignity  of  a  fruit- 
ful good,  productive  of  new  wealth  in  its  use.  To-day  money 
purchases  things  not  consumed  in  their  use,  things  productive 
of  new  wealth;  and  money,  assuming  the  quality  of  what  it 
can  purchase,  becomes  by  the  very  fact  a  fruitful  good.  In 
consequence,  whoever  lends  money  to  another,  has  a  right  to 
the  profit  he  might  have  earned  with  his  money,  while  it 
remained  with  the  borrower;  and  all  this,  not  by  virtue  of 
any  agreement,  but  in  virtue  of  the  change  made  in  money 
by  modern  conditions.  In  other  words,  money  is  now  an 
instrument  of  business  and  trade,  and  it  demands  a  price, 


148  GENERAL  ETHICS 

mucli  as  the  store  you  rent  to  another,  or  the  machine  hired 
to  manufacture  some  product.  Money,  therefore,  is  a  fruit- 
ful good,  because  it  stands  for  all  purchasable  commodities; 
and  the  loan  of  a  fruitful  good,  in  strict  justice  demands  more 
than  the  mere  return  of  the  good,  it  demands  a  return  of 
the  fruit  as  well.  Ballerini  thinks  that  custom  made  interest 
illicit  in  olden  times,  because  he  reckoned  it  impossible  to 
prove  that  anything  in  the  nature  of  money  forbids  such 
recompense  for  its  use.  But  St.  Thomas  and  the  others  regu- 
larly appeal  to  the  very  nature  of  money,  viewed  as  a  thing 
consumed  in  its  use.  Others  favor  leaving  everything  to  the 
intention  of  the  borrower.  They  would  consider  interest 
wrong,  in  case  the  borrower  meant  to  purchase  food  and  the 
like;  right,  in  case  he  meant  to  trade  with  it  for  purposes 
of  profit.  Charity  might  recognize  a  difference  between  the 
two  cases,  not  justice.    The  two  are  onerous  contracts. 


THESIS  XIII 

MERIT  AND  DEMERIT 

Jcmin,  21-23;  Bickahy,  152. 

Merit  and  demerit  are  fruits  of  morality.  A  man  can 
merit  with  God  and  with  other  men.  He  can  so  behave  to- 
wards God  and  men  as  to  deserve  in  justice  reward  at  their 
hands.  Merit  and  demerit  result  from  imputability,  that 
quality  which  makes  man  the  cause  and  proprietor  of  his  acts. 
Only  rational  beings  are  capable  of  merit  and  demerit,  be- 
cause freedom  is  a  requisite.  Imputability  implies  ownership, 
and  freedom  alone  vests  man  with  ownership  in  his  acts. 
Necessary  agents  are  not  owners.  Merit  means  right  to  pay- 
ment for  favor  done  another,  it  means  reward.  Demerit 
means  right  or  liahility  to  payment  for  harm  done  another, 
it  means  punishment  or  penalty.  Justice  is  the  measure  of 
merit  and  demerit.  They  even  up  justice,  when  the  balance 
swings  one  side.  Justice  is  the  virtue  that  renders  to  every- 
body his  due.  It  is  of  three  kinds,  commutative,  man  to 
man ;  distributive,  state  to  citizen ;  legal,  citizen  to  state,  cor- 
porately  and  individually.  Commutative  demands  strict  or 
arithmetical  equality  between  favor  and  reward.  Distribu- 
tive demands  geometrical  equality  between  favor  and  reward. 
Ordinarily  a  fair  distribution  of  emoluments  and  burdens 
satisfies  its  claims.  Legal  regularly  demands  arithmetical 
equality,  and  is  secured  by  law.  Equity  is  a  merciful  provi- 
sion meant  to  he  corrective  of  justice.  It  has  application, 
tvhere  reward  is  due,  not  in  strict  justice,  hut  from  a  view- 
point of  fairness  and  honor.  It  ministers  to  the  incomplete- 
ness of  legal  justice.  Commutative  gets  its  name  from  the 
process  of  exchange,  at  the  basis  of  business  transactions,  like 
trading,  and  buying,  and  selling.  In  this  species  of  justice 
arithmetical  equality,  or  that  of  5  to  5,  is  possible,  because 

149 


150  GENERAL  ETHICS 

both  favor  and  reward  are  things,  money,  for  instance,  and  a 
horse.  Distributive  gets  its  name  from  the  distribution  in 
play,  when  offices  in  a  government  are  parcelled  out  to  de- 
serving citizens.  In  this  species,  geometrical  equality,  or 
that  of  6  and  4  to  3  and  2,  is  alone  possible;  because,  while 
the  favor  is,  as  it  were,  a  person,  the  reward  is  a  thing.  If 
a  citizen  doing  6  points  of  service  gets  an  office  worth  4,  a 
citizen  doing  3  points  of  service  ought  to  get  and  office  worth 
2.  Legal  justice  in  point  of  equality  resembles  commutative, 
differing  merely  in  origin.  Physical  violence  does  away  with 
merit  and  demerit,  because  it  destroys  freedom  of  execution; 
but  the  moral  violence  duty  or  obligation  exerts,  because  it 
leaves  even  the  ordered  act  voluntary,  has  no  destroying  in- 
fluence on  merit  or  demerit.  Duty  or  obligation  removes  the 
element  of  supererogation. 

God  can  be  said  to  owe  things  to  Himself  and  creatures. 
He  owes  it  to  Himself  to  see  to  the  fulfilment  of  His  wisdom, 
will,  and  goodness  in  creatures.  He  owes  creatures  equip- 
ment with  requisites  to  their  nature.  This  second  debt  is 
rooted  in  the  first,  and  so  God  is  under  obligation  to  nobody 
but  Himself.  God  is  just  to  the  wicked,  when  He  punishes 
the  wicked,  because  it  is  what  the  wicked  deserve.  He  is  just 
to  Himself,  when  He  spares  the  wicked,  because  mercy  is 
what  He  owes  His  own  goodness. 

Merit  is  of  two  kinds,  de  condigno  and  de  congruo.  One  is 
based  on  strict  justice,  the  other  on  equity.  Harmony  or  dis- 
cord with  the  objective  order  of  things  makes  an  act  good  or 
bad.  Imputability  has  its  origin  in  freedom  of  will,  and 
makes  an  act  blamable  or  praiseworthy.  Justice  measures  an 
act's  merit  or  demerit.  To  merit  with  men,  the  favor  done 
must  not  be  payment  for  antecedent  debt,  and  it  must  be -a 
favor  asked  or  desired,  or  reasonably  supposed  such. 

Man  can  merit  with  God  and  other  men,  because  he  can 
freely  do  them  a  favor.  The  favor  changes  the  prior  condi- 
tion of  justice,  and  calls  for  recompense  to  reestablish  justice. 
Man's  merit  with  God  is  not  absolute,  but  conditional;  and 
God  has  put  the  condition.  Man  owes  everything  to  God, 
without  right  to  any  return.  And  yet,  in  making  man  free, 
God  changes  the  aspect  of  things,  and  agrees  to  consider  a 
favor,  what  is  in  reality  a  debt.     This  gift  of  free  will  is  a 


MERIT  AND  DEMERIT  151 

virtual  promise  on  the  part  of  God  to  reward  its  right  use, 
and  punish  its  abuse, 

God  is  incapable  of  intrinsic  addition;  but  man  can  do  God 
a  kindness,  by  adding  to  His  extrinsic  glory;  and  virtue  se- 
cures this  addition.  Man  is  at  the  same  time  a  servant  and 
a  son  of  God.  He  merits  with  God  as  a  son,  and  as  a  serv- 
ant ;  supernatural  reward  as  a  son,  natural  reward  as  a  serv- 
ant. God  is  first  cause  of  a  man's  free  will,  as  He  is  first 
cause  of  every  effect  in  the  universe.  But  man  is  second 
cause  of  His  free  acts,  in  such  manner  that  he  contributes  of 
his  own  to  their  reality,  and  exerts  his  own  independent  activ- 
ity. Man  in  God's  hands  is  no  mere  passive  instrument,  but 
active  as  well.  God's  promise,  makes  man's  merit  de  con- 
digno.  In  the  supernatural  order  this  promise  is  writ  in 
revelation ;  in  the  natural  order,  on  the  open  page  of  creation. 
The  discrepancy  between  man's  acts  and  a  supernatural  re- 
ward, is  atoned  for  by  the  addition  of  sanctifying  grace. 
That  quality  renders  them  supernatural,  and  enables  them  to 
merit  de  condigno  supernatural  recompense,  or  Heaven. 


THESIS  XIV 

Utilitarianism  is  wrong,  dangerous  and  absurd.  Jouin,  31  j 
Rickahy,  177-191. 

QUESTION 

Utilitarianism  is  a  standard  of  morality,  set  up  by  men 
who  want  to  keep  God  and  a  future  life  out  of  the  question. 
They  ignore  immortality,  and  with  it  the  spiritual  side  of 
man's  nature.  They  ?ire  not  everywhere  consistent  in  their 
views ;  and,  when  trapped  by  their  own  words  into  some  dam- 
aging admission,  never  hesitate  to  seek  a  refuge  in  self-contra- 
diction. William  Paley,  1743-1805 ;  Jeremy  Bentham,  1748- 
1832 ;  James  Mill,  1773-1836 ;  John  Stuart  Mill,  his  son,  1806- 
1873;  John  Austin,  1790-1859;  and  George  Grote  belong  to 
this  school. 

TERMS 

Utilitarianism.  Its  creed  is  formulated  in  two  principles 
and  a  law.  First  Principle :  Man 's  last  end  lies  in  this  world, 
and  is  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number,  mean- 
ing pleasure  as  well  of  the  senses  as  of  the  understanding. 
N.B.  Cudworth,  Butler,  Paley,  and  others,  notably  older 
Utilitarians,  mention  God  and  a  future  life  with  respect. 
John  Stuart  Mill  and  moderns  in  general  resent  all  reference 
to  God  and  a  future  life. 

Second  Principle:  Useful  acts  are  right,  hurtful  acts  are 
wrong.  Acts  are  useful,  when  they  result  in  pleasure;  hurt- 
ful, when  they  result  in  pain.  Law:  General  results  must 
be  taken  into  account,  not  particular;  not  the  immediate  re- 
sult of  this  particular  act,  but  what  would  result  to  society, 
if  this  sort  of  act  were  generally  allowed. 

This  last  is  what  Paley  calls  the  Law  of  General  Conse- 

152 


UTILITARIANISM  158 

quences.  It  hits  near  our  standard  of  morality,  the  objective 
order  of  things;  and  we  have  no  quarrel  with  it.  But  we 
have  a  very  serious  quarrel  with  the  Principle  of  Greatest 
Happiness,  and  the  Principle  of  Utility.  We  have  already 
proved  that  man 's  absolutely  last  end,  his  greatest  happiness, 
lies  outside  of  this  world,  and  is  God,  intuitively  possessed. 
We  have  besides  proved  that  his  greatest  happiness  on  earth, 
his  relatively  last  end,  is  the  introduction  of  moral  rectitude 
into  his  acts ;  and  that  moral  right  and  wrong  are  constituted 
by  harmony  or  discord  with  the  objective  order  of  things. 
Our  three  theses  are  a  direct  refutation  of  Utilitarianism. 

If  somebody  wants  to  believe  in  the  reality  of  a  future  life, 
the  Utilitarians  assure  him  that  their  doctrine  menaces  no 
harm  to  his  aspirations.  They  are  quite  accommodating. 
* '  Take  care  of  the  things  of  earth, ' '  they  say,  ' '  and  the  things 
of  Heaven  will  take  care  of  themselves."  Christ  taught  the 
contrary,  when  He  called  the  cares,  and  riches,  and  pleasures 
of  life  thorns  that  choke  the  seed  and  hinder  it  of  fruit.  Our 
friends  meet  this  difficulty  with  a  new  distinction  between 
Hedonism,  pleasure  for  me,  and  Altruism,  pleasure  for  the 
other  fellow.  These  thorns  of  the  gospel  are  the  pleasures  of 
Hedonism,  not  the  pleasures  of  Altruism.  Altruism  then  is 
their  last  end.  To  meet  Utilitarianism  on  common  ground, 
we  must  for  the  time  being  neglect  the  future  life,  and  dis- 
cuss with  them  man's  highest  good  in  this  present  life.  We 
maintain  that  man's  highest  good  in  this  life  is  the  establish- 
ment of  moral  rectitude  in  his  acts,  calling  the  condition  in- 
complete happiness,  because,  in  life's  sum  of  good  and  evil, 
moral  rectitude  procures  the  preponderance  of  good  over 
evil.  They  maintain  that  man's  highest  good  in  life  consists 
in  the  greatest  happiness  of  the  greatest  number  of  mankind, 
and  they  seem  to  mean  by  happiness  pleasure  as  well  of  the 
senses  as  of  the  understanding,  physical  as  well  as  intellectual. 
It  must  be  evident  that  we  both  agree  in  making  happiness 
of  some  kind  man's  supremest  good;  and,  if  we  contend  for 
exactly  the  same  kind  of  happiness,  we  are  fools  to  quarrel. 
Our  happiness  is  virtue,  it  is  compatible  with  pain;  it  rates 
one  unit  of  intellectual  pleasure  superior  to  many  units  of 
physical  pleasure;  it  counts  the  intensest  physical  pain  man 
can  suffer,  death  amid  the  cruellest  torments,  martyrdom  at 


154  GENERAL  ETHICS 

the  hands  of  Nero,  less  an  evil  than  the  slightest  departure 
from  the  straight  line  of  morality. 

Of  course,  an  ideal  conception  of  incomplete  happiness  even 
in  our  theory  would  be  a  blessed  aggregate  of  unvarying  vir- 
tue, pleasure  of  body,  and  pleasure  of  soul,  without  the  small- 
est trace  of  pain  anywhere  in  the  mixture.  It  would  mean 
holiness  fit  for  the  altars,  along  with  the  money  of  a  million- 
aire ;  the  wisdom  of  the  most  consummate  sage  history  knows ; 
a  mind  free  from  business  cares,  a  heart  free  from  the  aches 
of  love;  a  body  without  the  ills  of  disease,  a  soul  without  a 
sorrow ;  nights  of  refreshing  sleep,  days  of  uninterrupted  ease, 
luxury  and  exhilarating  enjoyment.  But  we  are  not  the 
fools  to  think  any  such  ideal  condition  possible  since  the  fall. 
Apart  even  from  the  teachings  of  faith,  we  know  that,  ages 
before  the  parable  of  the  seed  and  the  sower,  pagans  like 
Diogenes  and  Zeno,  Socrates  and  Plato,  in  the  full  light  of 
reason,  regarded  the  riches  and  pleasures  of  this  life  thorns 
in  the  field  of  virtue.  Before  the  ominous  words,  ''Go  sell 
what  thou  hast,  and  give  it  to  the  poor,"  sounded  on  human 
ears,  mere  philosophers  had  buried  their  wealth  in  the  sea,  as 
a  preliminary  to  the  acquisition  of  virtue  and  wisdom.  We 
must  be  content  with  the  world  as  it  is,  we  must  be  practical 
even  in  our  Ethics,  and  write  down  man's  highest  good  a 
species  of  happiness  possible  of  attainment.  This  happiness 
is  necessarily  limited,  it  is  incomplete,  and  we  have  reason  to 
be  thankful  for  the  circumstance.  It  whets  desire  for  the 
beyond,  holds  us  to  duty,  and  makes  us  stronger  than  un- 
avoidable pain,  that  might  otherwise  overwhelm  us  with  dread. 

Happiness  with  Utilitarians  would  seem  to  be  sometimes 
Hedonism,  sometimes  Altruism;  pleasure  for  me,  and  pleas- 
ure for  the  other  fellow.  We  repeat  again,  that  if  we  mis- 
interpret their  writings,  we  honestly  mean  no  wrong,  and 
stand  ready  to  make  them  due  reparation  for  our  mistake. 
If  their  greatest  possible  happiness  of  the  greatest  possible 
number  is  virtue,  or  moral  rectitude  in  man's  acts,  the  fight 
is  over,  and  we  are  everlasting  friends.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
it  is  either  the  Hedonism  of  Epicurus  or  the  Altruism  of  mod- 
ern atheists  and  materialists,  the  fight  is  on,  and  we  are 
deadly  enemies.  Mill  would  seem  to  make  it  Hedonism,  when 
he  says  that  acts  are  right  in  proportion  as  they  tend  to  pro- 


HAPPINESS  155 

mote  happiness,  meaning  by  happiness  pleasure  and  the  ab- 
sence of  pain.  This  doctrine  makes  good  and  pleasure  iden- 
tical, accounting  the  most  pleasant  pleasure  the  best  pleasure. 
Paley  very  logically  accepts  this  view  of  the  thing,  and  main- 
tains that  pleasures  ^differ  only  in  duration  or  intensity,  not 
in  kind.  With  him  pleasure  of  sense  can  surpass  pleasure 
of  mind.  We  maintain,  on  the  contrary,  that  pleasures  differ 
in  quality  as  well  as  in  quantity;  that  pleasure  is  not  iden- 
tical with  good,  but  one  of  its  three  kinds  or  species;  and 
that  intellectual  delight  is  a  better  pleasure  than  sensual,  not 
because  it  is  the  more  pleasant  or  lasting,  but  because  it  is 
nobler. 

Good  IS  of  three  sorts,  becoming,  agreeable  and  useful; 
honestum,  dulce  et  utile.  Becoming  good  appeals  to  what 
is  specific  in  man's  nature,  his  intellect;  the  agreeable  is 
oftener  than  not  a  loud  cry  to  what  is  generic  in  man,  his 
animality;  the  useful  is  a  mere  help  to  the  other  two.  The 
becoming  is  loved  for  itself  singly;  the  agreeable,  for  the 
pleasure  it  creates;  the  useful,  for  an  ulterior  advantage 
altogether  distinct  from  itself.  Good  itself  is  an  analogical 
term;  and,  arguing  from  the  word  perfect,  it  means,  in  root, 
finish,  completeness.  That  is  man's  good,  which  finishes, 
rounds  out,  completes  his  being.  Primarily,  therefore,  good 
signifies  the  becoming;  secondarily,  and  by  analogy  of  attri- 
bution, the  agreeable;  secondarily  still,  but  by  analogy  of 
proportion,  the  useful.  Becoming  good  is  loved  on  its  own 
single  account,  not  because  of  some  third  reality  its  posses- 
sion secures.  Agreeable  good  is  not  loved  on  its  own  single 
account,  but  on  account  of  a  third  reality  its  possession  se- 
cures, the  satisfied  feeling  it  induces.  Useful  good  would 
never  be  missed,  if  only  the  advantage  it  helps  to  procure 
could  be  obtained  without  its  assistance.  Examples  are  knowl- 
edge, a  banquet,  and  money.  Real  good  is  suited  to  the  de- 
sires most  in  harmony  with  the  nature  that  seeks  it.  What- 
ever good  is  opposed  to  real  good  is  called  apparent  good. 
Man's  real  good  is  intellectual  and  spiritual,  and,  therefore, 
the  becoming.  When  the  agreeable  and  useful  are  directly 
opposed  to  the  becoming,  they  are  only  apparent  goods. 
Whatever  real  goodness  they  possess,  is  derived  from  the 
becoming,  and  dependent  on  the  degree  in  which  they  meas- 


156  GENERAL  ETHICS 

ure  up  to  the  same.  An  apparent  good  is  a  real  evil.  Nearly 
every  good  in  nature  is  a  mixture  of  the  three,  and  it  is  one 
or  other  according  to  the  light  in  which  it  is  viewed.  Thus, 
knowledge  is  in  itself  a  becoming  good.  And  yet,  because  of 
the  pleasure  it  ministers,  and  because  of  the  opportunities  it 
affords  for  honor  and  wealth,  it  can  readily  enough  descend 
to  the  level  of  an  agreeable  or  useful  good.  A  banquet  is  a 
becoming  good,  inasmuch  as  it  is  quite  in  harmony  with 
man's  rational  nature;  it  is  an  agreeable  good,  inasmuch  as 
it  procures  bodily  pleasure;  it  is  a  useful  good,  inasmuch  as 
it  wins  for  the  host  the  favor  of  his  guests.  Between  agree- 
able and  useful  good  the  distinction  is  clear  and  marked. 
It  is  not  so  easy  to  discern  between  the  becoming  and  the 
agreeable.  Pain  can  never  be  reckoned  agreeable  good ;  it  can 
be  reckoned  becoming  good. 

Pleasure  and  Pain.  Therefore,  these  few  words  about 
.pleasure  may  help  us  to  better  understand  things.  Feeling 
cuts  so  important  a  figure  in  modern  Psychology  that  writers 
assign  it  a  faculty  of  its  own,  distinct  from  the  faculties  of 
knowledge  and  desire,  denominated  cognoscitive  and  appeti- 
tive. Our  English  word  feeling  is  fruitful  in  meaning. 
Maher  notes  these  four,  outer  sensations,  pain  or  pleasure, 
excitement,  certainty  without  motives.  Examples  are,  smooth 
feeling  of  velvet,  to  feel  hot  or  cold ;  to  feel  hurt,  sad,  joyful ; 
I  have  a  feeling  for  you ;  to  feel  that  it  will  rain.  Emotion 
occurs  often  in  second  and  third  senses.  Passion  is  intense 
excitement;  affection  turns  on  likes  and  dislikes  with  persons 
for  objects;  sentiment  is  emotion  in  abstract  and  highly 
wrought  characters,  as  opposed  to  practical  men.  On  this 
question  of  pleasure  and  pain  rare  old  Aristotle  wrote  the 
final  word  centuries  ago.  St.  Thomas  in  this  particular  makes 
the  Stagirite  his  model,  and  voices  his  sentiments  with  hardly 
'  a  word  of  correction.  Modern  writers  are  true,  only  when 
they  keep  close  to  these  master-minds;  and  the  measure  of 
their  departure  from  Aristotle  is  the  measure  of  their  folly. 
Plato  is  responsible  for  the  opinion  that  all  pleasure  is  nega- 
tive and  relative.  It  is  negative,  inasmuch  as  it  is  mere  ab- 
sence of  pain.  It  is  relative,  inasmuch  as  it  is  transition  from 
state  of  pain  to  opposite  condition.  And  some  pleasures  of 
sense  lend  color  to  his  theory.     Thus,  the  joy  of  eating  and 


PLEASURE  AND  PAIN  157 

drinking  would  seem  to  be  dependent  on  antecedent  hunger 
and  thirst.     Aristotle,  however,  calls  attention  to  the  fact 
that  pleasures  without  number  betray  no  such  dependence  on 
previous  pain.     He  alleges  for  examples  the  delight  attaching 
to  mathematics,  agreeable  sounds  and  smells,  the  pleasures 
of  memory,  and  hope,  and  imagination.     He  makes  all  the 
reality  of  pleasure  dependent  on  activity,  calling  it  activity's 
efflorescence  or  hloom, — ''nil  sine  magno  Vita  labore  dedit 
mortalibus. ' '     Each  faculty  in  man  has  its  own  pleasure,  de- 
rivable from  judicious  exercise.     Count  the  antecedent  exer- 
cise pain,  and  you  have  Plato's  opinion  of  relativity.     St. 
Thomas  remarks  that  nobody  enjoys  uninterrupted  pleasure, 
simply  because  the  quality  follows  work.     The  faculty  em- 
ployed, and  the  object  stimulating  the  faculty,  gauge  the  in- 
tensity of  a  pleasure ;  and  in  point  of  duration  it  lasts  as  long 
as  faculty  and  stimulus  are  in  harmonious  relations,  one  fresh 
and  vigorous,  the  other  fit  and  suitable.     During  early  pe- 
riods in  the  process,  pleasure  reacts  to  stimulate  energy;  but 
by  degrees  fatigue   results,   to   first   lessen   the  feeling   and 
eventually  close  in  pain.     Hence  the  need  of  variety  in  this 
business  of  pleasure.     The  faculty  is  dulled  by  use,  and  a 
new  stimulus  must  supplant  the  old,  when  fatigue  ensues. 
As  faculties  are  specifically  different,  pleasures  of  intellect  and 
sense  differ  as  much  as  the  faculties  themselves.     Conflicting 
pleasures  neutralize  each  other,  and  the  faculty  in  question 
determines  the  moral  rank  of  the  pleasure.     The  nobler  the 
faculty,  the  nobler  the  pleasure.     Pain  is  pleasure's  oppo- 
site, and  eadem  est  ratio  oppositorum.     The  nature  of  pain  is 
manifest  from  our  description  of  pleasure.     It  can  have  its 
origin  in  faculty  or  object.     It  accompanies  excess  or  defect 
of  energy  or  exercise,  and  is  regularly  due  to  pressure  of  an 
unfit   or  unsuited   stimulus.     These   different   characteristics 
of  pleasure  and  pain  have  been  gathered  by  Maher  into  two 
laws, — 1,  Pleasure  is  healthy  exercise   or  activity,  pain  is 
excess  or  defect  of  same.     2,  Pleasure  grows  up  to  a  certain 
limit,  then  it  diminishes  and  becomes  pain.    Variety  con- 
tributes to  pleasure,  because  the  interval  of  change  is  a  period 
of  rest,  and  gives  the  dulled  activity  an  opportunity  to  recover 
its  sharpness.     Accommodation  can  explain  factitious  pleas- 
ures as  well  as  insensibility  to  pain.    From  long  use  the  fac- 


158  GENERAL  ETHICS 

iilty  of  taste,  for  instance,  loses  its  edge,  and  tobacco  passes 
from  disagreeable  to  pleasant.  Constant  pain  in  much  the 
same  way  operates  to  diminish  or  quite  destroy  the  discom- 
fort. 

We  maintain  against  modern  writers  that  pleasure  and  pain 
call  for  no  third  faculty ^  distinct  from  man's  cognoscitive  and 
appetitive  powers.  They  are  hut  different  aspects  of  cogni- 
tion and  desire.  Touch  and  taste  call  for  new  faculties,  dis- 
tinct and  different  among  themselves;  not  feeling.  Feeling 
is  best  described  as  the  tone  of  a  function.  The  function  is 
exercise  of  a  cognoscitive  or  appetitive  faculty ;  the  tone  in  case 
of  pleasure  is  spontaneous,  healthy,  harmonious  exercise;  in 
case  of  pain,  restrained,  unhealthy,  excessive  exercise.  The 
theories  about  pleasure  and  pain  are  numerous,  most  of  them 
substantially  the  same  as  Aristotle 's ;  and,  as  before  remarked 
regarding  wrong  theories,  the  measure  of  their  departure  from 
Aristotle  is  the  measure  of  their  folly.  Spinoza  leans  to 
Plato 's  notion  of  transition  from  pain.  Kant  makes  pleasure 
the  promotion  of  life-processes;  pain,  the  hindrance  of  life- 
processes.  Schopenhauer  and  the  pessimists  view  pleasure 
as  escape  from  pain  by  filling  a  want.  Descartes  and  Leib- 
nitz make  it  consciousness  of  perfection  possessed.  Hamilton 
calls  pleasure  the  reflex  of  conscious  activity;  pain,  the  reflex 
of  overstrained  or  repressed  exertion.  Bain  describes  them  as 
increase  and  abatement  of  vital  functions.  Physiologists  in 
general  view  pleasure  and  pain  as  integration  or  disintegra- 
tion of  neural  elements.  Grant  Allen  makes  pain  a  destruc- 
tive act,  or  insufficient  nutrition  in  sentient  tissue.  Spen- 
cer calls  pleasure  organic  equilibrium,  or  harmonious  func- 
tioning, or  struggle  for  life. 

PROOFS 

I.  Principle  of  Greatest  Happiness. 

To  return  now  to  Utilitarianism.  In  its  selection  of  man's 
highest  good,  as  already  seen,  it  veers  between  Hedonism  and 
Altruism,  pleasure  for  me,  and  pleasure  for  the  other  fellow. 
Indeed  some  defenders  of  the  theory  try  to  combine  the  two. 
But  that  is  impossible.  They  are  opposite  poles.  Hedonism 
is  gross  selfishness,  Altruism  rates  selfishness  the  unforgiven 


PROOFS  159 

sin.  Hedonifsm  certainly  cannot  be  man's  highest  good,  be- 
cause it  is  pleasure ;  pleasure  in  turn  is  the  effect,  activity  the 
cause;  and  the  cause  is  always  superior  to  the  effect.  Activ- 
ity, therefore,  is  a  higher  good  than  the  pleasure  it  pro- 
duces; and  no  pleasure,  whatever  its  kind,  can  be  man's  high- 
est good.  Becoming  good  is  sought  for  itself,  and  for  noth- 
ing beyond.  Even  knowledge,  when  sought  for  pleasure  or 
gain,  becomes  an  agreeable  or  useful  good.  Man's  highest 
good,  therefore,  cannot  he  pleasure  of  whatever  sort,  whether 
intellectual  or  sensual,  because  pleasure  is  at  most  an  agree- 
able good,  and  magi's  highest  good  ought  to  he  a  becoming 
good.  Besides,  pleasure  is  always  an  effect,  and  effects  are 
inferior  to  their  causes. 

PRINCIPLE 

A.  The  end  is  superior  to  the  means.  Pleasure  is  the  end, 
activity  is  the  means.  Answer:  This  is  in  the  order  of  inten- 
tion, not  in  the  order  of  being  or  reality.  Redemption  of 
mankind  is  the  end;  the  tears  and  the  blood  of  God  are  the 
means.  Operis  and  operantis.  Priority  in  order  of  being 
or  reality  settles  dignity.  Reversed  in  two  orders  of  inten- 
tion and  being.  End  first  in  intention,  last  in  being.  Means 
last  in  intention,  first  in  being.  Ergo,  activity  is  superior  to 
pleasure,  as  cause  is  superior  to  effect. 

Therefore,  knowledge,  clear  of  the  pleasure  it  occasions, 
can  alone  be  man's  highest  good.  The  pleasure  may  be  in- 
separable from  the  knowledge,  but  this  is  far  from  consti- 
tuting the  pleasure  knowledge  itself.  God  known  is  man's 
absolutely  highest  good,  and  virtue  is  his  relatively  highest 
good,  his  highest  good  in  this  life.  Altruism  cannot  be  man's 
highest  good,  because,  as  understood  by  the  Utilitarians,  it 
neglects  two  important  factors  in  the  makeup  of  virtue,  self 
and  God.  Again,  if  their  Altruism  means  virtue,  if  it  means 
measuring  up  to  the  objective  order  of  things,  the  exact  pay- 
ment of  all  our  debts  to  the  neighbor,  self  and  God,  we  have 
no  quarrel  with  Utilitarianism,  and  we  are  Altruists  as  well 
as  they.  But,  whatever  their  real  sentiments,  the  writings  of 
Utilitarians  are  proof  conclusive  that  they  ignore  the  interior 
life  of  the  soul,  the  inner  man  of  the  heart,  and  give  human 


160  GENERAL  ETHICS 

society,  the  neighbor,  the  place  that  belongs  to  God.  They 
mistake  the  political  for  the  ethical  end  of  life.  They  provide 
for  a  good  citizen,  a  good  husband,  a  good  father;  but  not 
for  a  good  man.  They  exaggerate  a  secondary  concern,  to 
minimize  or  altogether  nullify  what  ought  to  be  man's  pri- 
mary concern  and  first  consideration.  Therefore,  the  Al- 
truism of  the  Utilitarians  is  no  more  man 's  highest  good  than 
the  Hedonism  of  Epicureans.  It  wears  a  more  decent  ap- 
pearance, but  there  is  more  logic  or  common  sense  in  Hedon- 
ism than  in  Altruism.  Both  are  vile  errors,  one  from  the 
viewpoint  of  gentility,  the  other  from  the  viewpoint  of  phi- 
losophy; and  only  in  the  eyes  of  shallow  thinkers  are  of- 
fenses against  gentility  viler  than  offenses  against  philosophy. 
Hedonism  banishes  God  and  the  neighbor  from  morality,  to 
set  up  self  for  idol.  Altruism  does  the  same  unkindness  to 
God  and  self,  to  fall  down  and  worship  the  neighbor.  And 
there  you  are. 

II.  Principle  of  Utility. 

The  Principle  of  Utility,  which  makes  acts  right  or  wrong, 
according  as  they  are  useful  or  hurtful  to  the  greatest  num- 
ber, stands  condemned  on  these  four  counts:  1,  It  makes  no 
difference  between  acts  good  and  had  in  themselves,  confound- 
ing intrinsic  value  with  extrinsic  results;  2,  affirms  that  the 
motive  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  morality  of  the  action; 
3,  levels  all  distinction  between  injury  and  harm;  4,  a7id 
favors  the  theory  confuted  by  Plato  in  his  Republic,  personal 
indulgence  at  expense  of  neighbor.  We  already  proved  in 
Thesis  III,  that  an  essential,  intrinsic  difference  exists  be- 
tween right  and  wrong  in  the  moral  order.  We  argued  from 
example,  alleging  love  and  hatred  of  God  as  instances;  and, 
for  every  believer  in  God,  the  argument  is  conclusive.  Un- 
fortunately for  them,  the  Utilitarians  prefer  to  keep  God  out 
of  the  question,  and  might  logically  take  exception  to  our 
method.  Love  of  parents  and  a  lie  might,  perhaps,  prove 
more  acceptable  examples;  and  they  are  equally  well  suited 
to  our  purpose.  Therefore,  according  to  us  a  lie  is  essentially 
and  intrinsically  bad,  because  of  its  very  nature  it  is  at  odds 
with  the  objective  order  of  things,  imperatively  demanding 
conformity   of  language   with  thought.    A   lie  is   radically 


PROOFS  IW 

wrong,  because  it  is  an  abuse  of  language.  It  is  wrong  now, 
it  was  always  wrong,  and  will  forever  continue  to  be  wrong, 
even  if  God  could  wish  otherwise,  even  if  the  whole  world 
entered  into  a  conspiracy  to  call  it  right.  Love  of  parents  is 
in  precisely  the  same  way  an  act  intrinsically  and  essentially 
right.  With  Utilitarians  a  lie  would  be  wrong,  simply  be- 
cause of  its  consequences  or  effects;  love  of  parents  would  be 
right  for  the  same  reason;  and  the  Law  of  General  Conse- 
quences, they  think,  makes  their  position  impregnable.  They 
would  contend  that  lying  and  hatred  of  parents,  if  universally 
allowed,  would  work  harm  to  society;  and  they  are  not  far 
wrong  in  their  contention.  A  bad  act  always  breeds  bad 
consequences,  and  in  most  cases  this  secondary  norm  of  util- 
ity coincides  with  our  own.  As  a  rule.  Utilitarians  would 
scruple  calling  right  whatever  acts  we  call  wrong,  and  theo- 
retically their  standard  is  not  blameworthy.  But  in  practice 
it  is  open  to  flagrant  abuse,  and  it  is  responsible  for  much  of 
the  evil  now  prevalent  in  society.  Its  advocates  easily  lose 
sight  of  the  Law  of  General  Consequences,  and  measure  the 
quality  of  their  acts  hy  the  advantage  or  disadvantage  accru- 
ing to  themselves  personally.  If  he  is  a  Hedonist,  the  Utili- 
tarian can  see  nothing  but  advantage  in  a  lie,  that  procures 
him  thousands  of  dollars  to  purchase  the  luxuries  of  life.  If 
he  is  an  Altruist  and  a  diplomat,  the  Utilitarian  can  see  noth- 
ing but  advantage  in  a  lie,  that  would  save  an  entire  com- 
munity from  the  disasters  of  war.  The  temptation,  then,  is 
to  think  a  lie  right  on  occasions,  and  account  so-called  pru- 
dential departures  from  the  truth  no  breach  of  morality. 
How  often  men  yield  to  the  temptation,  every-day  history  is 
witness.  Individualism  is  the  rich  man's  creed,  Utilitarian- 
ism is  the  hasis  of  his  ethics;  and  the  had  philosophyy  taught  in 
our  present  day  universities  strengthens  him  in  his  position 
of  greed  and  injustice.  Less  conscientious  Utilitarians  teach, 
and  avaricious  misers  among  their  followers  ardently  hold, 
that  acts  are  morally  right,  when  they  tend  to  the  doer's 
profit ;  and  virtue  comes  to  mean  the  accumulation  of  wealth 
by  fair  means  and  foul.  If  Utilitarianism  were  not  wrong 
in  itself,  abuse  of  its  principles  is  easy,  and  this  abuse  is  most 
damaging  in  its  consequences. 

2.  We  have  alsewhere  shown  motive  to  be  one  of  morality's 


162  GENERAL  ETHICS 

determinants.  Motive  is  the  act  in  its  subjective  aspect,  and 
its  morality  is  quite  as  important  as  that  of  the  object  itself. 
We  are  agreed  that  no  individual  human  act  is  indifferent, 
though  in  the  abstract  many  such  acts  occur  to  mind,  like 
walking,  singing,  study.  Acts  of  the  kind  derive  all  their 
morality  from  the  motive  prompting  their  execution.  To  walk 
to  the  church  for  purposes  of  prayer,  is  right;  to  make  the 
same  journey  for  purposes  of  theft,  is  wrong;  and  all  the 
difference  is  constituted  by  the  walker's  motive.  Motive 
makes  one  man  a  worshipper,  the  other  a  thief.  And  we  are 
not  talking  about  the  act  of  prayer  or  the  theft ;  we  are  talk- 
ing of  the  journey  itself.  The  journey  made  by  the  pros- 
pective thief  is  as  morally  wrong  as  the  theft  he  afterwards 
commits.  This  truth  is  even  more  evident  in  the  case  of  a 
good  act,  done  with  an  evil  design.  To  give  alms  for  the 
express  purpose  of  making  the  beggar  accomplice  to  a  mur- 
der, is  out  and  out  bad.  No  matter  how  useful  the  gift  may 
prove  to  the  beggar,  the  act  of  the  giver  is  thoroughl}'-  wicked ; 
and  what  would  be  otherwise  virtuous  charity,  is  changed  by 
mere  motive  to  downright  murder.  This  example  slightly 
changed  proves  Utilitarianism  immoral.  Suppose  the  alms 
given  without  any  wrong  intention ;  later  on,  the  beggar  finds 
his  benefactor  engaged  in  murder,  and  out  of  gratitude  goes 
to  his  assistance.  The  alms  would  have  bad  results  and 
would  therefore  be  wicked,  an  opinion  altogether  against 
common-sense.  Our  kindness  would,  then,  depend  on  how 
people  used  it.  I  am  aware  that  a  man's  motive,  when  once 
conceived  and  embraced,  becomes  part  and  parcel  of  his  act, 
because  the  motive  is  the  man.  I  am  aware  that  honest  Utili- 
tarians' would  never  reckon  right,  alms  bestowed  for  so  un- 
holy a  purpose;  and  all  because  conduct  of  the  sort,  if  uni- 
versally tolerated,  would  prove  damaging  in  the  extreme. 
And  yet  they  are  highly  unphilosophical,  when  they  brand 
such  alms  wrong,  simply  because  of  consequences  or  inde- 
pendently of  motive.  The  fact  of  the  matter  is  that  the  act 
in  question  is  damaging  in  its  consequences,  because  it  is 
morally  wrong,  and  not  vice-versa.  Causes  never  follow  their 
effects;  and  the  act  is  not,  first  damaging  in  its  consequences, 
and  then  morally  wrong;  but  it  is  first  morally  wrong,  and 
then    damaging   in   its   consequences.     The   horse    pulls   the 


PROOFS  163 

wagon;  not  the  wagon,  the  horse.  Scripture  is  of  small 
weight  with  the  average  Utilitarian ;  and  yet  he  may,  in  com- 
mon with  respectable  unbelievers,  have  a  measure  of  reverence 
for  Christ's  wisdom.  Motive  in  His  divine  eyes  makes  a  su- 
preme difference  between  acts;  and  the  first  half  of  St.  Mat- 
thew's sixth  chapter  contains  His  doctrine  on  the  subject. 
We  commend  His  words  to  the  careful  and  reverent  perusal 
of  searchers  for  the  truth.  The  acts  discussed  are  alms, 
prayer  and  fasting. 

3.  If  use  and  harm  are  the  measures  of  morality,  all  differ- 
ence between  mere  harm  and  injury  disappears ;  and  balanced 
minds  are  not  ready  to  accept  this  view  of  things.  Injury 
adds  wilfulness  and  malice  to  mere  harm,  which  oftener  than 
not  is  wholly  without  the  stigma  of  moral  hlame.  The  pedes- 
trian, who  tramples  your  watch  to  pieces  on  the  dark  street, 
works  you  a  lot  of  harm,  but  no  injury.  The  enemy,  who 
deliberately  and  knowingly  smashes  the  same  with  an  axe, 
over  and  above  the  harm  he  works,  does  you  a  downright  in- 
jury. In  both  cases  the  harm  is  practically  the  same;  while 
injury  is  absent  from  one  case,  present  to  the  other.  Even 
if  all  men  without  a  single  exception  were  allowed  to  repeat 
the  act  of  the  innocent  pedestrian,  it  could  never  become 
morally  wrong,  in  spite  of  the  harm  consequent  on  its  occur- 
rence. And  yet  the  harm  done  would  prove  as  much  a  hard- 
ship to  the  watch's  owner  as  the  injury  done  him  by  his 
enemy.  The  effects  of  the  harm  and  the  injury  are  the  same, 
the  moral  difference  between  the  two  is  due  to  the  agent's 
purpose,  motive,  intention. 

4.  Plato  in  his  Republic  confutes  a  theory  of  morals,  that 
would  seem  to  coincide  in  all  respects  with  Utilitarianism. 
Briefly,  it  stands  for  the  contention  that  a  man's  highest  good 
in  this  life  is  his  own  personal  indulgence,  at  the  expense 
of  his  neighbors.  Society,  to  keep  down  fighting  and  save 
the  race  from  suicide,  hampers  this  inclination,  and  blocks 
each  individual  citizen's  aspirations  for  his  own  highest 
good.  It  forces  him  to  forego  the  natural  right  he  has  to 
prosecute  his  own  happiness,  at  the  expense  of  his  neighbors. 
In  this  way  the  interest  of  society  is  opposed  to  the  interests 
of  the  individual,  and  life  in  a  state  is  a  real  curse  and  only 
a  makeshift  blessing.     Tyrants  alone,  in  this  theory,  compass 


164  GENERAL  ETHICS 

highest  good;  their  subjects,  through  no  fault  of  their  own, 
are  hopelessly  unable  to  realize  their  destinj^  in  this  life,  that 
natural  desire  all  men  have  to  enjoy  incomplete  happiness,  the 
preponderance  of  good  things  over  evil  things.  And  all  be- 
cause these  shortsighted  mortals,  in  common  with  the  Utili- 
tarians, establish  man's  highest  good  in  pleasure  or  advan- 
tage, his  supremest  evil  in  pain  or  hurt. 

Our  theory  makes  moral  rectitude  or  virtue  man's  highest 
good,  and  no  tyrant  can  effectively  keep  his  subjects  from 
the  attainment  of  this  result  in  their  lives.  Again,  it  would 
be  foully  wrong  to  suppose  that  Christ  or  the  early  martyrs 
failed  of  man's  highest  good;  and  their  entire  lives  were 
empty  of  what  a  Utilitarian  world  calls  happiness  or  pleas- 
ure, and  were  crowded  full  of  misery  and  pain.  They  com- 
passed supremest  good  or  incomplete  happiness,  simply  be- 
cause what  the  world  calls  happiness  or  pleasure  cuts  no 
figure  whatever  in  the  thing,  and  one  unit  of  virtue  out- 
weighs units  without  number  of  mere  physical  pain  or  men- 
tal distress.  Virtue  is  no  artificial  happiness,  it  is  happiness 
of  the  solidest  sort;  and  the  pain  endured  for  virtue's  sake 
never  loses  its  quality  of  bitterness.  Saints  never  come  to 
directly  like  self-denial,  they  like  it  only  in  an  indirect  way, 
inasmuch  as  it  secures  to  them  that  virtue  or  holiness,  which 
is  the  basis  and  foundation  of  man's  supremest  good  on 
earth. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Stoic  Formalism.  Stoic  Formalism  is  from  Kant,  and 
Kant's  system  of  Ethics  is  a  profound  mistake.  The  whole 
trouble  with  Kant  would  seem  to  be  that  he  has  hazy  no- 
tions about  God,  and  denies  Him  the  quality  of  lawgiver. 
And  all  this  in  spite  of  an  utterance  on  page  322,  to  this 
effect,  ''Conscience  must  be  conceived  as  the  subjective  prin- 
ciple of  a  responsibility  for  one's  deeds  before  God."  Abbott. 
He  recognizes  only  two  lawmakers,  self  and  the  state.  Self 
is  responsible  for  ethical  law;  the  state,  for  juridical  law. 
Hence  his  autonomy  of  reason  in  matter  of  ethical  law.  Rea- 
son is  self,  reason  makes  law,  defines  and  imposes  duty,  sits 
in  judgment,  rewards  virtue,  punishes  offenders  in  the  domain 
of  Ethics  or  internal  morality.     The  state  performs  exactly 


KANT  AND  ETHICAL  DUTY  165 

the  same  functions  in  the  domain  of  Nomology,  Jurisprudence 
or  external  morality.  God  occurs  nowhere,  no  doubt  because 
He  is  a  noumenon.  Natural  law  with  Kant  is  not  divine  law 
at  all,  it  is  as  much  human  law  as  civil  law  itself,  the  only 
difference  between  the  two  being  that  the  man  makes  natural 
law  for  himself,  the  state  sets  him  civil  law.  In  the  field  of 
internal  morality,  in  the  matter  of  acts  not  prescribed  by 
positive  law,  in  question  of  commands  issued  by  what  we 
persist  in  calling  the  natural  law,  man,  according  to  Kant, 
is  subject  to  no  outside  constraint ;  he  has  no  Heaven  to  hope 
for,  no  hell  to  fear.  In  the  field  of  external  morality,  in  mat- 
ters provided  for  by  the  statutes,  in  question  of  murder,  eft 
and  other  penal  offenses  enumerated  in  the  code,  man  is  sub- 
ject to  constraint  of  the  state,  and  enjoys  the  favor  of  pos- 
sible fine  or  imprisonment  as  a  deterrent  from  crime. 

With  Kant,  natural  law  ought  to  fare  worse  at  men^s  hands 
than  positive  law.  When  a  man  makes  a  law  for  himself,  he 
can  as  easily  neglect  it ;  when  a  man  is  judge  and  jury  in  his 
own  case,  he  is  seldom  convicted;  when  he  executes  law  on 
himself,  he  gets  off  with  a  light  sentence.  When  the  state 
exercises  these  several  prerogatives,  the  culprit  is  more  likely 
to  get  his  deserts ;  and  this  single  thought  would  make  positive 
law  surer  of  fulfilment  than  natural  law.  God  would  neglect 
in  the  enforcement  of  His  law  a  most  efficacious  help,  em- 
ployed by  men  in  the  enforcement  of  their  laws.  Ethical 
duty  with  Kant  is  self-imposed  constraint;  juridical  duty  is 
constraint  imposed  by  positive  law  and  its  author,  the  state. 
Self-imposed  constraint  is  no  constraint  at  all;  and  ethical 
duty,  to  have  any  force,  must  be  constraint  imposed  by  the 
natural  law  and  its  author,  God.  Therefore,  to  act  from  a 
sense  of  ethical  duty,  is  to  act  with  an  eye  to  God's  attitude 
towards  right  and  wrong,  as  well  as  with  an  eye  to  our  own 
attitude  towards  the  same;  and  Kant's  autonomy  of  reason, 
and  his  principle  about  duty  for  duty's  sake,  are  only  half 
the  truth;  and,  what  is  still  worse,  they  are  that  half  of  the 
truth,  which  apppeals  to  only  a  select  few  in  the  republic  of 
refined  minds  and  critically  exact  moral  tastes.  The  sanction 
of  the  natural  law  embodied  in  an  eternal  hell,  is  a  much 
more  appealing  incentive  to  virtue  than  Stoic  Formalism  or 
subjective  feelings  of  shame.     Remorse  of  conscience  means 


166  GENERAL  ETHICS 

more  than  shame,  it  means  dread  of  hell;  and  the  sinner  is 
wide  awake  to  the  fact,  that  he  has  offended  somebody  dis- 
tinct from  and  greater  than  himself. 

Utilitarians  contend  that  happiness,  or  pleasure  of  mind 
and  body,  is  man's  destiny  on  earth,  his  supreme  good,  his 
last  end;  and  many  contend  that  it  is  folly  to  look  higher. 
We  already  proved  with  irrefutable  arguments  that  pleasure, 
whether  of  mind  or  of  body,  cannot  be  man's  last  end,  either 
in  this  life  or  in  the  next.  Stoic  Formalism,  a  product  of 
Kant 's  philosophy,  is  the  opposite  pole  to  Utilitarianism ;  and 
it  contends  that  duty  is  man's  destiny  on  earth,  to  such  an 
extent  that  it  is  the  single  motive  able  to  make  his  acts  moral ; 
and  that  pleasure,  or  whatsoever  other  motive,  renders  them 
unmoral.  Duty  for  duty's  sake,  is  its  slogan,  and  it  accounts 
acts  morally  good,  only  when  done  from  a  sense  of  duty; 
unmoral,  when  done  for  pleasure  or  from  any  motive  save 
sense  of  duty.  Kant  is  responsible  for  the  system,  and  it  is 
in  line  with  his  autonomy  of  reason,  to  be  explained  and  re- 
futed in  our  next  thesis. 

Against  Utilitarianism  and  Stoic  Formalism  we  contend 
that  man's  absolutely  last  end,  his  destiny  in  the  next  life, 
is  complete  happiness,  the  possession  of  God  in  the  beatific 
vision;  that  his  relatively  last  end,  his  destiny  on  earth,  is 
incomplete  happiness  or  virtue  and  resulting  peace  of  con- 
science. The  happiness  we  contend  for  is  not  the  pleasure  of 
Utilitarianism,  nor  is  it  the  sense  of  duty  advocated  by  Stoic 
Formalism.  Happiness,  whether  complete  or  incomplete,  is 
not  pleasure  of  mind  or  body.  Complete  happiness  is  a  heaped 
up  measure  of  good  with  unending  duration,  a  measure  of 
good  from  which  no  particle  of  good  is  absent,  altogether  in- 
compatible with  pain  and  discomfort.  Complete  happiness 
is  a  natural  desire,  the  one  necessary  wish  of  every  man's 
heart,  the  hiding  principle  of  every  wish  we  conceive;  and, 
therefore,  our  happiness  in  this  sense  cannot  be  excluded ; 
and,  if  Kant  were  right,  all  our  acts  would  necessarily  be  un- 
moral. Virtue  is  our  destiny  on  earth,  and  therefore  our 
duty;  and  the  peace  of  conscience  resulting  from  virtue  can- 
not be  excluded  from  our  motive,  and  again  all  our  acts  would 
be  unmoral.     The  consciousness  of  duty  done  is  only  another 


STOIC  FORMALISM  167 

pleasure;  and,  before  we  do  our  duty,  this  pleasure  in  the 
order  of  intention  can  move  us  to  act,  without  any  detriment 
to  morality.  Whatever  motive  is  compatible  with  virtue,  be 
it  pleasure,  or  wealth,  or  honor,  health,  wisdom  or  charity, 
can  originate  a  morally  good  act;  and  there  are  virtuous  as 
well  as  vicious  pleasures. 

Arguments  against  Stoic  Formalism  'by  Father  Cronin,  pp. 
245-263. 

1.  It  demands  too  much  of  human  nature. 

2.  It  is  not  contained  in  the  idea  of  moral  good. 

3.  It  is  disproved  by  works  of  supererogation. 

4.  All  moral  acts  would  be  equally  moral. 

5.  Eadem  est  ratio  oppositorum.  If  acts  were  good  solely 
on  account  of  respect  for  law,  acts  would  be  bad  solely  on 
account  of  disrespect  for  the  law.  No  criminal  ever  acts  from 
disrespect  for  the  law ;  but  from  motives  of  gain,  revenge  and 
the  like.     Ergo,  no  bad  act. 

6.  There  would  be  no  room  for  merit.  Every  good  act 
would  be  owed. 

7.  Happiness  is  inseparable  from  moral  acts ;  and  acts  would 
be  unmoral,  when  done  from  motives  of  happiness. 

8.  Motive  would  be  respect  for  law  as  such.  Bad  legisla- 
tion is  law  as  such,  and  bad  legislation  never  bases  moral  act. 

9.  Law  is  meant  for  common  good,  as  means  to  end.  To 
act  not  for  common  good,  but  for  law,  would  be  to  make  means 
superior  to  end. 

Arguments  in  Favor  of  Stoic  Formalism  are  Fallacious. 

1.  It  is  the  creed  of  the  crowd.  Morality  is  in  the  will,  not 
in  the  external  act. 

Answer:  True,  but  the  will  gets  its  morality  from  object, 
end,  and  circumstances ;  pure  selfishness  does  not  of  itself 
vitiate  act ;  pleasure  is  good  or  bad  according  to  object ;  duty 
is  only  one  object  of  pleasure ;  love  of  duty  is  as  much  a  moral 
principle  as  duty. 

2.  AH  outer  objects  are  mere  means  to  pleasure.  Ergo,  no 
proper  motive. 

Answer:  The  summum  bonum  is  not  a  mere  means  to 
pleasure,  it  is  happiness  itself.    It  is  man's  end,  not  a  means 


168  GENERAL  ETHICS 

to  his  end.     It  is  an  affair  of  the  intellect,  not  of  the  will. 
Law  varies  with  the  individual,  the  summum  bonum  or  last 
principle  of  morality  is  the  same  for  all. 
B.  Hedonism..    Father  Cronin  discusses  Hedonism   between 
pages  264  and  304. 

Hedonism  of  whatever  kind  is  wrong,  when  it  makes  pleas- 
ure man 's  last  end.  Egoistic  Hedonism  is  Hedonism  proper ; 
Universal  Hedonism  is  Altruism  or  Utilitarianism.  Pleasure 
for  me,  and  pleasure  for  the  other  fellow.  Some  Hedonists: 
Hohhes  says  that  any  object  of  desire  is  man's  last  end,  and 
this  is  Hedonism's  most  degraded  type.  Aristippus  makes 
mental  pleasure  man's  last  end.  Mill  makes  higher  pleas- 
ures of  mind  man's  last  end;  and  this  is  a  more  refined 
type.  Cudworth  makes  pleasures  of  virtue  man's  last  end; 
and  this  is  higher  still.  Butler  makes  pleasures  awaiting  men 
in  Heaven  man 's  last  end ;  and  this  is  the  highest  of  all. 

Answer:  Pleasure  is  not  our  sole  natural  end,  because  it 
can  be  spurned  aside.  Happiness  is  our  sole  natural  end,  be- 
cause it  cannot  be  spurned  aside.  Pleasure  is  not  man's  last 
end,  because  it  resides  in  the  will,  as  the  passion  of  delight 
resides  in  the  appetite;  and  no  act  of  the  will  can  be  man's 
last  end. 
Five  Arguments  from  St.  Thomas,  C.G.3.  26. 

1.  Happiness  is  man's  last  end,  and  happiness  is  not  de- 
light or  r  pleasure.  Pleasure  is  an  act  of  the  will,  object  is 
prior  to  act,  and  will's  object  is  prior  to  will's  pleasure.  Ob- 
ject is  mover,  pleasure  is  movement.  Ergo,  happiness  cannot 
be  an  act  of  the  will,  it  cannot  be  pleasure. 

2.  Happiness  is  no  act  of  the  will,  it  is  not  pleasure.  It 
would  he  either  a,  desire;  h,  love;  or  c,  delight,  a,  Not  desire, 
which  tends  towards  something  not  yet  gotten,  b.  Not  love, 
because  love  turns  on  absent  as  well  as  present  good,  c,  Not 
delight,  because  delight  is  the  effect ;  possession  is  the  cause. 

3.  Happiness  is  not  in  act  of  the  will,  not  in  pleasure;  be- 
cause pleasure  can  be  true  or  false,  and  ever  the  same  with 
respect  to  rest  or  quiescence  on  part  of  the  will,  e.g.,  a 
drunken  man  and  a  philosopher.  Real  man  and  painted  man 
differ  by  constituents  of  substance,  and  intellect  makes  pleas- 
ure true  or  false,  not  act  of  the  will. 

4.  Delight  is  not  desirable  of  itself,  and,  therefore,   not 


STOIC  FORMALISM  169 

man's  last  end.  Otherwise  all  delight  would  be  desirable. 
Pleasure  is  of  indifferent  ethical  value,  sometimes  good,  some- 
times bad;  some  delight  is  desirable,  other  delight  is  to  be 
shunned. 

5.  Nature  uses  pleasure  as  means  only.  Ergo,  not  man's 
last  end.  Right  order  coincides  with  order  of  nature,  nature 
orders  things  without  mistake.  Nature  orders  man  as  well 
as  animals.  Delight  is  for  activity,  not  the  other  way  about, 
e.g.,  use  of  food  for  preservation  of  individual.  We  eat  to 
live;  we  do  not  live  to  eat.  Without  delight  animals  would 
not  eat.  Delight  is  the  means,  preservation  the  end.  Pleas- 
ures of  marriage  are  for  preservation  of  race. 

P.S.  Title  of  last  end  is  assigned  to  activity,  whereby  ex- 
terior thing  is  gained,  e.g.,  act  of  getting  the  money  is  last 
end,  not  desire  or  love  of  money.  God  is  last  end,  activity 
getting  God  is  understanding.  We  cannot  wish  what  we  do 
not  understand.  Ergo,  happiness  is  act  of  the  intellect,  not 
act  of  the  will,  not  pleasure  of  whatever  kind. 


THESIS  XV 

Ecmt's  autonomy  of  reason  is  wrong.    Russo,  pp.  67-70. 

The  greatest  of  all  goods  in  the  moral  order,  because  true 
and  absolute,  is  a  good  will.  All  other  faculties  are  good  in 
the  moral  order,  because  of  something  they  borrow  from  the 
will.  Morality  is  like  freedom.  It  belongs  primarily  to  the 
will,  and  is  passed  along  by  the  will  to  mind,  senses,  and  all 
else  in  the  man.  Mind  in  itself  is  a  physical,  not  a  moral 
good.  It  is  often  an  apparent  good,  and  always  a  relative 
good.  It  makes  a  good  writer,  a  good  philosopher,  but  not 
a  good  man.  Nobody  deserves  Heaven  for  proficiency  in 
mathematics  pure  and  simple.  Some  of  the  greatest  minds 
history  knows  are  buried  in  hell.  No  good  will  is  buried 
there,  because  good  will  means  virtue,  and  virtue  is  passport 
to  the  kingdom  of  God.  Will  is  choice,  and  the  best  will,  or 
the  best  good,  is  the  best  chooser.  In  morality  choice  lies  be- 
tween obedience  to  law  and  disobedience;  and  the  motive 
prompting  the  choice  has  a  decided  bearing  on  its  dignity  and 
worth.  Respect  for  the  law  would  seem  to  be  the  highest 
conceivable  motive;  and  therefore  two  factors  conspire  to 
make  a  perfect  will,  obedience  to  law,  with  respect  for  the 
law  for  single  motive  or  reason  why.  Obedience  and  respect 
are  paid  to  persons,  not  to  things;  and,  therefore,  we  might 
better  say,  obedience  to  the  lawmaker,  and  respect  for  the 
same.  Fear  and  hope  are  negatively  imperfect  motives  as 
compared  with  love. 

Up  to  this  point  we  are  a  unit  with  Kant.  All  the  differ- 
ence between  us  starts  here,  and  it  is  rooted  in  the  man's 
stupid  conception  of  the  law  in  question,  and  of  the  relative 
worth  of  motives  urging  to  its  observance.  With  him,  the 
law  to  be  obeyed  is  his  categorical  imperative,  "So  act  that, 
if  you  had  your  way,  your  conduct  would  have  to  be  made 
universal  standard  for  the  race.''    His  categorical  imperative 

170 


AUTONOMY  AND  HETBRONOMY      171 

emanates  from  his  own  reason,  his  practical  reason,  his  will, 
without  God  or  man  at  its  back  to  urge  its  observance.  It  is 
his  own  private  affair,  a  matter  of  business  between  himself 
and  himself.  If  he  follows  orders,  he  does  himself  a  kindness ; 
if  he  breaks  orders,  he  does  himself  an  unkindness ;  and  that  is 
all.  No  created  thing  is  capable  of  uttering  a  categorical  im- 
perative, an  absolute  and  necessary  imperative,  because  no 
created  thing  is  the  absolute  and  necessary,  and  no  effect  can 
surpass  its  cause.  From  relative  and  contingent  beings  like 
creatures,  and  practical  reason  is  a  creature,  no  higher  than 
a  relative  and  contingent  imperative  can  issue. 

And  this  is  what  we  call  Kant's  autonomy  or  autocracy  of 
reason,  the  enthronement  of  self  as  supreme  arbiter  of  every 
man's  destiny,  the  impudent  usurpation  by  man  of  rights 
vested  in  the  Creator,  a  virtual  declaration  of  man's  inde- 
pendence of  everybody,  God  included,  subservient  to  nobody 
but  himself,  subject  to  only  such  laws  as  he  makes  for  him- 
self, accountable  for  his  conduct  to  nobody  but  himself,  his 
own  judge,  his  own  jury,  his  own  executioner.  He  gathers 
the  purely  subjective  nature  of  his  categorical  imperative,  the 
fact  that  all  obligation  in  the  man  is  due  to  a  command  he, 
and  he  alone,  imposes  on  himself,  from  the  circumstance  that 
no  other  absolute  and  necessary  command  is  conceivable. 
Everything  falling  under  the  experience  of  our  senses  is  rela- 
tive and  contingent,  the  categorical  imperative,  as  an  abso- 
lute and  necessary  something,  must  have  its  origin  in  the 
practical  reason,  considered  in  action,  the  one  phenomenon 
apart  and  distinct  from  sensile  occurrences.  He  sees  the 
absurdity  of  attributing  the  qualities,  absolute  and  necessary, 
to  any  product  of  the  practical  reason;  and,  therefore,  ac- 
knovjledging  his  inability  to  prove  the  absolute  and  necessary 
nature  of  his  categorical  imperative,  he  contends  that  these 
two  qualities  of  his  categorical  imperative  are  a  postulate  of 
his  system,  and  must  be  accepted  without  proof. 

He  could  have  easily  avoided  all  trouble  by  introducing 
God,  the  one  absolute  and  necessary  being  in  the  universe, 
and  ascribing  his  categorical  imperative  not  to  practical  rea- 
son but  to  the  natural  law  imposed  on  man  by  God,  and 
brought  to  man's  notice  by  reason.  But  the  poor  man  is 
hounded  everywhere  by  that  ghost  of  his  own  making,  nou- 


172  GENERAL  ETHICS 

menaj  spirits,  thirigs  in  themselves,  too  far  removed  from  the 
senses  to  base  certain  knowledge,  matter  for  empty  conjecture, 
sure  in  the  event  to  propagate  ignorance  and  superstition. 
God  is  a  noumenon,  a  pure  spirit,  beyond  the  reach  of  eye, 
and  ear,  and  all  the  senses,  but  quite  within  the  reach  of 
reason,  arguing  from  the  reality  of  patent  effects  in  the  uni- 
verse to  the  reality  of  their  cause.  Man's  reason  is  for  nou- 
mena,  as  his  senses  are  for  phenomena;  and  if  our  knowledge 
is  restricted  to  phenomena,  if  we  have  no  certain  knowledge 
of  noumena,  we  are  little  better  than  brutes,  and  in  many 
respects  their  inferiors. 

With  practical  reason  for  single  origin  of  the  categorical 
imperative,  reason  is  oMtonomous,  its  own  lawmaker,  and 
every  man  is  his  own  standard  of  morality.  More  than  this, 
every  man  manufactures  his  own  moral  obligations,  imposes 
on  himself  whatever  duties  he  sees  fit  to  impose,  selecting  some, 
rejecting  others,  always  with  the  proviso  that  he  can  reject 
to-morrow  what  he  selects  to-day.  In  other  words,  he  is 
morally  bound  to  the  performance  of  this  or  that  particular 
act,  simply  because  he  holds  himself  to  its  performance,  not 
because  any  outside  superior  issues  a  command  to  that  effect. 
Kant  stands  for  autonomy  of  will,  as  opposed  to  heteronomy. 
We  stand  for  heteronomy  of  the  will,  maintaining  that  God  is 
single  author  of  moral  obligation,  that  reason  is  the  herald 
God  employs  to  make  His  wishes  known,  that  the  true  cate- 
gorical imperative  is  the  natural  law,  which  is  divine  legisla- 
tion, not  human,  which  is  found  indeed  in  man 's  reason,  with- 
out being  derived  from  it.  We  can  all  be  found  in  the  Wool- 
worth  Building  Friday  evening,  but  the  Woolworth  is  no  ex- 
planation of  our  origin.  The  laws  of  New  York  can  be  found 
in  certain  printed  books,  but  the  printer  never  made  them. 
Kant  wants  us  to  think  that  we  impose  obligations  on  our- 
selves, simply  because  we  wake  up  to  the  fact  that  we  are 
under  obligations.  The  objective  order  of  things,  as  set  forth 
in  the  natural  law,  arouses  us  to  a  sense  of  obligation,  and 
this  objective  order  of  things  is  the  handiwork  of  God,  as 
well  as  the  natural  law  embodying  it.  If  man  himself  is 
altogether  responsible  for  Kant's  categorical  imperative,  man 
imposes  this  obligation  on  himself  either  with  full  freedom 
or  with  strict  necessity.     If  with  full  freedom,  it  ceases  to 


AUTONOMY  AND  HETERONOMY      173 

be  real  and  true  obligation ;  if  with  strict  necessity,  something 
distinct  from  the  will  forces  its  wishes  on  the  will,  and  God 
alone,  as  maker  of  the  will,  enjoys  this  prerogative.  Kant's 
imperative  is  a  self-imposed  command,  one  and  the  same  per- 
son is  ruler  and  subject ;  and  a  self-imposed  command,  because 
open  always  to  revocation  at  the  will  of  the  subject,  carries 
no  binding  authority.  To  save  himself  from  open  folly,  Kant 
makes  the  reason  ruler,  the  will  subject ;  but  reason  and  will 
belong  to  the  same  man,  and  no  two  persons  are  present. 
When  a  man  binds  himself  hy  agreement,  or  vow,  the  obliga- 
tion arises  not  from  the  man  himself,  but  from  a  precept  of 
the  natural  law,  an  ordinance  of  God  holding  rational  crea- 
tures to  their  promises.  The  obligation  is  independent  of 
man's  will.  He  is  free  to  make  the  agreement  or  not;  but, 
once  the  agreement  is  made,  he  is  not  free  to  assume  the  obli- 
gation or  not.  He  is  free  to  put  the  condition  or  not;  but, 
with  the  condition  once  placed,  the  obligation  follows,  no 
matter  what  he  wishes. 

Besides  missing  the  true  nature  of  the  only  categorical  im- 
perative worthy  of  the  name,  the  natural  law  issuing  as  a 
command  from  God  to  do  good  and  avoid  evil,  Kant  beauti- 
fully mixes  things  in  his  discussion  of  motives  and  their 
relative  dignity.  The  motive  of  obedience  is  the  reason  why 
the  will  obeys,  and  three  possible  motives  for  observance  of 
the  natural  law  at  once  suggest  themselves,  respect  for  the 
lawmaker,  fear  of  penalty  and  hope  of  reward.  All  three  mo- 
tives are  equally  relative  and  contingent.  The  most  perfect 
motive  of  the  three  is  respect  for  the  lawmaker;  but  this  is 
far  from  rendering  the  other  two  positively  imperfect  or  bad. 
They  are  at  most  negatively  imperfect,  or  less  good.  They 
possess  their  own  worth,  they  have  their  own  goodness,  though 
it  happens  to  be  inferior  to  the  goodness  attaching  to  respect 
for  the  lawmaker.  The  whole  thing  is  like  saying  that  im- 
perfect love  for  God  is  inferior  to  perfect  love  for  God,  with- 
out ever  becoming  hatred.  Only  a  bad  motive  is  a  positively 
imperfect  motive.  Negatively  imperfect  motives  are  good  mo- 
tives of  varying  degrees.  A  five-dollar-bill  is  always  money, 
though  it  is  worth  less  than  a  hundred-dollar-bill.  Only  a 
counterfeit  is  no  money  at  all.  And  all  three  motives  are  com- 
patible, not  mutually  destructive  of  one  another.     Nothing 


174  GENERAL  ETHICS 

prevents  a  man  from  keeping  the  law  out  of  respect  for  the 
lawmaker,  from  dread  of  penalty,  and  from  hope  of  reward. 
In  fact,  three  motives  are  better  than  one,  especially  when 
the  one  chosen  is  the  weakest  of  the  three;  and  man^s  innate 
selfishness  will  always  make  penalty  and  reward  more  effective 
for  good  thari  respect  for  the  lawmaker. 


PART  II 
SPECIAL  ETHICS 

INTRODUCTION 

We  have  thus  far  dealt  in  speculation  of  a  general  nature, 
without  adverting  much  to  individual  emergencies  in  an  indi- 
vidual life.  We  have  rather  laid  down  rules,  sure  to  find 
application  in  every  step  taken  with  a  bearing  on  morality. 
Now  we  proceed  to  examine  the  obligations  arising  from  rela- 
tions involved  in  certain  conditions  and  contingencies  of  life. 
Man  has  dealings  with  God,  with  himself,  and  with  his  fellow- 
men.  He  occupies  a  well  defined  position  in  the  universe,  and 
his  moral  worth  stands  or  falls  with  the  attitude  he  adopts 
in  his  every  day  acts  towards  God,  towards  himself,  and  to- 
wards his  neighbor.  This  threefold  source  of  duty  is  common 
to  every  man  born  into  the  world,  and  independent  of  every 
later  arrangement  or  added  condition.  It  aifects  the  indi- 
vidual as  such.  Nature,  however,  has  besides  constituted  man 
a  social  being.  It  has  ordained  that  at  his  very  birth  he 
belong  to  a  family,  and  has  made  it  quite  impossible  for  him 
to  continue  in  existence  without  entering  into  certain  amicable 
relations  with  his  fellows.  Hence  he  finds  himself  by  a  very 
necessity  of  nature  constituted  at  once  a  member  of  civil  so- 
ciety or  the  state,  as  well  as  of  domestic  society  or  the  family. 
Besides,  God  the  author  of  nature  has  in  the  person  of  Jesus 
Christ  established  a  third  society,  the  Church,  and  has  made 
membership  in  it  an  inevitable  duty.  These  three  societies, 
differing  in  scope  and  machinery,  secure  advantages  and  im- 
pose in  return  corresponding  burdens.  Fathers,  mothers, 
brothers,  sisters,  children,  rulers  and  subjects  have  set  func- 
tions to  discharge,  and  rectitude  consists  in  strict  compliance 
with  their  several  duties.  It  therefore  belongs  to  this  part 
of  Moral  Philosophy  to  put  in  as  clear  a  light  as  possible 

175 


176  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

man^s  obligations  as  an  individual  to  God,  himself  and  his 
neighbor,  and  man 's  obligations  as  a  social  being  to  his  family, 
to  his  government  and  its  citizens,  und  to  the  Church  ap- 
pointed of  God. 

Religion  is  the  one  word  expressive  of  man's  duty  towards 
God,  and  this  religion  includes  worship  of  mind  and  body, 
and  steadfast  belief  in  revelation,  or  the  utterances  of  God. 
Man  is  loyal  to  himself,  when  he  makes  good  all  the  claims 
urged  by  reason  in  behalf  of  his  own  proper  soul  and  body. 
Suicide,  self-defense  and  duelling  are  topics  of  vital  interest 
in  this  subject.  Truthfulness  in  speech  and  the  right  to  prop- 
erty are  points  particularly  offended  against  in  man 's  conduct 
towards  his  fellows.  In  the  field  of  the  family,  or  domestic 
society,  marriage  itself,  celibacy,  polygamy,  divorce,  education 
of  child  and  the  mutual  relations  between  family  and  state, 
are  questions  of  weighty  importance.  Man's  natural  instinct 
for  political  or  civil  society,  society's  end,  its  constituents, 
forms  of  government,  state  prerogatives,  and  sedition  will 
occur  for  discussion  in  our  consideration  of  civil  society. 


SECTION  I.    MAN  AS  AN  INDIVIDUAL 
THESIS  I 

Religion  is  man*s  first  duty,  a  matter  of  essential  necessity 
to  the  individual  and  the  state.  Worship,  interior  and  ex- 
terior, private  and  public,  is  God^s  due.  Man's  duty  towards 
revelation  is  to  accept  it,  when. known  as  such;  to  diligently 
seek  and  find  it,  when  hidden,  and  when  he  has  reason  to  sup- 
pose that  it  exists.  Toleration  in  matter  of  dogma  is  absurd. 
Jouin,  71-96 ;  Bickaby,  191-202. 

QUESTION 

We  are  by  supposition  dealing  with  men  honest  enough  to 
admit  God's  existence  and  the  fact  of  creation.  We  likewise 
take  for  granted  the  possibility  and  the  fact  of  creation.  For 
proofs  of  these  several  points  we  refer  to  Natural  Theology 
and  forward  parts  of  Metaphysics.  Man's  duties  towards 
others  are  based  on  relations  in  force  between  himself  and 
these  others;  and  the  first  condition  that  confronts  him  is, 
from  the  very  fact  of  creation,  that  of  utter  dependence  on 
God.  Man  is  God 's  handiwork,  and  belongs  to  Him  body  and 
soul.  In  virtue  of  His  supreme  dominion  God  has  an  in- 
alienable right  to  the  completest  service  of  His  creature;  and 
must,  from  the  very  nature  of  things,  stand  vested  with  a 
master's  control  over  man's  every  faculty  and  energy.  Wor- 
ship, interior  and  exterior,  submission  of  intellect  and  will, 
are  the  highest  conceivable  tributes  of  superiority  one  ra- 
tional being  can  pay  another,  and  religion  embodies  both. 
Faith  and  trust  in  God's  messages,  or  the  acceptance  of  reve- 
lation, is  an  element  of  religion  on  which  champions  of  God's 
cause  cannot  with  too  much  force  insist  in  these  days  of  irre- 
ligion  and  unbelief.  Revelation  is  the  channel  through  which 
men  are  advertised  of  the  sort  of  service  God  wants,  and  ex- 

177 


178  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

perience  is  witness  that  worship  weakens  and  falls  dead,  when 
the  truths  of  revelation  are  once  called  into  question  and 
doubted. 

TERMS 

Religion.  The  word  is  of  Latin  origin,  and  authors  are 
divided  between  three  possible  derivations.  Lactantius,  an 
eminent  scholar  and  Church-writer,  favors  religare  for  root- 
word.  Religion  with  him  means  a  second  bond  or  moral  obli- 
gation, added  to  man's  first  or  physical  dependence  on  God 
for  being,  preservation,  activity  and  care.  Cicero,  with  whom 
Lactantius  finds  fault,  ventures  relegere,  meaning  to  dwell  on 
in  thought,  or  meditate.  His  derivation  gives  large  prom- 
inence to  the  theoretical  side  of  religion.  St.  Augustine,  see- 
ing in  the  Redemption  a  second  choice  of  God  made  by  fallen 
man,  traces  the  word  to  religere,  to  choose  again.  In  classical 
Latinity  religion  is  regularly  identified  with  the  feeling  of 
respect  and  veneration  entertained  towards  parents,  relatives 
and  friends. 

But  whatever  may  be  said  of  ancient  usage,  it  is  quite  cer- 
tain that  religion  to-day,  taken  in  a  strict  and  technical  sense, 
denotes  a  something  referred  to  God  alone.  It  is  a  duty,  a 
moral  attitude,  or  condition,  or  relation,  based  on  man 's  phys- 
ical dependence  on  God  for  existence,  preservation,  activity 
and  control.  It  has  for  foundation  the  circumstance  that 
God  is  man's  first  cause  and  last  end.  Hence  religion  is  gen- 
erally defined,  the  duty  to  acknowledge  and  worship  God  as 
first  cause  and  last  end.  Acknowledgment  denotes  the  free 
acceptance  of  a  truth,  and  of  whatever  responsibilities  attach 
to  it.  It  supposes  knowledge,  and  adds  thereto  an  act  of  the 
will.  Worship  is  testimony  rendered  to  divine  excellence, 
coupled  with  due  submission.  It  is  honor  combined  with  sub- 
mission. 

Religion  may  be  considered  objectively  or  subjectively. 
Objectively  taken,  it  is  a  collection  of  truths  expressive  of  the 
relations  in  force  between  God  and  man,  and  a  catalogue  of 
the  duties  hinging  on  these  relations.  Subjectively  taken,  it 
is  the  actual  or  habitual  acknowledgment  of  these  truths  and 
performance  of  these  duties.  Religion  is  a  branch  of  justice, 
because  it  is  God 's  due.     It  includes,  among  others,  truths  like 


RIGHTS  AND  DUTIES  179 

the  following,  God  created  man,  preserves  him,  exercises  over 
him  the  controlling  influence  of  a  ruler  and  helper,  rewards 
and  punishes  him  in  the  next  life  as  a  most  just  judge.  It 
includes  the  duties  of  adoration,  sacrifice,  prayer  and  faith 
in  God's  word.  Religion  is  a  branch  of  justice  under  the 
formality  of  God's  due,  not  under  other  formalities.  Reli- 
gion is  something  more  than  mere  good  conduct  and  respect- 
able behavior.  Pagans  and  modern  heretics  in  reducing  the 
notion  to  limits  so  narrow  forget  that  the  will,  the  mainspring 
of  conduct,  depends  for  all  its  vigor  on  the  mind  or  intellect. 
Luther's  rule  was,  faith  without  good  works;  now  the  rule 
reads,  good  works  without  faith. 

Viewed  as  a  body  of  truths,  religion  is  said  to  be  theoretical, 
dogmatic,  speculative.  Viewed  as  a  body  of  duties,  it  is  said 
to  be  practical.  Religion  in  both  senses  is  essential.  Theo- 
retical religion  without  practical  religion  is  imperfect.  Prac- 
tical religion  without  theoretical  religion  is  often  no  better, 
no  more  sincere ;  and  is  always  subject  to  decay  and  death.  A 
religion  may  be  false  and  wrong  in  one  of  two  ways,  either  by 
paying  homage  to  a  false  god,  or  by  worshipping  the  true  God 
in  a  way  opposed  to  His  wishes.  Natural  religion  would  be 
a  thing  no  higher  than  human  reason,  with  precepts  possible 
of  fulfilment  to  man's  unaided  resources.  But  we  live  in  the 
blessed  light  of  revelation,  and  the  only  religion  now  in  vogue, 
and  in  vogue  from  the  beginning,  is  revealed  or  supernatural. 
God  has  in  His  goodness  deigned  to  stamp  with  the  seal  of 
His  own  word  even  such  truths  and  such  plain  obligations  as 
reason  of  itself  can  fathom. 

Duty.  Right  and  duty  are  correlative  terms  and  insep- 
arable. Right  is  one  of  the  terms  in  our  language,  conveying 
notions  at  first  sight  whole  seas  different.  Thus,  the  right  is 
confounded  with  rectitude  and  conveys  the  notion  of  exact 
agreement  with  that  straight  line  of  conduct  morality  bids 
us  walk.  A  right  is  something  altogether  other,  and  can  be 
best  perhaps  described  as,  the  moral  and  inviolable  power  or 
strength  to  do  or  exact  something.  The  Romans  had  two 
words  for  our  one.  Right  in  the  first  sense,  they  expressed 
by  rectum;  right  in  the  second  sense,  they  expressed  by  jus. 
This  jus  is  clearly  connected  with  jubere,  to  order  or  legis- 
late; and  since  all  law  is  founded  on  rectitude,  the  choice 


180  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

of  the  word  was  happy.  A  jus  or  right  is  an  emphatic  com- 
mand, forbidding  anybody  to  interfere  with  its  enforcement. 
It  is  creative  of  a  duty  in  outside  agencies,  restraining  them 
from  opposition  to  its  peaceful  fulfilment.  Four  elements  of 
a  right  are  person  of  inherence,  person  of  incidence,  object, 
and  act. 

Take  for  example  ownership  in  a  house  and  lot  or  parcel 
of  ground.  The  person  of  inherence  is  owner,  the  person  of 
incidence  is  the  rest  of  the  world,  the  object  is  the  building 
and  piece  of  ground,  the  act  is  use  for  purposes  of  residence, 
sale,  changes,  repairs,  and  against  trespass.  Right,  therefore, 
is  an  order  issuing  from  the  person  of  inherence  or  owner, 
backed  by  the  omnipotence  of  nature  or  God,  and  command- 
ing the  person  of  incidence,  whether  a  set  and  definite  indi- 
vidual or  the  world  at  large,  to  reverence  the  wishes  of  its 
owner  in  at  least  one  respect.  God  is  the  avenger  of  broken 
rights,  and  nobody  violates  a  right  without  disputing  the 
authority  of  God,  and  running  counter  to  His  wishes.  Na- 
ture, and  nature  here  means  God,  vests  the  owner  of  a  right 
with  the  authority  of  a  king,  and  word  from  him  in  the  mat- 
ter of  his  right  is  word  from  God.  Men  on  occasions  lack 
the  physical  strength  needed  to  enforce  their  rights ;  but  God 
is  their  champion,  strength  never  fails  Him,  and,  whether  in 
this  life  or  the  next,  God  ultimately  makes  right  prevail,  by 
actual  accomplishment  or,  in  event  of  its  failure,  by  penalty. 

Right  and  duty  are  therefore  closely  related,  and  a  knowl- 
edge of  one  helps  much  to  a  knowledge  of  the  other.  A  right 
is  a  moral  force,  and  depends  by  no  means  for  its  validity  on 
physical  superiority.  Rights  are  on  this  account  often  tram- 
pled and  violated  by  might  in  a  world  of  iniquity  and  wrong ; 
but  nobody  ever  maintained  that  a  right  lapsed  when  borne 
down  by  might.  For  the  simple  reason  that  they  have  no 
intellect  or  will,  and  are  therefore  outside  the  category  of 
moral  beings,  animals  have  no  rights.  We  owe  it  to  ourselves 
to  treat  them  humanely;  but,  as  far  as  they  are  themselves 
concerned,  cruelty  to  animals  is  no  violation  of  a  right.  The 
obligation  engendered  in  others  by  the  existence  of  a  right  is 
sometimes  negative,  sometimes  positive.  There  are  in  other 
words  rights  of  such  a  nature  that  they  merely  forbid  outside 
interference,  without  obliging  others  to  help  positively  to  their 


MIGHT  AND  RIGHT  ISl 

realization.  There  are  others,  on  the  contrary,  of  such  a 
nature  that  they  lay  on  others  the  responsibility  of  contrib- 
uting by  positive  acts  to  their  issue.  Finally,  right  is  founded 
on  law ;  and  since  law  without  God  is  a  dead  letter,  any  recog- 
nition of  right  is  silent  and  sure  testimony  to  the  existence 
Of  God. 

Rights  are  personal  or  real.  A  personal  right  immediately 
affects  the  person  of  the  possessor;  a  real  right  affects  him 
only  through  the  medium  of  some  second  thing.  Instances 
are,  the  right  to  life  and  the  right  to  a  piece  of  property. 
Rights  are  likewise  natural  and  inborn,  or  acquired.  They 
are  natural,  if  derived  to  man  from  his  very  nature.  They 
are  acquired,  if  due  to  some  free  act,  of  which  he  acquits  him- 
self. Thus,  the  rights  to  improve  the  mind,  to  defend  life 
when  unjustly  attacked,  to  acquire  land,  are  all  natural ;  and, 
as  such,  beyond  all  possibility  of  loss  or  forfeiture.  The  right, 
on  the  other  hand,  to  ownership  in  this  or  that  particular 
strip  of  land,  because  largely  dependent  on  some  special  ac- 
tivity freely  exerted,  is  an  acquired  right,  and  admits,  of  loss 
or  change.  Might  can  with  justice  and  propriety  be  employed 
to  effect  the  enforcement  of  a  right.  Right,  resident  as  it  is 
in  the  mind  and  the  will,  has  claims  on  man's  inferior  facul- 
ties, and  can  call  these  forces  that  constitute  physical  strength 
to  its  assistance.  Neither  is  injustice  done  the  party  against 
whom  violence  is  used.  If  right  primarily  binds  his  mind 
and  will,  small  wonder  if  its  influence  extends  to  the  mem- 
bers of  his  body. 

A  conflict  or  collision  of  rights  is  quite  possible  in  certain 
contingencies.  In  such  an  emergency  only  one  of  the  two 
rights  is  real.  The  other  is  no  right  at  all,  but  only  a  shadow. 
Right  cannot  in  the  nature  of  things  be  opposed  to  right. 
When  a  clash  of  the  kind  occurs,  the  relative  merit  of  the 
two  claims  must  be  weighed,  and  the  worthier  must  prevail. 
Nature  again  furnishes  us  with  the  standard  of  measurement, 
and  the  question  must  be  decided  in  strict  accordance  with  the 
demands  of  nature's  order.  Thus,  when  some  human  enact- 
ment is  in  open  contradiction  with  God's  law,  the  human  law 
is  no  law  at  all.  It  must  yield,  and  its  framers  are  vested 
with  no  prerogative  of  authority,  as  against  the  source  and 
author  of  all  authority.     In  every  well  organized  community 


182  SPECIAL  ETHIQS; 

courts  are  established,  and  their  word  is  supreme  in  the  set- 
tlement of  disputes  turning  on  civil  rights.  No  private  citi- 
zen has  the  power  to  take  the  law  into  his  own  hands,  and 
decide  quarrels  with  his  neighbor.  In  this  plan,  justice  may 
on  some  rare  occasions  be  defeated ;  but  the  order  maintained, 
and  the  bloodshed  avoided,  more  than  compensate  for  these 
scattered  wrongs.  Eights  have  limits,  beyond  which  they  can- 
not be  pushed.  No  right  however  valid  can  sanction  the  com- 
mission of  sin.  When  pursuing  a  right,  we  must  proceed 
with  caution,  and  avoid  offending  against  the  duties  of  others 
and  our  own  plain  duty.  Rights  in  many  cases  assume  the 
nature  of  privileges,  and  there  is  no  law  compelling  a  man 
to  everywhere  make  use  of  his  privileges. 

Duty  is  the  source  of  that  inner  consciousness  of  moral  re- 
straint which  accompanies  every  dictate  of  the  natural  law. 
It  invariably  presents  itself  in  the  shape  of  a  command, 
ordering  man  to  do  or  avoid  something.  It  is  a  strict  obliga- 
tion, and  man  knows  that,  if  he  wants  to  remain  true  to  him- 
self and  his  nature,  he  must  satisfy  its  demands.  A  duty,  in 
concrete  terms,  is  this  or  that  act  urged  or  forbidden  by  law 
and  order.  God 's  rights  are  the  origin  of  men 's  duties ;  and 
God,  independent  as  He  is  of  every  superior,  is  a  stranger 
to  duties  properly  so  called.  In  figurative  language  we  some- 
times speak  of  God's  duties  to  Himself  and  even  to  men. 
But  in  strict  usage  duty  always  connotes  a  superior,  a  being 
with  full  authority  to  impose  the  duty.  Absolutely  speaking, 
then,  right  is  first  of  the  two  in  order  of  time.  Confining 
the  question  to  man,  duty  always  precedes  right.  All  man's 
rights  are  founded  on  the  duty  binding  him  to  the  accom- 
plishment of  the  end  designed  for  him  by  nature's  Creator. 
Whatever  conduces  to  that  end,  without  disturbing  the  reign 
of  justice,  constitutes  matter  for  a  right.  He  is  armed  with 
a  right  to  repel  whatever  seriously  and  unjustly  interferes 
with  his  destiny's  consummation. 

N.B.  Duty  manifests  the  claims  of  moral  rectitude,  and 
rectitude  is  the  observance  of  relations,  or  conduct  in  har- 
mony with  the  objective  order  of  things.  The  order  of  excel- 
lence and  importance  prevalent  in  duties  is,  God,  self,  and  the 
neighbor.  Compare  Hedonism  and  Altruism.  Ahrens  and 
Damiron  would  recognize  rights  in  animals,  because  they  are 


RELIGION  A  NECESSITY  183 

called  in  Holy  Writ  sons  of  God,  and  because  we  are  forbidden 
to  do  them  injury  or  cause  them  pain.  We  answer,  Holy 
Writ  is  on  occasions  poetic,  and  these  scattered  passages  are 
to  be  so  interpreted.  The  Church  is  judge,  not  our  op- 
ponents or  ourselves.  We  slay  animals  for  purposes  of  sus- 
tenance, comfort  and  ornament.  We  must  not  be  wanton  in 
our  treatment  of  animals,  because  all  such  conduct  is  hostile 
to  the  growth  of  mildness  and  meekness. 

First  Duty.  In  point  of  time  and  in  point  of  excellence. 
This  duty  of  religion,  to  ensure  good  results  in  after  life,  ought 
to  be  impressed  on  the  child 's  thoughts  from  the  earliest  dawn 
of  reason,  and  all  other  duties,  even  towards  his  parents, 
should  be  unfolded  to  his  growing  mind  as  corollaries  flowing 
from  the  first.  He  should  be  taught  that  parents,  country 
and  friends,  high  as  they  stand  in  his  esteem  and  love,  occupy 
only  second  place  to  God,  and  that  at  God's  call  all  these  and 
much  else  besides  must  be  abandoned. 

Essential  Necessity.  Philosophy  recognizes  two  kinds  of 
necessity,  accidental  and  essential.  The  former  hardly  de- 
serves the  name.  It  represents  a  thing  necessary  only  after 
such  a  fashion  that  the  effect  can  in  certain  circumstances 
have  place  in  its  absence,  and  its  functions  can  always  be 
discharged  by  some  other  object.  Thus,  for  instance,  brown 
bread  is  said  to  be  an  accidental  necessity  of  life.  Essential 
necessity  truly  deserves  the  name.  It  represents  a  thing  so 
necessary  that  in  the  event  of  its  absence  the  effect  is  simply 
out  of  the  question.  Thus,  food  of  some  sort  is  an  essential 
necessity  for  continuance  in  life.  This  essential  necessity, 
however,  admits  of  degrees.  It  may  be  physical,  or  quasi- 
physical,  or  moral.  A  physical  essential  necessity  forms  part 
of  a  thing's  very  being,  body  in  man.  A  quasi-physical  es- 
sential necessity  contributes  to  a  thing's  well-being.  Want 
of  a  necessity  of  this  kind  makes  itself  felt  in  a  wholly  differ- 
ent way  from  want  of  an  accidental  necessity.  Sound  health, 
for  instance,  is  a  quasi-physical  essential  necessity  for  the 
enjoyment  of  life.  It  cannot,  like  bread,  be  replaced  by  some 
other  commodity.  A  moral  essential  necessity  is  an  object, 
thoroughly  requisite  for  the  rounding  out  of  a  man's  moral 
being.  It  is  an  imperative  call  of  conscience,  a  heavy  and 
unavoidable  obligation.     Failure  to  comply  with  its  demands 


184  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

disturbs  that  harmony  with  the  objective  order  which  con- 
stitutes man's  last  end  or  destiny  in  this  life.  We  contend 
that  religion,  objective  and  subjective,  dogmatic  and  prac- 
tical, while  not  a  physical  essential  necessity  for  individual 
and  state,  is  for  one  and  the  other  a  quasi-physical  and  a 
moral  essential  necessity.  We  contend,  in  other  words,  that 
without  religion  man's  physical  life  is  beset  with  trials,  trou- 
bles and  dangers,  that  the  state's  welfare  is  seriously  harmed, 
and  that  individual  and  state  are  out  of  harmony  with  recti- 
tude. 

Individual  and  State.  Religion's  bearing  on  the  lives  of 
individual  citizens  presents  no  difficulty  whatever.  Its  bear- 
ing on  the  state  becomes  as  clear,  when  we  regard  the  state 
a  moral  person,  affected  with  rights  it  can  enforce,  with  duties 
it  must  discharge.  With  this  view  of  the  state  we  are  ac- 
quainted from  common  every  day  experience.  Our  President 
and  our  Governors  pay  religious  tribute  to  God,  by  proclaim- 
ing once  a  year  the  advent  of  Thanksgiving  Day,  by  coun- 
tenancing religious  observance  throughout  the  land,  by  prayer 
in  our  legislative  assemblies,  and  at  other  functions  of  state. 
In  distinctively  Catholic  countries  the  duty  is  accomplished 
with  more  solemn  ceremony. 

Worship.  Testimony  to  divine  excellence  coupled  with  due 
submission.  It  is  honor  of  a  peculiar  sort  combined  with 
submission.  When  the  acts  of  homage  are  internal  and 
unseen  of  men,  the  worship  is  interior.  When  these  acts  are 
external,  and  plain  to  the  senses,  the  worship  is  exterior. 
Public  worship,  or  social,  is  homage  done  God  by  the  state 
in  its  representatives,  not  in  private  individuals.  The  ob- 
servance paid  God  by  citizens  in  their  private  capacity  con- 
stitutes private  worship.  Only  the  godless  deny  the  necessity 
of  interior  worship.  But  scores  of  writers  endeavor  to  do 
away  with  the  need  of  exterior  worship,  and  public  or  social 
worship  of  whatever  sort.  Many  are  urged  to  take  this  step 
by  hostility  to  the  Catholic  Church,  so  insistent  on  exterior 
worship.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  vast  majority  of  men 
to-day  outside  of  the  true  faith,  regard  attendance  at  Sunday 
service  a  thing  of  minor  importance,  wholly  beneath  their 
notice,  and  no  matter  of  conscience  at  all.  Some,  with  a  fam- 
ily resemblance  to  the  traitor  Judas,  prate  about  the  useless 


WORSHIP  185 

expenditure  of  money,  wasted  in  the  erection  of  edifices  for 
purposes  of  worship.  These  proclaim  with  loud  mouths  that 
the  green  fields  are  God's  temple,  and  that  the  birds  of  the 
air  are  His  choristers.  They  declare  external  observances  and 
ceremonies  a  hollow  mockery,  superstition ;  and  never  lose  an 
opportunity  to  inveigh  against  them.  But  their  own  conduct 
is  the  weightiest  argument  against  their  words.  They  are 
monuments  of  decayed  religious  spirit,  the  unfailing  growth 
of  negligence  in  matters  external. 

Of  the  two  kinds  of  worship,  interior  is,  of  course,  the 
higher  and  more  precious ;  but,  constituted  as  he  is,  man  de- 
pends for  inner  emotions  on  his  outward  behavior  and  deport- 
ment of  body.  When  minded  to  pray,  he  needs  to  be  sur- 
rounded with  all  the  holy  images,  and  with  that  atmosphere 
of  quiet  resident  in  our  churches.  He  needs  to  go  down  on 
his  knees,  and  fold  his  hands,  and  shut  his  eyes  against  the 
thousand  distracting  objects  clamoring  for  his  attention. 
Even  with  all  the  varied  helps  present  in  our  houses  of  prayer, 
it  is  no  easy  task  to  check  our  senses,  and  address  God  with 
the  profound  respect,  which  is  His  due.  Then  too,  the 
Creator  made  our  hands,  arms,  eyes  and  the  other  members 
of  the  body,  as  well  as  the  soul;  and  mind-worship  to  the 
exclusion  of  body-worship  is  paying  only  half  our  debt. 
Thomasius,  Dunzi  and  Kemmerichius  concede  a  measure  of 
usefulness  to  exterior  worship,  but  deny  reason's  ability  to 
prove  its  necessity.  Ahrens,  infected  with  modem  rational- 
ism, frames  up  a  definition  of  religion,  from  which  he  en- 
tirely excludes  the  necessity  of  exterior  worship.  ''Reli- 
gion," he  says,  "is  a  union  of  mind  and  heart  with  the  su- 
preme being."  ''Worship,  therefore,"  with  him,  "is  an 
intellectual  and  spiritual  work  only,  which  ought  to  refrain 
from  representing  God  and  His  attributes  by  sensible  signs." 
' '  One  may, ' '  he  continues,  ' '  call  to  his  assistance  some  of  the 
fine  arts,  such  for  instance  as  music  and  song,  because  these 
serve  to  more  vividly  express  our  notions  of  the  infinite. ' ' 
He  allows  the  sense  of  hearing  to  play  a  part  in  divine  wor- 
ship, he  has  no  place  for  the  eyes,  and  scents  from  afar 
Catholicity's  veneration  of  images 

Eevelation.  The  word  is  a  Latin  derivative  from  re,  back, 
and  velum,  a  veil.     It  means  therefore  the  removal  of  a  veil. 


186 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


the  lifting  of  some  hidden  truth  into  the  light.  In  theology, 
revelation  is  defined  as,  '' A  communication  from  God  in  lan- 
guage strictly  so  called,  hy  which,  on  the  authority  of  His 
testimony.  He  makes  known  to  men  truths  in  the  order  of 
salvation.' '  All  creation  is  said  to  be  a  book,  which  sets  forth 
with  a  great  wealth  of  detail  God's  guiding  presence,  His 
attributes,  and  His  wishes  in  our  regard.  But  it  conveys 
lessons  through  a  medium  different  from  language  properly 
so  called,  and  therefore  falls  short  of  being  revelation.  Reve- 
lation is  the  word  of  God,  something  once  uttered  by  God 
for  men 's  spiritual  advantage.  Its  channels  are  direct  speech, 
the  written  word,  and  tradition.  He  held  immediate  converse 
with  Moses  and  the  prophets,  who  afterwards  at  His  express 
command  committed  His  wishes  to  writing  for  the  benefit  of 
future  ages.  This  body  of  revelation  is  contained  in  the  Old 
Testament.  Later  on.  He  appeared  among  men,  and  in  the 
person  of  Jesus  Christ  changed  much  of  the  old  dispensation, 
and  instituted  the  New  Law,  destined  to  govern  His  people 
without  change  or  alteration  till  the  end  of  time.  He  bade 
His  apostles  preach  and  teach  His  doctrine  throughout  the 
world.  St.  Matthew  and  St.  John,  with  the  disciples  St.  Mark 
and  St.  Luke,  compiled  the  four  Gospels,  or  narratives  of 
Christ's  life.  St.  Paul  and  others,  under  the  influence  of 
divine  inspiration,  wrote  a  series  of  letters  or  documents 
abounding  with  rules  for  the  right  ordering  of  Christian  life. 
God  ordained  that  these  writings  should  always  remain  in 
the  custody  of  a  living  Church,  which  He  solemnly  founded 
and  placed  under  the  control  of  St.  Peter  and  his  successors 
forever.  This  Church  is  to  be  the  arbiter  of  all  religious 
disputes,  and  this  Church  is  to  decide  beyond  all  appeal  the 
amplitude  of  revelation.  There  is  no  higher  court,  empowered 
to  review  or  reverse  its  decisions;  and  God  has  promised  it 
immunity  from  error  in  matters  of  dogma.  It  is  the  guardian 
and  authoritative  interpreter  of  God's  word,  as  contained  in 
the  Old  and  New  Testaments;  the  witness  to  and  the  dis- 
penser of  tradition.  For  revelation  is  of  wider  extent  than 
the  mere  written  word,  and  embraces  all  the  points  of*  belief 
insisted  on  and  taught  by  the  Catholic  and  true  Church  of 
Christ,  though  not  explicitly  set  forth  in  the  pages  of  Holy 
Scripture. 


REVELATION  187 

Scripture  itself  bears  us  out  in  all  these  statements,  but 
their  further  discussion  belongs  to  the  domain  of  theology. 
"We  have  said  enough  to  convince  any  honest  mind  that  revela- 
tion is  no  empty  dream.  Scripture  and  tradition  are  its 
abundant  sources,  and  he  who  diligently  searches  can  easily 
recognize  the  contents  of  the  Bible  and  the  doctrines  of  the 
Catholic  Church  for  the  word  of  God.  Miracles  and  proph- 
ecies are  the  most  obvious  of  the  seals  divinity  has  stamped 
upon  them;  and  the  miracles  and  the  prophecies  we  appeal 
to  for  the  heavenly  character  of  our  religion,  are  beyond 
denial,  and  beyond  serious  dispute  or  doubt.  God  alone  is 
equal  to  the  infinite  task  of  working  real  miracles,  and  utter- 
ing real  prophecies;  and  when  He  invests  a  messenger  with 
these  dread  prerogatives  for  credentials  of  his  mission,  that 
messenger  is  God 's  mouthpiece,  and  the  tidings  he  brings  are 
fresh  from  the  lips  of  God. 

Faith  is  the  virtue  called  into  play  by  revelation,  and  faith 
is  not  knowing,  but  believing.  The  truths  of  faith  are  not 
blessed  with  all  the  light,  thrown  round  the  axioms  of  algebra 
and  geometry.  They  are  obscure,  hard  to  understand,  and 
in  some  cases  absolutely  beyond  human  comprehension.  More 
than  any  other  act  of  the  mind,  faith  makes  large  demands 
on  free  will ;  and  this  circumstance,  constituting  faith 's  merit, 
is  responsible  for  faith's  small  influence  with  the  ill-disposed. 
As  an  act  of  supremest  homage,  it  is  only  just  that  it  carry 
along  with  itself  submission  of  will,  the  faculty  whose  sur- 
render is  a  most  pleasing  sacrifice  in  God's  sight. 

Faith  of  the  right  kind,  faith  with  the  authority  of  God's 
word  for  root  and  motive,  leaves  a  man  no  room  for  choice 
between  dogmas  that  flatter  and  dogmas  that  pinch  self. 
Everj^  statement,  whether  it  pictures  forth  the  ravishing  joys 
of  Heaven,  or  the  terrifying  flames  of  hell,  must  be  accepted 
with  the  same  readiness  and  good-will.  Of  course,  some  of 
Scripture's  utterances  have  a  more  important  bearing  on 
morality,  a  more  intimate  connection  with  eternal  salvation 
than  others;  but  all,  all  without  a  single  exception,  rest  for 
credence  on  the  self-same  support,  the  knowledge  and  the 
truthfulness  of  God.  If  God  could  stoop  to  the  meanness  of 
deceiving  man  in  the  most  trivial  particular,  man's  trust  and 
confidence  in  God  would  be  at  an  end.     Faith  in  any  utter- 


18d  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

ance  of  God,  no  matter  how  solemn  and  weighty,  would  then 
degenerate  to  stupidity.  People  outside  our  Church,  people 
whose  faith  is  measured  by  the  canons  of  convenience,  set 
apart  certain  far-reaching,  general  and  palatable  dogmas,  and 
label  them  fundamental  articles.  They  preach  that  these 
alone  are  to  be  believed  under  pain  of  eternal  loss.  Other 
articles  of  minor  importance  deserve  no  attention,  though 
out  of  respect  for  God's  word  they  ought  not  to  be  wantonly 
denied.  With  them,  individuals  are  judge  and  jury  in  the 
selection;  and  confusion  reigns  supreme. 

"We  too  recognize  a  difference  in  importance  between  various 
parts  of  Holy  Scripture;  but  no  one  sentence  is  so  unimpor- 
tant as  not  to  demand  our  full  faith  and  belief.  We  feel  at 
liberty  to  deny  nothing,  we  feel  bound  to  believe  at  least 
implicitly  the  whole  of  Scripture's  contents,  and  explicitly 
believe  every  dogma  duly  proposed  to  our  consideration.  And 
since  every  clause  in  the  Bible  descends  to  us  from  the  same 
God  who  teaches  the  more  important  articles,  our  position  is 
alone  logical,  our  position  alone  approves  itself  to  reason.  To 
accept  revelation  as  such  means,  therefore,  a  vast  deal  more 
than  half-hearted  and  insincere  believers  to-day  make  it  mean. 
To  diligently  seek  and  find  revelation  when  hidden,  implies 
a  larger  amount  of  labor  than  most  strangers  to  the  truth 
devote  to  this  undeniable  duty.  Doubts  daily  cross  their 
minds,  and  suspicions  concerning  the  dangerous  risks  they  are 
taking  constantly  arise  within  them.  And  yet  these  improv- 
ident philosophers,  because  the  consequences  of  their  mistake 
will  become  fully  apparent  only  in  the  next  life,  prefer  the 
ease  of  uncertainty,  and  the  license  their  pretended  ignorance 
lends  to  their  low  instincts. 

Toleration.  Nobody  need  be  informed  that  the  world  is 
sadly  full  of  different  religious  sects.  A  walk  through  our 
own  city,  with  now  and  then  a  glance  at  the  sign-boards  con- 
spicuously displayed  at  temple  entrances,  must  effectually 
cure  any  doubt  on  the  subject.  Indifferentism  is  a  rampant 
sin  among  us,  so  rampant  that  the  early  signers  felt  con- 
strained to  introduce  into  our  Constitution  a  clause  ensuring 
to  every  citizen  immunity  from  persecution  on  the  score  of 
religion.  Be  it  noted,  however,  that  the  toleration  sanctioned 
by  our  government  is  merely  political ;  and  therefore  not  to  be 


TOLERATION  189 

branded  in  virtue  of  our  thesis  absurd.  Dogmatic  toleration 
is  as  eminently  absurd  a  notion  as  can  well  be  conceived. 
Only  a  disordered  mind  could  seriously  entertain  it.  Political 
toleration  is  mere  permission,  without  the  declaration  of  any 
absolute  right,  to  practise  false  as  well  as  true  religions.  Dog- 
matic toleration  is  permission  along  with  the  assertion  of  an 
absolute  right  to  practise  false  as  well  as  true  religions. 

Political  tolerance  tolerates  not  mistakes,  but  people  who 
make  the  mistakes.  It  can  at  heart  abominate  all  false  wor- 
ship, and  yet  have  a  word  of  kindness  for  the  victims  of  error. 
It  takes  men  as  it  finds  them,  and  merely  permits  all  without 
distinction  to  practise  whatever  system  of  public  worship 
they  choose.  It  seals  with  its  sanction  no  form  of  worship 
at  all,  but  in  the  interests  of  peace  allows  the  false  and  the 
true  to  grow  up  together  till  the  harvest.  And  God  allows 
that,  in  a  permissive,  though  not  in  an  approving  way.  Ar- 
dent lovers  of  the  truth  at  first  sight  revolt  against  any  such 
proceeding;  but  after  calm  consideration  they  settle  down  to 
the  conviction,  that  in  the  present  lamentable  state  of  affairs 
it  is  the  only  feasible  method.  Christ  once  rebuked  indigna- 
tion of  the  kind  in  St.  James  and  St.  John.  The  Samaritans 
had  shut  their  gates  against  His  coming  and  these  disciples 
said,  "Lord,  wilt  thou  that  we  command  fire  to  come  down 
from  heaven  and  consume  them?  And  turning  He  rebuked 
them,  saying.  You  know  not  of  what  spirit  you  are.  The  Son 
of  man  came,  not  to  destroy  souls,  but  to  save."  St.  Luke 
9.54. 

When  authority  permits  a  practice  as  abominable  in  the 
sight  of  God  as  heresy,  it  can  still  be  justified  on  the  double 
plea  of  inability  to  remedy  the  abuse,  and  refraining  from  the 
crime  of  formal  cooperation.  Were  there  no  such  escape  from 
the  difficulty,  our  rulers  would  be  obliged  in  conscience  to  do 
one  of  two  things.  They  would  have  either  to  expel  all  sec- 
taries from  the  country,  or  whip  them  into  submission  to  the 
true  faith.  But  the  one  alternative  is  quite  as  impracticable 
and  impossible  as  the  other.  Adherents  to  the  true  religion 
are  not  in  the  majority,  and  truth's  victory  would  be  uncer- 
tain. It  is  criminal  to  undertake  any  kind  of  a  war  without 
reasonable  hope  of  winning.  Catholics  outnumber  every  single 
sect  taken  separately;  but,  in  the  event  of  force,  error  would 


190  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

unite  against  the  truth,  as  against  a  common  foe.  Then,  too, 
even  were  the  triumph  of  truth  an  assured  possibility,  the 
land  would  have  to  be  deluged  with  blood,  and  life  would 
perish  from  the  state.  Submission  procured  by  force  is  simply 
out  of  the  question.  Religion  subjectively  taken  is  largely 
a  matter  of  free  will.  Liberty  enters  religion  as  an  essen- 
tial element,  and  religion  embraced  under  stress  of  physical 
violence  is  hypocrisy. 

Besides,  the  state  by  supposition  lends  no  peculiar  support 
or  encouragement  to  false  creeds,  and  in  this  particular  es- 
capes censure.  Dogmatic  toleration  would  be  in  effect,  if 
our  Constitution  anywhere  committed  itself  to  the  stupidity 
of  declaring  all  forms  of  worship  equally  good.  But  you  will 
look  in  vain  throughout  its  pages  for  any  such  assertion. 
Well-meaning  Catholics,  to  conciliate  the  esteem  and  friend- 
ship of  separated  brethren,  sometimes  stoop  to  the  meanness 
of  giving  expression  to  sentiments  of  the  kind.  But  their 
excuse  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  are  over-zealous  for  peace, 
and  speak  without  due  reflection.  Rome  recognises  no  com- 
promise with  error.  She  teaches  her  children  to  put  on  the 
feelings  of  charity  and  forbearance  towards  error's  deluded 
victims,  but  denounces  error  as  an  unpardonable  sin,  and 
commends  its  slaves  to  the  mercy  and  justice  of  God. 

Absurd.  The  full  force  of  this  term  implies  something  more 
than  mere  falsehood.  It  further  conveys  the  notion  of  silli- 
ness and  open  war  with  reason's  most  evident  dictates.  A 
statement  can  well  be  false  without  being  absurd.  We  are 
acquainted  with  many  such  statements.  The  falsehood  they 
contain,  lies  deep  beneath  the  surface,  mixed  with  much  that 
is  true,  and  only  diligent  search  can  detect  it.  But  dogmatic 
tolerance  is  so  repugnant  to  common  sense  that  we  hesitate 
not  to  brand  it  absurd. 

DIVISION 

Four  Parts— I,  II,  III,  IV 

I.    Religion  is  (a)  man's  first  duty,  of  essential  necessity 
to  (b)  individual  and  (c)  State. 
II.    Worship,  interior  and  exterior,  private  and  public  is 
God's  due. 


PROOFS  191 

III.  Man's  duty  towards  revelation  is   (a)   to  accept,  or 

(b)  seek  it. 

IV.  Toleration  in  matter  of  dogma  is  absurd. 


PROOFS 

I.  (a)  The  position  and  standing  of  relations  fix  the  po- 
sition and  standing  of  duties.  But  of  all  man's  relations 
those  with  God  are  first  in  time  and  first  in  excellence.  Ergo, 
man's  duty  towards  God,  or  religion,  is  man's  first  duty. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  Duties  are  the  growth  of  rela- 
tions in  force  between  a  man  and  God,  himself  and  his  neigh- 
bors. They  are,  as  it  were,  an  effect,  with  these  several  rela- 
tions for  cause ;  and  effects  partake  of  the  nobility  inherent  in 
necessary  causes. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  Existence  and  reality  derived 
from  God  and  Creator  are  first  requisites  for  whatever  events 
crowd  into  a  man's  after-life.  To  none  therefore  are  we 
more  under  obligation  than  to  God.  Nobody  has  more  sacred 
rights  to  our  homage  and  service.  No  conceivable  object  is 
worthier  of  our  energies. 

(b)  A  duty  based  on  a  relation  arising  from  man's  very 
nature  is  a  thing  of  moral  essential  necessity  to  the  indi- 
vidual. But  religion  is  a  duty  arising  from  just  such  a  rela- 
tion. Ergo,  religion  is  a  thing  of  moral  essential  necessity 
to  the  individual. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  Duties  are  strict  moral  neces- 
sities. Duties  arising  from  man's  nature  are  as  close  and 
present  to  man  as  his  very  nature.  They  can  no  more  be 
absent  from  him,  they  can  no  more  loosen  their  hold  on  his 
allegiance  than  nature  can  abandon  him,  or  reside  somewhere 
apart  from  him.  That  religion  is  a  quasi-physical  essential 
necessity  to  the  individual,  favorable  to  his  happiness,  peace 
and  well-being  must  be  evident  from  the  line  of  reasoning 
followed  in  proof  of  next  clause. 

(c)  1°.  A  moral  person  immediately  dependent  on  God  for 
maker,  helper,  guide  and  rewarder  lies  under  moral  essential 
necessity  to  acknowledge  and  worship  God.  But  the  state  is 
such  a  moral  person,  and  religion  is  this  acknowledgment  and 


192  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

worship.  Ergo,  religion  is  a  moral  essential  necessity  to  the 
state. 

2°.  That  without  which  duties  of  justice,  honesty,  and  mu- 
tual harmony  can  in  no  wise  stand  is  a  quasi-physical  essential 
necessity  to  the  state  as  such.  But  religion  is  a  thing  of  the 
kind.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  Nobody  will  deny  that  the  du- 
ties enumerated  are  of  vital  importance  and  large  factors  in 
the  state's  well  being. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  Remove  God  from  the  universe, 
destroy  religion,  and  all  moral  obligation  falls,  sanction  is 
idle,  and  states  go  down  in  ruin. 

II.  N.B.  Worship  offered  to  God,  divine  excellence  itself, 
is  called,  latria.  Worship  offered  the  Blessed  Virgin  Mary, 
who  borrows  all  her  excellence  from  God,  is  called,  hyperdulia. 
Worship  offered  the  saints  is  called  dulia. 

The  worship  belonging  to  God  is  at  least  interior.  In  the 
case  of  individuals  it  must  likewise  be  exterior  or  bodily,  since 
man's  dependence  on  God,  extending  as  it  does  to  body  and 
soul,  must  be  shown  whole  and  entire.  The  worship  rendered 
by  the  state  must  be  social,  and  therefore  visible  or  exterior. 
Public  worship  is  worship  rendered  by  the  individuals  com- 
posing a  state,  not  in  their  private  capacity,  but  as  welded 
together  by  authority  into  one  body  politic. 

III.  Man's  duty  towards  revelation  is  to  (a)  accept  it,  or 
(b)  seek  it. 

(a)  1°.  It  is  a  rational  creature's  duty  to  accept  for  true 
every  statement  made  by  the  God  of  truth  and  known  for  such. 
But  man  is  a  rational  creature,  and  revelation  is  a  body  of 
statements  made  by  the  God  of  truth.  Ergo,  man's  duty 
towards  revelation  is  to  accept  it  when  known  as  such. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  Duties  are  the  result  of  rela- 
tions, and  the  relations  in  force  between  the  Creator  and  His 
rational  creatures  make  faith  in  the  Creator's  word  an  im- 
perative necessity.  God  therefore  has  a  right  to  man's  men- 
tal submission  when  He  speaks.  That  He  invariably  insists 
on  this  right,  is  evident  from  the  circumstance  that  He  is  all- 
wise  and  all-true.  He  cannot,  like  limited  and  finite  mortals, 
give  expression  to  utterances,  that  owing  to  dearth  of  knowl- 
edge are  tainted  with  falsehood.     He  cannot  like  fools  talk 


PROOFS  198 

for  the  mere  sake  of  talking,  without  caring  whether  His 
listeners  heed  His  words  or  not.  Men  can  be  guilty  of  folly 
of  the  sort;  but  God  has  too  much  reverence  for  language's 
end  and  purpose  to  so  abuse  it.  When  a  man  of  ordinary 
common  sense,  blessed  with  a  fair  measure  of  seriousness, 
vouches  for  the  truth  of  some  fact,  he  can  with  reason  feel 
offended  at  a  refusal  to  abide  by  his  declaration.  God's  at- 
tributes would  make  such  a  refusal  a  monstrous  crime,  and 
God's  attributes  make  faith  in  His  word  an  absolute  duty. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  That  Scripture  and  tradition, 
or  revelation,  are  a  body  of  statements  made  by  the  God  of 
truth  is  proved  at  great  length  in  works  on  Theology.  Phi- 
losophy left  to  itself  can  proceed  no  farther  than  demonstrate 
the  necessity  of  accepting  revelation  in  the  event  of  its  being 
made.  It  cannot,  alone  and  single  handed,  conclusively  prove 
that  this  or  that  set  of  truths  constitutes  revelation.  History 
furnishes  us  with  well  attested  facts,  and  philosophy  can  dis- 
cover in  these  facts  traces  of  God's  presence. 

Thus,  the  records  of  history  are  witness  to  the  reality  of 
Moses  and  the  prophets,  and  to  certain  wonderful  or  miracu- 
lous events  in  their  lives.  They  claimed  for  themselves  the 
dignity  of  messengers  from  God  to  men,  and  left  in  writing 
to  posterity  facts,  principles,  and  maxims,  that  God  commis- 
sioned them  to  communicate.  For  credentials  they  appealed 
to  miracles  and  prophecies,  worked  and  uttered  by  them  in 
the  name  of  God.  Philosophy  is  within  its  own  province, 
when  it  undertakes  to  show  that  the  writings  of  Moses  and  the 
prophets  derive  from  these  miracles  and  prophecies  a  divinity 
peculiarly  their  own.  These  two  species  of  effects  are  be- 
yond the  reach  of  power  inferior  to  God's,  and  God  could 
never  sanction  lies  by  the  performance  of  prodigies.  When, 
therefore.  He  stamped  with  these  seals  of  His  omnipotence 
and  wisdom  the  claims  of  Moses  and  the  prophets,  He  signi- 
fied as  plainly  as  possible  how  He  wished  their  statements  to 
be  regarded.  He  signified  as  plainly  as  possible  that  the 
words  they  committed  to  writing  were  His  own  words  and 
had  Him  for  author. 

2°.  From  analogy.  To  God  as  the  supreme  being  adora- 
tion is  due ;  to  God  as  the  supreme  good  love  is  due.  Ergo, 
to  God  as  the  highest  truth  faith  is  due. 


IM  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

(b)  Contempt  of  revelation  is  contempt  of  God,  and  in- 
difference to  eternal  salvation.  But  avoidance  of  contempt 
for  God,  and  of  indifference  to  salvation,  is  man's  plain  duty. 
Ergo,  avoidance  of  contempt  for  revelation,  diligent  search 
for  the  truth,  is  man's  duty. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  God  wastes  no  words,  and 
means  His  every  message  to  be  seriously  taken.  He  is  like- 
wise anxious  that  all  His  children,  without  any  exception,  take 
full  advantage  of  the  instruction  He  proffers.  He  occupies 
the  position  of  Lord  and  Father,  and  resents  negligent  atten- 
tion on  the  part  of  such  as  He  deigns  to  address.  Revelation 
teems  with  documents  designed  for  helps  to  attain  to  the  King- 
dom of  Heaven,  and  the  loss  of  these  necessary  helps  through 
sloth  is  attended  with  damage  and  serious  responsibility.  It 
is  quite  impossible  for  me  to  think,  that  to-day's  scoffers  at 
religion  and  revelation  are  absolutely  free  from  suspicion  and 
anxiety,  concerning  the  doubtful  and  preposterous  position 
they  occupy.  And  to  let  one  single  doubt  in  this  matter  of 
revelation  remain  unsettled,  is  to  take  sides  with  God's 
enemies,  and  to  confide  to  chance  eternal  destiny  for  weal  or 
woe.  Plungers  at  a  race-track,  when  placing  money  on  horses, 
display  more  skill  and  prudence  than  the  wiseacres,  who,  be- 
cause of  trivial  difficulties,  gamble  in  risks,  and  leave  Heaven 
to  a  game  of  chance. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  God  has  well  founded  claims  on 
our  reverence;  and,  apart  from  other  considerations,  we  owe 
it  to  our  souls  and  bodies  to  procure  for  them  an  abode  of 
comfort,  and  happiness,  and  security  against  the  endless  ages 
of  ages  in  store  for  them  beyond  the  grave. 

IV.  1°.  Toleration  in  matter  of  dogma  supposes  that  a 
system  of  religion  false  in  itself,  yea,  immoral  and  unclean  in 
its  tendencies,  can  be  an  instrument  in  God's  worship.  But 
this  supposition  is  eminently  absurd.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  God  is  truth,  God  is  purity; 
and  falsehood,  immorality,  and  uncleanness  can  have  no  part 
in  His  service.  Any  other  notion  would  be  unworthy  of  God 's 
infinite  majesty  and  degrading  in  the  extreme. 

2°.  Toleration  in  matter  of  dogma  supposes  that  religion 
can  be  manifold  in  such  sort  that  a  duty  prescribed  by  one 
system  can  be  neglected  by  another  system,  or  totally  con- 


PEINCIPLES  195 

demned  as  dishonest  by  a  third  system.     But  this  supposition 
is  eminently  absurd.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  The  collection  of  truths  and 
duties  embraced  in  a  religion,  truly  deserving  of  the  name, 
ought  to  be  one  and  the  same  for  all  mankind.  Religion  is  the 
outcome  of  man's  dependence  on  God;  and,  since  the  two 
terms  of  the  relation,  human  nature  and  an  unchangeable 
God,  are  the  same  the  world  over  and  for  all  time,  religion 
the  result  of  the  relation  ought  to  be  the  same,  without 
shadow  or  suspicion  of  change  or  difference.  Artificial 
changes,  wrought  in  men's  minds  by  education,  prejudice, 
and  other  external  agencies,  are  no  excuse  and  no  ground 
whatever  for  declaring  that  human  nature  in  me  is  different 
from  human  nature  in  my  neighbor. 


PRINCIPLES 

A.  In  every  free  act  of  the  will,  whether  it  be  prayer  or 
murder,  man  necessarily  keeps  his  relations  with  God,  mani- 
festing and  acknowledging  his  quality  of  dependence  on  God. 
Ergo,  no  religion  needed. 

Answer:  Materially,  I  grant;  formally,  I  deny.  The  de- 
pendence must  not  be  in  the  free  act,  but  in  the  very  free- 
dom of  the  act.  The  dependence  manifest  in  the  free  act  it- 
self never  bases  religion.  Otherwise  brutes,  plants  and  min- 
erals would  be  capable  of  religion,  and  there  would  be  no  dis- 
tinction between  the  service  of  brutes  and  the  service  of  men. 
The  difference  would  be  merely  on  the  part  of  the  servant, 
not  on  the  part  of  the  service.  Other  creatures  serve  God, 
no  matter  what  they  do.  Man  in  his  free  acts  serves  God 
only  when  he  uses  his  will  aright.  The  service  God  exacts 
from  men  is  different  from  the  service  He  exacts  from  brutes ; 
and  free  will  is  index  of  His  wishes. 

B.  God  cannot  be  acted  on.  Ergo,  He  cannot  be  wor- 
shipped. 

Answer:  He  cannot  be  acted  on  physically,  I  grant; 
morally,  as  in  case  of  wrong  or  honor,  I  deny.  Worship  in- 
duces no  intrinsic  change  in  God.  All  the  change  is  outside 
God.    Worship  changes  us. 


196  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

C.  God  is  infinitely  perfect.  Ergo,  He  has  no  need  of  wor- 
ship. 

Answer:  He  has  no  need  of  worship,  as  of  a  perfection 
antecedently  absent  from  His  being,  I  grant.  He  has  no  need 
of  worship,  as  of  homage  which  is  His  due,  I  deny.  The  mil- 
lionaire may  have  no  need  of  the  five  dollars  you  owe  him, 
but  the  circumstance  never  excuses  you  from  payment. 

D.  Reason  would  be  the  basis  of  moral  obligation  and  the 
single  origin  of  good  and  evil. 

Answer:  Reason  manifests  moral  obligation,  I  grant. 
Reason  makes  or  constitutes  it,  I  deny. 

E.  Society  owes  worship.  Ergo  the  family,  and  literary, 
scientific,  athletic  societies. 

Answer:  Complete  society,  I  grant;  incomplete,  I  deny. 
The  family  because  complete  and  independent  is  a  moral  per- 
son and  held  to  worship.  Private  societies  of  the  kind  men- 
tioned, because  incomplete  and  dependent  on  the  state,  are 
no  moral  persons,  and  under  no  such  obligation. 

F.  The  state  has  a  temporal  end  or  purpose.  Ergo,  no  re- 
ligion. 

Answer:  Its  first  and  chief  purpose  is  the  temporal  pros- 
perity of  its  citizens.  This  purpose  it  must  accomplish  in  a 
way  befitting  its  nature,  and  by  nature  it  is  a  moral  person, 
under  obligations  to  God.  Ergo,  while  pursuing  temporal 
good,  it  must  not  neglect  the  knowledge  and  worship  of  God. 

G.  Society  is  immediately  dependent  on  the  free  will  of 
man.     Ergo,  independent  of  God. 

Answer:  In  its  making,  when  not  yet  a  person,  I  grant; 
when  constituted  and  now  a  person,  I  deny. 

H.  In  spirit  and  in  truth,  John  4.23.  Ergo,  no  external 
worship  needed. 

Answer:  The  true  meaning  of  the  passage  is  a  contrast  be- 
tween the  Old  Law  and  the  New,  between  the  letter  or  figure, 
and  spirit  or  truth.  Besides,  insistence  on  internal  worship 
is  far  from  condemning  external.  Christ  on  no  few  occasions 
employed  external  worship. 

I.  The  State  can  get  along  without  religion.  Ergo.  Schiff, 
p.  511,  n.  510. 

Answer:    We  could  transmit  the  antecedent  and  deny  the 


PRINCIPLES  ^  197 

conclusion  as  inconsequent.  Worship  is  a  need  to  the  state, 
not  precisely  because  of  advantage,  but  because  of  the  nature 
of  things.  The  state  can  get  along  somehow  and  imperfectly, 
I  grant ;  as  nature  intended  and  perfectly,  I  deny. 

J.  Other  incentives  would  hold  men  to  honesty;  a  sense  of 
honor,  for  instance.     Ergo. 

Answer:  We  could  again  transmit.  Our  argument  is  not 
based  on  advantage,  but  on  the  nature  of  things.  These  other 
incentives  would  be  sufficient  and  efficacious,  I  deny;  insuffi- 
cient and  inefficacious,  I  grant. 

K.  State  and  religion  have  two  different  ends,  temporal 
good  and  spiritual.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Different,  when  incompletely  viewed,  I  grant; 
w^hen  viewed  in  their  completeness,  I  deny.  When  viewed  in 
their  completeness,  the  ends  of  the  two  are  one  and  the  same, 
the  glory  of  God.  God  is  the  absolutely  last  end  of  every- 
thing. 

L.  Church  and  state  are  distinct.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Distinct  and  separate,  I  deny;  distinct  and  not 
separate ;  I  again  distinguish.  In  the  present  order  of  things, 
with  revelation,  I  grant;  in  the  order  of  pure  nature,  with- 
out revelation,  I  again  distinguish,  completely  distinct,  I  deny, 
incompletely  distinct,  I  grant.  In  the  order  of  pure  nature, 
the  state  as  supreme  authority  would  determine  religion;  in 
the  present  order,  revelation  appoints  the  Church  to  that 
office. 

M.  *'It  would  be  easier,  I  think,  to  build  a  city  without 
ground,  than  to  establish  or  preserve  a  state  without  God 
and  religion. ' '  Plutarch.  ' '  Time  destroys  extravagant  opin- 
ions, it  solidifies  the  judgments  of  nature."  Cicero,  de  Nat. 
Deorum,  2. 

N.  No  need  to  pray,  because  God  knows  everything.     Kant. 

Answer:  S.  Th.  2.2.  q.  83,  a.  2.  ''Men  ought  to  do  things, 
not  for  the  purpose  of  changing  the  arrangements  of  Provi- 
dence, but  to  accomplish  results  in  accordance  with  these 
arrangements."  We  pray  to  change  God's  decrees,  I  deny; 
we  pray  to  fulfil  them,  I  grant.  His  decrees  are  conditioned. 
Gifts  are  made  us,  if  we  pray ;  withheld,  if  we  neglect  to  do 
so.     He  knows  from  eternity  whether  He  will  relieve  men 


198  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

or  not;  but  this  knowledge  is  terminatively  speaking  conse- 
quent on  our  use  of  free  will,  on  our  choice  or  rejection  of 
prayer. 

O.  Truths  above  understanding  would  be  a  contradiction. 
Ergo,  no  revelation. 

Answer:  Above  all  understanding  both  divine  and  human, 
I  grant ;  above  merely  human  understanding,  I  deny. 

P.  No  truth  above  human  understanding,  because  its  object 
is  all  being.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Its  proportionate  object  is  all  being,  I  deny;  all 
material  being  is  that ;  its  adequate  object  is  all  being,  I  again 
distinguish ;  inasmuch  as  the  human  intellect  can  understand 
whatever  being  is  duly  presented  or  brought  to  its  notice,  I 
grant ;  inasmuch  as  all  being  is  as  a  matter  of  fact  thus  duly 
presented  or  brought  to  its  notice,  I  deny.  There  are  more 
things  in  Heaven  and  earth  than  are  dreamt  of  in  our  phi- 
losophy. 

Q.  A  truth  above  reason  would  be  against  reason,  because 
out  of  harmony  with  reason. 

Answer:  Out  of  harmony  in  a  contradictory  way,  I  grant ; 
in  a  contrary  way,  I  deny.  There  is  a  difference  between  not 
being  a  mjin's  friend,  not  loving  him;  and  being  his  enemy, 
hating  him.  In  much  the  same  way  to  be  on  no  terms  of 
intimacy  with  reason  is  not  the  same  as  to  be  opposed  to 
reason. 

R.  God  has  a  right  not  only  to  worship,  but  to  worship  of 
the  kind  He  wants. 

S.  Religion  is  truth  and  justice.  Truth  is  one,  error  is 
manifold.     Justice  is  one. 

T.  Christianity  and  Judaism  are  two  opposite  religions. 
Ergo,  if  one  was  ever  right,  the  other  must  always  be  wrong. 

Ansiver:  Opposite  essentially,  with  regard  to  Christ,  I 
deny;  opposite  accidentally,  with  regard  to  circumstances  of 
time  and  form,  with  regard  to  Christ  already  come  and  Christ 
yet  to  come,  I  grant.  Christianity  worships  Christ  already 
come,  Judaism  worships  Christ  yet  to  come,  the  Messiah. 

U.  If  an  opponent  admits  Scripture.  Christ  wants  one 
Church,  one  fold,  one  Baptism.  Christ  wants  His  people  to 
guard  against  false  prophets,  and  in  the  event  of  dogmatic 
toleration  false  prophets  must  grow  and  multiply.     Christ 


PRINCIPLES  199 

wants  His  Church  to  endure  forever.  St.  Luke,  11.17. 
* '  Every  kingdom  divided  against  itself  shall  fall. "  * '  Now  I 
beseech  you,  brethren,  to  mark  them  who  make  dissensions 
and  offences  contrary  to  the  doctrine  which  you  have  learnt, 
and  to  avoid  them."  Rom.  16.17.  ''But  though  we,  or  an 
angel  from  Heaven,  preach  a  gospel  to  you  besides  that  which 
we  have  preached  to  you,  let  him  be  anathema."     Gal.  1.8. 

V.  Indifferentism  and  Liberalism  are  two  theories  based  on 
toleration. 

Indifferentism  f  Absolute  =  No  religion  is  necessary  =  Altogether  wrong 
is  of  two        J  ^"^  against  whole  thesis, 

kinds        2  1  Relative  =  Some  religion  necessary,  no  one  form  before 
t         another,    f  Universal  =  All  forms  equally  good. 
-I  Particular  ==  All  Christianity  equally 
L  good. 

Philosophy  refutes  universal;  theology,  particular,  because 
revelation  enters  question. 

Toleration    f  l^ogmatic  =  All  religions  equally  good  =  Toleration  of 
is  of  two     -l  error  ==  Indifferentism. 

kinds        1  Political  =  All  public  worship  is  allowed  =  Toleration  of 
I         the  erring  =  Liberalism. 

Dogmatic  is  freedom  of  conscience,  meaning  immunity  from 
all  restraint,  moral  as  well  as  physical ;  from  all  law  of  nature 
and  all  law  of  God.  Political  is  freedom  of  worship,  im- 
munity from  the  moral  restraint  imposed  by  law  of  state  and 
Church,  not  from  law  of  nature  or  of  God.  In  a  Catholic 
country,  Indifferentism  of  whatever  kind  and  Liberalism  are 
regularly  wrong,  circumstances  may  condone  Liberalism.  In 
a  mixed  country,  absolute  and  relative  universal  Indifferent- 
isms  are  wrong,  and  the  aid  of  theology  must  be  invoked  to 
prove  relative  particular  Indifferentism  wrong.  In  a  mixed 
country,  that  Liberalism  is  right,  which  for  grave  reasons 
tolerates  whatever  false  religions  threaten  no  harm  to  the  first 
principles  of  morality;  and  every  other  species  of  Liberalism 
is  wrong.  When  a  false  religion  threatens  the  first  princi- 
ples of  morality,  it  must  not  be  tolerated,  because  it  is  a 
menace  to  not  only  the  welfare  but  the  very  life  of  the  state. 
In  the  event  of  legitimate  toleration,  some  grave  reason,  like 
the  violent  disturbance  of  social  order,  must  be  present ;  be- 


200  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

cause  every  false  religion  is  an  obstacle  to  the  public  good, 
and  no  risk  of  the  kind  can  be  legitimately  taken  without  a 
serious  and  proportionate  reason.  The  religion  of  the  state 
ought  to  be  one  and  true;  but  facts,  over  which  we  have  no 
control,  make  this  condition  impossible  in  certain  countries 
called  mixed,  and  a  sane  Liberalism  is  the  only  alternative  for 
them.  By  a  Catholic  country  we  mean  a  country,  wherein 
morally  speaking  all  the  inhabitants  profess  the  true  reli- 
gion. By  a  mixed  country  we  mean  a  country,  wherein  men 
in  sufficiently  large  numbers  to  destroy  this  moral  unanimity 
profess  false  religions. 

W.  A  Catholic  country  has  no  right  to  insist  on  the  Cath- 
olic religion,  (1)  because  God  leaves  men  free;  (2)  because 
human  reason  is  open  to  mistake  in  the  matter  of  religion; 

(3)  because  the  state  has  temporal  good  for  end  or  purpose; 

(4)  because  a  Protestant  country  would  have  the  same  right; 

(5)  because  the  Catholic  religion  will  prevail  anyhow,  as 
truth  is  stronger  than  falsehood;  (6)  because  peace  would  be 
disturbed;  (7)  because  such  interference  is  everywhere  re- 
garded a  species  of  tyranny. 

Answers:  (1)  God  leaves  men  free  physically,  I  grant; 
morally,  I  deny;  (2)  Reason  is  fallible  with  regard  to  moral- 
ity's first  principles  and  immediate  deductions  from  same,  I 
deny ;  with  regard  to  remoter  conclusions,  I  again  distinguish ; 
if  revelation  lends  reason  no  support,  I  grant;  if  revelation 
supplements  reason,  I  deny.  (3)  The  state  has  temporal 
good  for  immediate  and  incomplete  end,  I  grant;  for  remote 
and  complete  end,  I  deny;  that  is  the  glory  of  God.  (4)  Ob- 
jectively, I  deny;  subjectively,  I  again  distinguish;  if  error 
has  any  right  against  the  truth,  I  grant ;  if  error  has  no  such 
right,  I  deny.  (5)  Truth  is  stronger  than  falsehood  objec- 
tively and  intrinsically,  I  grant ;  subjectively  and  extrinsically, 
I  deny.  Men's  passions  commonly  favor  falsehood.  (6) 
Peace  would  be  disturbed  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  I 
deny ;  by  accident,  I  again  distinguish ;  and  for  this  very  rea- 
son toleration  is  to  be  conditionally  permitted,  I  grant ;  tolera- 
tion is  to  be  absolutely  permitted,  I  deny.  (7)  Such  inter- 
ference is  erroneously  accounted  tyranny,  I  grant;  rightly 
accounted  tyranny,  I  deny. 


THESIS  II 

Suicide  is  a  sin  against  nature.  Death  inflicted  in  self- 
defense  is  under  certain  conditions  justifiable.  Private  duels 
are  highly  absurd,  and  contrary  to  the  law  of  nature.  Jouin, 
96-118 ;  Rickaby,  202-224. 

QUESTION 

Religion  is  the  one  word  expressive  of  our  duties  towards 
God.  It  is  a  word  of  wide  significance,  and  we  were  able  in 
our  first  thesis  to  discuss  only  its  most  salient  features.  From 
among  its  varied  contents  we  selected  for  study  worship, 
revelation,  and  its  concomitant  question  of  religious  tolera- 
tion. Religion,  of  course,  imposes  on  us  the  obligation  of 
cultivating  whatever  virtues  have  a  direct  bearing  on  God. 
These  virtues  are  in  especial,  faith,  hope  and  charity;  and 
they  are  for  this  reason  called  the  theological  virtues.  There 
must,  however,  be  a  limit  to  our  treatise,  and  we  prefer  to 
leave  the  fuller  examination  of  these  several  topics  to  cate- 
chism and  the  Sunday-school. 

These  theological  virtues  as  such  would  have  no  place  in 
the  natural  order,  because  they  have  God  as  known  from 
revelation  for  material  and  formal  object.  And  yet  corre- 
sponding virtues  in  the  shape  of  love,  hope,  obedience,  grati- 
tude and  fidelity  would  be  serious  obligations  in  even  the 
natural  order,  and  God  as  known  by  reason  would  be  their 
object.  Man  is  certainly  bound  to  seek  his  end  or  purpose  in 
life.  "We  described  it  as  proximately  the  introduction  of 
moral  order  into  his  conduct,  and  ultimately  the  intellectual 
possession  of  God.  Viewed  one  way  or  the  other,  this  end 
is  an  arduous  or  difficult  good,  and  tendency  towards  every 
such  good  is  hope.  Man  is  likewise  bound  to  love  God  above 
everything,  because  right  order  demands  that  we  make  the 
dignity  of  love's  object  the  measure  of  love's  quality.     God 

201 


202  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

is  infinite  good,  the  source  and  origin  of  all  created  good,  and 
as  such  deserves  to  be  loved  above  everything.  Our  duty  of 
obedience  flows  from  our  relation  of  creature.  We  are  the 
work  of  God's  hands,  and  the  artificer  is  absolute  owner  of 
the  thing  he  makes.  Gratitude  and  fidelity  are  obligations 
in  view  of  the  multitudinous  favors  conferred  on  us. 

And  now  we  pass  from  God  to  self.  Man  has  duties  towards 
his  soul,  he  has  duties  towards  his  body.  Obviously  we  can- 
not enter  into  all  the  questions  suggested  by  these  two  com- 
ponent parts  of  man's  being.  We  choose  to  busy  ourselves 
in  the  main  with  his  body,  dismissing  the  soul  with  these  few 
remarks.  Man  was  created  to  the  image  and  likeness  of 
God,  and  this  resemblance  with  the  Creator  is  principally 
resident  in  the  soul.  His  intellect  and  will  must  be  there- 
fore developed  and  made  grow  more  and  more  like  their 
divine  prototype  by  steady  improvement.  With  the  Child 
Jesus  he  must  grow  in  wisdom,  age  and  grace.  His  mind 
must  be  stored  with  knowledge,  human  and  divine;  his  will 
must  strengthen  itself  in  good.  All  the  virtues  with  a  bear- 
ing on  the  mind,  all  the  virtues  with  a  bearing  on  the  will, 
must  be  sedulously  cultivated;  and  passions,  ready  helps  to 
wrong  conduct,  must  be  subdued  and  kept  in  tight  check. 
Intellect  and  will  must  be  shaped  by  diligent  care  into  instru- 
ments calculated  to  procure  their  owner's  welfare  here  and 
hereafter.  Mind  and  heart  must  be  trained  along  right  lines ; 
and  this  means  education  in  its  fullest  and  completest  sense. 
This  topic  of  education  will  get  fuller  attention  when  we  come 
to  discuss  the  duties  of  parents  in  particular.  Suicide,  with 
everything  suggestive  of  suicide,  is  the  chiefest  offense  man 
can  do  his  own  body ;  but  this  question  is  so  closely  connected 
with  self-defense  and  duelling,  that  we  choose  to  gather  all 
three  topics  into  one  thesis.  Suicide  is  destruction  of  life, 
self-defense  is  its  preservation,  and  duelling  partakes  of  the 
double  malice  of  murder  and  suicide.  We  say  nothing  of 
murder,  because  it  is  too  evident  a  violation  of  natural  law 
to  need  notice. 

Some  philosophers,  like  Thomasius  and  Schopenhauer,  ob- 
ject to  the  expression,  man's  duties  towards  himself.  Regu- 
larly duties  are  between  two  different  persons,  and  even  in 
this  case  the  relations  establishing  man's  duty  towards  his 


SUICIDE  203 

own  proper  person  are  fundamentally  between  himself  and 
God.  His  duties  towards  his  neighbor  rest  ultimately  on  the 
same  foundation;  and  merely  to  keep  one  set  of  duties  apart 
from  the  other,  we  denominate  them  duties  towards  self  and 
duties  towards  the  neighbor.  The  whole  man  can  be  said  to 
differ  from  his  parts  or  faculties,  and  this  circumstance  would 
be  basis  enough  for  the  expression,  duty  towards  self. 

TERMS 

Suicide.  Suicide  is  direct  killing  of  self  on  one's  own  initio^ 
tive.  Life,  because  the  root  of  all  succeeding  favors,  is  Heav- 
en 's  first  and  highest  gift ;  and,  no  matter  how  crowded  with 
misfortunes,  it  never  loses  this  quality  of  a  gift.  All  things 
considered,  its  chief  good  lies  in  the  circumstance  that  it  is 
the  one  road  leading  to  a  happy  eternity.  Any  other  view 
of  life's  utility  is  a  mistake,  and  sure  to  work  sad  havoc. 
Some  enjoy  a  gilt-edged  existence  from  the  cradle  to  the 
grave.  Others  drag  out  a  short  or  long  period  of  disease, 
and  want,  and  disappointment.  But  all,  without  a  single 
exception,  the  poor  as  well  as  the  rich,  the  unfortunate  as  well 
as  the  fortunate,  can  still  count  life  a  priceless  jewel.  When 
turned  to  good  and  proper  uses,  it  can  purchase  a  seat  in  the 
kingdom,  a  title  to  that  supreme  happiness,  which  constitutes 
man's  last  end. 

And  yet  life  is  something  more  than  a  mere  gift.  It  is  a 
responsibility,  and  its  giver  attaches  to  it  obligations,  that 
its  recipient  is  not  free  to  abide  by  or  shirk  at  will.  When 
bom  into  the  world,  a  man,  without  being  at  all  consulted 
beforehand,  is  set  down  in  the  midst  of  a  multitude  of  rela- 
tions, which  produce  unavoidable  and  stem  duties.  No  man 
can  escape  them,  no  man  can  afford  to  trifle  with  them,  with- 
out diminishing  his  dignity  and  suffering  irreparable  loss. 
Life  is  not  given  to  mortals  to  be  squandered  on  every  chance 
attraction  that  happens  along.  It  is  not  a  toy  meant  by  its 
gracious  author  to  be  used  till  it  loses  the  power  to  please, 
and  then  be  cast  aside. 

Everything  in  nature  points  to  the  fact  that  God  created 
men  as  well  as  other  beings  to  add  their  little  measure  to  His 
glory.     Everything  in  nature  proclaims  Him  the  author  of  life 


204 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


and  death,  and  He  is  jealous  of  His  prerogatives.  Men, 
whether  they  will  or  not,  have  to  procure  the  spread  of  His 
kingdom,  and  proclaim  His  sovereignty.  In  His  all-wise 
plans  every  creature  has  its  allotted  time  for  life,  and  woe 
to  the  man  who  attempts  to  interfere  with  the  plan.  Men 
cannot  call  life  out  of  nothing;  men  usurp  a  right  belonging 
to  God  Himself,  when  without  His  sanction  they  put  an  end 
to  their  existence.  They  deny  God  service,  they  rob  them- 
selves of  eternal  glory,  they  plunge  their  families  and  friends 
into  the  depths  of  disgrace,  they  bequeath  to  their  descendants 
a  name  of  ignominy  and  shame,  they  curse  their  country  with 
an  example  of  craven-hearted  cowardice  and  sottish  impiety. 

The  crime  of  suicide  is  thoroughly  wicked,  and  has  noth- 
ing whatever  to  recommend  it  to  the  esteem  of  men  born  with 
high  instincts.  It  is  the  mad  act  of  a  coward,  and  bravery 
is  dishonored  by  being  mentioned  in  the  same  breath  with 
suicide.  Fortitude  impels  the  courageous  to  bear  up  under 
troubles  that  crush  men  of  weaker  mould.  Fortitude  is 
blessed  with  long  vision,  and  in  the  very  excess  of  pain  looks 
forward  to  the  hour  when  pain  will  be  no  more.  It  knows 
the  weakness  inherent  in  all  the  ills  of  this  life,  and  is  satis- 
fied from  experience  that  sufferance  is  their  infallible  remedy. 
With  time  they  wear  themselves  out,  and  joy  succeeds  to  sor- 
row. But  the  suicide,  whose  vision  is  as  short  as  his  patience, 
madly  rushes  through  the  first  avenue  open  to  escape.  In- 
stead of  meeting  an  enemy  to  his  happiness  with  a  bold  front, 
he  turns  his  back  and  flees.  The  pit  of  hell-fire  into  which 
he  falls  has  been  robbed  by  his  irreligion  of  all  its  dread 
reality.  In  the  minds  of  the  unfortunates,  who  trifle  with 
thoughts  of  suicide,  hell  and  Heaven  are  dreams,  and  never 
awaken  serious  consideration.  They  play  the  coward;  and, 
choosing  between  a  present  and  a  distant  evil,  between  a  cer- 
tain and  an  uncertain  calamity,  they  avoid  the  one  and  fall 
headlong  into  the  other. 

Climate,  heredity,  racial  characteristics,  are  not  responsible 
for  suicide.  They  may  be  occasions,  but  they  are  not  causes. 
They  may  pave  the  way  to  self-destruction,  but  freedom  of 
will  always  holds  the  balance  of  power ;  and,  if  freedom  of  will 
has  been  instructed  along  right  lines  of  morality,  virtue  will 
always  assert  itself,  and  suicide  will  be  hated  with  all  the  hate 


SUICIDE  205 

it  deserves.  Apart  from  their  piety  and  religion,  the  people 
of  Ireland,  because  of  the  misery  attendant  on  hundreds  of 
years  of  oppression,  have  small  incentive  indeed  to  continue 
a  tiresome  and  from  a  worldly  point  of  view  hopeless  exist- 
ence. And  yet  consulting  tables  prepared  for  the  World 
Almanac  by  Barker  in  1894,  Ireland  and  Spain  contribute 
fewest  to  the  army  of  suicides.  Protestantism,  with  its  im- 
pious^ principle  of  private  interpretation,  is  the  parent  of 
unbelief,  and  countries  cursed  with  its  blight  are  rich  in  un- 
natural crimes  of  the  sort.  Here  are  a  few  interesting  and 
instructive  statistics  culled  from  the  table  referred  to. 


Rate  per 

Rate  per 

Catholic 

100,000 

Protestant 

100,000 

Saxony, 

31.1 

Austria, 

21.2 

Denmark, 

25.8 

France, 

16.7 

Prussia, 

13.3 

Bavaria, 

9.1 

Sweden, 

8.1 

Ireland, 

1.7 

England, 

6.9 

Spain, 

1.4 

Common  sense  would  lead  us  to  expect  no  other  result.  Un- 
belief unsettles  all  the  convictions  implanted  by  faith,  and 
faith  is  busiest  with  the  reality  of  life  beyond  the  grave. 
Faith  is  our  soundest  argument  for  the  existence  of  Heaven 
and  hell ;  and,  when  Heaven  and  hell  become  dim  realities  in 
men's  minds,  small  wonder  if  they  take  all  risks  to  avoid 
impending  evils  like  disease,  disgrace,  poverty  and  disap- 
pointment. 

Some  ancient  philosophers,  like  Seneca,  Plato,  Socrates  and 
others,  defended  suicide,  but  on  grounds  far  different  from 
the  silly  pretenses  set  up  by  their  modem  imitators.  It  may 
be  well  to  remark  that  the  ancients  never  regarded  suicide 
justifiable,  when  used  as  an  exit  from  ills  for  which  the  suicide 
was  himself  responsible.  Socrates  thought  self-murder  eth- 
ically correct,  only  because  he  knew  that  after  condemnation 
by  the  state  authorities  he  had  to  die  anyhow.  Seneca  and 
the  rest  thought  it  a  laudable  subterfuge  only  when  cornered 
by  adverse  circumstances,  over  which  they  had  no  control. 
The  old  Romans  considered  these  seven,  justifiable  causes  for 
suicide.  A  disgust  for  life.  The  wish  to  be  rid  of  a  dis- 
tressing disease.  Regret  for  the  decease  of  some  dear  com- 
panion.    Shame  at  being  an  insolvent  debtor.     Ambition  to 


206  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

be  spoken  of  after  death,  when  there  had  been  no  honor  in 
this  life.  Dementia  or  insanity.  Outrage  to  a  woman's 
chastity.  But  modern  advocates  of  the  revolting  theory 
preach  its  adaptability  to  every  occasion.  They  draw  no  fine 
distinctions  between  evils  for  which  the  victim  of  poison,  pis- 
tol or  the  knife  is  himself  responsible,  and  evils  brought  to  his 
door  by  friends  or  strangers.  When  life  from  whatever  cause 
grows  disagreeably  heavy,  life,  they  say,  should  be  pushed 
aside.  We  have  no  excuse  to  offer  for  the  mistakes  made  by 
the  wise  of  old,  when  defending  the  theory  and  practice  of 
suicide.  It  is  explanation  enough  for  us  to  know  that  faith 
in  God  never  had  a  tight  or  loose  hold  on  their  minds  and 
hearts,  that  their  natural  knowledge  of  God  and  a  future  life 
was  dim,  obscure  and  imperfect,  and  that  selfishness,  with  an 
inborn  tendency  to  comfort  and  ease,  is  as  native  to  the  sa- 
pient philosopher  as  it  is  to  the  ignorant  clod.  But  it  is  at 
the  same  time  worth  noting,  that  the  higher  they  climbed  in 
the  scale  of  true  wisdom,  the  less  they  conceded  to  this  basest 
of  sins.  See  Cicero,  De  Senectute,  c.  20;  Somnium  Scipionis, 
c.  3 ;  Virgil,  ^neid,  VI,  434. 

No  well  balanced  mind  can  for  a  moment  doubt  of  the  guilt 
resident  in  suicide.  In  every  well  organized  community  any 
attempt  at  self-murder  is  a  crime  punishable  with  short  or 
long  terms  of  imprisonment.  By  measures  of  the  sort  the 
state  loudly  proclaims  its  belief  that  suicide  is  not  only  a  sin 
against  God  and  reason,  but  also  a  crime  against  a  govern- 
ment 's  very  existence.  In  general  the  state  has  small  concern 
for  sins  against  God  .and  reason.  It  rouses  itself  to  persistent 
activity  against  transgressors,  mostly  when  its  own  life  is 
threatened.  With  the  aid  of  a  little  reflection,  we  can  read- 
ily understand  that  the  encouragement  of  suicide  in  a  re- 
public would  lead  to  annihilation.  The  godless  among  its 
citizens,  and  they  always  constitute  a  large  number,  would 
be  apt  at  any  moment  to  disappear  from  its  ranks,  and  leave 
to  survivors  an  inheritance  of  untold  shame  and  misery. 

Suicide  is  so  shocking  a  crime,  an  act  so  far  beside  the 
promptings  of  nature,  that  men  usually  reckon  its  perpetrators 
insane.  Intense  grief  and  overwhelmingly  sharp  pain  can,  of 
course,  unbalance  the  mind  of  a  sufferer;  and  our  Church, 
with  this  fact  in  view,  and  because  of  the  mystery  that  al- 


SUICIDE  207 

ways  attaches  to  a  man's  last  moments,  is  extremely  lenient 
in  the  application  of  its  laws  against  suicide.  The  circum- 
stance should  not,  however,  lead  us  to  conclude  that  every 
single  act  of  self-murder  is  the  freak  of  a  lunatic.  The  care- 
ful preparations,  the  secrecy  of  proceeding,  the  efficacy  of 
the  means  chosen,  the  schemes  employed,  often  point  to  the 
criminal's  full  possession  of  his  wits  up  to  the  latest  breath. 
Besides,  it  is  ill-directed  charity  to  invariably  excuse  the  folly 
of  the  dead  by  fastening  on  their  posterity  the  hereditary 
taint  of  a  reputation  for  insanity. 

Thoughts  of  suicide  cannot,  of  course,  be  seriously  enter- 
tained by  minds  alive  to  religious  instincts,  to  the  true  mean- 
ing of  life  and  its  attendant  woes  and  joys.  Minds  dead  to 
faith  can  easily  fall  a  prey  to  the  temptation,  when  their  cup 
of  sorrow  overflows,  and  the  future  holds  out  no  promise  of 
respite.  Incurable  disease,  disappointment  in  love  or  busi- 
ness, loss  of  motive,  or  purpose,  or  ambition,  these  several 
causes  will  operate  to  drag  down  to  a  suicide's  grave  the  fool, 
who  has  cut  loose  from  religion,  and  entertains  only  hazy  and 
uncertain  opinions  concerning  Heaven  and  hell.  To  the  well 
instructed  Christian  these  several  misfortunes  present  no  in- 
superable difficulty.  He  knows  that  disappointment  here  was 
the  lot  God's  Son  chose  for  Himself,  when  He  condescended 
to  put  on  our  nature.  He  knows  that  every  motive  or  pur- 
pose, his  soul's  salvation  excepted,  is  beneath  his  contempt, 
unequal  to  the  full  dignity  of  his  sublime  calling,  and  worthy 
of  only  his  waste  energies.  He  reckons  it  a  sin  to  allow  any 
lesser  aim  to  completely  absorb  his  attention. 

The  Christian,  therefore,  goaded  by  despair,  and  urged  in 
weaker  moments  to  the  crime  of  self-murder,  must  be  com- 
pelled to  refresh  his  memory  of  the  lessons  learned  from  a 
pious  mother  in  childhood;  and,  if  reason  is  at  his  call,  he 
can  pass  through  the  temptation  with  safety.  To  the  irreli- 
gious we  can  give  no  solid  advice  till  they  mend  their  ways, 
and  get  into  the  trend  of  mind  God  wants  them  to  follow  in 
His  service.  We  might  perhaps  endeavor  to  convince  them 
that  no  disease  is  absolutely  incurable,  that  every  cloud  has 
a  silver  lining,  that  disappointment  in  love  or  business  has 
often  paved  the  way  to  life-long  happiness  and  unprecedented 
prosperity,  and  that  there  is  plenty  of  work  in  the  world  for 


208 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


the  energetic  and  industrious.  But  they  will  find  it  possible 
to  answer  somehow  every  argument  of  the  sort  we  have  to 
offer,  and  we  shall  find  ourselves  reduced  to  silence,  or  driven 
in  the  end  to  the  only  true  method,  the  only  trustworthy 
source  of  encouragement  and  comfort,  religion  and  faith  in 
its  principles.  A  sovereign  remedy  for  suicide  is  Shake- 
speare's ''dread  of  something  after  death,  that  undiscovered 
country,"  that  pit  of  fire,  a  sterner  and  more  substantial 
reality  to  men  blessed  with  the  instincts  of  faith  than  the 
very  ground  they  tread.  Nor  ever  yet  did  man  or  woman 
take  the  sad  and  unholy  step  of  self-murder,  until  hell  by 
repeated  insults  to  conscience  had  worn  in  his  or  her  mind 
to  a  thin  shadow  of  itself. 

Against  Nature.  We  intend  to  prove  our  verdict  against 
suicide  without  once  appealing  to  Scripture  or  the  teachings 
of  the  Church.  And  we  emphatically  condemn  the  conduct 
of  whatever  sages,  modern  or  ancient,  from  motives  of  moral 
cowardice  and  selfishness  ran  counter  in  this  respect  to  the 
canons  of  right  reason.  No  man  is  so  wise  but  that  free  will, 
influenced  by  mean  and  ungodly  motives,  can  lead  him  into 
the  commission  of  horrible  crimes.  Socrates,  Plato  and  others 
were  lying  to  their  own  hearts,  when  they  endeavored  to  find 
in  philosophy  an  excuse  for  turpitude,  into  which  want  of 
courage  forced  them. 

Self-defense.  This  term  is  commonly  used  to  denote  the 
act  of  opposing  force  to  violence  when  unjustly  attacked. 
When  it  results  in  the  death  of  the  offender,  no  moral  wrong 
attaches  to  the  slayer,  if  certain  conditions  have  place.  One 
is  at  liberty  to  use  this  prerogative  of  self-defense,  not  only 
when  his  life  is  in  danger,  but  also  when  threatened  with  the 
loss  of  some  other  great  good,  like  wealth,  virtue,  bodily  in- 
tegrity. It  likewise  enables  a  friend  to  rescue  a  friend  from 
death  or  other  heavy  loss  at  the  hands  of  an  assassin  or 
thief.  Self-defense  is  no  legitimate  plea  for  excuse,  when 
harm  is  threatened  by  one  in  a  position  to  inflict  just  punish- 
ment. For  instance,  the  criminal  condemned  to  death  by  the 
state  has  no  right  whatever  to  defend  himself  against  the 
executioner  of  the  law's  sentence.     A  child  has  no  right  to 


SELF-DEFENSE  209 

resist  a  parent  when  chastised ;  a  pupil  has  no  right  to  quarrel 
with  a  punishment. 

Philosophy  further  recognises  these  four  conditions  as  neces- 
sary of  fulfilment.  First,  the  violence  done  the  aggressor 
must  be  exerted  only  while  the  danger  actually  exists,  not 
before,  not  after  the  attack.  Besides,  no  other  method  of 
escape  than  a  return  of  violence  for  violence  must  be  in  the 
innocent  party's  power.  If  flight  is  possible,  flight  must  be 
had  recourse  to.  No  amount  of  dread  concerning  a  reputa- 
tion for  cowardice  will  justify  the  killing  of  another.  Sec- 
ondly, no  severer  measures  must  be  taken  than  are  absolutely 
necessary.  If  a  blow  in  the  face  will  prove  sufficient  safe- 
guard, a  severe  wound  with  a  weapon  is  not  justifiable.  If 
a  severe  wound  will  serve  to  stay  the  aggressor,  the  party 
attacked  must  rest  satisfied  with  inflicting  the  wound,  and 
must  not  proceed  to  slay  his  assailant.  Thirdly,  there  must 
exist  between  the  good  defended  and  the  harm  done  the 
wrong-doer  a  well  defined  proportion.  This  provision  is  of 
special  importance,  when  the  protection  of  wealth  or  property 
is  in  question.  Thus,  a  small  sum  of  money  is  so  little  worth 
in  comparison  with  a  human  life,  that  reason  cries  out  against 
murdering  a  petty  thief  to  save  the  contents  of  a  pocketbook. 
Fourthly,  revenge  must  have  no  part  in  the  proceeding.  No 
motive  but  that  of  self-defense  pure  and  simple  will  justify 
an  act  so  serious  in  its  consequences  as  the  destruction  of  a 
fellow-being.  These  four  conditions  combine  to  rid  an  act 
done  in  self  defense  of  the  moral  wrong  under  other  cir- 
cumstances resident  in  it.  They  operate  to  bring  about  the 
state  of  things  expressed  by  that  phrase  consecrated  in  the 
Latin  tongue.  ''Servato  moderamine  inculpatae  tutelae," 
**  Observing  always  the  due  measure  or  moderation  that  frees 
self-defense  from  blame. ' ' 

Of  course,  these  precautions  approve  themselves  to  reason. 
It  is,  however,  one  thing  to  see  their  force  and  fairness,  when 
coolly  studying  the  subject;  another,  to  apply  them  in  the 
heat  of  action,  when  pressed  into  a  tight  corner,  where  a 
second's  delay  may  mean  death  for  the  irresolute.  Many  a 
crime  of  murder,  we  are  aware,  is  committed  under  the  cloak 
of  self-defense,  and  the  Universal  Reckoner  alone  can  dis- 


210  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

tinguish  genuine  from  spurious  cases.  Civil  law  can  hardly 
enter  into  men's  motives.  It  decides,  and  generally  has  to 
decide,  with  the  help  of  whatever  light  facts  lend.  It  must 
of  necessity  exercise  leniency  towards  the  accused,  who  enters 
a  plea  of  self-defense ;  and  must  give  him  the  benefit  of  every 
little  circumstance  that  favors  his  cause.  We  are  ourselves 
disposed  to  be  easy  with  the  man  brought  face  to  face  with 
death  through  no  fault  of  his  own,  and  forced  by  a  mad 
adversary  to  make  up  his  mind  without  much  time  for  re- 
flection. Theologians  introduce  into  this  question  topics,  that, 
without  affecting  the  irreligious,  have  a  practical  bearing  on 
the  lives  of  religious  people.  They  ask,  for  instance,  if  it  is 
lawful  to  kill  a  drunken  or  mad  assailant;  if  it  is  lawful  to 
kill  in  defense  of  a  neighbor ;  if  it  is  lawful  to  kill  when  limbs 
are  endangered,  when  chastity  is  assailed,  or  honor.  They 
discuss  what  manner  of  threat  constitutes  an  assault,  and 
the  relative  weight  of  a  blow  in  the  face,  when  aimed  at  a 
man  of  dignity  and  an  ordinary  person. 

Duels.  Some  regard  the  duel  a  species  of  self-defense.  It 
is  a  means  to  which  so-called  gentlemen  resort  when  their 
honor,  not  their  life  or  material  wealth,  is  in  danger.  The 
barbarous  practice  is  now  well  nigh  dead;  but  less  than  a 
hundred  years  ago  it  was  conspicuously  alive  in  our  own 
country.  Public  opinion  has  finally  succeeded  in  frowning 
it  down,  and,  though  preliminaries  are  even  now  arranged 
in  the  newspapers,  the  hostile  meeting  seldom  or  never  has 
place.  The  custom  has  a  long  history.  Traces  of  it  are  found 
in  the  earliest  writings.  It  is,  however,  safe  to  say  that  the 
private  duel  is  an  invention  of  comparatively  modern  times. 
David  and  Goliath,  the  heroes  of  Homer,  Livy's  triplets,  the 
Horatii  and  Curiatii,  fought  duels  of  a  harmless  and  legiti- 
mate kind.  The  combatants  in  these  several  cases  engaged 
in  what  for  distinction's  sake  we  style  a  public  duel.  They 
were  representatives  chosen  by  the  leaders  of  two  contending 
armies  to  defend  by  their  prowess  the  fortunes  of  their  re- 
spective sides,  and  no  moral  blame  whatever  attached  to  their 
act  or  its  promoters.  If  reason  sanctions  war  and  allows 
whole  armies  of  men  to  perish  for  the  reestablishment  of 
equity  and  peace,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  reason  can  enter 
a  disclaimer  against  a  species  of  combat,  which  settles  the 


DUEL  211 

question  of  supremacy  at  the  expense  of  one  or  a  half  dozen 
lives.  Public  duelling  would  on  the  contrary  appear  to  be  a 
humane  substitute  for  the  horrors  of  war.  If  the  late  rebellion 
or  the  recent  World-Conflict  could  have  been  settled  in  some 
such  way,  a  world  of  loss  would  have  been  saved  the  coun- 
try. 

Barbarians  first  gave  to  single  combat  a  color  of  religion. 
They  counted  it  an  appeal  to  the  God  of  right;  and,  when 
other  testimony  was  wanting,  called  on  Heaven  in  this  crude 
way  for  a  decision.  The  Trial  by  Ordeal  had  its  origin  in 
the  same  mistaken  notion  of  Providence.  Legislators  of  the 
Middle  Ages  had  to  consult  these  superstitions  of  their  people, 
and  enacted  stringent  measures  to  regulate  loss  of  life.  The 
Truce  of  God,  established  in  1041,  forbidding  duels,  out  of 
respect  for  the  Saviour's  Passion,  between  Wednesday  and 
Monday,  served  as  a  check  to  frequency  of  duels.  Every  na- 
tion in  history  had  its  troubles  with  this  abuse.  As  long 
as  parties  to  a  dispute  agreed  to  submit  their  differences  to 
the  court  of  single  combat,  with  the  approval  and  under  the 
direction  of  judicial  authority,  the  evil  was  somewhat  re- 
stricted, and  wore  a  less  repugnant  appearance.  But,  when 
individuals,  without  any  permission  from  the  state,  took  jus- 
tice into  their  own  hands,  and  made  skill  in  the  use  of  weapons 
the  sole  arbiter  of  right  and  wrong,  duelling  lost  its  religious 
aspect,  and  degenerated  to  wholesale  butchery.  It  was  in 
any  event  a  sad  spectacle,  and  a  growth  of  ignorance;  but 
under  these  new  conditions  it  was  revolting  in  the  extreme 
and  attended  with  dreadful  consequences. 

Frenchmen  have  always  kept  well  to  the  front  in  this  par- 
ticular branch  of  barbarity.  Richelieu  opposed  the  practice 
with  all  the  strength  of  his  legislative  genius;  and,  to  strike 
terror  into  its  patrons,  stopped  not  at  beheading  in  1627  one 
of  the  nobility.  Count  Francois  de  Montmorency.  In  Ger- 
many duelling  is  much  in  use  at  the  universities;  but,  as 
swords  are  the  weapons,  and  the  bodies  of  the  contestants  are 
well  protected,  these  encounters  usually  result  in  a  few  face- 
scratches,  and  seldom  prove  fatal.  Among  Irishmen  Daniel 
0 'Council  killed  at  least  one  adversary  on  the  field  of  honor, 
D'Esterre,  and  his  conduct  in  this  particular  filled  the  later 
years  of  his  life  with  regret  and  sorrow.     In  America  Hamil- 


212 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


ton  and  Burr  fought  a  historic  duel  in  1804.  Hamilton,  the 
first  treasurer  of  the  United  States,  was  killed,  and  Burr 
passed  into  obscurity  and  oblivion.  Barron  and  Decatur,  a 
man  universally  loved  and  one  of  our  most  celebrated  commo- 
dores, fought  soon  after  the  War  of  1812  at  Bladensburg,  a 
village  about  seven  miles  outside  of  Washington.  Decatur 
was  killed,  Barron  was  severely  wounded.  The  near  neigh- 
borhood of  Bladensburg  to  Washington,  a  rendezvous  for  all 
the  political  worthies  of  the  country,  made  it  a  desirable  loca- 
tion for  battle-ground,  and  many  a  duel  was  negotiated  there 
in  the  early  days  of  the  last  century.  Clay  and  Randolph 
fought  in  1826.  Andrew  Jackson  killed  a  Charles  Dickinson, 
and  participated  in  other  affairs.  Benton  of  Missouri  killed 
a  Mr.  Lucas.  Two  members  of  Congress,  Cilley  of  Maine  and 
Graves  of  Kentucky,  fought  near  Washington  in  1838.  Cilley 
was  killed.  Richard  Somers  had  a  record  of  three  duels  in 
one  day.  Debates  on  the  floor  of  Congress  often  precipitated 
disputes,  a  challenge  followed,  and  one  or  both  of  two  fools 
died  in  the  gray  of  the  morning. 

The  custom  may  fairly  be  said  to  have  taken  its  rise  from  the 
false  notion  that  chance  would  favor  the  party  in  the  right, 
and  so  manage  matters  that  the  wrong-doer  would  fall.  But 
chance  has  no  real  existence,  and  God,  who  disposes  of  things 
in  creation,  has  nowhere  promised  to  turn  the  tide  of  victory 
this  way  or  that.  He  has  put  at  men's  disposal  other  and 
more  efficient  remedies  for  wrongs  done  their  honor,  and  these 
remedies  are  to  be  sought  at  the  bar  of  duly  constituted 
tribunals.  If  survival  means  vindication,  that  principal  in  a 
duel  generally  won  it,  who  had  the  steadier  arm,  the  truer 
aim,  and  the  better  education  in  the  use  of  weapons.  Duel- 
ling, therefore,  defeats  the  very  purpose  for  which  it  was 
instituted.  Of  course,  a  certain  amount  of  bull-dog  courage 
is  displayed  in  the  acceptance  of  a  challenge,  and  this  circum- 
stance may  help  to  commend  the  practice  to  some.  They 
feel,  no  doubt,  that,  whether  victor  or  victim,  they  have  at 
least  proved  to  the  world  that  they  are  no  cowards,  and  that 
friends  will  applaud  their  heroism  in  spite  of  the  insult  or 
insinuation  that  provoked  the  combat. 

But  common  sense  has  at  last  begun  to  assert  itself,  and  the 
civilization  of  to-day  reserves  its  applause  for  valor  of  a 


PROOFS  213 

sterner  sort  than  the  recklessness  common  to  duellists  and  in- 
furiated bulls.  Public  opinion'  frowns  down  exhibitions  of 
the  kind,  and  >the  makers  of  our  literature  have  done  much 
to  bring  about  this  happy  result.  Sheridan  in  his  play,  ' '  The 
Rivals,"  mercilessly  ridicules  the  custom.  Writers  poke  fun 
at  the  abominable  practice,  and  take  advantage  of  every  op- 
portunity to  show  it  up  in  its  true  colors.  The  consequence 
is  that  lucky  rascals,  who  escaped  the  death  they  richly  de- 
served, are  no  longer  reckoned  heroes.  They  are  banished 
from  good  society,  they  are  approached  with  horror,  and  their 
company  is  always  productive  of  unease  and  discomfort. 
They  are  rated  for  what  they  in  reality  are,  genteel  murder- 
ers, with  the  blood  of  fellow-men  on  their  guilty  heads,  and 
crying  out  to  Heaven  for  vengeance.  A  prize  fight  would  not 
Seem  to  be  a  duel,  with  this  for  definition:  ^'A  combat  with 
deadly  weapons,  fought  in  a  private  cause,  without  the  sanc- 
tion of  public  authority,  with  prior  agreement  concerning 
weapons,  seconds,  place  and  time.'' 

DIVISION 

Three  Parts— I,  II,  III 

I.     Suicide. 
II.     Self-defense. 
III.    Duelling. 

PROOFS       • 

I.  1°.  An  act  subversive  of  man's  duty  to  God  is  a  sin 
against  nature.     But  suicide  is  an  act  of  the  sort.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  Reason  or  nature  insists  on 
the  observance  of  relations  in  force  between  God  and  rational 
creatures.  These  relations  constitute  duties,  and  violence 
done  them  is  denominated  a  sin  against  nature. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  We  know  from  experience, 
from  man's  inability  to  produce  life,  that  God  alone  is  the 
author  and  preserver  of  life.  We  know,  further,  that  God 
bestows  life  with  a  definite  end  in  view.  It  is  to  be  scrupu- 
lously used  as  a  means  towards  establishing  in  ourselves  and 
others  moral  order,  and  compassing  eternal  happiness.    He 


214 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


gives  man  no  absolute  dominion  over  his  life,  but  only  what 
philosophers  term  use-ownership.  Man  is  therefore  obliged 
to  apply  life  to  the  uses  for  which  it  is  plainly  intended,  and 
keep  to  his  post  just  as  long  as  God  sees  fit  to  continue  his 
existence.  The  fact  that  man  is  vested  with  the  physical 
power  to  put  a  period  to  his  life,  is  no  sign  that  God  has  con- 
ferred on  him  absolute  dominion  over  it.  The  same  argument 
would  hold  good  in  the  case  of  a  thief  unjustly  possessed  of 
another's  property,  or  a  murderer  sending  some  weaker  victim 
to  death.  Man's  ability  to  inflict  death  on  himself  is  only 
another  effect  of  God's  determination  to  leave  His  creature 
absolute  freedom  of  will,  and  another  proof  that  willingness 
or  refusal  to  serve  is  a  matter  entirely  within  the  domain  of 
man's  unrestrained  choice. 

2°.  An  act  subversive  of  man's  duty  to  himself  is  a  sin 
against  nature.     But  suicide  is  an  act  of  the  kind.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  Man  has  duties  towards  his 
soul  and  body,  and  by  deliberately  cutting  short  his  days  he 
works  irreparable  injury  to  both. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  Life,  because  of  the  chance  to 
hope,  is  always  and  under  whatever  circumstances  better  even 
for  the  body  than  death.  As  far  as  the  mind  is  concerned, 
no  ills  of  life  can  rob  it  of  opportunities  to  improve  and 
enjoy  itself.  No  matter  what  misfortunes  overtake  a  man, 
no  matter  what  pains  and  diseases  distress  him,  he  has  it 
always  in  his  power  to  compass  his  supremely  last  end,  which 
we  long  ago  agreed  to  call  eternal  happiness.  He  has  it 
always  in  his  power  to  add  by  repeated  acts  of  virtue  to  the 
degree  of  glory  awaiting  him  after  death.  Fortitude,  pa- 
tience, resignation  to  the  Creator's  will,  all  these  meritorious 
acts  put  on  new  splendor,  when  exercised  in  the  midst  of 
trials  and  difficulties.  Pagan  poets  and  philosophers  pause 
in  their  writings  to  contemplate  and  praise  the  heroism  of 
suffering  undergone  in  the  cause  of  conscience;  the  sub- 
limity of  manly  virtue  struggling  against  odds  that  would 
overwhelm  natures  of  a  weaker  sort.  Seneca  thinks  no  spec- 
tacle so  worthy  of  Jove  as  that  presented  by  a  just  man,  en- 
gaged in  a  battle  with  adversity.  Horace  has  these  lines, 
**Justum  et  tenacem  propositi  virum — Si  fractus  illabatur 
orbis — Impavidum  ferient  ruinae."     ''If  the  world  fell  in 


PROOFS  215 

ruins  at  his  feet,  the  just  and  resolute  man  of  principle  would 
present  a  bold  front  to  the  crash." 

3°.  An  act  subversive  of  man's  duty  to  society  is  a  sin 
against  nature.     But  suicide  is  an  act  of  the  kind.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  Man's  birth  into  society  gives 
rise  to  a  kind  of  contract.  Neighbors,  banded  together  with 
him  for  the  common  good,  tacitly  agree  to  procure  for  him 
blessings  absolutely  out  of  reach  in  other  contingencies.  He, 
on  his  part,  promises  in  effect  to  make  due  return  to  society 
for  the  advantages  procured,  and  in  cutting  short  his  life  he 
ignominiously  falls  away  from  his  promise. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  Every  member  of  society  is  in 
justice  bound  to  contribute  his  share  towards  advancing  the 
interests  of  the  community  of  which  he  forms  part.  He 
proves  recreant  to  this  solemn  obligation  when  from  shame, 
cowardice,  or  impatience  he  sneaks  from  the  ranks  and  lays 
new  burdens  on  other  men's  shoulders.  I  say  nothing  of  the 
infinite  harm  a  suicide  does  his  family  and  intimate  friends. 
It  may  happen  that  he  leaves  a  wife  and  children  to  starve, 
or  eke  out  a  miserable  existence  on  the  charity  of  others.  Cer- 
tainly, he  leaves  as  an  inheritance  to  connections  a  blot  of 
shame  and  a  measure  of  disgrace,  that  no  time  or  endeavor 
can  wholly  eradicate.  Society  has  a  right  to  expect  from  him 
an  example  of  constancy,  courage  and  magnanimity,  and  he 
slinks  away  conspicuous  for  weakness,  cowardice,  and  a  mean- 
ness of  spirit  without  parallel. 

II.  A  legitimate  means  to  the  effective  preservation  of  a 
well  founded  right  is  justifiable.  But  death  inflicted  in  self- 
defense  is  a  legitimate  means  to  the  effective  preservation  of 
a  well  founded  right.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  A  right  vests  its  owner  with 
the  moral  prerogative  to  enforce  in  others  respect  for  its 
sacredness.  It  privileges  the  owner  to  use  even  physical 
violence,  when  men  deaf  to  moral  instincts  attempt  to  assail 
it.  A  right  would  in  any  other  supposition  lose  much  of  its 
efficacy,  and  would  be  of  small  practical  utility.  The  world 
would  be  reduced  to  chaos,  and  injustice  would  everywhere 
prevail. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  Life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit 
of  happiness  are  in  the  words  of  our  Constitution  inalienable 


216  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

rights,  and  all  three  may  be  seriously  interfered  with  by  at- 
tempts from  without.  The  death  of  the  offender  is  at  times 
the  only  effective  bar  against  loss  of  life  or  property,  and, 
as  a  consequence,  desirable  and  morally  correct.  In  such  an 
event  the  transgressor,  by  deliberately  putting  himself  in 
the  wrong,  forfeits  his  right  to  live,  and,  if  killed,  is  done  no 
injustice.  Nobody  can  hesitate  to  regard  the  assailant 's  death 
an  effective  means  to  the  preservation  of  rights  involved. 
That  it  is  a  legitimate  means,  is  evident  from  the  circumstance 
that  the  innocent  party  would  have  to  otherwise  yield  up 
his  own  life,  or  some  possession  a  little  less  valuable,  merely 
out  of  kindness  to  the  offender.  But  kindness  or  charity  of 
that  sort  is  prescribed  by  no  law  of  God  or  man.  Love  of 
neighbor  sins  by  excess,  when  it  moves  a  man  to  love  his 
neighbor  more  than  himself.  To  sacrifice  one's  life  for  a 
neighbor's  salvation  is  not  to  love  the  neighbor  more  than 
self.  That  would  be  to  sacrifice  one's  salvation  for  a  neigh- 
bor's.    The  killing  of  an  aggressor  is  not  always  obligatory. 

III.  A  means  founded  on  false  principles,  unsuited  to  the 
purpose  intended,  and  wrong  in  itself,  is  highly  absurd  and 
contrary  to  the  law  of  nature.  But  private  duels  are  such 
a  means.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  Ethics  can  borrow  no  princi- 
ples from  falsehood,  and  wickedness  shields  itself  behind  ex- 
cuses full  of  error,  and  easily  detected.  It  is  the  mark  of  a 
fool  to  employ  in  the  prosecution  of  some  work  agencies  cal- 
culated to  operate  against  and  not  in  favor  of  the  agent's  aim. 
Foolishness  degenerates  to  heinous  crime,  when  the  methods 
adopted,  besides  being  unequal  to  the  end  proposed,  are  at- 
tended by  consequences  as  serious  as  those  that  accompany 
private  duels.  A  lavish  waste  of  life  is  a  direct  insult  to 
Almighty  God,  and  as  such  deserves  the  severest  condemna- 
tion on  the  score  of  morality. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  The  private  duel  had  its  origin 
among  barbarians.  The  Lombards,  with  whom  might  always 
prevailed  over  right,  introduced  it  throughout  Europe.  The 
Greeks  and  Romans,  though  acquainted  with  public  duels, 
were  strangers  to  the  other  custom.  In  its  origin,  therefore, 
this  brutal  practice  rested  on  a  notion  subversive  of  all  moral- 
ity and  truth,  the  sacredness  of  physical  as  compared  with 


PROOFS  217 

moral  force.  It  was  in  a  manner  a  necessary  growth  of  early- 
times,  when  law  and  order  were  subject  to  great  upheavals, 
and  tribunals  of  justice  were  little  respected.  The  supersti- 
tious belief  that  God  would  interfere  in  an  extraordinary  way 
to  save  the  innocent  and  destroy  the  guilty,  was  a  new  and 
grievous  mistake  added  to  the  first  blunder.  In  later  times 
revenge  was  the  element  uppermost  in  the  minds  of  com- 
batants, and  duels  were  tolerated  on  the  plea  that  individuals 
have  a  right  to  seek  on  their  own  private  account  satisfaction 
for  injury  done  their  honor.  But  no  principle  can  be  falser. 
No  community,  no  society  or  state  could  long  subsist,  if  such 
a  mode  of  procedure  were  once  sanctioned  and  came  into 
general  use.  For  the  settlement  of  disputes  and  reparation 
of  assailed  honor  we  have  courts  by  law  established,  and  death 
would  result  to  authority,  were  any  other  process  introduced. 
Were  duels  not  prohibited  by  conscience,  by  reason  proclaim- 
ing the  truth,  enemies  in  private  life  would  fall  to  butchering 
one  another,  and  the  State  would  become  a  wilderness. 

The  absurdity  of  duelling  is  manifest  from  the  fact  that  it 
shockingly  fails  to  serve  the  purpose  for  which  it  was  insti- 
tuted. Whether  it  be  viewed  as  a  means  of  repairing  the 
wrong  done  a  man's  honor  and  reputation,  or  considered  a 
possible  means  of  revenge,  it  has  no  one  -feature  to  recommend 
it.  It  is  not  an  apt  instrument  for  satisfaction,  because  the 
innocent  party  is  just  as  likely  to  forfeit  his  life  as  the  guilty. 
The  event  of  the  combat  proves  simply  that  the  survivor  man- 
aged his  sword  or  pistol  with  more  skill  and  dexterity  than  his 
victim.  It  certainly  leaves  the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  sur- 
vivor as  much  an  open  question  as  it  was  before  the  meeting. 
If  the  innocent  party  falls,  where  is  the  revenge?  Certainly 
the  man  guilty  of  the  wrong  done  by  the  injury  or  insult  had 
no  claims  to  revenge,  and  entered  not  into  the  struggle  to 
vindicate  himself.  Honor  is  not  man's  highest  good.  And 
true  honor  is  not  praise  in  the  mouths  of  men,  but  inward 
consciousness  of  right  conduct  and  a  virtuous  life. 

But  the  characteristic  that  emphatically  condemns  duelling 
is  its  own  objective  immorality.  It  involves  a  two-fold  mal- 
ice. The  duellist  commits  a  double  crime  with  all  the  malice 
of  attempted  murder  and  attempted  suicide;  and  on  no  few 
occasions   the  two   attempts   become   accomplished   realities. 


218  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

The  duellist,  therefore,  incurs  whatever  blame  attaches  to 
murder  and  suicide.  In  morality,  because  will  is  the  pre- 
dominating factor,  the  difference  between  the  attempt  to  do 
evil  and  the  actual  accomplishment  of  evil  is  accidental,  and 
therefore  negligible. 

PEINCIPLES— SUICIDE 

A.  Distinguish  between  direct  and  indirect  killing  of  self. 
Direct  is  suicide.  Indirect  is  death  foreseen  in  some  act  put 
for  a  legitimate  purpose.  Instances  are,  a  fatal  operation, 
jump  from  a  high  window  in  time  of  fire,  nurse  to  plague- 
stricken. 

B.  Destruction  is  supreme  act  of  ownership.  Man  is  vested 
with  no  such  ownership  in  life,  because  its  primary  purpose 
is  not  man's  advantage,  but  the  greater  glory  of  God. 

C.  Instinct  of  self-preservation  is  index  of  God's  will  in 
the  matter,  and  of  His  disapproval  of  suicide. 

D.  God's  permission  can  be  presumed  when  serious  spirit- 
ual dangers  threaten,  or  life  becomes  oppressive. 

Answer:  Life's  chief  purpose,  the  greater  glory  of  God, 
never  becomes  impossible;  and  only  in  this  case  can  He  be 
supposed  to  give  permission.  With  His  grace,  whatsoever 
spiritual  danger  can  be  met  and  overcome ;  and  patience  is  a 
virtue. 

E.  Direct  mutilation  partakes  of  the  malice  of  suicide.  And 
yet  man  is  the  steward  of  his  life,  if  not  its  absolute  owner. 
He  is  allowed  to  preserve  his  life  at  the  expense  of  a  limb. 
The  part  ranks  lower  than  the  whole. 

P.  Saints,  who  rushed  to  death,  acted  under  inspiration, 
or  through  invincible  ignorance,  or  committed  indirect  self- 
killing. 

G.  Our  second  and  third  arguments  against  suicide  pre- 
suppose the  first.  Thus,  the  drunkard  committing  suicide 
after  a  mission  and  a  good  confession  would  perhaps  be  con- 
sulting his  own  interests,  but  at  the  expense  of  God's  rights 
as  owner.  With  St.  Paul  we  can  long  to  be  dissolved  and  be 
with  Christ,  but  always  in  a  spirit  of  resignation  to  God's 
will. 

H.  We  can  reject  a  gift.     Life  is  a  gift.     Ergo. 


PRINCIPLES  219 

Answer:  A  gift  meant  primarily  for  our  advantage  and 
subject  to  absolute  ownership,  I  grant ;  a  gift  meant  primarily 
for  the  giver's  advantage,  and  subject  to  only  use-ownership, 
I  deny. 

N.B.  Suicide  is  more  than  rejection,  it  is  destruction  of 
life. 

I.  Hume  argues  thuswise.  If  we  cannot  interfere  with  the 
course  of  nature  to  shorten  life,  we  cannot  interfere  with  the 
course  of  nature  to  prolong  it.  Eadem  est  contrariorum 
ratio.  Ergo,  it  would  be  wrong  to  push  aside  a  falling  stone 
that  threatened  destruction. 

Answer:  Use-ownership  empowers  and  obliges  us  to  pre- 
serve or  prolong  our  life.  It  vests  us  with  no  right  to  destroy 
same.  That  is  the  exclusive  prerogative  of  absolute  owner- 
ship.    We  are  stewards,  not  proprietors. 

J.  It  is  lawful  to  choose  a  lesser  evil  for  the  purpose  of 
escaping  a  greater. 

Answer:  The  saying  has  some  force  in  question  of  phys- 
ical evil,  none  in  question  of  moral  evil.  In  the  case  of  self, 
it  can  never  become  necessary  to  commit  one  sin  to  avoid 
others.  It  is  always  quite  possible  to  avoid  all  sin.  In  the 
case  of  others,  it  would  be  highly  wrong  to  commit  one  sin  to 
prevent  them  from  committing  a  thousand.  Moral  evil  is 
never  justified  by  good.  The  end  never  'justifies  the  means. 
Suicide  would  be  the  lesser  evil  only  in  the  supposition  that 
it  is  not  sinful.  The  smallest  sin  is  a  greater  evil  than  phys- 
ical evil  of  whatever  magnitude. 

K.  Suicide  is  wrong  because  the  man  does  himself  an  in- 
justice. Nobody  can  do  himself  an  injustice.  Volenti  nulla 
fit  injuria. 

Answer:  Suicide  is  an  injustice  to  God  as  well  as  to  its 
perpetrator.  Man  has  duties  towards  himself,  and  to  fall 
away  from  them  is  injustice.  The  saying  admits  of  excep- 
tions, e.g.,  fraud  in  law. 

L.  Hunters  dispose  of  birds  and  beasts  without  ownership 
in  them.  Ergo,  a  pari,  a  man  ought  to  be  able  to  dispose  of 
his  life  without  ownership  in  it. 

Answer:  Hunters  have  no  particular  or  private  owner- 
ship empowering  them  to  exclude  others.  I  grant.  Hunters 
have  no  universal  or  general  ownership  as  in  things  belong- 


S30  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

ing  to  nobody  in  particulai*,  I  deny.  Birds,  beasts  and  all 
lower  creation  are  by  nature  man's  property  to  use  them  and 
destroy  them  as  he  sees  fit. 

M.  A  criminal  condemned  to  death  may  lawfully  execute 
himself  at  the  bidding  of  authority.     Ergo. 

Answer:  In  suicide  there  is  question  not  of  public,  but  of 
private  authority.  Besides,  some  authors  deny  the  legitimacy 
of  every  such  proceeding,  and  they  assign  two  reasons.  The 
state  is  allowed  to  kill  only  as  a  measure  of  justice,  and  no- 
body can  be  expected  to  execute  justice  on  himself.  Nobody 
is  a  good  judge  in  his  own  case,  and  therefore  nobody  is  a 
fit  executioner  of  himself.  Every  such  arrangement  is  directly 
opposed  to  nature's  instinct  for  self-preservation.  Law  must 
be  possible. 

N.  One  must  take  means  to  preserve  his  life  and  health; 
generally  speaking  he  need  not  take  extraordinary  means, 
such  as  occasion  serious  inconvenience.  Serious  inconvenience 
excuses  from  affirmative  law,  and  God  is  a  prudent  law-maker. 
The  penances  and  fasts  of  the  saints  are  opposed  to  no  law  of 
nature,  even  though  they  weaken  the  body  and  shorten  life. 
Spiritual  good  is  of  a  higher  order  than  life  and  health.  The 
harm  done  the  body  and  life  is  indirect,  not  direct. 

0.  It  is  often  lawful  to  expose  oneself  to  death,  when  death 
is  not  directly  intended,  and  a  proportionate  cause  justifies  the 
proceeding.  Soldiers  taken  prisoners  are  not  allowed  to  kill 
themselves  to  escape  doing  service  to  their  captors.  Sailors 
are  allowed  to  jump  from  a  burning  vessel  into  the  sea  to  es- 
cape death  by  fire.  A  soldier  in  time  of  war  is  allowed  to  set 
fire  to  a  ship  or  tower,  though  it  means  instant  death  for  him- 
self, if  the  act  causes  heavy  damage  to  the  enemy. 

PRINCIPLES— SELF-DEFENSE 

A.  This  privilege  of  self-defense  extends  farther  than  life 
or  property.  A  woman  has  a  right  to  kill  an  assailant  in  de- 
fense of  her  chastity.  Nobody  has  the  right  to  kill  another  in 
defense  of  his  honor  or  reputation. 

B.  An  insane  or  drunken  person  is  an  unjust  assailant,  not 
formally  but  materially.  The  child  in  a  mother's  womb  is 
in  no  sense  of  the  word  an  unjust  assailant.     The  mother 


PRINCIPLES  221 

causes  the  collision  of  rights,  and  must  yield  to  the  child. 
When  violence  is  done  her,  neither  she  nor  the  child  is  to 
blame;  and  yet  she  comes  closer  to  blame  than  the  child  for 
the  condition  of  affairs,  and  must  suffer  accordingly. 

C.  Self-defense  procures  damnation  of  the  assailant.  Ergo, 
wrong.  Self-defense  sacrifices  greater  good  to  lesser.  Ergo, 
wrong. 

Answer:  Essentially  and  of  itself,  I  deny ;  accidentally  and 
by  way  of  occasion,  I  grant.  Charity  forbids  us  to  procure 
another's  damnation  the  first  way,  not  the  second  way,  unless 
the  thing  can  be  avoided  without  great  inconvenience,  and  the 
neighbor  is  in  extreme  need.  The  thing  can  be  avoided  only 
at  the  expense  of  the  innocent  party's  life,  and  that  would  be 
a  rather  serious  inconvenience.  The  assailant  is  not  in  ex- 
treme need,  because  he  can  refrain  from  attack.  Besides,  the 
common  good  must  be  taken  into  account.  Without  this  priv- 
ilege life  would  be  insecure. 

D.  In  the  case  of  a  drunken  or  mad  assailant  damnation 
would  be  sure.     Ergo,  wrong. 

Answer:  No  moral  certainty  on  these  three  points,  the  ex- 
act spiritual  condition  of  innocent  party  and  assailant,  and 
future  salvation  of  party  in  the  wrong,  if  spared  for  con- 
version. 

E.  It  is  wrong  to  kill  another  in  defense  of  reputation  or 
honor,  not  because  reputation  is  a  smaller  good  than  life, 
property  is  that,  but  because  the  moderamen  inculpatae  tu- 
telae  is  seldom  or  never  verified.  It  is  next  to  impossible  to 
be  sure  of  the  serious  harm  attaching  to  slander,  calumny  and 
detraction  before  the  harm  is  actually  done,  and  then  it  is  too 
late  for  defense ;  defense  is  out  of  the  question,  revenge  alone 
is  in  order.  Besides,  escape  from  the  harm  is  within  easy 
reach  of  less  radical  measures.  Opposite  doctrine  would  be 
open  to  great  abuse,  and,  though  no  doctrine  is  to  be  con- 
demned because  of  extrinsic  and  accidental  abuses,  every  doc- 
trine, accompanied  like  this  by  intrinsic  and  essential  abuses, 
deserves  condemnation. 

F.  Reputation  is  a  more  precious  possession  than  life. 
Ergo. 

Answer:  Fundamentally  taken,  inner  virtue  and  honesty, 
I  grant;  formally  taken,  outer  esteem  and  credit,  I  deny. 


222  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

Reputation  is  the  judgment  passed  by  others  on  our  conduct 
and  affairs.  Honor  is  outward  manifestation  of  the  good 
esteem  we  have  of  others.  Fama  from  fando,  to  talk,  the  way 
men  talk  about  us. 

G.  The  end  never  justifies  the  means.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Homicide  is  the  means,  and  homicide  is  not  in- 
trinsically evil.  Otherwise  capital  punishment  would  be 
wrong.  It  is  a  physical  evil  and  in  itself  morally  indifferent. 
While  the  end  never  justifies  an  intrinsically  evil  means,  it 
often  justifies  a  physically  evil  and  a  morally  indifferent 
means. 

H.  God's  right  as  Master  of  life  and  death  is  violated  by 
the  assailant,  not  by  the  innocent  party. 

I.  We  must  love  our  enemies,  but  not  more  than  we  love 
ourselves.  In  all  honesty  we  could  account  ourselves  worthy 
of  no  better  fate,  were  we  the  unjust  assailant. 

J.  In  this  case,  we  should  be  in  duty  bound  to  kill  our 
assailant. 

Answer:  Homicide  is  an  extraordinary  means,  and  we  are 
held  to  only  ordinary  means.  Circumstances  like  the  support 
of  a  family  can  render  self-defense  a  serious  obligation. 

K.  Self-defense  is  not  a  morally  bad  act  put  to  compass  a 
good  end.  It  is  a  morally  good  act,  the  preservation  of  one's 
life,  and  from  this  good  act  a  physical  evil  follows,  loss  of 
life  on  the  part  of  the  unjust  assailant.  This  death  is  not  to 
be  imputed  to  the  innocent  slayer,  but  to  the  unjust  assailant. 

PRINCIPLES— DUELLING 

A.  The  duel  is  a  species  of  defense  against  loss  of  prop- 
erty. To  refuse  a  duel  means  dismissal  from  the  army,  re- 
duction in  rank,  and  consequent  loss  of  livelihood.     Ergo. 

Answer:  One  must  lose  his  livelihood  rather  than  per- 
petrate an  intrinsically  evil  deed.  A  duel  contracts  the  mal- 
ice of  attempted  murder  and  attempted  suicide,  and  both 
deeds  are  intrinsically  evil.  A  duel  is  no  defense  against  an 
unjust  assailant;  and,  therefore,  the  attempt  on  a  rival's  life 
has  all  the  malice  of  murder.  It  is  no  mere  exposure  of  life 
to  a  risk  justified  by  a  proportionate  cause ;  and,  therefore,  it 
has  all  the  malice  of  suicide.    We  are  allowed  to  undergo  dan- 


PRINCIPLES  223 

ger  to  life  with  a  proportionate  reason.  We  are  never  al- 
lowed to  seek  danger  to  life  with  or  without  a  proportionate 
reason.  The  duellist  more  than  undergoes  danger,  he  seeks 
it;  because  by  the  very  seeking  of  danger  he  vindicates  his 
reputation  for  bravery.  A  nurse  in  time  of  the  plague  merely 
exposes  himself  to  danger,  because  his  whole  purpose  is  to 
minister  to  the  sick,  and  danger  contributes  nothing  to  this 
purpose.  In  other  words,  the  duellist  makes  risk  to  life  a 
means  to  his  end;  the  nurse  employs  other  means  like  medi- 
cine, food,  care  and  attention,  and  to  these  means  danger  is, 
much  against  his  wishes,  inseparably  attached. 

B.  The  state  has  no  right  to  authorize  a  duel  for  the  set- 
tlement of  justice  between  two  disputants.  It  is  the  state's 
duty  to  settle  such  disputes  on  their  merits,  punishing  the 
guilty  and  freeing  the  innocent.  If  unable  to  arrive  at  a  de- 
cision, it  must  give  the  benefit  of  the  doubt  to  the  accused. 
The  state  is  not  allowed  to  arbitrarily  treat  guilty  and  inno- 
cent alike  by  exposing  them  to  the  same  risk.  The  state  ought 
to  put  down  duelling,  and  not  encourage  it.  The  Trial  by 
Ordeal  was  all  wrong  and  the  Church  consistently  opposed 
it.  God  has  nowhere  promised  to  favor  the  innocent  in  tests 
of  the  kind. 

C.  Duels  between  students  are  sometimes  against  the  law 
of  nature,  because  they  lead  to  serious  wounds  and  mutilation. 

D.  Though  a  prize-fight  is  not  a  duel  properly  so  called, 
on  occasions  it  would  seem  to  be  against  the  law  of  nature. 

E.  It  is  lawful  to  use  the  one  and  fit  means  for  defending 
honor.     But  the  duel  is  such.     Ergo. 

Answer:  If  the  one  and  fit  means  is  at  the  same  time  legi- 
timate, I  grant ;  otherwise,  I  deny.  A  duel  is  the  one  and  fit 
means  not  of  itself  and  by  nature,  but  by  accident  and  the 
wrong  views  of  men. 

F.  The  duel  is  said  to  be  wrong,  because  the  good  it  effects 
is  out  of  proportion  with  the  evil.  But  the  preservation  of 
honor,  rank  and  wealth  is  not  out  of  proportion  with  risk  to 
life.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Because  the  immediate  effect  is  out  of  propor- 
tion, I  grant;  because  the  remote  effect  is  out  of  proportion, 
I  deny.  The  immediate  effect  is  to  show  courage,  and  that  is 
out  of  proportion.     Honor,  rank,  property  are  but  the  remote 


224  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

effects  and  even  they  are  out  of  proportion.  Honor  is  two- 
fold, honor  in  root,  virtue  and  other  good  qualities  provoking 
the  esteem  of  others;  and  formal  honor,  the  good  esteem  of 
others.  Honor  in  first  sense  is  intrinsic  to  the  man  and  su- 
perior to  life.  Honor  in  the  second  sense  is  extrinsic  to  the 
man  and  far  inferior  to  life.  Honor  in  root  is  the  man's  own 
affair  and  cannot  be  touched  by  the  neighbor.  Formal  honor, 
the  kind  duels  mend,  is  beyond  a  man 's  own  control  and  alto- 
gether dependent  on  the  neighbor's  whim  and  fancy. 

G.  A  duel  in  no  way  resembles  self-defense,  because  prior 
agreement  is  of  its  essence.  This  circumstance  separates  the 
duel  from  an  ordinary  fight  or  shooting-match. 

H.  The  man  who  refuses  to  honor  a  challenge  is  a  coward 
in  the  eyes  of  fools  alone,  and  their  opinion  is  no  safe  stand- 
ard of  morality.  Moral  courage  is  of  a  higher  order  than 
physical. 

I.  A  woman  is  allowed  to  defend  her  honor  to  the  extent  of 
killing  an  assailant.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Honor  in  this  case  means  more  than  mere  es- 
teem ;  it  means  bodily  integrity  or  chastity. 


THESIS  III 

A  lie  is  always  and  of  its  very  nature  wrong.  To  safeguard 
a  proportionate  right,  the  use  of  a  broad  mental  reservation  is 
allowed.    Jouin,  106-109 ;  Rickahy,  224-237. 

QUESTION 

In  this  matter  of  man 's  duty  towards  his  neighbor,  we  single 
out  the  obligation  of  truthfulness  and  respect  for  the  right  of 
property  in  others.  We  treat  these  questions  in  separate 
theses,  giving  our  first  attention  to  the  moral  aspect  of  lying. 
Because  truth  is  due  the  neighbor,  and  because  men  have  an 
inviolable  right  to  whatever  they  legitimately  make  their  own, 
these  two  duties  are  branches  or  departments  of  the  compre- 
hensive virtue  called  justice,  that  habit  of  mind  and  will 
eternally  ready  to  give  to  everybody  his  due.  We  shall  see 
later  that  the  lie  is  formally  a  sin  against  truth,  not  against 
justice. 

DIVISION 

Thesis  has  two  parts — 
I.     The  lie. 
II.     The  reservation. 

PART  I.    LIE— TERMS 

I.  A  Lie.  The  Latin  verb  mentiri,  meaning  to  lie,  fur- 
nishes us  with  a  true  definition  of  the  thing.  It  is  supposed 
to  be  a  shortened  form  of  the  expression,  contra  mentem  ire, 
or  menti  ire,  and  signifies  to  go  against  the  mind.  Hence, 
a  lie  is  best  described  as  locutio  contra  mentem,  speech  or 
language  conveying  the  opposite  of  what  we  have  in  our  mind. 
It  is  want  of  harmony  between  what  we  say  and  what  we 
think.  It  is  opposed  to  moral  truth.  Truth  is  threefold: 
logical,  ontological  and  moral;  and  harmony  with  something 
is  the  generic  notion  common  to  all  three.     Logical  is  har- 

225 


226  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

mony  of  mind  with  outside  things,  and  affects  our  knowledge; ; 
ontological  is  harmony  of  things  outside  with  the  mind  of 
their  fashioner,  and  is  said  with  reference  to  creatures  and 
God;  moral  is  harmony  of  language  with  thought,  and  is  pe- 
culiar to  intercourse  of  man  with  man.  As  we  shall  imme- 
diately see  from  St.  Thomas,  deception  and  intention  to  de- 
ceive play  no  part  in  the  essential  constitution  of  a  lie.  A 
material  lie  can  be  formal  truth,  and  a  formal  lie  can  be  ma- 
terial truth.  No  moral  guilt,  of  course,  attaches  to  a  mere 
material  lie,  because  moral  blame  attaches  to  the  will  alone, 
and  in  a  material  lie  the  will  is  right,  the  intellect  is  at  fault. 

St.  Thomas  is  a  safe  guide  in  philosophy,  as  well  as  in 
theology,  and  it  may,  therefore,  be  useful  to  here  note  down 
what  he  has  to  say  on  the  subject.  I  quote,  therefore,  at  some 
length  from  his  Summary  of  Theology.  In  the  2nd  of  the 
2nd  part,  quest.  110,  art.  I,  he  has  what  follows : 

*' Truth  and  falsehood  are  the  proper  objects  of  speech.  A 
disordered  will  can  in  this  matter  have  one  of  two  intentions 
or  both,  either  to  communicate  a  falsehood  or,  as  an  effect  of 
the  communication,  to  deceive  some  one.  If  therefore  these 
three  elements  are  present,  viz. :  falsehood  of  communication, 
a  wish  to  communicate  falseness  and  the  desire  to  deceive, 
then  is  the  lie  a  material  one,  because  a  falsehood  is  communi- 
cated ;  a  formal  one,  because  it  is  wilfully  and  knowingly  com- 
municated; and  effective,  because  deception  is  wilfully  and 
knowingly  intended.  Nevertheless,  the  lie  derives  its  essence 
from  the  second  element,  i.e.,  the  wish  to  communicate  false- 
ness, or  a  falsehood  wilfully  and  knowingly  communicated. 
Wherefore  a  lie  receives  its  name  in  Latin  from  the  fact  that 
it  is  something  said  contrary  to  the  mind's  conviction.  The 
circumstance  that  one  designs  to  affect  another 's  opinion  with 
falseness  belongs  not  to  the  nature  or  essence  of  a  lie,  but 
to  a  further  perfection  of  the  same.  Even  so  with  things  in 
nature,  an  object,  when  once  it  assumes  the  form,  attains  to 
its  allotted  place  in  the  universe  of  existences,  even  though 
the  effect  generally  accompanying  the  form  is  for  the  time 
being  absent,  as  is  evident  for  instance,  in  a  thing  of  weight 
when  forcibly  held  aloft. ' ' 

In  the  same  part  and  question  art.  Ill  in  answer  to  the  4th 
difficulty  he  says: 


LIE  AND  DECEPTION  227 

**The  sinfulness  of  a  lie  is  derived  not  from  the  damage 
alone  which  it  does  our  neighbor,  but  from  its  want  of  har- 
mony with  the  order  of  reason." 

The  learned  Doctor 's  words  are  quite  plain.  His  idea  seems 
to  be  this — A  moral  falsehood  or  a  lie  consists,  as  far  as  mat- 
ter goes,  in  want  of  harmony  between  what  is  in  the  mind 
and  the  language  used  to  express  it.  It,  therefore,  differs 
from  logical  falsehood,  which  means  a  want  of  harmony  be- 
tween some  object  in  nature  and  the  mind's  conception  of  it. 
Hence  a  logical  falsehood  can  readily  enough  be  foundation 
for  a  moral  truth ;  and  a  logical  truth,  foundation  for  a  moral 
falsehood.  Yet,  such  a  factor  is  the  will  in  all  questions  of 
morality,  that  the  material  moral  falsehood  is  blameless  until 
the  intention  of  communicating  as  true  matter  known  and 
understood  to  be  false  accrues  to  it  and  by  union  completes, 
perfects  and  finishes  the  lie  properly  so  called.  He  insists 
very  much  on  this  point  because  the  introduction  of  a  third 
element,  viz.,  the  deception  of  our  neighbor,  is  made  too  much 
account  of  by  some  authors. 

The  third  element  is  a  merely  accidental  circumstance,  and 
contributes  nothing  to  the  naked  essence  of  a  lie.  It  is  quite 
true  that  every  lie  will  be  accompanied  by  this  third  element 
or  characteristic.  For,  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  a  false 
communication  known  to  be  such,  which  will  not  at  the  same 
time  procure,  at  least  in  intention,  a  neighbor's  deception. 
But  the  lie  is  in  full  consummated,  though  this  element  be 
entirely  wanting.  As  soon  as  the  speaker  attempts  in  his 
language  to  convey  an  untruth  known  to  be  such,  so  soon  does 
he  lie,  whether  he  intends  to  deceive,  or  to  amuse,  or  to  help, 
or  to  injure  his  neighbor.  The  injury  done  his  neighbor  may 
be  inseparably  connected  with  the  lie,  and  may  have  been 
uppermost  in  the  liar's  mind;  but  the  injury  derives  its  mal- 
ice not  from  the  circumstance  that  it  is  a  lie,  but  from  the  fact 
that  it  is  a  wounding  of  charity,  something  quite  distinct 
from  the  virtue  of  truth. 

PROOF 

I.  The  lie  has  its  intrinsic  malice  from  this,  that  it  is  a 
falling  away  from  our  duty,  not  precisely  to  our  neighbor, 


228  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

but  to  God  and  to  ourselves.  He  has  wisely  ordained,  for  the 
good  of  society,  that  words  should  communicate  ideas,  which 
would  otherwise  be  so  much  dead  lumber,  for  purposes  of  use 
to  the  neighbor.  He  has  imbedded  within  us  an  instinct,  as 
present  as  the  nose  on  our  face,  influencing  us  to  cherish 
truthfulness  in  our  dealings  one  with  another.  The  liar  reck- 
lessly tramples  this  ordinance  of  God,  and  stifles  within  him- 
self an  instinct,  which  is  among  Heaven's  purest  and  best 
gifts.  Hence  it  is  that  God,  who  is  avenger  of  broken  ordi- 
nances and  a  jealous  watcher  of  His  gifts  to  man,  punishes 
in  a  way  known  only  to  His  victims  the  deliberate  and  down- 
right liar.  I  should  call  for  no  more  potent  proof  of  God's 
interference  in  this  matter  than  that  furnished  by  the  blush 
of  shame  and  the  self-condemning  perturbation,  visible  all 
over  the  countenance  of  a  liar  in  the  beginning  of  his  career, 
or  of  the  ingenuous  youth  whose  poorly  ordered  self-love  has 
ensnared  him  into  a  cowardly  untruth. 

PRINCIPLES— LYING 

A.  Hugo  Grote,  a  Hollander,  for  the  seeming  purpose  of  de- 
ducing principles  subversive  of  society,  though  flattering  the 
self-love  of  a  dangerous  few,  offers  this  wrong  definition  of  a 
lie:  ''A  lie,''  he  says,  '4s  language  or  a  manifestation  in 
conflict  with  a  right,  which  exists  and  belongs  to  him  to  whom 
the  language  or  manifestation  is  addressed  or  directed." 

Were  this  the  proper  notion  of  a  lie,  to  say  nothing  of  other 
absurdities  painfully  apparent  in  it,  the  liar's  sin  would  in- 
herit its  essence  from  the  injury  done  his  neighbor.  The  con- 
clusion, of  course,  would  be  that  lies  told  by  way  of  joke, 
helpful  lies,  and  lies  told  by  men  in  responsible  positions  to 
save  a  secret,  are  truths.  We  have  already  met  this  difficulty 
and  shown  conclusively  enough  that  the  idea  of  the  injury 
done  our  neighbor  by  no  means  enters  into  the  essential  con- 
struction of  a  lie,  and  that  it  is  an  after  and  accidental  effect, 
which  may  with  the  same  influence  on  the  act  denominated  a 
lie  be  present  or  absent.  Besides,  let  the  two  latter  species 
of  a  lie,  countenanced  by  such  false  philosophers  as  Grote, 
become  prevalent,  and  the  intercourse  of  man  with  man  will 
soon  grow  a  scourge  and  a  gift  for  which  we  should  have 


PROOF  AND  PRINCIPLES  229 

small  occasion  to  thank  Heaven.  Remember,  however,  that 
our  decided  and  clearly  expressed  conviction  with  regard  to 
the  intrinsic  evil  of  lying  is  based  not  on  the  injury  done  the 
neighbor,  but  on  this  one  circumstance  that  it  is  an  abuse  of 
language,  that  God  and  nature  intended  to  be  used  as  a 
vehicle  of  thought.  The  inconvenience  done  the  neighbor  is 
a  weighty  argument  to  deter  men  from  lying,  and  perhaps 
exerts  a  more  universally  dissuasive  influence  than  our  meta- 
physical argument.  Still  it  is  an  extrinsic  element  and  may 
lead  to  false,  unfounded  notions. 

B.  Milton,  to  prove  that  lying  is  at  times  admissible,  asks 
this  empty  question:  ''If  all  killing  be  not  murder;  nor  all 
taking  from  another,  theft;  why  must  all  untruths  be  lies?" 
The  answer  at  once  suggests  itself.  Man  must  not  kill  an- 
other when  innocent,  he  must  not  take  from  another  unless 
necessity  is  extremely  urgent ;  because  in  the  one  case  and  the 
other  man  has  a  right  to  his  life  and  his  property  which  he 
has  nowise  forfeited.  It  is  not  his  nature  to  live  forever  but 
only  as  long  as  the  body  continues  a  fit  tenement  for  the  soul. 
Universal  ownership  is  of  nature  and  inamissible ;  but  particu- 
lar ownership  is  based  on  the  man's  own  individual  activity, 
open  to  loss,  accidental  in  itself,  and  natural  only  inasmuch 
as  it  is  rooted  in  the  universal  ownership  which  forever  re- 
mains. But  the  sheriff  commits  no  murder ;  the  wretch  dying 
of  hunger,  no  theft;  because  the  capital  offender  against  so- 
ciety loses  all  prior  claims  to  life,  the  former  owner  of  the 
property  is,  in  case  of  another's  dire  necessity,  divested  of 
his  rights,  nature  depriving  the  property  of  any  particular 
and  specific  owner.  The  obligation  a  man  owes  his  rational 
nature  in  point  of  telling  the  truth  can  never  change.  In 
other  words  man's  claims  to  life  and  property  do  not  turn 
directly  and  wholly  on  his  rational  nature.  His  bounden 
duty  to  tell  the  truth  flows  directly  from  his  rational  nature. 

C.  One  author  insists  very  much  on  what  he  styles  his  meta- 
physical and  absolute  definition  of  a  lie,  viz.,  the  privation 
of  truth  that  is  or  ought  to  be  due.  The  definition  goes  to 
greater  lengths  than  is  necessary,  but  its  length  does  not 
lessen  its  correctness.  It  is  emphatically  correct.  His  ex- 
planation, however,  of  the  word  "due"  is  as  emphatically 
incorrect,  and  evidently  introduced  to  remove  difficulties  that 


230  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

were  better  removed  otherwise.  Of  course,  lying  is  the  priva- 
tion of  truth  that  is  due ;  but  does  it  hence  necessarily  follow 
that  lying  is  the  privation  of  such  truth  only  as  is  due  the 
neighbor?  Decidedly  no!  The  truth  in  question  may  not 
perhaps  be  due  my  neighbor,  but  I  owe  it  to  the  God  who 
made  me  and  to  myself  to  use  on  all  occasions  language  in 
exact  accordance  with  the  ideas  in  my  mind. 

D.  If  deceit  entered  into  the  essential  constitution  of  a  lie, 
the  above  author's  remarks  about  primary  and  secondary 
intentions,  or  secrecy  and  deceit,  would  be  to  the  point.  St. 
Thomas  a  short  while  ago  made  it  clear  that  the  lie  exists  in  a 
finished  state  before  deception  enters  upon  the  scene  at  all. 
Deception  may  or  may  not  be  present.  Its  influence  on  the 
lie  as  such  is  the  same.  Like  all  accidents  it  can,  indeed, 
modify  the  evil  done.  It  can  make  it  greater  by  adding  a 
sin  of  unkindness  to  that  of  cheating  God's  intent,  but  it 
cannot  make  a  bit  of  language  truth  or  falsehood.  Like  all 
things  intrinsically  or  of  their  very  nature  evil,  no  conceiv- 
able intention  can  make  a  lie  good  and  praiseworthy.  Who 
can  blaspheme  without  sinning,  who  can  hate  God  without 
sinning?  But  this  impossibility  arises  from  the  mere  cir- 
cumstance that  blasphemy  and  hatred  of  God  are  intrinsically 
evil.  In  the  same  way  the  second,  third,  fourth  and  all  the 
intentions  possible  in  a  lie  are  swallowed  up  in  the  first,  viz., 
the  wilful  and  deliberate  communication  of  falseness  as  truth. 
This  intention  comes  first,  this  intention  is  the  life  and  being 
of  a  lie,  and  not  even  the  gaining  of  Heaven  can  justify  it. 

E.  A  lie  is  wrong  because  it  is  an  abuse  of  speech.  But 
other  abuses  are  not  wrong.  Ergo,  neither  is  a  lie  for  this 
single  reason  wrong.  To  walk  on  the  hands  is  an  abuse  of 
the  hands,  but  not  therefore  wrong. 

Answer:  To  walk  on  the  hands  is  abuse  of  the  hands  in 
strict  sense,  I  deny;  in  wide  sense,  I  grant.  Abuse  in  strict 
sense  is  use  that  destroys  or  hinders  the  purpose  intended  by 
nature.  Walking  on  the  hands  leaves  them  wholly  capable 
of  the  functions  for  which  nature  intended  them.  But  a  lie 
aims  at  the  destruction  of  speech's  natural  purpose,  the  com- 
munication of  our  ideas  or  of  truth. 

F.  The  purpose  of  speech  is  the  good  of  society  and  the 
lie  far  from  being  a  hindrance  or  a  damage  to  society,  is  on 


PRINCIPLES  231 

no  few  occasions  a  positive  help  and  advantage  to  same. 
Ergo.  A  lie  can  at  times  happen  to  be  the  readiest  means  to 
avert  a  war  or  a  murder. 

Answer:  Material  advantage  is  not  the  criterion  of  moral- 
ity, but  the  objective  order  of  things.  A  lie  is  not  primarily 
wrong  because  it  works  evil  to  society,  nor  is  the  truth  pri- 
marily good  because  it  is  of  advantage  to  society.  Harmony 
with  the  purpose  of  speech  and  discord  with  same  constitute 
the  goodness  of  truth  and  the^  malice  of  lying  respectively. 
Even  material  advantage  can  never  in  the  long  run  result 
from  an  intrinsic  evil  like  lying,  and  this  is  evident  from  the 
Law  of  General  Consequences  discussed  in  the  matter  of  Utili- 
tarianism. But  this  is  not  the  root-reason  for  the  immorality 
of  lying.  If  a  lie  were  allowed,  to  avert  some  particular  evil 
like  war,  or  procure  some  particular  good  like  a  livelihood, 
its  approbation  would  work  to  the  complete  destruction  of 
credit  among  men,  and  that  evil  would  be  worse  than  a  hun- 
dred wars. 

G.  A  lie  might  be  permitted  for  very  grave  reasons,  and 
within  these  limits  all  danger  would  be  removed.     Ergo. 

Answer:  The  danger  would  still  stand,  because  in  that 
case  every  individual  would  be  absolute  judge  of  the  weight 
of  his  reasons;  and  credit  would  be  universally  shaken.  Be- 
sides, the  lie  is  intrinsically  and  of  its  very  nature  wrong, 
deriving  its  malice  from  no  such  accidental  and  extrinsic  cir- 
cumstances as  harm  and  advantage. 

H.  Homicide  in  self-defense  is  right.  Ergo,  a  pari,  a  lie 
in  self-defense  is  right. 

Answer:  Homicide  is  not  an  intrinsic  evil,  as  is  evident 
from  war,  hanging  and  self-defense.  Homicide  is  changed  to 
murder  by  the  injustice  done  the  person  slain,  and  by  the 
usurpation  of  God's  rights  as  the  Lord  and  Master  of  life 
and  death.  A  lie  is  intrinsically  wrong,  and  God  Himself 
cannot  make  it  right.  God  cannot  bestow  on  others  a  right, 
in  which  He  is  not  Himself  vested. 

I.  To  lie  is  to  talk  otherwise  than  as  you  think.  But  the 
objector  on  a  circle  talks  otherwise  than  as  he  thinks.     Ergo. 

Answer:  The  objector  talks  as  he  thinks,  but  he  is  at  the 
same  time  playing  the  part  of  another.     Actor  on  stage. 

J.  Communication  of  thought  to  another,  whether  by  speech 


232  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

or  other  arbitrary  signs,  is  of  the  essence  of  a  lie.  It  takes 
two  to  converse,  and  in  strict  language  nobody  ever  talks 
to  or  addresses  himself.  Therefore,  a  false  statement  shouted 
to  vacancy  or  the  wind  is  not  in  strict  sense  a  lie. 

K.  Lies  are  usually  divided  into  jocose,  officious,  official 
and  injurious.  Not  all  jokes  are  jocose  lies.  Equivocation 
and  mental  reservation  save  many  jokes  from  the  malice  of 
sin.  Others,  while  plain  misstatements,  are  so  openly  absurd 
that  they  can  be  rated  mere  material  falsehoods,  free  from  the 
guilt  of  a  formal  lie.  Instances  are,  Washington  is  not  dead. 
Miss  Liberty  is  walking  the  harbor.  And  yet  many  jokes  are 
lies,  and  their  perpetrators  incur  all  the  blame  of  sin.  Offi- 
cious lies  are  meant  to  be  helpful,  injurious  are  meant  to  harm. 
Outside  of  injurious  lies,  which  wound  charity  as  well  as 
truth,  the  sin  is  never  more  than  venial.  Official  lies  are  sin- 
ful subterfuges  employed  by  men  in  authority  to  keep  state 
secrets,  and  are  no  less  blameworthy  than  the  rest. 

L.  The  mouth  that  lies  kills  the  soul.     Wisdom  1-11.     Ergo. 

Answer:    Formally,  I  deny;  preparatively,  I  grant. 


PART  II— RESERVATION 

II.  We  now  take  up  a  few  difficulties,  which  to  some  ap- 
peared so  formidable,  that  only  a  wide  departure  from  phi- 
losophy's common  notion  regarding  a  lie  seemed  capable  of 
solving  them. 

TERMS 

Reservation.  Everybody  grants  that  there  are  secrets  with- 
out end,  which  must  under  no  consideration  be  delivered  over 
to  unauthorized  enquirers.  Philosophers  are  a  unit  on  this 
point.  But  how  to  perform  this  nice  and  difficult  duty  with- 
out at  the  same  time  wounding  truth,  is  a  task  nowise  easy. 
Deep  silence  will  not,  it  is  quite  certain,  always  extricate  the 
honest  man  from  his  straits.  His  secret  may  be  natural,  or 
a  secret  of  promise,  or  a  secret  of  trust.  We  may  suppose, 
too,  that  matters  are  come  to  such  a  head  that  a  direct  answer 
alone  will  satisfy  the  questioner.     An  innocent  mental  reser- 


MENTAL  RESERVATION  233 

vation  seems  to  be  on  such  an  occasion  the  only  means  of 
escape.  It  can  be  reconciled,  too,  with  our  rigorous  doctrine 
on  lying,  and  needs  no  such  laxity  of  principle  as  is  advocated 
by  some  authors.  In  mental  reservation  several  very  impor- 
tant items  must  be  carefully  attended  to,  not  precisely  because 
a  lie  is  told,  but  because  even  though  the  truth  is  told,  such 
manner  of  telling  the  truth  is  full  of  danger  to  mutual  con- 
verse, to  the  union  of  families,  and  to  the  well-being  of  the 
state.  Observe,  therefore,  that  the  notion  uppermost  with  us 
in  thus  hedging  about  mental  reservation  with  cautious  con- 
ditions is  not  at  all  to  make  lies  less  frequent,  for  on  no  occa- 
sion do  we  consider  a  lie  lawful,  but  only  to  shield  man  in 
his  dealings  with  his  fellows. 

There  are,  then,  two  sorts  of  mental  reservation,  one  always 
to  be  abominated,  the  other  to  be  sometimes  commended. 
They  are  the  pure  and  the  broad.  He  uses  a  mental  reserva- 
tion, who,  when  conveying  information,  so  manipulates  his 
words,  that  the  listener  will  in  all  probability  derive  from 
them  only  false  notions.  The  pure  mental  reservation  fur- 
nishes the  listener  with  no  external  clew  to  the  truth,  and 
renders  it  absolutely  impossible  for  him  to  escape  the  mis- 
take ;  and  is  in  simple  language  a  lie,  under  no  circumstance 
excusable. 

Pure  means  language  of  itself,  and  from  present  circum- 
stances, restricted  to  one  meaning,  out  of  harynony  with  mind 
of  speaker,  in  harmony  with  same  when  something  retained  in 
the  mind  is  added,  e.g., ' ' Have  you  eaten  anything ? ' '  "Noth- 
ing at  all,"  understanding  meat. 

Broad  means  language  externally  conveying  the  speaker  ^s 
true  mind,  intelligible  from  circumstances,  in  spite  of  a  cer- 
tain ambiguity  and  obscurity.  Listener  is  cause  per  se  of 
deception,  not  talker.  Proximate  end  is  to  convey  mind. 
Remote  is  to  hide  truth.  Remote  end  must  be  legitimate. 
Hence  no  broad  in  contracts,  questions  of  justice,  courts  of 
law.     Only  proportionate  cause  justifies. 

Protestants  are  fond  of  reproaching  us  with  the  laxity  of 
our  moral  theologians  in  this  matter  of  mental  reservations. 
But,  whereas  our  moralists  utterly  condemn  the  pure,  to  ad- 
mit the  broad  mental  reservation  only  for  the  safeguarding 
of  a  proportionate  right,  Cranmer,  Henry  VIII 's  archbishop 


234  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

of  London,  when  taking  his  oath  of  fealty  to  the  Pope,  con- 
trived a  pure  mental  reservation,  a  lie,  and  so  stained  his  im- 
mortal soul  with  a  perjury  unexampled. 

PROOF 

The  broad  mental  reservation,  available  only  when  great 
interests  are  at  stake,  not  in  every  trifling  affair,  leaves  it  pos- 
sible though  difficult  for  the  listener  to  still  detect,  if  he 
proceeds  with  prudence,  the  speaker's  meaning.  In  other 
words,  the  speaker  returns  to  the  questioner  a  double  answer, 
a  jumble  of  what  is  in  his  mind  and  what  is  outside  of  it. 
That  part  of  his  answer,  which  is  language  in  harmony  with 
his  mind,  he  considers,  and  every  fair-minded  man  must  con- 
sider, a  sufficiently  truthful  answer  to  the  question;  that 
which  is  wide  of  the  mark  may  be  considered  something  super- 
added, not  intended  indeed  to  form  part  of  the  answer  to  the 
enquiry  made,  but  to  some  enquiry  that  might  have  been  made. 
If  the  imprudent  listener  confounds  one  part  with  the  other, 
he  has  himself  to  blame ;  and  no  great  unkindness  is  done  him. 
But  the  lie  is  absent,  not  because  no  injury  is  directly  done 
the  neighbor,  but  because  the  group  of  words  can  be  con- 
strued into  a  meaning  in  perfect  harmony  with  the  speaker's 
mind. 

This  I  recognize  as  the  limit  to  which  mental  reservation 
can  be  pushed,  when  it  is  borne  in  mind  that  only  motives  as 
serious  and  grave  as  the  saving  of  an  innocent  life,  the  reten- 
tion of  a  close  secret,  liable  if  revealed  to  undo  somebody,  the 
life  of  a  state,  can  counterbalance,  the  baneful  effects  not  of  a 
lie ;  for,  I  repeat  it,  no  lie  is  told ;  but  of  the  apparent  unkind- 
ness contained  in  the  very  act  of  giving  to  the  person  ad- 
dressed an  opportunity  to  go  astray,  and  fervently  wishing 
that  he  may  do  so.  The  preservation  of  a  cigarette  is  not 
motive  enough  for  a  broad  mental  reservation.  For  a  pure 
mental  reservation,  between  which  and  a  lie  I  can  see  no 
difference,  even  the  preservation  of  the  innocent  is  not  mo- 
tive enough.  Remark,  however,  that,  when  an  innocent  life 
is  at  stake,  common  charity  obliges  you  to  take  all  legitimate 
means  to  its  defense;  and,  therefore,  common  charity  im- 
peratively demands  a  broad  mental  reservation,  that  namely 


PROOF  AND  PRINCIPLES  235 

which  through  the  agency  of  some  external  sign  leaves  it  pos- 
sible for  the  person  deceived  to  avoid  deception. 

PRINCIPLES— RESERVATION 

A.  About  the  prisoner  at  the  bar  in  the  civil  court  of  jus- 
tice, this  solution  appears  most  praiseworthy  and  is  wholly 
satisfactory.  Words  are  but  arbitrary  signs.  When,  there- 
fore, the  expression,  ''Not  guilty,"  has  come  by  the  common 
consent  of  mankind  to  mean,  "Not  proved  guilty,"  a  man, 
though  actually  guilty,  says  nothing  contrary  to  what  he  has 
in  his  mind  when  he  answers,  ''Not  guilty."  For,  even  in 
his  own  mind  he  is  not  proved  guilty,  and  according  to  com- 
mon usage  or  agreement,  which  alone  imparts  meaning  to 
words,  he  has  made  no  other  statement. 

B.  The  priest  is  bound  by  his  duty  to  an  authority  far 
higher  than  that  attached  to  any  civil  court  of  justice  to  pre- 
serve inviolate  a  confessional  secret.  No  sane,  unprejudiced 
judge  will  require  at  his  hands  the  communication  of  such 
a  secret.  But  there  are  on  record  instances  of  bigoted  and 
unscrupulous  ministers  of  the  law,  who  endeavored  to  wrest 
from  the  priest's  bosom  truths  more  sacred  than  fall  to  the 
lot  of  physicians,  lawyers  or  friends.  In  such  cases  it  is  a 
sacred  duty  imposed  upon  the  priest  to  maintain  even  unto 
death  his  seal  of  secrecy.  He  is  not,  however,  in  any  sense 
of  the  word  permitted  to  lie.  He  is  at  liberty  to  profess  that 
he  knows  nothing  whatever  of  the  matter  in  question,  but 
must  contrive  to  give  his  hearers  an  opportunity  to  under- 
stand, if  they  will,  that  he  represents  a  twofold  character,  that 
of  the  priest  or  representative  of  Christ,  and  that  of  the 
citizen  or  subject  of  the  law.  He  must,  without  at  all  com- 
promising his  penitent  or  endangering  the  seal  of  the  confes- 
sional, advertise  the  questioner  of  his  determination  and  right 
to  answer  all  enquiries  put  to  him  as  a  citizen  or  witness  in 
his  capacity  of  man  or  of  individual  of  the  community,  not 
in  his  capacity  of  representative  and  vice-gerent  of  God.  His 
answer,  therefore,  which  intimates  entire  ignorance  of  the 
subject  under  discussion,  is  not  language  out  of  harmony  with 
what  he  has  in  his  mind,  and  therefore  not  a  lie.  As  citizen, 
he  has  no  knowledge  whatever  of  the  point  in  question ;  and 


23t  SPBGEAL  ETHIGS 

ht  ImalgBifted  Ikis  detcnunatkia  and  lif^  to  ipeik  in  that 
tmpmaltj  on^.  As  fv  as  in  liim  Ucb,  Iub  language  ahould 
also  QoiiTqr  to  tibe  minds  of  liis  bearers  an  exact  represents- 
of  vbat  ke  widMS  to  eoHununieate.  If  tliey  foolishly 
that  his  denial  extends  also  to  knowledge  acq[iiired 
in  tibe  eonfesBbaal,  they  ha^e  to  Uame  aaij  thenselYes  for 
their  ignorances  In  faet»  if.  after  takinf^  the  ground  that 
he  is  hff  ri^  divine  entitled  to  aesuBe  these  two  charaeters 
of  ■an  or  citiaen  and  Tice-gercnt  of  CSnist,  he  should  affirm 
as  a  wifcnesB  on  the  stand  aeqinaintanee  with  the  secrets  of 
Gonfiecsion,  he  would  be  guilty  of  apeecb  oat  of  harmony  with 
what  he  has  in  Ins  mind,  Le^  of  a  lie. 
C  In  point  of  li nt idninii  the  seercts  of  lawyos,  j^ysiciaiis 
next  to  those  of  the  priest.  ProfeBsionsl 
idiose  futh  is  ^i^ited  to  £riends»  have  dotieB 
in  this  regard  to  wbidi  tbcy  mnst  nowise  prove  ddinquent. 
Xcweitlielcag,  socb  men,  tboof^  tb^  be  lawyers,  mnst  cherish 
tnith  in  their  ereryday  dealings  with  themselves  and  others ; 
tharrfote,  tb^  are  not  allowed  to  save  a  secret  at  the 
of  truth.  But  no  sodi  nnlawfol  proceeding  is  neces- 
The  secret  can  be  saved  without  any  baim  to  troth. 
For,  apart  from  profesaonal  knowledge  which  he  is  by  no 
means  sspposed  to  rereal  to  an  unauthoritative  enquirer,  the 
ndnd  of  the  lawyer,  physician  or  friend  is  a  perfect  Uank 
the  infocmation  desired.  An  imprudent  man  may 
and  may  so  miseonstrue  the  rei^y  made  by  the 
lawyer  or  friend  as  to  &ncy  that,  when  be  pr«> 
€i4y  partial  ignorance  or  ign<Hance  under  one  capaory, 
he  eonffJBM  to  ignunmee  under  every  capacity.  But  even  in 
this  case  the  deeeptian,  which  in  itsriif  would  not  make  the 
a  lie,  is  the  fruit  of  unprudenee  on  the  part  of  the 
can  with  justice  be  imputed  to  the  witness 
only,  not  a  cause  or  at  most  a  cause  by  aeei- 


rers  that  simply  stand  c&  the  qnes- 
betokcn  by  the  conununicatiom  of  irrele- 
vant knowledge  an  unwiDingnem  to  satisfy  morbid  curiosity 
aicv  of  course^  at  all  times  and  on  all  oeearions  licit  in  tbem- 
advcs.  Tlwy  need  never  be  united  with  falsdiood.  though 
tihi^  cni  readily  enon^  become  fsnlts  against  cononoii  charity. 


FJUNdPLBS  fSi 


pxvtty  rnoek  ai  tke  wjlhlwilding  font  a 

in  itadf  bandcM  and  canbr  parted  vitk  bj  tlK 

£.  EqaiYioeatianB  are  not 
Uie  ipeakier  s  aundiy  wtauir,  as  w^  itaetc  gnrat  to 
of  this  itamp  a  amitipiifd  faniug,  the  ^ifakrr  ii^  of  eoonfu 
at  liberty  to  attadi  to  tfaoB  arhatevcr  one  off  lAe  aeful  Bcaa- 
ihitif  ■  Oaritf  impomm  apoo  lam  tlie  dntf  off  ffnr- 
the  pcmB  addrened  with  hiirts  tufliririn  to  pot  hiat 
on  his  guard  agaiart  deception-  Contimial  and  mnvanantcd 
cqiDYQeatifln  woold  be  a  sin;  not,  indeed,  agamnt  troth,  hat 
agaimt  the  kire  off  nrighbor  whieh  natnre 
a  jnrt  eauK  is  prcaent,  certain  sorts  o 
are  not  sinfoL  The  presence  off  anj  eanse  whatever  esertts 
no  soeh  potent  jwflnmrr  as  will  dtange  a  lie  to  a  0Dod  deed. 

this  verbal  ■ideading  is  a  denial  off  strai^tfforward  charity, 
which  a  £dlow-aMn  can  off  ri^kt  esaet  at  oar  hands,  onl^  in 
certain  nailingenaea. 

To  d^nve  him,  therefore,  of  this  ri^t,  it  moat  fint  haie 
wamt  into  T**"M»**f  with  sone  r^kt  off  a 
in  Tirtae  off  a  solid  cthieal  princi^e,  lose  fw  the 
ffoiee  and  cffieaej.    In  other  woed^  sane  hi^er 

dcaiitiing  off  it,  maj  be  lawfiiDy  aiaied  at,  not  1^  a  lie,  hat 
by  a  legitiaytfe  verbal  ■Mlcadiug.  Alie 
bat  it  is  altogether  iHecitiMrtr, 
itselff  or  Ac  convcraion  off  the  whole  world  to  be  had  £or  a 
lie,  the  liar  would  not  be  justified.  It  would,  howeicr,  be  an 
of  an  praise  to  coaqiaaB  l&e 
soul  hf  the  use  of 
or  a  Itroad  SMntal  rcaervation,  hedeed  about  by  all  tha 


238  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

been  found  worthy  of  censure. ' '  This  by  no  means  prevents 
you  or  me  from  adopting  opinions  at  variance  with  his,  or  to 
quote  again,  "This  is  said,  however,  without  on  that  account 
judging  that  they  are  reprehended  who  follow  opinions 
handed  down  by  other  approved  authors." 

G.  To  sum  up,  and  so  bring  our  remarks  to  a  close,  this  is 
in  short  our  view  of  the  matter.  A  lie  or  a  wilful  and  de- 
liberate speaking  against  what  is  in  the  mind  has  a  decidedly 
twofold  malice:  one,  primary,  specific  and  all  important;  the 
other,  secondary,  accidental  and  of  less  importance.  The 
primary  malice  of  a  lie  is  bound  up  in  the  fact  that  it  is  an 
abuse  of  the  Heaven-sent  faculty  of  speech.  Its  secondary 
malice  is  derived  from  the  circumstance  that  every  lie  is  an 
injury  done  the  neighbor.  The  lie,  therefore,  can  never  be 
justified.  Silence,  evasions,  equivocations,  broad  mental  reser- 
vations are  not  lies;  and  can,  therefore,  be  tolerated  when 
some  just  cause,  some  good  of  more  vital  concern  than  the 
kindness  of  straightforward  truth  is  the  motive  that  prompts 
the  speaker.  Instances — not  guilty — not  at  home ;  priest,  law- 
yer, friend ;  state  officials,  * '  What  news,  my  lord  ? "  ' '  I  don 't 
know;  I  haven't  read  the  papers."  ''Do  Christians  believe 
in  a  Trinity?"     ''They  believe  in  only  one  God." 

H.  Mental  reservation  and  lie  have  the  same  evil  results. 
Ergo. 

Answer:  A  lie  is  wholly  misleading;  a  reservation  is  par- 
tially misleading.  A  lie  deceives  per  se,  a  reservation  deceives 
per  aecidens.  This  accidental  deception  makes  the  indiscrim- 
inate and  universal  use  of  reservation  wrong.  The  legiti- 
mate use  is  restricted  to  safeguarding  a  proportionate  right. 
A  lie  is  the  cause  of  deception ;  a  reservation  is  mere  occasion 
of  the  same. 

I.  Mental  reservation  is  flagrant  abuse  of  language.     Ergo. 

Answer:  A  reservation  fills  a  double  function.  It  conveys 
our  thought  and  conceals  our  thought.  Inasmuch  as  it  con- 
veys our  thought,  it  is  the  truth;  inasmuch  as  it  conceals 
our  thought,  it  is  at  times  a  species  of  unkindness.  The  deed 
itself  is  morally  right,  our  purpose  would  in  other  circum- 
stances be  unkind ;  but  the  charity  due  an  imprudent,  meddle- 
some and  unauthorized  questioner  yields  in  importance  to 
the  right  we  safeguard.     Manifestation  of  our  mind  is  the 


ETHICS  OF  SECRETS  239 

finis  operis  or  proximate  end  in  reservation;  concealment  is 
the  finis  operantis,  or  remote  end.  Manifestation  comes  first 
in  order  of  execution;  concealment  comes  first  in  order  of 
intention. 

J.  A  pure  mental  reservation  is  a  lie,  because  the  words,  as 
they  stand,  convey  the  opposite  of  what  the  speaker  has  in 
his  mind,  and  no  accompanying  circumstance  helps  the  lis- 
tener to  a  knowledge  of  what  the  speaker  has  in  his  mind. 
Here  is  an  instance:  '^Have  you  eaten  anything?"  ''Not  a 
thing."  The  party  interrogated  has  eaten  a  Friday  dinner, 
and  he  means  that  he  has  eaten  nothing  in  the  line  of  meat. 
A  broad  mental  reservation  conveys  what  the  speaker  has  in 
his  mind  in  so  concealed  a  way  that  the  listener,  if  at  all  im- 
prudent, will  gather  the  opposite  of  what  the  speaker  has  in 
his  mind,  in  spite  of  helps  against  deception  derivable  from 
such  attendant  circumstances  as  tone  of  voice,  common  usage, 
gesture,  official  capacity  and  the  like.  Usage  after  all  fixes 
the  value  and  meaning  of  words,  and  usage  can  alone  deter- 
mine whether  any  given  expression  is  a  pure  mental  reserva- 
tion or  a  broad  mental  reservation. 

K.  Ethics  of  Secrets:  There  are  three  kinds  of  secrets: 
1.  Natural.     2.  Secret  of  promise.     3.  Secret  of  contract. 

A  secret  is  natural,  if  the  obligation  to  keep  it  hidden  has 
its  origin  in  nature.  Whatever  private  knowledge  we  have 
of  others  able,  if  revealed,  to  work  them  harm  in  point  of  repu- 
tation, property  and  such,  constitutes  a  natural  secret.  A 
natural  secret  becomes  a  secret  of  promise,  when,  after  com- 
ing into  possession  of  the  secret,  we  promise  the  party  in 
question  not  to  reveal  the  same.  If  such  promise  is  exacted 
from  us  before  we  come  to  knowledge  of  the  secret ;  in  other 
words,  if  the  secret  is  confided  to  us  only  after  a  promise 
on  our  part  to  keep  it  hidden,  the  secret  of  promise  becomes 
a  secret  of  contract.  All  three  kinds  impose  the  obligation  of 
secrecy,  but  the  binding  force  of  the  obligation  varies  with 
the  kind  of  secret.  The  order  of  importance  in  ascending 
scale  is :  Natural,  Secret  of  Promise,  and  Secret  of  Contract. 
To  reveal  any  secret,  to  whatever  class  it  belongs,  some  pro- 
portionate reason  must  be  present.  A  weightier  reason  is 
needed  when  a  secret  of  contract  is  in  question  than  when 
there  is  question  of  the  other  two.     Nature  forbids  us  to  harm 


240  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

another  without  good  and  sufficient  reason.  A  promise  bind- 
ing by  way  of  a  man's  word  or  by  way  of  justice,  according 
to  the  intent  of  the  person  making  the  promise,  calls  for  even 
a  better  and  a  weightier  reason.  The  contract  involved  in  a 
secret  of  the  third  kind  renders  its  violation  a  more  serious 
matter,  and  only  the  gravest  of  reasons  can  justify  the  vio- 
lation of  such  a  secret.  The  contract  in  question  may  be 
either  express  or  tacit,  and  it  regularly  accompanies  profes- 
sional secrets.  If  serious  harm  threatens  the  state,  or  an  in- 
nocent person,  or  either  of  the  two  parties  to  the  contract, 
even  a  secret  of  contract  can  without  wrong  be  revealed.  If 
there  is  question  of  harm  already  done,  a  natural  secret,  or 
a  secret  of  promise  must  be  revealed  to  a  judge  or  superior 
making  lawful  enquiry.  In  this  last  case  a  secret  of  contract 
is  privileged,  and  must  not  be  revealed  even  to  a  judge  or 
superior.  In  no  emergency  must  the  secrecy  of  the  confes- 
sional be  violated. 

L.  St.  Alphonsus  Liguori — Second  Commandment.  Du- 
bium  4;  151-172. 

151.  Not  wrong  to  swear  to  equivocal  statement,  when  one 
has  good  reason,  and  the  equivocation  itself  is  lawful;  to  do 
so  without  good  reason,  not  perjury,  but  mortal  sin  against 
religion  ;■  oath  abused. 

Three  kinds  of  equivocation: 

1.  Word  has  two  meanings,  e.g.,  volo,  from  velle  and  volare. 

2.  Word  has  two  senses  equally  common,  e.g.,  Peter's  book 
whether  owner  or  author. 

3.  Word  has  two  senses,  common  and  unusual,  e.g.,  literal 
and  spiritual. 

The  Baptist  is  Elias.  St.  Matt.  2-14;  I  am  not  Elias.  St. 
John  1-21. 

I  say  no,  whether  affirmation  or  negation. 

152.  A  pure  mental  reservation  is  never  lawful;  a  broad  is 
right  when  good  reason  is  present,  e.g.,  I  go  not  up  to  this 
festival  day.  St.  John  7-8 ;  He  also  went  up,  not  openly  7-8 ; 
openly,  from  context. 

Of  that  day  and  hour  no  one  knoweth,  meaning  end  of 
world.     St.  Matt.  24-36.     No  one  knows  to  tell,  from  context. 
Reason  for  broad,  the  one  legitimate  way  to  hide  a  secret. 

153.  If  asked  to  testify  as  God's  minister,  priest  can  deny. 


THESIS  lY 

Man's  right  to  ownership,  whether  temporary  or  lasting,  ^ 

is  derived  to  him,  not  from  any  formal  compact,  nor  from  any  / 

civil  law,  hut  from  nature.    Jouin,  118-140;  Bickaby,  278-  • 
297. 

QUESTION 

Socialism  is  the  economic  error  we  combat  in  this  thesis. 
Man's  right  to  property  in  capital  is  the  precise  point  at- 
tacked by  Socialism,  and  we  meet  the  enemy  by  setting  this 
right  to  property  in  whatever  good  on  a  basis  that  cannot  be 
shaken  or  overthrown  If  nature  equips  man  with  equal  right 
to  exclusive  ownership  in  the  capital  he  invests  and  in  the 
food  he  eats,  no  legislation  can  in  ordinary  contingencies  with 
justice  separate  him  against  his  will  from  his  capital  or  his 
food.  That  ownership  in  capital  is  a  natural  right,  inde- 
pendent of  compact  and  civil  law,  is  with  us  a  basic  prin- 
ciple ;  and,  once  this  point  is  settled,  Socialism  and  its  philan- 
thropic but  wild  contentions  in  behalf  of  oppressed  labor,  fall 
to  the  ground.  There  are  other  arguments  against  Socialism, 
and  we  mean  to  call  attention  to  them  in  due  process  of  time. 
But  in  basing  man's  right  to  ownership  on  nature,  our  pres- 
ent thesis  is  a  sweeping  condemnation  of  Socialism  and  kin- 
dred theories.  Socialism  and  Communism  are  systems  at  first 
sight  identical,  but  very  distinct  when  more  closely  studied. 
As  long  as  men  possess  minds  and  use  them  for  purposes  of 
study,  the  two  systems  stand  about  equal  chances  for  uni- 
versal sway.  As  long  as  man 's  wickedness  remains  what  it  is, 
to  encourage  oppression  of  labor  and  contempt  of  the  poor, 
so  long  shall  their  advocates  harangue  crowds  of  listeners  in- 
tellectually too  feeble  to  see  beyond  appearances,  or  reason 
to  remote  conclusions. 

Socialism  assumes  the  hue  of  whatever  mind  falls  under  its 
sway,  and  is  therefore  as  varied  in  its  outlines  as  the  physiog- 

241 


242  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

nomies  of  men.  But  there  are  some  broad  features,  and  oi 
these  we  now  insist.  He  therefore  would  seem  to  be  a  Social{^ 
ist,  who  holds  it  proper  and  exclusively  proper  for  man  to' 
turn  over  to  the  Socialistic  commonwealth  whatever  property- 
can  in  good  faith  be  styled  capital.  He  prescribes  under 
pain  of  sin  community  of  goods  not  strictly  necessary  for  the 
consumer's  use.  He  would  allow  the  railroad  magnate  to 
earn  his  annual  salary  as  president  of  a  corporation,  but 
would  forbid  him  to  lock  up  in  his  private  safe  more  of  that 
salary  than  would  furnish  himself  and  his  family  with  the 
necessaries  or  even  the  luxuries  of  life.  In  fact  he  would 
make  the  railroad  magnate  a  paid  servant  of  the  common- 
wealth after  confiscating  or  buying  his  railroad,  and  would 
strip  him  of  his  capital  and  all  chance  to  accumulate  capital, 
reducing  him  to  a  level  with  the  operatives  he  now  robs  of 
the  fruit  of  their  labors.  Millionaires  would  become  extinct 
specimens,  and  the  state  treasury  would  distribute  to  the 
poor  a  surplus,  in  comparison  with  which  any  prior  surplus 
would  be  mere  pocket-money.  The  condition  of  God's  poor 
would  be  so  far  bettered  that  Heaven  would  become  a  reward 
out  of  all  proportion  with  the  small  price  paid  for  it.  Lei- 
sure, and  ease,  and  retirement  on  a  competency,  would  be 
worn  out  notions.  The  whole  world  would  put  on  the  busy 
appearance  of  a  beehive.  After  one  year  all  the  drones  would 
die,  and  this  gap  in  nature  would  remain  forever  empty. 
With  no  fund  for  a  rainy  day,  work  would  be  eagerly  sought 
and  as  zealously  performed.  Industry  would  be  life,  idleness 
would  be  death.  What  a  picture !  Nobody  can  immoderately 
chide  the  generous  but  shallow-brained  enthusiasts,  who  see 
in  this  wonderful  transformation  the  dawn  of  millennium. 
But  it  costs  no  great  effort  to  set  aside  poetry,  and  view  this 
theory,  as  all  philosophical  theories  must  be  viewed,  in  the 
even  and  full  light  of  reason.  Socialism,  whatever  may  be 
said  of  its  possibilities  as  a  system  for  men  with  other  hearts 
and  other  passions  than  ours,  is  certainly  doomed  to  remain 
idle  as  long  as  time  lasts.  Its  refutation  is  clearly  and  satis- 
factorily set  forth  in  the  arguments  to  be  advanced  in  sup- 
port of  our  thesis. 

The  Communist,  recognizing  no  difference  between  capital 
and  other  possessions,  cries  out  for  a  share  in  every  man's 


SOCIALISM  AND  COMMUNISM  243 

goods;  and  in  return  lays  open,  as  well  he  may,  to  every 
chance-comer  his  own  meagre  store.  Communism  is  insanity 
or  gross  depravity.  Communism  has  no  redeeming  feature. 
We  are  bad  enough,  when  at  our  best,  but  make  us  Com- 
munists, and  we  should  in  a  twinkling  degenerate  to  cut- 
throats, thieves,  devils  incarnate.  There  would  be  no  security 
at  home  or  abroad.  Our  very  friends  would  mix  our  cup  with 
poison.  Our  lot  would  be  incomparably  less  endurable  than 
that  of  lions  and  tigers  roaming  the  jungle.  No  doubt  a 
chosen  few  can  so  discipline  their  greed,  and  so  develop  their 
esteem  of  eternal  riches,  as  to  work  even  more  strenuously 
than  otherwise  without  any  pecuniary  reward  in  view.  But 
to  assert  that  the  whole  race  is  morally  capable  of  such  per- 
fection, and  that  the  whole  race  is  ready  and  eager  to  put  off 
selfishness,  and  sap  its  strength  to  feed  and  clothe  the  worth- 
less and  idle,  is  the  empty  vaunt  of  ignorance,  and  worthy  of 
only  the  man  who  knows  neither  himself  nor  other  men.  Com- 
munism maintains  that  everybody  is  to  own  everything,  and 
that  the  common  vagrant  and  the  man  who  tries  to  do  his 
duty,  the  outcast  of  society  and  the  man  high  in  his  neigh- 
bors' esteem,  are  in  some  unexplained  way  to  have  an  equal 
share  in  the  enjoyment  of  this  world's  goods. 

Our  thesis,  we  flatter  ourselves,  strikes  at  the  very  root  of 
Socialism  and  Communism.  We  are  far  from  contending 
that  the  natural  law  imposes  on  individuals  the  duty  of  own- 
ing goods  in  severalty,  nor  yet  that  natural  law  absolutely 
forbids  and  discountenances  community  of  possessions  in  any 
and  every  possible  combination  of  circumstances.  But  we  do 
maintain  that  natural  law  unequivocally  and  unmistakably 
imposes  on  mankind  the  duty  of  refraining  from  all  undue 
meddling  with  the  neighbour's  private  property.  We  do 
maintain  that  a  man's  right  to  his  field  and  to  his  capital  has 
all  its  strength,  not  from  formal  compact  or  civil  agreement, 
with  which  indeed  man  can  so  far  tamper  as  to  change  or 
even  repeal  them;  but  from  nature,  which  lies  outside  of 
man's  dominion,  and  acknowledges  obedience  to  God  alone. 
We  do  maintain  that  neither  Communism  nor  Socialism  is 
prescribed  by  the  law  of  nature  or  by  the  obligations  of  man 
to  man;  that  they  are  not  expressly,  immediately  and  uni- 
versally forbidden  by  the  law  of  nature.    We  do  maintain 


244  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

nevertheless  that  they  are  implicitly,  mediately  and  in  par- 
ticular circumstances,  which  now  obtain  throughout  the  uni- 
verse, absolutely  condemned  by  the  voice  of  nature,  with  in- 
tent that  the  condemnation  endure  until  this  world  of  ours  is 
peopled  with  a  race  strangers  to  the  passions  that  agitate  our 
bosoms.  We  are  ready  to  grant  that  no  peculiar  offense  is 
committed,  if  a  body  of  men  come  together  in  harmony  and 
agree  among  themselves  to  convey  to  some  common  treasury 
all  their  wealth,  with  the  understanding  that  it  is  to  belong 
to  no  individual  precisely,  but  to  be  used  by  all  in  common 
as  events  fall  out.  We  are  ready  to  further  grant  that  he 
would  be  a  benefactor  of  the  race,  who  could  so  work  on  the 
minds  and  wills  of  capitalists  and  landowners  as  to  induce 
them  of  their  own  free-will  to  divest  themselves  of  their 
superfluous  moneys,  and  confide  the  same  to  the  state  or  to 
some  equally  responsible  corporation  for  distribution  among 
the  poor.  But  we  reprobate  as  firebrands  to  the  republic  the 
hot-headed  fanatics,  who  open  wide  their  mouths  and  cry 
out  that  capital  is  sin,  and  that  ownership  of  land  is  a  crime 
against  nature.  We  are  not  afraid  to  give  utterance  to  the 
opinion  that  all  such  intemperate  zealots  should  be  deprived 
of  the  power  they  wield  for  harm  among  the  desperate  mob 
and  placed  with  convenient  despatch  between  the  four  walls 
of  the  city-jail.  The  millionaire  may  legally  be  induced  to 
part  with  his  money-bags  for  the  weal  of  the  populace.  He 
is,  however,  undeniably  free  to  close  his  ears  to  all  such  ex- 
travagant pleadings  of  misapplied  humanity,  and  in  ordinary 
contingencies  law  cannot  forcibly  extort  from  him  a  penny 
in  the  name  of  justice.  What  has  once  fairly  slipped  into 
his  coffers  is  his  in  spite  of  the  universe,  and  this  one  circum- 
stance imposes  on  the  world  at  large  the  solemn  duty  of  re- 
specting that  right,  and  allowing  him  to  possess  his  own  in 
peace.  His  acquisition  of  the  wealth  is  no  necessity  of  na- 
ture, neither  is  his  close  retention  of  the  same;  but,  once 
acquired,  his  will  about  the  disposition  of  his  dollars  is  law, 
and  with  all  the  grim  necessity  of  nature's  ordinances  debars 
others  from  approach,  and  imperatively  demands  non-inter- 
ference. Of  course,  I  speak  of  wealth  legitimately  come  by, 
and  nowise  forfeited  by  debts  afterwards  contracted,  or  at  the 
competent  command  of  higher  rights. 


OWNERSHIP  245 


TERMS 


Bight.  The  moral  power  or  force,  in  itself  inviolate,  to  do 
or  exact  something. 

Ownership.  The  right  to  claim  some  external  and  ma- 
terial thing  as  one's  own,  subject  always  to  restrictions  im- 
posed by  higher  rights. 

Ownership  is  one  species  of  dominion  or  lordship,  juris- 
diction is  the  other.  Dominion  or  lordship  is  the  right  to 
claim  a  thing  as  one's  own.  Ownership  is  lordship  turning 
on  external  and  material  things  like  money,  land  and  kindred 
articles.  Jurisdiction  is  lordship  turning  on  spiritual  objects 
like  the  minds  and  wills  of  men,  and  it  is  a  prerogative  of 
rulers.  The  clearest  title  to  lordship  is  production,  and  God 
alone  is  true  Lord,  true  owner,  true  ruler,  because  God  alone 
in  true  and  strict  sense  makes  or  produces  things.  Men 
make  nothing,  they  merely  change  things.  Men,  therefore, 
are  owners  and  rulers  not  by  essence,  not  in  an  independent 
way,  but  only  by  participation,  and  with  utter  dependence 
on  God,'s  good  pleasure.  Ownership  enables  them  to  dispose 
of  external  and  material  things  that  really  and  truly  belong 
to  God.  Jurisdiction  enables  them  to  control  minds  and  wills 
that  really  and  truly  owe  allegiance  to  God  alone. 

Ownership,  then,  is  the  right  to  keep  and  to  use  external 
material  things  as  one's  own,  subject  always  to  restrictions 
imposed  by  rights  of  a  higher  order.  Three  elements  deserv^e 
notice.  To  keep  and  to  use,  imply  a  bond  of  union  between 
property  and  owner.  As  one's  own,  excludes  others  from 
possession  and  use.  Restrictions,  remove  all  danger  of  Exag- 
gerated Individualism,  which  would  make  individual  owner- 
ship in  man  entirely  independent  of  God  and  law.  The  bond 
of  union  is  commonly  called  the  title,  and  is  whatever  fact 
stamps  and  seals  the  material  good  in  question  as  property 
belonging  to  the  owner.  In  origin  it  is  not  civil  law,  it  is 
not  compact,  it  is  not  labor  alone  or  work  on  the  ot)ject  of 
ownership.  It  is  what  we  call  occupancy,  and  occupancy  is 
best  described  as  the  actual  appropriation  of  a  thing  along 
with  the  avowed  intention  of  holding  on  to  it ;  or  more  fully, 
as  seizure  of  material  goods  belonging  to  nobody  in  partic- 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 

vlsr,  WI&  the  intentioii  of  rrtainmg  tiKn  as  one's  own, 
witk  tlie  k^  of  dear  and  manifest  sasi>s» 
■oraL  nese  signs  are  difiBsrcnt  in  dif > 
foent  cases.  Gn^s  are  liaifChUd,  antaials  are  killed  or  eap- 
tared,  fields  are  feneed,  voncx  and  deeds  are  passed,  ^eitial 
are  made^  This  is  effeedre  oeenpancj,  otlier 
are  legal  and  politied,  txmtL  ciWI  law  and  intcmationaL 
cslnctions  ire  bnpose  are  fruitfal  in  eonseqiMiieeB.  In- 
dhridoal  owneisiiip  ean  eoDide  widi  ligjits  in  CSod,  and  nghts 
in  Ae  state;  and  in  ewy  soA  coHision  individiial  ownersiiip 
miBl  jidd.  Ciod  alone  is  absolute  tmmet  c^  eveiytliing.  He 
owns  the  man  as  wtH  as  the  man's  fxwpcrfjy  and  ean  dispose 
of  hotiiaoeordii^toHiseoodpIeBBQre.  God  nevo* abdicates 
Hs  dominion  in  men  or  things^  and  He  makes  men  gifts  witli- 
to  be  tiicir  owner.  The  landlord  remains  owner 
he  rents  his  boose  to  the  tenant.  As  against  God,  man 
timn  rdati¥e  or  me^ywnadi^  and  he 
gifts  God  makes  him  witk  a  iriew  to  the 
of  God's  greater  i^oiy.  Hcnee,  the  ri^t  to  indi- 
Tidaal  iwHwiAip  in  the  rkk  never  ezenses  them  foom  the 
ohiigatinM  of  Parity  towards  the  poor;  and  denial  of  diarity 
on  their  part  is  a  spedes  of  robbeiy  against  God.  As  against 
the  state  and  indrFidaals  eomposiiig  it,  man's  li^  to  indi- 
Tidoal  own»ship  is  riianhiteL  Neither  state  nor  indiTiduals 
give  the  li^it,  and,  Hicnfore,  neither  state  war  indrndoals 
ean  take  it  awaj.  And  jet  in  Witoe  of  the  adage  that  the 
part  is  serrant  to  the  whole,  the  rtate  has  lig^ds  in  this  mat- 
ter of  own»sh^  that  the  indiridDal  owner  most  adnowkdge 
and  respect.  Tlie  state  eannot  take  away  the  ri^t  to  individ- 
nal  ownenfcqp,  but  it  ean  in  emetgencies  dhrcxt  private  prop- 
erty to  paWe  OSes.  It  ean  call  citizens  to  SHiiee  in  time  of 
war.  and  TrrtoaDr  deprive  them  of  ownersiiip  in  thdr  own 
lives,  it  can  impose  taxes  and  cwslnmK,  it  ean  institute  ecm- 
dcmnation  i^oeeedings,  and  cgereiae  all  the  varioos  fdnetians 
implied  in  Eminent  Domain. 

bunent  Domain  is  no  proof  that  indiridual  ownership 
originates  in  the  state  or  dTil  law.  Quite  the  eontraiy,  it  is 
open  acknowledgment  that  the  state  and  law  haTe  no  sach 
efficacy.  In  condemnation  eases  the  state  when  possible  makes 
rnmpfWfiStinn  to  tihe  owner,  and  the  prerogatire  is  exereised 


OWNBBSHIP  AXD  KINDS  247 

only  in  serious  public  need.  If  individual  ownership  had 
its  origin  in  state  or  law,  compensation  would  be  no  requi- 
site, and  the  will  of  the  state  in  whatever  trivial  emergency 
would  justify  the  proceeding.  When  courts  of  law  settle  cases 
in  property,  they  virtually  acknowledge  that  the  right  of 
ownership  has  a  validity  all  its  own,  independent  of  their 
rulings.  They  never  create  or  confer  ownership,  they  deter- 
mine where  it  exists.  They  hear  testimony,  examine  docu- 
ments, and  take  every  means  to  discover  in  what  party  the 
right  resides  and  decide  accordingly,  all  which  would  be  need- 
less waste  of  time,  if  the  court  could  of  itself  vest  either  party 
to  the  suit  with  the  disputed  right. 

This  ownership  is  of  many  different  kinds,  absolute  and 
relative;  perfect  and  imperfect;  direct  and  indirect;  transient 
and  permanent;  public  and  private;  collective  and  individual; 
abstract  and  concrete.  Absolute  ownership  is  independent 
ownership,  and  in  strict  sense  accrues  to  God  alone.  It 
means  the  right  to  dispose  of  and  use  a  thing  at  pleasure, 
without  restrictions  imposed  by  another.  Relative  ownership 
IS  dependent  ownership,  and  strictly  speaking  all  human 
ownership  is  such.  It  means  the  right  to  dispose  of  and  use 
thing^s,  not  at  pleasure,  but  within  limits  prescribed  by  God 
or  nature.  Men  have  the  physical  power  or  freedom  to  abuse 
things,  but  they  are  without  the  moral  power  or  right  to  do 
so;  and  aU  their  ownership  is  by  very  nature  subservient  to 
the  good  pleasure  of  GJod.  As  between  individuals  human 
ownership  can  be  said  to  be  absolute  as  well  as  relative.  As 
between  state  and  citizen  Eminent  Domain  is  only  a  seeming 
denial  of  absolute  ownership.  The  ri^t  to  ownership  is  not 
taken  away  by  the  state,  it  ceases  because  of  collision  with  a 
higher  right.  Perfect  ownership  extends  to  substance  and 
use  of  a  thing,  while  imperfect  extends  to  only  one  or  other 
of  the  two.  Imperfect  ownership  is  direct,  when  it  touches 
the  thing's  substance;  indirect,  when  it  touches  the  thing's 
use.     Landlord  and  tenant  are  examples. 

Ownership  is  transient  or  temporary,  when  it  turns  on 
goods  consumed  or  destroyed  in  their  use,  on  goods  that  can- 
not of  their  very  nature  successively  belong  to  two  or  more 
owners.  Food  is  an  example.  Ownership  is  permanent, 
stable,   lasting,   when   it   turns   on   goods   practically   inde- 


248  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

struetible,  and  open  to  successive  possession  by  several. 
Money,  a  field,  a  house,  capital  are  examples.  Capital  is  prac- 
tically indestructible  property,  that  tends  to  the  production 
of  new  wealth,  and  is  opposed  to  what  constitutes  transient 
ownership.  Money  inve,sted  in  a  business  or  deposited  in  a 
bank  can  be  called  capital.  The  same  object  can  be  basis  for 
both  transient  and  permanent  ownership.  Wine  and  bread, 
for  instance,  can  be  regarded  as  food  or  as  articles  of  trade 
and  commerce.  We  maintain  against  Socialism  that  man, 
when  he  acquires  dominion  over  property  of  either  denomi- 
nation, transient  or  permanent,  food  or  capital,  is  only  ap- 
plying a  right,  with  which  nature  at  his  birth  vested  him. 
We  maintain  that  his  right  to  land  and  capital  is  just  as 
sacred  as  his  right  to  the  food  he  eats,  and  that  he  can,  there- 
fore, be  no  more  deprived  of  one  than  of  the  other.  Food 
is  a  more  immediate  need  to  existence  than  land  or  capital; 
but  transient  ownership  without  permanent  is  precarious,  in- 
secure, well  nigh  impossible;  and  the  owner's  title  or  occu- 
pancy is  equally  valid  in  the  two  cases. 

Public  ownership  is  ownership  vested  in  a  perfect  society, 
like  the  Church  or  the  state;  private  ownership  is  ownership 
vested  in  an  individual  or  in  an  imperfect  society,  like  a 
business  partnership,  or  the  whole  human  race.  Private  own- 
ership, therefore,  can  be  individual  or  collective.  Individual 
attaches  to  a  definite  physical  person,  and  it  implies  exclu- 
sion of  other  owners;  collective  attaches  to  a  moral  person, 
or  to  several  physical  persons  taken  collectively  not  distribu- 
tively.  This  collective  ownership  is  common  ownership,  and 
it  can  be  positivel}^  common  or  negatively  common  ownership. 
In  collective  ownership  goods  are  common  to  several  in  such 
a  way  that  none  of  the  several  can  exclude  the  others  from 
their  possession  or  use.  Obviously,  such  collective  ownership 
is  barren  and  of  no  practical  utility  to  individuals.  Collec- 
tive ownership  is  an  advantage,  only  when  reducible  to  indi- 
vidual ownership.  Individual  ownership  is  part  and  parcel 
of  the  very  word,  property  or  proprium. 

Collective  ownership  of  this  practical  kind  is  positively  com- 
mon ownership  and  negatively  common  ownership.  Posi- 
tively common  ownership  is  reducible  to  individual  owner- 
ship only  by  favor  of  all  the  individuals  in  the  community. 


INDIVIDUAL  AND  COMMON  249 

or  by  favor  of  a  head  or  person  in  authority  substituting  for 
all  the  individuals,  never  by  virtue  of  independent  activity 
on  the  part  of  an  ordinary  individual  in  the  community.  As 
far  as  individuals  in  the  community  are  concerned,  positively 
common  ownership  remains  forever  common  in  potency  as 
well  as  actually.  All  power  to  change  positively  common 
ownership  to  individual  ownership  resides  in  the  members  of 
the  community  as  a  whole,  or  in  a  head  substituting  for  these 
members.  Negatively  common  ownership  is  reducible  to  in- 
dividual ownership,  not  by  favor  of  community's  members 
or  a  head,  but  by  virtue  of  independent  activity  like  occu- 
pancy on  the  part  of  any  single  member,  without  reference 
to  the  other  members  or  their  representative.  Negatively 
common  ownership  is  in  itself  actually  common,  but  poten- 
tially individual,  reducible  to  individual  by  virtue  of  inde- 
pendent activity  on  the  part  of  any  single  member  in  the 
community.  This  example  from  Costa-Rossetti,  page  363,  may 
serve  to  elucidate  things.  Some  forest  is  government  prop- 
erty either  in  such  a  way  that  no  citizen  is  able  to  cut  down 
and  appropriate  trees  in  the  forest  without  permission  from 
all  the  other  citizens  or  from  the  head  of  the  government,  or 
in  such  a  way  that  any  citizen  is  at  liberty  to  cut  down  and 
appropriate  trees,  not  already  appropriated  by  others,  with- 
out any  permission  whatever  from  his  fellow-citizens  or  the 
government's  head.  In  the  first  case  individual  citizens  enjoy 
positively  common  ownership  in  the  forest,  in  the  other  case 
citizens  enjoy  negatively  common  ownership. 

Of  their  very  nature,  and  apart  from  every  other  consid- 
eration, the  material  goods  of  earth  belong  to  nobody  by  way 
of  actual  individual  ownership ;  they  belong  to  everybody, 
not  by  way  of  positively  common  ownership,  but  by  way  of 
negatively  common  ownership.  In  other  words,  actual  indi- 
vidual ownership  is  not  from  nature,  potential  individual 
ownership  is  from  nature.  Positively  common  ownership  is 
neither  actual  nor  potential  individual  ownership ;  negatively 
common  ownership,  though  not  actual  individual  ownership, 
is  potential  individual  ownership.  Actual  individual  owner- 
ship is  not  natural,  in  the  sense  of  inborn,  because  otherwise 
everybody  at  his  birth  would  have  a  definite  supply  of  ma- 
terial goods  set  apart  for  his  own  exclusive  use.     Positively 


250  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

common  ownership  is  not  natural  in  the  same  sense,  because 
otherwise  persons  born  into  the  world  could  never  on  their 
own  initiative  become  individual  owners,  but  only  by  favor 
of  every  single  individual  of  the  race,  or  by  favor  of  some 
person  in  authority  substituting  for  every  individual.  Nega- 
tively common  ownership  of  everything  is  natural  in  the  sense 
of  inborn,  because  it  is  the  only  species  of  common  ownership 
able  to  eventuate,  with  the  help  of  occupancy  or  personal 
endeavor,  in  actual  individual  ownership,  the  one  kind  of 
ownership  universally  prescribed  or  counselled  by  nature  in 
present  circumstances. 

If  God  wants  individual  ownership,  no  right  of  jurisdic- 
tion in  a  ruler  can  impose  collective  ownership,  because  juris- 
diction in  a  ruler  is  subservient  to  the  will  of  God;  and  no 
sane  ruler,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  ever  attempted  the  usurpation. 
That  God  in  present  circumstances  wants  individual  owner- 
ship, is  clear  from  the  constitution  of  man,  and  from  evils 
inseparably  attaching  to  collective  ownership.  Had  man 
continued  in  primitive  innocence,  or  had  the  race  never 
amounted  to  more  than  a  few  families,  collective  ownership 
would  have  in  its  favor  arguments  now  altogether  wanting. 
The  passions  of  men  and  the  numerical  vastness  of  the  race 
plainly  declare  against  universal  collective  ownership.  In 
the  present  system  of  individual  ownership  disputes  are  all 
too  common,  in  collective  ownership  quarrels  would  be  mul- 
tiplied a  millionfold.  Therefore,  individual  ownership  is  not 
from  nature  in  such  a  way  that  collective  ownership  is  in 
every  conceivable  case  against  nature.  Positively  common 
ownership  is  not  from  nature  at  all,  but  from  agreement  sanc- 
tioned by  nature  in  particular  instances,  as  in  religious  com- 
munities or  associations.  Negatively  common  ownership  is 
from  nature  in  such  a  way  that  denial  of  it  in  any  particular 
instance  is  against  nature. 

Nobody  is  bom  an  actual  individual  owner  by  virtue  of 
very  birth,  nobody  is  bom  neither  an  actual  nor  a  potential 
individual  owner.  Everybody  is  born  a  potential  individual 
owner  by  virtue  of  very  birth.  Therefore  actual  individual 
ownership  is  a  prescription  of  nature  in  much  the  same  way 
as  marriage;  and,  though  Church  and  state  may  make  laws 
regulating  marriage,  they  must  not  absolutely  forbid  mem- 


COMMON  AND  INDIVIDUAL  251 

bers  or  citizens  to  marry.  Positively  common  ownership  is 
no  more  a  prescription  of  nature  than  membership  in  a  busi- 
ness firm;  negatively  common  ownership  is  a  prescription 
of  nature  in  much  the  same  way  as  desire  of  complete  happi- 
ness. Negatively  common  ownership  is  everybody's  natural 
right,  absolutely  inamissible,  inalienable  and  beyond  the  reach 
of  human  legislation,  whether  ecclesiastical  or  civil.  Nega- 
tively common  ownership  is  practical  potential  individual 
ownership,  every  practical  potency  involves  future  reduction 
to  actuality,  and  to  unduly  interfere  with  actual  individual 
ownership  is  to  violate  and  attack  nature. 

Abstract  ownership  is  another  term  for  negatively  com- 
mon ownership,  concrete  ownership  is  another  term  for  indi- 
vidual ownership.  Abstract  ownership,  then,  is  that  natural 
right  inherent  in  all  new-bom  babes,  whether  they  be  of  noble 
or  plebeian  origin,  to  get  and  to  hold  as  their  own  whatever 
material  goods  of  the  earth  they  may  in  after-life  legitimately 
acquire.  This  abstract  ownership  becomes  concrete  at  what- 
ever particular  moment  the  child  or  the  man  assumes  towards 
a  material  object  some  relation  which  justifies  his  claim  to 
its  exclusive  possession.  It  is  a  fact  readily  granted  by  all 
that  God  presented  to  our  race  in  the  person  of  Adam  the 
territory  of  the  universe  with  all  its  splendid  blessings.  The 
earth  with  all  its  contents  was  made  for  Adam  and  his  de- 
scendants to  the  end  of  time.  This  gift  was  made  to  Adam 
as  to  an  individual,  it  was  made  to  the  rest  of  the  race  as  it 
then  existed,  viz.,  as  to  an  abstraction,  or  to  some  actual  non- 
being.  Adam  was  created  not  an  individual  or  exclusive 
owner  of  the  earth  and  all  its  goods,  but  only  a  negatively 
common  owner.  This  abstract  ownership  he  converted  into 
concrete  ownership  with  the  help  of  occupancy,  and  by  his 
own  personal  endeavor  he  became  individual  and  exclusive 
owner  of  such  portions  of  the  earth  and  its  goods  as  he  made 
exclusively  his  own.  Adam  certainly  began  as  an  individual 
owner,  because  there  was  nobody  to  share  ownership  with 
him.  God  never  settled  unconditionally  and  unexceptionally 
whether  the  descendants  of  Adam  should  be  positively  com- 
mon or  individual  owners.  He  vested  them  with  negatively 
common  ownership,  left  the  future  to  natural  reason,  and 
virtually  decreed  individual  or  exclusive  ownership  as  the 


252  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

system  best  suited  to  ordinary  mortals  after  the  fall  and  a 
sufficiently  widespread  growth  of  the  race. 

Eve  and  her  children  by  virtue  of  negatively  common 
ownership,  their  natural  right,  had  full  power  to  become  in 
the  nature  of  things  individual  owners;  but  the  union  be- 
tween husband,  wife  and  children  demanded  by  the  family 
persuaded  them  to  be  content  with  positively  common  owner- 
ship, dependent  on  Adam's  good  pleasure.  Even  nowadays 
nature  counsels  collective  ownership  in  the  family.  When 
husband  and  wife  keep  separate  purses,  peace  in  the  family  is 
menaced,  and  mutual  union  is  not  what  it  ought  to  be.  Even 
nowadays  nature  counsels  positively  common  ownership  in 
religious  communities,  in  comparatively  small  gatherings  of 
spiritually  minded  men,  banded  together  for  purposes  of 
perfection  along  the  lines  of  the  gospel.  And  yet  collective 
ownership  is  not  their  natural  inheritance  in  the  same  sense 
as  negatively  common  ownership ;  and,  while  surrendering  the 
use  of  the  right,  they  cannot  9,lienate  or  surrender  the  right 
itself  to  become  individual  and  exclusive  owners.  Adam, 
Eve  and  their  children  were,  therefore,  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  religious  in  the  matter  of  ownership,  with  Adam 
for  superior  or  substitute  for  the  others. 

Had  primitive  innocence  continued,  had  man's  passion  or 
appetite  for  worldly  goods  remained  forever  subservient  to 
reason,  the  system  might  have  persevered  without  change 
and  threatened  small  or  no  harm  to  moral  order.  But  the 
fall  of  man  and  consequent  loss  of  primitive  innocence  made 
individual  ownership  the  one  safe  form  of  ownership  for  the 
bulk  of  mankind.  Adam,  therefore,  and  all  his  descendants 
began  as  negatively  common  owners.  Adam  changed  this 
negatively  common  to  individual  ownership  with  the  help 
of  occupancy.  Eve  and  her  children  changed  it  to  positively 
common  ownership.  When  men  grew  numerous  enough  to 
make  individual  ownership  advisable,  men  changed  negatively 
common  ownership  to  individual  with  the  help  of  occupancy 
and  kindred  titles,  like  accession  or  increment,  contracts  and 
inheritance.  Abraham  and  Lot  possessed  land  in  common 
till  a  quarrel  between  their  shepherds  urged  them  to  divide 
their  common  holdings  and  live  as  individual  owners  or  pro- 
prietors.   Abraham  on  at  least  two  occasions  purchased  land 


COMPACT  AND  LAW  253 

from  the  Egyptians,  showing  that  he  respected  the  right  to 
individual  ownership  in  his  neighbors.  History  everywhere 
bears  witness  to  this  ruling  of  nature  in  favor  of  individual 
ownership,  and  at  the  present  time  no  considerable  body  of 
men,  outside  of  religious  orders,  lives  according  to  the  tenets 
of  Communism  or  Socialism.  Men  like  Fourier,  1772-1837, 
Owen,  1771-1858,  and  Cabet,  1788-1856,  have  tried  the  thing, 
and  egregiously  failed.  Owen's  New  Harmony  colony  in  In- 
diana lasted  two  years ;  Cabet 's  Icaria  Community  in  Illinois, 
after  repeated  reverses  between  1849  and  1895,  entirely  dis- 
appeared in  the  latter  year.  Nature  enters  no  protest  against 
collective  ownership  in  the  family,  it  enters  no  protest  against 
collective  ow^nership  in  religion;  but  it  very  decidedly  pro- 
tests against  collective  ownership  for  the  bulk  of  mankind 
as  constituted  since  the  fall. 

Formal  Compact.  Civil  Law.  Nature.  The  Socialists  and 
Communists,  who  despair  of  ever  being  able  to  prove  that 
their  systems  would  be  more  replete  with  blessings  for  man- 
kind than  the  system  of  individual  ownership,  now  so  uni- 
versal, attack  the  justice  of  man's  plea  for  the  right  to  indi- 
vidual ownership.  For,  be  it  remembered,  we  maintain  that 
no  man  can  divest  himself  of  his  natural  right  to  individual 
ownership  any  more  than  he  can  divest  himself  of  rational- 
ity. He  can  so  abuse  his  faculties  as  to  lose  the  use  of  his 
reason,  but  the  use  of  reason  and  rationality  or  reason  itself 
are  two  things  quite  as  distinct  among  themselves  as  the 
builder  and  the  house  he  builds,  or  the  mind  and  the  thought 
it  thinks.  Even  so,  the  religious  who  binds  himself  by  sol- 
emn vow  to  poverty,  or  to  life  without  individual  ownership 
of  anything,  forever  retains  that  right  to  individual  owner- 
ship. He  goes  down  to  the  grave  without  ever  enforcing  the 
right,  but  the  right  itself  is  as  present  and  live  in  him  as  it 
is  in  the  richest  landlord  or  capitalist.  He  cannot  surrender 
his  right  to  individual  ownership.  He  can  and  does  sur- 
render all  desire  to  enforce  that  right.  Man's  right  to  indi- 
vidual ownership  is,  therefore,  so  just  that  he  cannot  even 
himself  legitimately  or  otherwise  deprive  himself  of  it.  It 
is  therefore  an  indispensable  requisite  of  his  nature  and  our 
all-wise  Maker  did  not  so  constitute  vis  that  an  element  of 
injustice  should  be  absolutely  and  unavoidably  inseparable 


254 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


from  our  nature.  If  man's  right  to  individual  ownership 
could  fall  back  for  foundation  on  only  a  formal  compact,  as 
Heyne  and  Grote  opine;  or  on  civil  laws,  as  Montesquieu, 
Bentham  and  Hobbes  groundlessly  imagine,  then  indeed  Henry 
George  and  men  of  his  stamp  could  question  the  justice  or 
injustice  of  that  right,  could  examine  the  terms,  and  the 
legality,  and  the  reasonableness  of  that  compact  and  those 
civil  laws.  But,  as  we  mean  to  show  in  our  proofs,  no  such 
supposition  is  tenable. 

DIVISION 
Three  Parts — I,  II,  III.    Not  Compact,  Not  Law,  But  Nature 


PROOFS 

I.  Whatever  is  asserted  without  proof,  can  likewise  be  de- 
nied without  proof.  But  this  first  theory  advances  no  proof 
of  the  fact  that  an  agreement  or  covenant  respecting  indi- 
vidual ownership  was  once  entered  into.  Therefore,  this  first 
theory  is  simply  denied. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  1°.  History,  that  is  most  an? 
cient  and  authoritative,  bears  witness  to  the  contrary  fact, 
viz.,  that,  before  any  agreement  was  ever  entered  into,  man 
recognized  within  himself  and  applied  the  right  to  individual 
ownership  with  which  he  was  bom.  History,  both  ancient 
and  modem,  is  authority  for  the  fact  that  bodies  of  men  and 
women,  like  the  primitive  Christians  and  the  religious  orders, 
have  by  a  formal  compact  agreed  to  relinquish  the  use  of 
this  right,  without  of  course  being  in  the  least  degree  capable 
of  shaking  off  the  right  itself.  Unlike  the  propounders  of 
the  false  theory  here  refuted,  we  have  ancient  historical  re- 
mains, such  as  monuments  and  tablets,  to  which  we  can  refer. 
The  book  of  Genesis,  written  by  Moses,  the  most  ancient  and 
best  authenticated  history  written,  no  matter  what  scoffers 
say  to  the  contrary,  carries  the  question  back  twenty  cen- 
turies before  Christ  and  plainly  indicates  that  in  the  time  of 
Abraham  the  right  to  individual  ownership  was  enforced  and 
respected.  On  two  separate  occasions  at  least  Abraham  buys 
pieces  of  land:  once  for  a  family  burial-plot,  again  for  a 
camping  ground.     Gen.   23-6,   8,   9,  11,   14,   18,   20;   33-19. 


PROOFS  255 

With  the  Egyptians,  whose  history  is  among  the  earliest  re- 
corded, Joseph  is  said  to  have  purchased  in  time  of  famine 
all  the  land  of  the  people.  Monuments  have  been  discovered 
and  are  now  visible  in  the  museums  of  Europe,  on  which  are 
traced  distinct  and  unequivocal  records  of  business  transac- 
tions in  property,  which  would  be  wholly  meaningless  if  in- 
dividual ownership  were  not  recognized.  One  of  these  monu- 
ments, that  of  King  Senefra,  dates  its  origin  from  a  period 
ten  or  twelve  centuries  in  advance  of  that  of  Abraham. 

2°.  Another  argument  might  be  drawn  from  the  fact  that 
community  of  goods,  as  our  opponents  themselves  confess, 
would  never  have  been  necessary  if  men  had  not  been  bom 
with  the  same  dispositions  for  virtue  and  innocence,  and  that 
exclusive  individual  ownership  necessarily  resulted  from  dif- 
ferences of  disposition  in  this  matter.  But  it  is  a  fact  wit- 
nessed to  by  the  wise  and  the  ignorant  alike  that  man  was 
created  on  a  plan  of  perfectibility,  and  that,  even  if  Adam 
had  prolonged  to  his  descendants  the  reign  of  primitive  inno- 
cence, there  would  still  have  prevailed  among  them  degrees 
of  virtue  and  perfection.  3°.  Besides,  if  community  of 
goods  were  natural,  and  exclusive  ownership  unnatural,  the 
savages  roaming  the  plains  and  living  from  hand  to  mouth 
would  be  men  more  according  to  God's  mind  than  the  in- 
habitants of  cities  with  all  their  wisdom  and  knowledge. 
4°.  The  philosophers  opposed  to  us  would  deplore  com- 
munism as  a  machine  of  the  devil.  But  communism  is  the 
legitimate  outcome  of  any  system  that  makes  man's  right  to 
individual  ownership  depend  on  human  agreement  or  civil 
law.  For  human  agreement  and  civil  law  admit  of  change, 
even  when  the  change  is  actually  from  better  to  worse. 

II.  No  effect  can  be  ascribed  to  any  cause  of  a  perfection 
inferior  to  its  own.  But  individual  ownership  is  a  universal 
custom  of  universal  duration  among  men.  It  cannot,  there- 
fore, be  referred,  as  to  a  cause,  to  so  inconstant  .and  so  re- 
stricted a  factor  as  civil  law.  Besides,  individuals  in  society, 
to  create  exclusive  ownership  by  civil  law,  must  have  had 
before  such  a  proceeding  exclusive  rights  to  the  goods  and 
parcels  of  land  deeded  over.  Otherwise,  the  whole  proceed- 
ing was  illegal  and  unjust,  as  the  parties  engaged  in  it  dis- 
posed of  that  which  did  not  belong  to  them.     Right  of  juris- 


256  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

diction  could  never  create  the  right,  because  jurisdiction 
touches  the  obedience  of  subjects,  not  their  property.  Even 
nowadays  when  through  some  legal  scheming  a  rightful  owner 
is  ousted  from  his  property,  do  fair-minded  people  for  a  mo- 
ment imagine  that  the  schemer  assumes  or  puts  on  a  right  to 
the  ill-gotten  goods?  Does  the  schemer  himself  fancy  that 
before  God  and  conscience  the  theft  is  justified?  By  no 
means.  But  were  civil  law  the  cause  of  man's  right  to  ex- 
clusive ownership,  the  opinions  of  the  fair-minded  in  the 
supposed  instance  would  be  empty  imaginings  without  any 
foundation  in  fact,  the  stings  of  conscience  would  be  unneces- 
sary pain,  self-inflicted,  without  any  assignable  cause  or  rea- 
son. If  law  could  once  change  positive  common  to  exclusive 
ownership,  law  can  now  change  exclusive  ownership  to  posi- 
tive common. 

III.  Man  is  bom  to  live  an  allotted  time  and  work  out  an 
allotted  destiny,  and  his  Maker  has  furnished  him  with  nat- 
ural rights  to  whatever  is  needful  for  that  existence  and  for 
the  attainment  of  that  destiny.  But  individual  ownership 
is  a  means  necessary  to  that  existence.  Therefore  man's 
Maker  has  furnished  him  with  a  natural  right  to  individual 
ownership,  and  this  individual  ownership  extends  itself  to 
temporary  and  lasting  objects. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  E very-day  experience  is  proof 
of  the  first  member,  conclusive  enough  to  convince  the  most 
sceptical.  The  absurdity  of  conceiving  man  alone,  creation's 
noblest  work,  placed  here  to  no  intended  purpose,  while 
everything  around  him  works  unto  an  end,  is  indeed  over- 
whelming. The  prudence  and  justice  of  his  Maker  would 
render  it  absolutely  impossible  to  fancy  man  bereft  of  means 
necessary  to  the  attainment  of  his  end. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  To  foster  existence,  it  is  a 
requisite  that  man  be  solicitous  about  procuring  what  beseems 
life.  But  by  very  nature  man's  solicitude  is  but  feebly  or 
not  at  all  aroused  save  in  the  search  for  things  that  belong 
to  himself  alone,  that  cannot  be  claimed  or  appropriated  by 
others.  Life  without  peace  would  be  without  joy  and  would 
be  even  impossible.  But  deprive  men  of  the  right  to  indi- 
vidual ownership,  and  life  would  be  a  warfare,  a  struggle  for 
existence  in  the  truest  and  strictest  sense  of  the  word,  peace 


INDIVIDUAL  AND  NATURE  257 

would  flee  the  earth.  There  are  innumerable  other  arguments 
applicable  here,  but  all  will  suggest  themselves  to  the  enquir- 
ing mind.  I  would  only  note  the  following.  Use  or  tran- 
sient dominion  is  certainly  a  natural  right.  It  must  be  plain 
to  all  that  this  right  is  little  worth,  unless,  for  instance,  the 
farmer  can  raise  his  crop  without  fear  that  a  stranger  may 
come  in  the  harvest-time  and  appropriate  his  sowing.  The 
sculptor  will  be  little  tempted  to  ply  his  art,  unless  secure 
in  the  possession  of  the  block  of  marble  on  which  he  works. 
Laziness,  and  hunger,  and  death,  are  in  sure  prospect  when 
any  chance-comer  may  with  impunity  lay  hands  on  the  prod- 
ucts of  the  industrious.  There  will  be  nothing  in  store  to 
tide  the  laborer  over  the  darksome  days  of  sickness  and  old 
age.  His  young  family  will  perish  before  it  reaches  ma- 
turity. Charity  and  bigness  of  heart  in  the  dispensation  of 
goods  will  be  utter  strangers  to  earth.  Add  to  all  this  the 
fact  that  the  lie  would  be  given  to  the  sentiments  and  opin- 
ions of  our  fathers  and  forefathers,  who  all  strenuously  main- 
tained that  the  right  to  exclusive  ownership  of  property  is 
inherent  in  man,  and  as  much  a  part  of  man  as  his  nature. 


PRINCIPLES 

A.  In  case  of  extreme  need  the  baker  loses  his  right  to 
individual  ownership  of  part  of  the  bread  in  his  shop.  This 
circumstance  is  due  to  a  phenomenon  in  question  of  rights, 
which  has  its  parallel  in  that  of  physical  forces.  In  the  mat- 
ter of  physical  forces  the  weaker  by  a  kind  of  inherent  neces- 
sity yields  to  a  stronger  force.  Even  so,  in  rights,  which  are 
moral  forces,  the  stronger  always  takes  precedence  of  the 
weaker  right.  But  one  sort  of  force  never  intrenches  on  the 
domain  of  the  other.  Thus,  the  strongest  imaginable  phys- 
ical force  can  never  obtain  legal  mastery  over  the  weakest 
imaginable  moral  force  or  right.  Necessity  or  indispensable- 
ness  of  the  means  involved  is  always  the  measure  of  dignity 
attached  to  a  right.  Four  kinds  of  necessity  are  recognized 
in  the  order  following:  absolute,  extreme,  serious,  common- 
place. A  divine  right  demands  the  sacrifice  of  a  human  right. 
The  right  of  a  natural  society  or  state,  when  all  the  condi- 


258  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

tions  are  the  same,  demands  the  sacrifice  of  a  right  belonging 
to  an  individual  of  that  natural  society  or  state. 

B.  The  acknowledgment  of  right  to  individual  ownership 
is  the  innocent  and  accidental  occasion  of  many  quarrels  and 
disputes.  But  such  quarrels  or  disputes  are  rather  the  out- 
come of  perverse  natures,  and  with  a  small  amount  of  com- 
mon sense  can  be  avoided.  But  in  community  of  goods 
quarrels  and  disputes  would  constitute  the  essential  and  un- 
avoidable order  of  the  day. 

C.  The  community  of  goods  in  use  with  the  apostles,  primi- 
tive Christians,  and  religious  orders  is  no  denial  of  the  right 
to  individual  ownership,  but  a  voluntary  and  meritorious 
cession  of  the  practical  advantages  ordinarily  attendant  on 
the  application  of  that  right. 

D.  Civil  law  surrounds  with  all  possible  safeguards  the 
citizen's  privileges  accruing  to  him  from  the  natural  right 
to  individual  ownership,  and  takes  all  possible  means  to 
ensure  harmony  and  order  among  claimants;  but  civil  law 
by  no  means  creates  the  right  to  individual  ownership.  In 
all  its  enactments  it  supposes  the  right  itself  already  pos- 


E.  Absolutely  speaking,  it  would  of  course  be  quite  pos- 
sible for  an  individual  to  come  into  the  possession  of  a  whole 
continent;  but  relatively  speaking,  i.e.,  taking  all  circum- 
stances into  account,  such  possession  would  be  utterly  im- 
possible. In  Moral  Philosophy,  as  elsewhere  remarked,  be- 
cause it  is  an  eminently  practical  science,  circumstances  can- 
not in  justice  be  neglected.  Therefore,  it  is  enough  to  re- 
mark, as  answer  to  this  seemingly  formidable  objection,  that 
individual  ownership  of  a  whole  continent  is  entirely  out  of 
the  question.  God's  ownership  forbids  that  the  race  be 
pushed  into  the  sea. 

F.  Abstract  ownership  is  a  natural  right  emanating  from 
God,  and  independent  of  all  civil  law.  Concrete  ownership 
is  natural  in  foundation,  strictly  human  because  of  occu- 
pancy, and  dependent  on  civil  law  in  its  application.  Law 
cannot  in  general  forbid  concrete  ownership;  but  it  can  pre- 
scribe methods  and  limits,  to  safeguard  the  common  good. 
Occupancy  is  more  than  a  mere  condition  in  question  of  con- 
crete ownership;  it  is  proximate  cause  or  title.     The  expres- 


PRINCIPLES  259 

sion,  this  is  mine  because  I  made  it  my  own,  is  proof  of 
occupancy's  causality.  No  danger  from  Socialism  attaches 
to  this  concession,  because  the  natural  right,  or  abstract  right 
of  ownership,  always  stands;  and  this  bases  concrete  owner- 
ship. Law  will  enforce  right  when  formalities  are  observed, 
not  otherwise.  Right  may  be  present,  State  will  refuse  to 
recognize ;  and  all  that  to  further  the  interests  of  peace  and 
prosperity.  Law  never  creates  or  causes  the  right  unless 
the  state  is  prior  owner;  it  safeguards  right  already  present. 
It  assists  the  obedient,  refuses  to  assist  the  disobedient;  and 
these  latter  must  prosecute  their  right  without  help  from  the 
law. 

G.  In  spite  of  individual  ownership  the  use  of  things  re- 
mains always  in  a  measure  common.  Concrete  ownership  is 
a  human  right.  Divine  law  ordains  that  the  goods  of  earth 
contribute  to  the  support  of  all  mankind.  In  extreme  need 
human  right  must  yield  to  divine  law,  and  in  this  emergency 
all  goods  become  common,  to  rescue  the  needy  from  destruc- 
tion. In  the  same  way  the  rich  are  obliged  in  charity,  though 
not  in  justice,  to  relieve  the  needy  poor  with  their  superfluous 
wealth.  The  poor  cannot  appeal  to  this  principle  as  to  an 
excuse  for  lawlessly  plundering  the  rich.  The  duty  of  the 
rich  has  its  origin  in  charity,  not  in  justice.  Rights  and 
duties  in  question  of  justice  turn  on  determined  persons  and 
definite  matter,  not  in  question  of  charity.  All  the  needy 
cannot  be  relieved;  and,  therefore,  the  rich  are  at  liberty  to 
make  a  judicious  selection.  Besides,  superfluous  goods  can- 
not be  determined  by  any  hard  and  fast  rule,  and  everjrthing 
is  left  to  the  prudent  charity  of  the  wealthy  owner. 

H.  Religious  never  divest  themselves  of  the  right  to  owner- 
ship, but  of  its  exercise. 

I.  The  right  to  use  is  basis  of  the  right  to  own,  and  yet 
individual  ownership  seems  to  destroy  the  right  to  use.  It 
destroys  in  others  the  right  to  use,  and  that  is  no  contradic- 
tion. 

J.  By  nature  all  things  are  common  in  negative,  not  in 
positive  sense. 


THESIS  V 

Socialism  is  false  in  its  principles^  morally  impossible  in 
itself,  and  quite  absurd.    Cathrein,  283-303. 

QUESTION 

Karl  Marx  (1818-1883),  is  the  acknowledged  founder  of 
present-day  Socialism,  the  species  called  democratic;  and  his 
work  on  Capital  can  be  taken  for  a  fair  exposition  of  its 
tenets.  It  condemns  the  present  condition  of  society  as  de- 
plorable and  unjust.  It  is  deplorable,  because  in  business 
everybody  does  as  he  likes,  trusts  capture  the  wealth  of  the 
world,  capital  practically  destroys  competition,  and  mankind 
goes  into  two  armies,  the  classes  and  the  masses,  captains  of 
industry  and  the  proletariat,  or  capitalists  and  slaves  to  cap- 
italists. It  is  unjust,  because  capital  enriches  itself  by  taking 
unfair  advantage  of  labor,  monopolizing  such  channels  of 
wealth  as  land,  factories,  mines,  railways,  and  seizing  every 
opportunity  to  rob  the  masses  of  the  fruit  of  their  labor. 

Marx  sees  in  every  product  of  labor  a  twofold  value:  its 
use  value,  and  its  exchange  value.  A  coat's  use  value  is 
fixed  by  its  physical  and  chemical  properties,  which  deter- 
mine its  usefulness  as  an  article  of  wearing  apparel.  Its 
exchange  value  depends  on  the  amount  of  money  it  is  worth 
in  the  market,  and  is  always  in  excess  of  its  use  value.  This 
excess  it  gets  from  the  workman's  labor,  which  is  represented 
by  the  difference  between  the  cost  of  raw  material  and  the 
selling  price.  In  much  the  same  way,  the  tailor's  labor  has  a 
twofold  value ;  one,  use  value ;  the  other,  exchange  value.  Its 
exchange  value  is  the  wages  he  gets  from  his  employer,  its 
use  value  is  its  exchange  value  along  with  the  profit  accruing 
from  such  labor  to  his  employer.  Suppose  a  tailor  makes 
a  suit  of  clothes  a  day.  Suppose  the  suit  worth  twenty  dol- 
lars, the  raw  material  five,  and  the  tailor's  wages  five.  The 
cloth's  use  value  will  be  five.     In  this  way  the  use  value  of 

260 


SOCIALISM  261 

the  tailor's  labor,  added  to  the  use  value  of  the  cloth,  gives 
the  market  price  of  the  suit,  and  the  excess  of  use  value  over 
exchange  value  in  the  tailor's  labor  represents  the  employer's 
profit.  This  excess  of  ten  dollars  the  Socialist  styles  capital, 
and  in  his  eyes  the  whole  process  of  commercial  profit  is  a 
species  of  robbery.  But  he  is  blind  to  the  fact  that  the  em- 
ployer has  a  sacred  right  to  wages  as  well  as  the  tailor,  and 
it  is  not  at  all  exorbitant  to  rate  what  he  contributes  to  the 
suit  of  clothes  in  the  way  of  skill,  management,  rent  and 
what  not,  twice  as  valuable  as  what  the  tailor  contributes. 
And  this  continues  true,  if  the  employer  be  an  out  and  out 
capitalist,  contributing  nothing  to  the  industry  but  his  money. 
For  great  mental  effort  was  expended  somewhere  in  the 
accumulation  of  this  money,  and  such  effort  deserves  a  re- 
ward or  wages.  The  capital  invested  stands  for  the  work 
expended  in  its  accumulation.  Certainly  the  employer  ought 
not  be  allowed  to  oppress  his  workmen,  or  keep  their  pay 
down  to  starvation  limits.  But  that  is  an  affair  labor  itself 
must  regulate  by  organization  and  by  appeals  to  the  state 
when  necessary.  And  all  appearance  of  dishonesty  must  be 
avoided,  no  crime  against  the  natural  right  of  property  must 
be  committed  in  the  process,  and  the  wrongs  of  the  poor  must 
be  righted  without  despoiling  the  rich  of  that  capital,  which 
is  as  much  theirs  as  the  dinner  the  workman  eats  is  his. 

In  spite  of  what  Socialists  preach  to  the  contrary,  society 
is  not  going  to  right  itself  by  the  commission  of  another 
colossal  wrong.  Religion  is  the  God-appointed  remedy  for 
this  evil,  and  for  whatever  other  evils  afflict  mankind.  The 
evolution  to  which  Socialism  looks  for  relief  is  progress  back- 
wards, and  would,  if  realized,  land  labor  in  infinitely  worse 
conditions  than  it  now  knows.  Socialists  see  in  the  gradual 
diminution  of  conspicuous  capitalists  a  hasty  advance  towards 
the  time  when  the  poor,  far  outnumbering  the  rich,  will  in 
sheer  disgust  confiscate  the  goods  of  the  wealthy,  and  in- 
augurate a  new  era  of  universal  prosperity.  The  world,  they 
think,  will  undergo  a  complete  revolution  in  the  matter  of 
morality,  religion  and  civil  government.  God  will  be  de- 
throned in  the  universe,  religion  will  be  beaten  down,  indi- 
viduals will  be  kings,  every  man  will  be  his  own  law,  passion 
will  usurp  the  place  of  reason,  and  the  world  will  go  its 


262  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

own  way  to  perdition.  By  a  most  pernicious  and  offensive 
propaganda  they  are  getting  men's  minds  and  hearts  ready 
for  the  change.  They  are  preaching  atheism  everywhere. 
Fear  of  God  is  a  check  to  their  iniquitous  progress,  and  this 
fear  must  be  proved  a  fiction.  The  old  doctrine  of  Heaven 
and  hell  teaches  patience,  and  impatience  with  their  lot  can 
alone  goad  the  poor  to  excesses.  Conscience,  with  its  an- 
tiquated standard  of  morality,  bars  spoliation  of  the  wealthy ; 
and  conscience  must  be  taught  that  self-advantage  is  the  first 
law  of  nature.  The  Church  is  in  league  with  capital  to 
enslave  the  masses,  it  is  the  paid  agent  of  capital,  advocating 
for  a  pecuniary  reward  the  need  of  obedience  to  authority, 
and  encouraging  laziness  in  its  ministers,  fattening  on  the 
credulity  of  the  poor.  The  State,  as  at  present  constituted, 
is  a  foe  to  labor,  and  capital's  most  steadfast  ally.  Govern- 
ment, therefore,  must  be  overthrown,  and  on  its  ruins  the 
socialistic  commonwealth  of  pure  democracy  must  arise.  Free 
love,  community  of  wives,  and  all  their  attendant  abomina- 
tions must  not  only  be  tolerated,  but  encouraged ;  family  life 
must  be  forever  obliterated;  children  must  be  reared  by  the 
state,  much  as  ranchmen  raise  their  cattle  on  the  plains. 
These  are  some  of  the  flattering  inducements  they  hold  out 
to  their  followers,  and  the  wonder  is  that  their  ranks  are 
not  more  crowded  than  they  are. 

Socialists  regularly  and  persistently  deny  that  their  sys- 
tem contends  for  any  of  the  degenerate  practices  just  enumer- 
ated; but  the  writings  of  their  leaders  give  the  lie  to  every 
such  protestation  of  innocence.  They  are  shrewd  dissem- 
blers; and,  where  the  truth  about  their  theory  would  hurt 
the  cause,  policy  urges  them  to  hide  its  base  consequences, 
and  clamor  aloud  that  their  one  holy  purpose  is  to  raise  up 
prostrate  labor,  and  better  the  condition  of  the  working 
classes.  But  accurate  quotations  from  recognized  authori- 
ties on  socialism  bear  honest  witness  to  their  true  purpose; 
and  we  mean,  before  we  finish,  to  gather  a  short  but  startling 
array  of  such  quotations.  Fortunately  for  the  truth,  social- 
ism is  its  own  worst  accuser,  and  its  own  propagators  voice 
its  severest  condemnation.  These  are  necessary,  logical  con- 
sequences. Fanatics  among  them  are  alone  logical.  Moderate 
socialists  are  not  true  socialists. 


EVOLUTION  AND  PROPAGANDA  263 

The  central  feature  of  the  whole  system  is  the  abolition  of 
individual  ownership  in  capital.  Collective  ownership  vested 
in  the  Socialistic  Commonwealth  will  constitute  the  new  order 
of  things.  This  commonwealth  will  be  radically  democratic, 
a  return  to  the  days  of  Demosthenes,  when  Athens  met  in  the 
agora  to  frame  laws,  elect  officials,  and  settle  weighty  affairs 
of  state.  It  will  assume  complete  control  and  ownership  of 
such  sources  of  revenue  as  land,  houses,  machinery,  manufac- 
tures, mines  and  railways.  Municipal  ownership  is  only  a 
step  towards  the  realization  of  their  plans,  and  advanced 
socialists  are  far  from  satisfied  with  this  settlement  of  the 
question.  They  complain  that  municipal  ownership  merely 
shifts  the  trouble  without  removing  it  root  and  branch,  be- 
cause government  in  this  event  turns  capitalist ;  and  it  makes 
small  difference  to  labor  whether  public  officials  or  private 
citizens  prey  upon  its  profits.  In  this  commonwealth  all 
magistrates,  without  a  single  exception,  will  be  immediately 
elected  by  the  people,  directly  responsible  to  the  people,  and 
subject  to  the  sharpest  kind  of  scrutiny  at  the  hands  of  the 
people.  They  will  be  labor's  paid  servants,  not  its  lords  and 
masters.  Privileges  will  be  dead,  all  will  be  on  a  level,  every 
citizen  will  be  on  an  equal  footing  with  his  neighbor.  Suf- 
frage will  be  universal,  officials  will  be  closely  watched,  the 
common  people  will  frame  laws,  sentence  offenders,  and  exe- 
cute judgment;  and  government  will  resolve  itself  into  a 
vast  trading  concern,  with  every  individual  citizen  an  active 
partner  in  the  business.  Men  of  special  parts  will  be  selected 
to  regulate  the  manufacture  and  distribution  of  products. 
The  proceeds  of  labor  down  to  the  last  penny  will  find  their 
way  into  the  laborer's  pocket,  and  overproduction  as  well  as 
scarcity  will  be  a  thing  of  the  past.  Officials  will  assign  to 
each  member  of  the  commonwealth  his  own  proper  share  and 
his  own  fixed  kind  of  labor.  Nobody  will  be  allowed  to  cul- 
tivate idleness  or  enjoy  superfluous  ease.  Eights  and  duties 
will  be  distributed  with  an  even  hand.  There  will  be  no 
merchants,  no  buyers  and  sellers.  Goods  will  be  stored  in 
public  depots  to  be  distributed  among  the  people  in  shares 
determined  by  individual  industry.  In  lieu  of  money,  pay- 
checks will  be  issued,  entitling  holders  to  fixed  portions  of  the 
common  products.     Transient  ownership  will  stand  inviolate, 


264  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

and  nobody  will  have  a  right  to  interfere  with  the  neighboPs 
use  and  management  of  whatever  articles  of  consumption  he 
justly  makes  his  own.  Then  follow  in  funereal  order  a  long 
line  of  logical  and  fatal  consequences. 

There  will  be  no  God,  no  religion,  no  Church,  no  priests. 
There  will  be  no  family.  Instead  of  marrying,  men  and 
women  will  mate  for  a  short  or  long  season,  like  the  beasts  of 
the  field  and  birds  of  the  air.  Children  will  not  know  their 
fathers,  and  soon  after  their  birth  will  be  handed  over  to  the 
commonwealth  by  their  mothers,  to  be  reared  and  educated 
at  the  government's  expense.  Divorce  will  disappear  from 
the  statute-books,  when  free  love  is  made  the  uniform  prac- 
tice. Women  will  be  on  a  footing  with  men,  and  work  side 
by  side  with  them  in  every  department  of  industry.  The 
time  mothers  hitherto  wasted  raising  a  family  will  be  merci- 
fully saved  to  labor  by  the  establishment  of  state-farms  for 
the  upbringing  of  the  young. 

DIVISION 

Two  Parts — I,  II 

I.     False  in  principles. 
II.     Impossible  and  absurd. 

PROOFS 

Its  three  chief  principles  are,  *'  the  theory  of  values;  ^'  the 
equality  of  men;  ^'  materialistic  evolution. 

a.  Socialists  contend  that  labor  gives  whatever  article  of 
trade  its  true  worth.  In  other  words,  they  exaggerate  labor's 
exchange  value  at  the  expense  of  the  article's  use  value.  In 
other  words,  the  higher  the  price  of  a  thing,  the  higher  the 
wages  for  making  it.  But  it  can  readily  be  shown  that  mer- 
chandise is  quite  as  dependent  for  worth  on  its  use  value  as 
on  labor's  exchange  value.  A  thing's  physical  and  chemical 
properties  have  quite  as  much  to  do  with  its  price  as  the 
labor  expended  in  its  manufacture.  The  labor  being  the 
same,  wine  from  one  vineyard  can  be  worth  a  hundred  times 
as  much  as  wine  from  another  vineyard.     Labor  need  have 


THEORY  OF  VALUES  265 

nothing  to  do  with  the  difference  of  value  in  two  fields. 
Wood,  wheat,  precious  stones,  in  many  cases  derive  their  value 
from  natural  causes,  antecedent  to  all  human  endeavor.  La- 
bor, of  course,  contributes  to  a  thing's  worth ;  but  oftener  than 
not  its  use  value,  its  substance,  is  the  weightier  factor  in  de- 
termining price.  The  exchange  value  of  a  workman's  labor 
is  not  measured  by  what  it  takes  to  support  him,  but  by  his 
strength,  skill,  energy  and  experience  as  well.  The  operative 
and  the  manager  can  equally  well  live  on  five  dollars  a  day, 
but  while  the  operative  ought  to  be  in  justice  content  with 
five,  the  manager  has  a  perfect  right  to  demand  ten.  And 
in  the  adjustment  of  wages,  the  world  of  sensible  labor  will 
never  be  led  astray  by  the  senseless  theories  of  socialists. 

b.  All  this  socialistic  talk  about  man's  equality  with  man 
is  noxious  nonsense;  and  to  nobody  is  the  folly  of  the  thing 
better  known  than  to  socialist  orators  themselves.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  fact,  they  reckon  themselves  leaders,  and  are  not  slow 
to  insist  on  their  superiority.  They  are  prophets  among  the 
people,  and  dumb  compliance  with  their  wishes  is  first  requi- 
site for  initiation  into  their  company.  Men  are  equal  in  the 
abstract,  in  the  possession  of  human  nature  with  its  con- 
stituent elements;  in  the  concrete,  in  accidental  accomplish- 
ments, men  are  as  far  removed  from  equality  as  the  remotest 
star  from  our  earth.  Fathers  and  mothers  are  above  their 
children,  rulers  are  above  their  subjects,  where  money  counts 
the  rich  are  vastly  superior  to  the  poor,  and  in  the  realms 
of  art  a  consummate  painter  or  sculptor  is  hardly  on  a  level 
with  a  practical  farmer  or  a  man  of  toil.  And  socialism  can 
try  till  doomsday,  it  will  never  succeed  in  eliminating  these 
accidental  differences  among  men.  They  would  persevere  in 
the  impossible  event  of  Socialism's  establishment,  because  God 
wants  them,  and  God 's  wishes  cannot  be  frustrated. 

c.  The  materialistic  evolution  of  socialism  is  but  a  con- 
ceited aping  of  what  is  going  on  in  the  scientific  world,  and 
what  one  must  expect  when  ill-trained  minds  of  Shakespeare 's 
mechanicals  dabble  in  philosophy  and  theology.  The  pan- 
theism of  Hegel,  the  materialism  of  Darwin,  now  occupy  the 
middle  of  the  stage,  and  the  attention  they  are  getting  is  a 
necessary  evil.  They  will  die  eventually,  as  all  previous 
errors  died;  but  in  the  process  of  their  killing  they  cannot 


266  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

but  be  prominent.  On  the  day  of  his  hanging  the  condemned 
criminal  gets  a  whole  page  in  the  newspaper,  while  an  hon- 
ored President  meets  with  the  scantest  notice.  Socialism, 
to  be  abreast  of  the  times,  casts  its  lot  with  modern  thinkers, 
and  sees  in  its  establishment  the  consummation  of  evolution. 
Unable  to  see  in  man  anything  higher  than  mere  matter,  so- 
cialists profess  to  think  him  hopelessly  subject  to  material 
forces  and  economic  environment.  To  know  the  political 
economy  of  an  age  in  history,  is  to  know  its  religion,  its  trend 
of  thought,  and  its  civilization.  Christianity  was  accordingly 
due  to  the  economic  notions  prevalent  in  Christ's  time; 
Protestantism  started  up  in  obedience  to  economic  changes 
in  human  affairs;  and  Socialism,  without  any  effort  on  its 
part,  is  bound  to  be  the  reigning  style  in  the  immediate  fu- 
ture. Everything  points  to  its  swift  inauguration.  Religion 
is  fast  losing  its  hold  on  the  minds  of  men,  morality  is  mak- 
ing unto  itself  other  standards,  trusts  are  crushing  competi- 
tion, absorbing  the  wealth  of  the  world,  centralizing  resources, 
and  cutting  down  the  number  of  enormously  rich  men  to  won- 
derfully small  limits.  Machinery  is  crowding  labor  out  of 
the  market,  obliterating  the  middle  class  of  thrifty  workmen, 
and  making  wider  the  line  of  division  between  the  rich  and 
the  poor.  Discontent  is  growing  among  the  masses,  and  the 
hour  is  not  far  distant  when  this  discontent  will  make  itself 
felt,  when  the  people  will  rise  in  revolt,  and  the  common- 
wealth will  complete  the  work  of  centralization  begun  by  the 
trusts,  and  vest  all  ownership  of  capital  in  the  people. 

But  man  is  not  the  weather,  to  be  determined  by  physical 
and  material  forces.  He  has  an  intelligent  mind  and  a  free 
will,  both  spiritual,  immortal,  and  in  last  analysis  quite  inde- 
pendent of  matter.  He  is  his  own  master,  maps  out  his  own 
conduct;  and,  though  subject  to  temporary  aberrations  from 
mental  and  moral  straightness,  he  generally  hits  the  truth, 
and  at  least  approves  of  what  is  right.  He  is  the  creature  of 
his  environment,  but  never  its  unwilling  slave.  The  preju- 
dices current  in  this  or  that  age  of  the  world  deeply  affected 
successive  generations  of  men,  but  there  were  always  enough 
honest  men  in  the  world  to  keep  the  heritage  of  truth  safe 
from  lasting  harm,  and  help  it  to  ultimate  victory.  Man's 
mind  was  made  for  the  truth,  and,  though  its  native  imperf ec- 


MATERIALISTIC  EVOLUTION  267 

tion  lays  it  open  to  the  danger  of  going  wrong  at  scattered 
intervals,  in  the  main  it  steers  a  straight  course,  and,  acci- 
dents aside,  it  invariably  finishes  where  God  would  have  it 
finish  in  moral  knowledge.  If  all  rivers  ran  upward,  if  stones 
in  the  air  continued  to  ascend  instead  of  falling  to  the  ground, 
it  would  be  less  a  miracle  than  the  altogether  unnatural  en- 
slavement of  any  large  collection  of  minds  to  moral  error. 
What  is  in  a  measure  true  of  even  scientific  judgments,  where 
passion,  prejudice  and  education  play  so  conspicuous  a  part, 
becomes  absolutely  true  in  question  of  ethical  judgments, 
based  as  they  are  on  human  nature,  and  making  mute  appeal 
to  the  God  of  nature  for  a  share  in  His  own  infallibility. 
Mind  is  spiritual  energy,  it  does  only  partial  allegiance  to 
matter,  and  under  ordinary  circumstances  its  testimony  is 
unerring  in  religion,  morality  and  topics  with  a  bearing  on 
these  momentous  questions.  Political  economy  had  little  or 
nothing  to  do  with  the  growth  of  Christianity.  Christianity 
swept  the  world  because  its  principles  are  true  and  stand  for 
the  right.  It  grows,  and  it  must  grow  till  the  end  of  time, 
because  its  tenets  are  as  indestructible  as  the  truth,  on  which 
they  are  based.  Protestantism  is  wrong;  and,  not  political 
economy,  but  the  perverseness  of  men's  hearts  is  its  explana- 
tion. Its  baneful  influence  was  most  severely  felt  in  sections 
of  the  world  where  morality  was  lowest  and  men's  aspirations 
were  grossest.  Its  first  recruits  were  degenerate  priests  and 
nuns,  men  and  women  impatient  of  virtue's  restraint;  and 
while  its  gospel  of  self-indulgence  attracts  meaner  characters 
of  the  sort,  its  inborn  wickedness  urges  honest  and  heroic 
souls  to  supreme  disgust.  It  is  gradually  disappearing  from 
the  face  of  the  earth,  and  it  is  to-day  but  a  mocking 
shadow  of  what  it  was  in  its  origin.  In  this  twentieth  cen- 
tury the  line  of  division  between  Protestantism  and  paganism 
is  hardly  discernible,  and  it  threatens  before  the  century  is 
over  to  altogether  vanish.  Individual  ownership,  rooted  in 
nature,  is  championed  by  Christianity,  and  stands  or  falls 
with  its  supremacy  in  the  world.  Collective  ownership  is  as 
false  as  Protestantism,  and  must  share  its  fate.  It  may  hold 
men's  attention  for  a  long  or  short  period  of  time,  it  may 
make  conquests  in  this  or  that  corner  of  the  world;  but  it 
can  never  hope  to  prove  lasting  or  compass  universality.     To 


268  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

become  socialistic,  the  world  must  repudiate  nature,  Grod, 
religion,  morality;  and  that  catastrophe  can  never  befall  the 
race. 

II.  False  in  principles,  socialism  is  morally  impossible  in 
itself  and  quite  absurd.  Bare  mention  of  the  insoluble  prob- 
lems attaching  to  the  scheme,  must  satisfy  the  most  incredu- 
lous about  socialism's  impossibility  as  a  system.  Hard  and 
fast  lines  would  have  to  be  drawn  between  articles  of  consump- 
tion and  articles  of  production;  and  the  wisdom  of  Solomon 
would  scarcely  suffice  for  the  task.  To  avoid  waste,  the 
quantity  and  quality  of  needed  products  would  have  to  be 
fixed  with  some  degree  of  exactness;  and  the  world  would 
hardly  contain  paper  enough  for  lists.  To  make  wise  ap- 
pointments, the  commonwealth  would  have  to  get  into  the 
closest  kind  of  touch  with  the  inclinations  and  abilities  of  its 
citizens.  Change  of  residence  or  employment  would  be  out 
of  the  question,  and  men  would  be  as  much  permanent  fix- 
tures as  houses  or  fences.  And  yet  men  are  not  going  to  lose 
their  love  for  travel.  Some  climates,  some  situations,  some 
skies  will  always  be  more  appealing  than  others.  Home  will 
be  without  meaning  when  house  and  land  are  property  of  the 
state.  Distribution  of  duties  will  be  a  ridiculously  wide  field 
for  discontent.  If  everything  is  left  to  the  free  choice  of 
the  citizens,  there  will  be  a  rush  for  easy  and  pleasant  places. 
Nobody  will  want  employment  of  a  hard,  humble,  unhealthy 
nature.  If  citizens  have  no  choice  in  the  matter,  no  more 
degraded  form  of  slavery  can  well  be  conceived.  In  any 
event  it  will  be  a  colossal  undertaking  to  single  out  the  milk- 
men and  miners,  factory-hands  and  farmers,  cooks  and  street- 
sweepers,  nurses  and  doctors,  lawyers  and  policemen.  In- 
centive to  industry  will  be  wanting.  Inventive  genius  will 
not  be  cultivated,  when  the  profit  accruing  from  new  ma- 
chinery goes,  not  to  the  inventor,  but  to  the  people  at  large. 
There  will  be  no  equality  of  rights,  if  some  certain  men  pur- 
sue the  professions  like  law,  medicine,  education;  and  there 
will  be  no  professions,  unless  some  certain  men  pursue  them. 
Professions  and  trades  call  for  years  of  training,  study  and 
patient  exercise;  and,  if  no  corresponding  reward  attaches  to 
this  excess  of  labor,  men  devoting  themselves  to  the  trades 
and  professions  will  be  models  of  unselfishness.    If  such  re- 


IMPOSSIBLE  SYSTEM  269 

wards  are  meted  out,  class  distinctions  will  be  inevitable,  and 
the  commonwealth  will  be  divided  into  rich  and  poor,  edu- 
cated and  uneducated,  gentle  and  plebeian,  men  of  brains 
and  men  of  toil.  According  to  whatever  standard  products 
are  distributed,  innumerable  difficulties  will  arise.  If  num- 
ber of  heads  is  the  standard,  it  will  be  unfair  to  make  no 
difference  between  the  industrious  and  lazy,  skilled  and  un- 
skilled, the  strong  and  the  weak.  If  hours  of  work  are  the 
standard,  an  active  workman  will  produce  in  a  given  time 
twice  as  much  as  a  lazy  workman,  and  can  well  be  dissatis- 
fied if  his  reward  is  the  same.  If  excellence  of  work  is  the 
standard,  it  will  be  practically  impossible  to  measure  the 
different  degrees  in  occupations  like  medicine,  law,  education, 
agriculture.  If  activity  is  the  standard,  every  workman  will 
have  to  be  under  the  constant  supervision  of  a  dozen  or  more 
watchers  and  measurers.  If  need  is  the  standard,  a  whole 
army  of  judges  will  scarcely  suffice  to  determine  the  peculiar 
needs  of  each  individual  in  the  commonwealth.  With  no 
motive  for  energetic  endeavor,  men  would  discharge  their  du- 
ties in  the  most  perfunctory  manner.  There  would  be  no 
family  to  care  for,  no  provision  to  make  for  rainy  days. 
While  young  and  strong,  the  necessaries  of  life  would  be 
men's  daily  wages.  When  old  and  infirm,  their  existence 
would  be,  to  say  the  least,  precarious.  Socialists  must,  be- 
sides, have  unlimited  faith  in  human  nature,  when  they  sup- 
pose that  officials  will  measure  up  to  requirements  in  the 
matter  of  prudence,  wisdom  and  honesty;  that  they  will  be 
immune  from  selfishness,  satisfied  with  their  pay,  wholly  in- 
tent on  the  common  good.  They  credit  the  common  people 
with  no  smaller  virtue,  when  they  suppose  that  subjects  will 
dutifully  hang  on  the  nod  of  superiors,  experience  no  pang 
of  greed,  and  contentedly  pass  their  lives  in  hard  and  humble 
avocations  with  a  view  to  furthering  common  prosperity.  In 
Christian  communities,  where  such  virtue  is  promised  a  sur- 
passing reward,  where  the  opposite  vices  are  threatened  with 
dire  disaster,  saints  of  the  sort  are  few  and  far  between,  rare 
enough  spectacles  to  excite  comment  and  wonder. 

Absurd,  because  unworkable — To  be  a  system,  it  must  be 
workable.     Ergo  workable  and  unworkable. 

Scholion — Agrarian  or  Land  Socialism. 


270  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

Henry  George,  who  died  in  1897,  advocated  a  modified 
form  of  socialism.  He  wants  the  state  to  become  owner  of 
such  immovable  property  as  land,  fields,  forests,  mines  and 
houses.  His  followers  are  styled  Land  Socialists  or  Single 
Taxers.  The  arguments  they  employ  are  nothing  worth.  In 
the  main  they  rest  their  case  on  these  six. 

1.  History  is  witness  that  collective  ownership  of  land  orig- 
inally prevailed  everywhere,  till  violence  and  fraud  substi- 
tuted the  present  system  of  individual  ownership. 

2.  Labor  is  the  single  title  to  individual  ownership,  and 
labor  cannot  produce  land. 

3.  Without  collective  ownership  of  land  nobody  can  appro- 
priate to  his  own  use  the  produce  of  his  labor. 

4.  Equal  right  to  live  postulates  equal  right  to  land. 

5.  The  first  to  enter  a  theatre  has  no  right  to  debar  later 
arrivals  from  sittings. 

6.  Land  owners  absorb  an  undue  proportion  of  the  world's 
wealth — ^unearned  increment. 

Answers:  1.  History  bears  opposite  witness;  and  we  can 
appeal  to  the  Hebrews,  Assyrians,  Egyptians  and  Chinese,  in 
whose  early  records  no  trace  of  collective  ownership  in  land 
can  be  found.  Whatever  may  be  the  truth  regarding  early 
ages,  it  is  certain  that  civilization  stands  for  individual  own- 
ership. 

2.  This  second  argument  proves  too  much,  and  applies  as 
well  to  movable  as  to  immovable  goods.  The  labor  being  the 
same,  statues  of  gold,  marble  and  wood,  are  of  different  val- 
ues. The  sculptor's  trade  would  be  worthless,  unless  he 
owned  the  material,  in  which  he  worked. 

3.  A  man  has  no  right  to  the  produce  of  a  farm,  unless  the 
farm  belongs  to  him;  but  he  has  a  right  to  wages  for  the 
labor  exerted  in  cultivating  another's  farm. 

4.  Ownership  of  land  is  no  requisite  for  support.  Mer- 
chants traffic  in  crops,  and  make  a  comfortable  living  without 
owning  a  square  inch  of  ground. 

5.  The  first  to  enter  has  a  right  to  debar  others  from  his 
seat,  without  preventing  others  from  taking  such  seats  as  are 
empty. 

6.  These  are  the  equations  he  uses  to  prove  the  undue  in- 


HENRY  GEORGE  271 

crease  of  rent,  the  unearned  increment:  Crop  =  rent  plus 
wages  plus  interest.  Ergo,  crop  minus  rent  =  wages  plus  in- 
terest. The  higher  the  rent  goes,  the  lower  wages  and  interest 
fall ;  and  the  lower  the  interest,  the  smaller  becomes  the  crop 's 
value.  He  seems  to  forget  that  if  the  crop  grows  in  value 
as  the  rent  rises,  the  wages  and  interest  will  remain  the  same, 
and  that  a  lower  rate  of  interest  on  a  larger  principal  is 
equivalent  to  a  high  rate  of  interest  on  a  smaller  principal. 
Five  loaves  distributed  among  five  men  are  better  than  ten 
loaves  distributed  among  twenty.  Similarly,  five  per  cent, 
of  five  hundred  is  greater  than  ten  per  cent,  of  one  hundred. 
Finally,  Land  Socialism  is  morally  impossible.  All  land 
cannot  become  the  state's  exclusive  property.  Three  possible 
methods  of  public  ownership  in  land  suggest  themselves. 

1.  The  state  can  hold  all  land  as  proprietor,  and  hire  men 
to  work  it. 

2.  The  state  can  hold  all  land,  and  rent  it  to  tenants. 

3.  The  state  can  leave  individual  owners  in  possession,  and 
exact  the  equivalent  of  rent  as  taxes. 

Answer:  1.  The  first  method  is  condemned  by  George  him- 
self. It  would  destroy  agriculture,  encourage  idleness  in 
workmen,  spoil  the  land  and  do  away  with  the  whole  class  of 
honest  farmers,  who  cling  to  homesteads  and  their  clustering 
traditions. 

2.  The  second  method  would  prove  no  less  destructive.  No- 
body would  improve  the  land  on  account  of  uncertain  tenure, 
the  soil  would  be  worked  to  death  for  large  profits  within  lim- 
ited periods.  No  ditches  would  be  dug,  no  marshes  would  be 
drained,  rotation  of  crops  would  be  neglected,  no  foresight 
would  be  used,  no  expense  with  an  eye  to  the  future  would  be 
undergone,  and  in  short  order  the  land  would  become  a 
barren  waste. 

3.  The  third  method  commends  itself  to  George.  He  would 
leave  the  farmers  in  possession,  and  exact  from  them  as  taxes 
that  portion  of  the  crop  equivalent  to  rent,  making  some  small 
allowance  from  same  as  incentive  to  make  improvements,  bet- 
ter the  condition  of  the  land  and  erect  necessary  buildings. 
He  thinks  that  this  one  source  of  revenue  would  meet  all  the 
necessary  expenses  of  the  government,  and  would  impose  no 
other  tribute.     Hence  his  system  gets  the  name  of  Single 


272  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

Tax.  First  of  all,  it  would  be  difficult  to  say  what  propor- 
tion of  the  crop  would  equal  rent;  what,  wages;  and  what, 
interest.  If  a  small  bonus  were  offered  farmers,  they  would 
grow  lazy ;  if  a  large  bonus  were  offered,  it  is  hard  to  see  how 
other  taxes  could  be  dispensed  with.  What  has  been  said  of 
farms  can  with  some  unimportant  changes  be  said  of  real 
estate  in  the  shape  of  city  sites  and  residences. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Some  Quotations:  ''Archbishop  Corrigan  and  Bishop 
Qtiigley  alike  charge  Socialism  with  hostility  to  religion. 
These  charges  are  unqualifiedly  false,  and  we  challenge  their 
authors  to  quote  one  phrase  from  our  party  platform,  that 
would  in  any  way  tend  to  support  their  accusations.  They 
cannot  do  it,  for  Socialism  has  no  concern  with  religion." 

—The  Worker,  Mar.  16,  1902. 

Answer:  Socialism  is  not  to  be  gotten  from  the  platform 
of  a  party  in  New  York;  but  from  the  writings  of  its  recog- 
nized leaders  and  exponents.  Socialism  is  international  and 
was  never  meant  to  be  sectional.  Therefore  it  ought  to  be 
the  same  all  over  the  world ;  and,  if  the  New  Yorkers  above 
quoted  want  to  be  considered  good  Socialists,  they  must  change 
their  manner  of  talk. 

*  *  There  is  no  such  thing  as  European  Socialism  or  American 
Socialism.  There  is  only  one  kind  of  Socialism  the  world 
over,  International  Socialism." 

— Haverhill,  Social  Democrat,  July  20,  1901. 

Now  let  us  hear  how  Socialists  the  world  over  talk  about 
religion : 

"The  possession  of  the  means  of  livelihood  gives  to  the 
capitalists  the  control  of  the  government,  the  press,  the  pul- 
pit, and  the  schools,  and  enables  them  to  reduce  the  working- 
men  to  a  state  of  intellectual,  physical  and  social  inferiority, 
political  subservience  and  virtual  slavery." — Socialist  Plat- 
form. 

'*  Christianity  to-day  stands  for  what  is  lowest  and  basest 
in  life.  Official  religion  and  militarism  are  the  two  guardians 
of  capitalism,  and  the  subtle  methods  of  the  church  in  de- 
stroying the  manhood  of  the  soul  and  keeping  it  servile  are 


QUOTATIONS  273 

infinitely  more  to  be  dreaded  by  the  socialist  movement  than 
the  world *8  standing  armies."  George  D.  Herron,  in  Ad- 
vance. 

''How  has  the  ruling  class  established  this  control  over 
its  members  and  its  slaves  ?  In  three  ways,  through  religion, 
through  public  opinion,  and  through  the  law,  with  its  judges 
and  soldiers.  Religion  is  perhaps  the  most  powerful  of  these 
means  of  maintaining  class  society,  by  inducing  the  members 
of  the  subject  class  to  act  contrary  to  their  interests  and  in 
accordance  with  that  of  their  masters.  Christianity  is  the 
most  effective  of  all.  It  has  operated  primarily  by  the  offer 
of  rewards  in  Heaven  and  the  threat  of  punishment  in  hell.'' 
—The  People,  New  York,  Feb.  18,  1900. 

**  Christianity  is  a  huge  and  ghastly  parasite,  consuming 
billions  of  treasure  out  of  the  labor  and  the  patience  of  the 
people,  and  is  supremely  interested  in  keeping  the  people  in 
economic  and  spiritual  subjection  to  capitalism.  The  spir- 
itual deliverance  of  the  race  depends  on  its  escape  from  this 
parasite.  The  world  must  be  saved  from  its  salvations." — 
George  D.  Herron,  in  Worker,  New  York,  Nov.  10,  1901. 

''The  truth  is,  as  all  thinking  men  are  aware,  we  have  no 
such  thing  as  intellectual  honesty  in  the  sphere  of  religion. 
The  deity  men  pray  to  and  exhibit  in  theology  is  not  a  moral 
being.  If  ever  in  the  history  of  the  world  any  human  in- 
stitution was  completely  and  finally  discredited,  it  is  the  reli- 
gious institution,  whose  putrid  and  decaying  carcass  here  at 
the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  menaces  the  life  of 
men." — William  Thurston  Brown  of  Rochester,  in  Socialistic 
Spirit,  June,  1902. 

"The  Church  is  one  of  the  pillars  of  capitalism,  and  the 
true  function  of  the  clergy  is  to  chloroform  the  workers,  to 
make  docile  wage-slaves  of  them,  patient  and  contented  with 
their  lot  in  this  world  while  expecting  a  glorious  reward  in 
the  next. — Henry  Quelch,  in  the  Social  Democrat,  March  15, 
1903. 

"Christianity  is  an  enemy  of  liberty  and  of  civilization. 
It  has  kept  mankind  in  slavery  and  oppression.  The  Church 
and  State  have  always  fraternally  united  to  exploit  the  peo- 
ple. Christianity  and  Socialism  are  like  fire  and  water." — 
Bebel,  1901, 


274  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

No  Christianity: 

**One  word  on  that  singular  hybrid,  the  Christian  Social- 
ist. The  association  of  Christianity  with  any  form  of  So- 
cialism is  a  mystery,  rivaling  the  mysterious  combination  of 
ethical  and  other  contradictions  in  the  Christian  divinity  Him- 
self/'—Bax,  in  ''Ethics  of  Socialism." 

* '  The  terrible  condition  of  our  poor  is  due  to  the  two  curses 
of  our  country  and  time.  These  two  curses  are  Capitalism 
and  Christianity." — Dr.  Averling,  in  To-day.  Free-love  hus- 
band of  Karl  Marx's  daughter.     Suicide. 

''That  familiar  fallacy,  the  ethics  of  Christianity  and  So- 
cialism are  identical.  It  is  not  true;  we  do  not  ourselves 
in  most  cases  believe  it.  We  repeat  it,  because  it  appeals  to 
the  slave-mind  of  the  world.  There  is  no  wrong,  however  ter- 
rible, which  has  not  been  justified  by  Christianity,  no  move- 
ment for  human  liberty  which  has  not  been  opposed  by  it. — 
The  Comrade,  N.  Y.,  May,  1903. 

Atheism : 

"And  while  all  of  us  are  thus  indifferent  to  the  Church, 
many  of  us  are  frankly  hostile  to  her.  Marx,  Lassalle  and 
Engels,  among  earlier  socialists;  Morris,  Bax,  Hyndman, 
Guesde,  and  Bebel,  among  present-day  Socialists,  all  are  more 
or  less  avowed  atheists ;  and  what  is  true  of  the  more  notable 
men  of  the  party  is  almost  equally  true  of  the  rank  and  file 
the  world  over." — James  Leatham,  in  "Socialism  and  Char- 
acter. ' ' 

"Marx  was  an  avowed  atheist." — Dr.  Averling,  in  "Charles 
Darwin  and  Karl  Marx." 

"Religion  is  a  fantastic  degradation  of  human  nature." — 
Karl  Marx. 

"In  politics,  the  republic;  in  economy  socialism;  in  reli- 
gion, atheism. ' ' — Bebel. 

"As  the  religion  of  slave  industry  was  Paganism;  as  the 
religion  of  serfage  was  Catholic  Christianity  or  Sacerdotal- 
ism; as  the  religion  of  Capitalism  is  Protestant  Christianity 
or  Biblical  Dogma;  so  the  religion  of  collective  and  coopera- 
tive industry  is  Humanism,  which  is  only  another  name  for 
Socialism." — Bax,  in  the  "Modem  Revolution,"  p.  81. 

' '  The  idea  of  God  is  the  keystone  of  perverted  civilization ; 
the  true  root  of  civilization,  the  true  root  of  liberty,  of  equal- 


QUOTATIONS  275 

ity,  of  culture,  is  atheism.'' — Karl  Marx,  in  ''Secret  Society 
in  Switzerland." 

No  divinity  of  Christ : 

''Can  we  keep  a  picture  of  Christ  in  our  Socialist  head- 
quarters? It  can  stay,  but  the  picture  should  be  without  a 
halo,  and  should  have  the  words  beneath  it :  To  Christ,  who 
was  a  man  and  a  martyr  to  the  principle  of  brotherhood 
among  men." — Oddino  Morgari,  Turin. 

Science  and  Religion: 

' '  Science  and  religion  are  in  inverse  ratio  to  each  other ;  the 
one  diminishes  and  grows  weaker  in  the  same  proportion  that 
the  other  increases  and  grows  stronger  in  its  struggle  against 
the  unknown."  "Under  the  influence  of  scientific  culture  re- 
ligious convictions  will  perish  by  atrophy. ' ' — Enrico  Ferri. 

Free-will  and  Determinism: 

"It  is  not  the  conscious  mind  of  man  that  determines  the 
form  of  his  being,  but,  vice  versa,  the  social  form  of  his  being 
determines  the  conscious  actions  of  his  mind." — Karl  Marx, 
in  "Critique  of  Political  Economy." 

Morality  without  religion: 

"We  bring  back  ethics  from  the  clouds.  Morals  being 
purely  secular  in  origin  and  purpose  should  be  kept  free  from 
all  contact  with  religion." — Spargo,  in  "Where  we  Stand," 
p.  19. 

"Morality  and  ethics  have  nothing  to  do  with  religion. 
Fools  or  hypocrites  assert  the  contrary.  They  regulate  the 
actions  of  men  towards  each  other;  religion  regulates  the  ac- 
tions of  men  towards  supernatural  beings." — Bebel,  in 
"Woman  Past,  Present  and  Future,"  p.  147. 

Free-love : 

"Three  great  obstacles  block  the  path  of  Social  reform: 
private  property,  religion,  and  the  present  form  of  marriage. '  * 
— Frederick  Engels. 

' '  Thanks  to  the  wrong  conditions  of  society  and  the  state, 
woman  is  to-day  without  rights  and  in  countless  cases  is  con- 
demned to  wedded  or  unwedded  prostitution.  The  inter- 
course of  the  sexes  is  unnatural  and  immoral, — socialism  will 
bring  the  emancipation  of  woman  as  well  as  of  man.  It  will 
destroy  prostitution,  w^hether  it  walk  ashamed  under  the  man- 
tle of  marriage  for  wealth  or  convenience,  or  whether  it  run 


278  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

shameless  painted  and  naked  upon  the  street/' — LiebneSl 
''Socialism,  What  it  is."     Chicago,  Aug.  1,  1901. 

''Legalized  monogamic  marriage  and  prostitution  are  based 
essentially  on  commercial  considerations.  The  one  is  pur- 
chase, the  other  is  hire.'' — Bax,  in  "Outlooks  from  a  New 
Standpoint. ' ' 

' '  The  reverence  of  the  bourgeoisie  for  the  monogamic  prin- 
ciple now  rests  almost  entirely  on  the  fact,  that  he  objects 
to  being  exposed  to  the  danger  of  having  to  put  his  hand  in 
his  pocket  for  the  maintenance  of  his  neighbor's  children." — 
Bax,  in  "Outlooks,"  p.  151. 

P.S.  Herron  was  deposed  from  the  ministry  for  abandon- 
ing his  wife  and  taking  a  soul-mate.  Dr.  Averling,  already 
married,  lived  as  a  husband  with  Eleanor  Marx,  Karl's  daugh- 
ter. When  his  love  grew  cold,  she  drank  poison.  Averling 
sex-crazed  soon  after  died. 

B.  Encyclical  of  Pope  Lea  XIII .  ''The  Condition  of  La- 
bor.''   May  15,  1891. 

Exordium — Elements  of  conflict  between  capital  and  labor 
are: 

1.  Growth  of  industry 

2.  Discoveries  of  science 

3.  Changed  relations  of  masters  and  workmen 

4.  Millionaires  and  paupers 

5.  Trusts  and  labor-unions 

6.  Irreligion. 

Hard  to  find  a  remedy  because : 

1.  Guilds  are  gone 

2.  Religion  is  repudiated 

3.  Usury-sharks  are  common 

4.  Monopoly  prevails  in  trade 

5.  Consolidation  of  interests  fosters  giant  corporations 

6.  Contract-labor. 

A.  Wrong  Remedy — Socialism — collective  ownership  of 
capital  in  land  and  money. 

1.  Socialism  hurts  labor,  because  capital  is  as  much  a  need 
to  workman  as  it  is  to  his  employer.  He  ought  to  invest  his 
savings  in  land  and  business.  Capital  is  his  wages  in  another 
shape. 


POPE  LEO  XIII  277 

2.  Socialism  is  unjust,  because  man  has  natural  right  to 
exclusive  ownership  on  account  of  reason  and  knowledge  of 
future.  Man  differs  from  brute  in  this  that  he  sees  beyond 
the  present,  and  makes  provision  for  the  future. 

3.  The  state  has  no  right  to  interfere  with  exclusive  owner- 
ship, because  the  individual  and  his  natural  right  are  prior 
to  state. 

4.  Man  has  a  natural  right  to  whatever  he  honestly  makes 
his  own.  By  work  of  body  and  work  of  mind  he  makes  land 
and  capital  his  own.  By  care  and  improvements  the  farmer 
as  truly  makes  the  land  as  the  crop  he  raises. 

5.  Mankind  approves  and  has  always  approved  of  exclusive 
ownership,  the  civil  law  recognizes  and  safeguards  the  right. 

6.  God  in  the  seventh  and  tenth  commandments  forbids 
interference  with  the  same. 

7.  Man  is  free  to  marry,  and  exclusive  ownership  of  land 
and  capital  is  more  a  need  when  children  put  in  an  appear- 
ance. 

8.  The  state  must  respect  family  rights  because  of  their 
precedence  in  point  of  time  and  importance. 

9.  Socialism  cannot  legitimately  do  parents  the  injustice  of 
robbing  them  of  their  children. 

10.  In  short,  socialism  would  prove  a  heavy  curse.  It 
would  introduce  disturbance,  slavery,  envy,  evil  speech,  quar- 
rels, poverty,  neglect  of  talent,  misery  and  dishonesty,  to  say 
nothing  of  atheism,  anarchy  and  free-love. 

B.  Right  Remedy — Religion — I,  Church,  aided  by  II,  State. 
I.  a.  The  Church  is  equal  to  the  task. 

1.  It  can  do  all  that  its  founder  accomplished. 

2.  To  attempt  to  do  away  with  classes  in  society,  would 
be  to  quarrel  with  God  and  court  defeat. 

3.  To  suffer  is  the  lot  of  humanity,  and  the  poor  will  be 
always  with  us. 

4.  Hostility  between  the  classes  is  not  a  necessity  of  nature, 
b.  The  Church  has  efficacious  means  to  destroy  hostility,  if 

rich  and  poor  heed  her  advice. 

1.  She  counsels  duty  and  justice  to  each  class. 

2.  The  workman  must  scrupulously  keep  agreements;  do 
no  injury  to  the  employer  or  his  property;  earn  his  wages; 
resort  to  no  violence,  riot  or  disorder ;  and  avoid  evil  men. 


278  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

3.  The  employer  must  not  count  his  workmen  slaves;  he 
must  respect  them  as  men  and  Christians;  he  must  bear  in 
mind  that  labor  is  no  shame,  that  it  is  inhuman  to  treat  men 
like  mere  chattels  for  purposes  of  gain. 

4.  Workmen  must  be  allotted  time  for  duties  of  piety,  safe- 
guarded from  dangerous  occasions.  They  must  not  be  taxed 
beyond  their  strength,  and  due  regard  must  be  had  for  age 
and  sex  in  the  allotment  of  tasks.  They  must  not  be  de- 
frauded of  adequate  wages,  no  advantage  must  be  taken  of 
their  helplessness.  No  fraud,  or  force,  or  usurious  dealings, 
must  be  practised  by  the  employer  against  his  workmen. 

5.  She  reminds  both  classes  of  the  future  life  awaiting  them 
and  of  its  paramount  importance. 

6.  The  rich  must  use  their  money  with  a  view  to  salvation. 
They  are  almoners  to  the  poor,  and  exclusive  ownership  never 
excuses  them  from  the  duty  of  sharing  their  goods  with  the 
needy  in  the  name  of  charity. 

7.  The  poor  must  be  content  with  the  lot  of  Jesus,  Mary 
and  Joseph.  They  are  walking  in  God's  footsteps.  Finally, 
rich  and  poor  alike  are  sons  of  God,  and  in  this  respect  equal. 

c.  The  Church  applies  the  remedies  at  her  disposal  with  an 
unerring  hand. 

1.  She  educates  the  world  with  all  the  authority  of  her 
founder;  and  while  most  intent  on  men's  spiritual  good,  she 
neglects  not  their  temporal  welfare. 

2.  Deacons  were  appointed  in  the  early  Church  to  serve 
at  table. 

3.  The  patrimony  of  the  Church  was  a  mammoth  poor- 
fund. 

4.  Her  religious  congregations  have  charity  in  every  form 
for  purpose. 

II.  The  State  must  cooperate  with  the  Church. 

1.  Law  must  consult  the  moral  well-being  of  subjects,  and 
must  be  just  to  all  classes.  It  must  safeguard  the  whole 
community  and  its  individual  parts,  rich  and  poor  alike. 

2.  Law  must  not  unduly  interfere  with  liberty,  and  under- 
take only  what  is  required  for  remedy  or  removal  of  danger. 

3.  Though  the  rights  of  all  must  be  religiously  respected, 
the  poor  are  entitled  to  special  consideration.  The  rich  are 
more  able  to  protect  themselves. 


POPE  LEO  XIII  279 

4.  In  behalf  of  capital,  private  property  must  be  guaran- 
teed; strikes  must  on  occasions  be  taken  in  hand  by  the  law. 

5.  With  regard  to  workmen,  their  spiritual  and  mental  in- 
terests must  be  ensured.  Man  cannot  give  up  his  soul  to 
servitude.  The  law  must  insist  on  Sunday  as  a  day  of  rest, 
and  protect  the  poor  from  grasping  speculators.  Hours, 
child-labor,  woman-labor,  are  within  the  province  of  the  law. 
It  must  take  into  account  that  in  all  contracts  rest  for  soul 
and  body  is  a  condition  expressed  or  understood. 

6.  Though  wages  are  largely  a  matter  of  free  agreement, 
the  law  must  not  allow  greedy  employers  to  impose  on  the 
poor.  Personally,  the  workman  is  free  to  accept  or  reject 
terms,  but  poverty  at  times  reduces  him  to  a  state  of  neces- 
sity in  the  matter  of  agreement,  and  the  law  must  keep  the 
employer  from  forcing  unreasonable  terms  on  his  workmen. 
The  victim  of  low  wages  is  oftener  than  not  forced  and  far 
from  free. 

7.  The  law  must  encourage  economy  and  ownership  among 
the  poor  by  inculcating  thrift.  Ownership  among  the  poor 
has  these  five  excellent  results.  It  brings  rich  and  poor  to- 
gether, it  weakens  monopoly,  it  procures  abundance  and  pros- 
perity in  state,  it  fosters  love  of  country  and  lowers  taxation. 

8.  To  cooperate  with  the  State,  employers  and  their  work- 
men must  get  together.  Labor  must  organize  for  mutual  help. 
Scripture  is  warrant  for  organization.  The  state  must  recog- 
nize lesser  societies,  and  encourage  rather  than  hamper  them. 
It  should  interfere  only  when  such  societies  threaten  the  com- 
mon good.  It  has  no  rights  regarding  societies  responsible 
to  the  Church. 

9.  Unfortunately  for  labor,  workmen's  societies  are  in  the 
hands  of  the  wicked,  and  spirited  Catholic  champions  ought 
to  take  a  strong  hand  in  their  affairs. 

10.  In  labor  unions  piety  should  not  be  neglected,  officers 
ought  to  be  prudent  and  honest.  One  great  need  is  a  com- 
mittee to  settle  grievances  between  workmen  and  employers. 

Peroration: 

Early  Christians  can  be  incentive  to  courage.  They  were 
poor,  but  winners.  Prejudice  and  money  are  in  the  way  of 
success.  Workmen,  formerly  cowards,  will  be  reclaimed  to 
religion  and  labor.    Religion  and  her  ministers  must  help. 


THESIS  VI 

The  right  remedy  for  labor  troubles  is  union  between  em- 
ployers and  workmen,  based  on  inequality;  consulting  the  in- 
terests of  both  in  such  a  way,  that  they  enjoy  life  and  its 
comforts  along  with  freedom  and  peace.    Bicsso,  178-191. 

QUESTION 

The  labor-question  is  the  social  question  of  the  hour.  This 
labor  problem,  because  of  its  bearing  on  morality,  is  as  much 
an  affair  of  the  Church  as  it  is  of  the  state.  Till  this  prob- 
lem is  satisfactorily  settled,  it  must  remain  a  menace  to  the 
salvation  of  men's  souls;  and  it  is  the  Church's  business  to 
fight  every  such  menace  to  a  finish.  All  the  world  is  her 
kingdom,  workmen  and  employers  alike  belong  to  her  juris- 
diction, they  are  children  in  her  house;  and,  like  a  good 
mother,  she  must  keep  down  quarrels  in  the  family.  Hence 
her  prayer  that  workmen  and  employers  may  come  to  a  swift 
understanding,  settle  their  mutual  differences,  and  work  to- 
gether in  harmony  towards  salvation.  The  Church  herself 
cannot  settle  the  problem,  the  state  itself  cannot  settle  the 
problem.  The  Church  can  help,  the  state  can  help ;  but,  un- 
less honest  cooperation  on  the  part  of  workmen  and  employ- 
ers seconds  their  efforts,  Church  and  state  are  practically 
powerless.  The  Church  can  preach,  the  state  can  legislate; 
but  their  subjects  have  free  wills,  and  free  will  is  too  strong 
an  agency  to  be  overpowered  by  either  a  sermon  or  an  army. 
The  man  himself  holds  the  single  key  to  the  situation.  Only 
the  owner  of  a  free  will  can  reduce  it  to  terms,  and  make  it 
walk  right  ways  with  content.  When  the  owner's  mind  is 
right,  when  his  will  is  strong  for  the  good,  mistake  is  a  re- 
mote possibility;  and  the  grace  of  God  is  the  one  lamp  to 
flood  the  mind  with  unerring  light,  the  grace  of  God  is  vested 
with  some  of  God's  own  omnipotence.  This  grace  can  be 
purchased  by  prayer.     When  once  workmen  do  their  whole 

280 


LABOR  PROBLEM  881 

duty  by  employers,  when  employers  do  their  whole  duty  by 
workmen,  there  will  be  no  labor-problem ;  the  industrial  world 
will  be  at  peace ;  the  time,  energy  and  brains  hitherto  wasted 
in  quarrels,  wrangles  and  disputes,  will  be  saved  and  made 
subserve  the  interests  of  virtue. 

TERMS 

Union.  The  labor-trouble  manifests  itself  in  moral  unrest, 
in  mutual  hostility  between  workmen  and  employers  and  in 
wide  fluctuations  of  wealth.  Relations  between  workmen  and 
employers  constitute  a  separate  branch  of  rights  and  duties, 
and  therefore  a  distinct  branch  of  Ethics.  The  workman  has 
a  right  to  wages  from  his  employer,  the  employer  has  a  right 
to  his  workman's  labor.  It  is  the  workman's  duty  to  give 
his  employer  stipulated  labor,  it  is  the  employer's  duty  to 
give  his  workman  stipulated  wages.  The  relations  between 
workman  and  employer  have  their  origin  in  an  onerous  or 
bilateral  contract,  creating  obligations  in  the  two  parties  to 
the  contract. 

This  contract  is  the  root  of  all  the  trouble  in  lahor-ques- 
tions,  and  modern  notio7is  regarding  it  are  at  times  absurd 
and  opposed  to  the  natural  law.  They  restrict  the  contract 
to  the  workman  singly,  without  taking  into  account  his  wife 
and  children.  They  reduce  the  whole  question  to  an  effort  on 
the  part  of  the  employer  to  get  the  greatest  amount  of  labor 
for  the  smallest  possible  wages ;  on  the  part  of  the  workman, 
to  get  the  greatest  possible  wages  for  the  smallest  amount  of 
labor.  They  forbid  every  other  consideration  to  workman 
and  employer.  Every  such  view  of  the  wage-contract  is 
wrong  on  these  several  counts.  It  oppresses  the  poor,  and 
against  all  justice  forces  them  to  the  acceptance  of  iniquitous 
conditions  and  starvation  wages.  It  promotes  strife  and 
hatred,  goading  the  poor  to  desperate  measures  against  the 
rich.  It  encourages  violence  and  disorder,  inciting  the  poor 
to  steal,  to  wantonly  destroy  property  and  to  defy  the  law. 
It  hurts  wife  and  children.  They  must  work,  to  supplement 
the  husband's  low  wages.  No  woman  can  work  abroad,  and 
at  the  same  time  properly  care  for  her  children.  The  right 
to  an  education  is  sacred  in  boy  and  girl,  and  education  calls 


282  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

for  years  of  constant  and  absorbing  toil.  It  tends  to  utterly 
destroy  the  family,  keeping  its  members  far  enough  apart  to 
kill  love,  and  trust,  and  deep  esteem;  provoking  carelessness 
and  want  of  interest  in  domestic  concerns,  and  leading  to 
illicit  attachments  and  unnumbered  abuses.  The  Egoism  it 
encourages  threatens  the  state  with  disaster,  responsible  as  it 
is  for  the  luxury,  hardness  of  heart,  absence  of  charity,  wide- 
spread corruption,  waste  of  wealth  and  consequent  dishon- 
esty, conspicuous  in  the  rich;  and  in  the  poor,  hate,  desire 
of  revenge  and  plunder,  ending  in  theft,  robbery  and  murder. 
Other  Reasons  for  Lahor-T roubles,  Because  Provocative  of 
Disunion.  Disappearance  of  guilds,  for  which  labor-unions, 
because  of  irreligion,  are  no  suitable  substitute.  Every  man 
for  himself,  on  the  pretext  of  liberty  and  equality.  Wide- 
spread use  of  machinery  takes  workmen  from  their  homes  to 
the  factory.  Speculation,  stocks,  get-rich-quick  concerns,  for- 
tunes made  and  lost  in  a  day.  Civil  laws  dictated  by  Liberal- 
ism; no  duties;  might  over  right;  opinion  of  the  majority. 
Laws  of  succession,  and  small  holdings.  Militarism  makes 
young  men  lazy  and  morally  corrupt. 

Wrong  Remedies 

Socialists  clamor  for  equal  distribution  of  profits;  work- 
men and  employers  on  an  equality ;  proportional  shares ;  fixed 
wages  along  with  part  of  profits,  cooperative  plan;  state  con- 
trol, set  wages,  hours,  work  for  all,  right  to  employment. 

Conservative  Liberals  want  books  open  to  state  for  settle- 
ment of  wages  and  share  in  profits;  officials  to  regulate  rela- 
tions between  workmen  and  employers;  alms  to  the  poor  out 
of  taxes,  hence  progressive  taxes.  Scientific  Liberals  or  Mal- 
thusians  advocate  limiting  number  of  children  in  family. 

Socialists  and  Malthusians  need  no  refutation.  Conserva- 
tive Liberals  are  wrong,  their  remedies  are  useless  and  harm- 
ful, because  opposed  to  peace  of  mind,  love  and  mutual  trust, 
common  prosperity  and  secure  possession  of  property.  The 
poor  resent  favors  from  the  law ;  favors  would  be  legal  obliga- 
tion, not  displays  of  kindness ;  distribution  would  be  uniform, 
and  blind  to  concrete  circumstances ;  officials  would  seek  their 
own  advantage;  inspectors  without  number  to  guard  against 
graft.     Ergo,  useless  agencies  for  the  promotion  of  peace  and 


CONTRACT  IN  LABOR  283 

good  will.     Harmful  because  of  tendency  to  Socialism  and 
baneful  centralization. 

Bight  Remedy 

In  the  words  of  our  thesis,  union  between  workmen  and 
employers,  based  on  inequality;  consulting  the  interests  of 
both  in  such  a  way  that  they  enjoy  life  and  its  comforts  along 
with  freedom  and  peace.  The  remedy  we  advocate  is  a  res- 
toration of  the  guilds  of  the  Middle  Ages,  with  what  changes 
present  conditions  demand.  In  this  union  the  employer  must 
be  superior;  the  workman,  inferior.  The  workman,  however, 
must  in  no  sense  of  the  word  be  a  mere  machine  in  the  hands 
of  his  employer  for  the  accumulation  of  wealth.  The  em- 
ployer must  in  kindness  provide  for  the  workingman's  needs, 
and  help  him  in  various  ways  to  meet  his  wants  and  discharge 
his  different  duties.  He  must  not  be  wholly  intent  on  his 
own  advantage,  but  consult  also  the  good  of  his  workmen. 
Workmen  must  be  content  with  their  lot,  harboring  no  desire 
to  better  their  condition  by  unfair  methods  or  by  taking  what 
belongs  to  others,  all  intent  on  using  their  own  rights,  caring 
for  their  families,  and  giving  the  best  in  them  to  their  em- 
ployers. 

PROOF 

Along  with  contract  regarding  labor  and  wages,  by  very 
force  of  natural  law,  workmen  and  employers  have  respective 
rights  and  duties,  looking  to  their  mutual  peace  and  advan- 
tage. But  the  union  we  advocate  would  secure  these  rights 
and  duties.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  Exaggerated  individualism  is 
WTong  in  employers.  They  are  not  absolute  lords  of  their 
own  property.  God  alone  enjoys  absolute  ownership  in 
things.  Man's  ownership  is  limited  by  moral  obligations, 
with  a  bearing  on  less  fortunate  neighbors.  One  of  the  means 
God  employs  to  procure  the  advantage  and  comfort  of  all,  is 
the  unequal  distribution  of  wealth  prevalent  in  the  world, 
enabling  the  wealthy  to  cooperate  with  Providence  in  alleviat- 
ing the  distresses  of  the  poor.  Nobody  has  the  right  to  turn 
all  his  wealth  to  his  own  exclusive  advantage  and  comfort. 
Charity  never  loses  its  claims  on  the  wealthy,  and  whatever 


284  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

contracts  are  made  always  presuppose  in  the  makers  a  willing- 
ness to  discharge  their  duties  and  respect  the  rights  of  others. 

Workmen  must  avoid  whatever  savors  of  socialism,  com- 
munism or  injustice.  They  have  families  to  support  and 
children  to  educate.  Their  wives  must  not  neglect  domestic 
concerns  or  the  duties  of  motherhood.  Their  children  cannot, 
before  they  are  sufficiently  grown,  be  subjected  to  long  hours 
of  labor  without  detriment  to  their  health  and  education. 
Workmen  must  be  given  abundant  opportunity  to  save  their 
souls  by  prayer  and  other  practices  of  piety;  and  time  must 
be  allowed  them  to  discharge  this  duty.  They  must  be  en- 
abled to  put  by  a  penny  for  a  rainy  day,  and  so  escape  starva- 
tion when  disabled  by  disease,  weakness,  or  old  age.  What- 
ever contract  the  workman  makes  presupposes  in  him  the  wish 
to  comply  with  his  duties,  and  means  to  their  fulfilment ;  and 
nothing  short  of  force  or  violence  can  hinder  or  impede  him 
in  this  important  matter. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  The  union  we  advocate  be- 
tween workman  and  employer,  far  from  promoting  unfriendli- 
ness, would  contribute  much  to  peace  and  prosperity.  It 
would,  of  course,  militate  against  the  accumulation  of  ab- 
normal fortunes,  and  so  rid  the  world  of  whatever  sudden 
reverses  and  financial  upheavals  minister  to  men's  sorrow  and 
foment  hatred.  Employers,  therefore,  must  not  unduly  tax 
their  workmen's  strength,  or  impose  long  hours.  They  must 
employ  women  in  lighter  work,  as  far  as  possible  in  their 
own  homes.  They  must  allow  children  to  work  in  their  fac- 
tories only  when  sufficiently  grown  and  sufficiently  educated. 
They  must  give  their  workmen  a  living  wage,  enabling  fathers 
to  support  their  families  without  need  of  hard  work  on  the 
part  of  their  wives  and  children.  They  must  keep  their  hands 
at  work  even  in  business  crises  and  periods  of  depression,  to 
free  them  from  dread  and  anxiety  when  times  are  busy.  They 
must  devise  some  way  of  insuring  their  workmen  against  acci- 
dents like  sickness,  broken  health  and  old  age. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Wages.  Workmen  have  a  right  to  fair  wages,  employ- 
ers must  not  be  plundered.     In  this  labor-question  two  ex- 


WAGES  285 

tremes  must  be  avoided.  Socialism  exaggerates  the  work- 
man's rights;  wrong  political  economy,  the  employer's.  Sal- 
ary is  wages  agreed  upon  by  contract.  This  contract  between 
workman  and  employer  is  onerous  and  bilateral,  creating  in 
both  parties  definite  rights  and  obligations.  Like  all  con- 
tracts, to  be  valid,  it  must  be  free  from  deceit,  mistake  and 
violence.  The  employer  purchases  not  only  the  workman's 
labor,  but  all  its  fruits.  Proudhon  distinguishes  between  the 
workman 's  labor  individually  taken,  and  in  gross ;  giving  the 
employer  the  first,  refusing  him  the  last.  Proudhon  is  wrong 
for  two  reasons,  1°.  The  employer  is  responsible  for  hia 
workmen's  labor  in  gross,  because  he  assembles  them,  he  por- 
tions out  their  work,  he  equips  the  factory,  selects  the  ma- 
terial, buys  machinery,  chooses  efficient  hands,  sells  the  prod- 
uct in  season.  2°.  The  workman's  efficiency  is  limited  to  his 
labor  individually  taken;  his  labor  in  gross  is  due  to  the 
employer's  industry,  and  therefore  belongs  to  him.  Besides, 
in  time  of  business  depression  the  loss  falls  on  the  employer, 
not  on  the  workmen.  Contraries  call  for  kindred  treatment ; 
and,  if  the  loss  due  to  business  depression  is  the  employer's 
burden,  the  profit  due  to  business  prosperity  ought  to  be  the 
employer's  reward. 

Socialists  like  to  view  the  contract  between  workman  and 
employer  in  the  light  of  a  partnership.  It  is  nothing  of  the 
kind.  It  is  a  pure  and  simple  contract  of  buying  and  selling. 
In  partnership  profit  and  loss  are  shared,  in  buying  and  sell- 
ing no  such  division  has  place.  In  this  matter  of  wages,  the 
mere  fact  that  workman  and  employer  agree  on  a  definite 
sum  of  money,  is  far  from  settling  the  whole  question.  Of 
course,  the  workman  owns  his  labor,  and  can  dispose  of  it  as 
he  chooses.  Law  perhaps  never  looks  beyond,  but  conscience 
may  still  take  offense ;  and  conscience  has  claims  on  employer 
and  workman  alike.  Fraud,  mistake,  violence  may  influence 
the  terms,  and  so  vitiate  the  whole  transaction.  A  traveller 
freely  yields  up  his  purse  to  the  highwayman,  but  he  sur- 
renders his  money  to  save  his  life.  In  much  the  same  way,  the 
workman  may  freely  contract  with  his  employer  for  starva- 
tion-wages ;  but,  in  the  event  of  refusal,  death  from  want  may 
stare  himself  and  his  family  in  the  face.  He  chooses  a  lesser 
evil  to  escape  a  greater ;  and  employers,  who,  to  strike  unfair 


286  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

bargains,  take  undue  advantage  of  their  workmen's  helpless- 
ness, are  nothing  short  of  highwaymen.  The  law  protects 
them,  but  God  has  a  heavy  punishment  in  store  for  oppressors 
of  the  poor,  and  for  such  scoundrels  as  defraud  the  laborer 
of  his  just  wages.  In  the  eyes  of  the  law,  if  a  man  wishes 
to  submit  to  injustice,  he  may  do  so.  The  contract  is  not  void, 
but  voidable.  But  in  the  eyes  of  God  the  employer,  who 
forces  his  workman  to  submit  to  starvation-wages,  is  a  crim- 
inal and  deserves  to  be  punished. 

This  other  view  may  help  to  a  clearer  understanding  of 
things.  In  contracts  of  buying  and  selling  equality,  as  far  as 
possible,  between  the  thing  purchased  and  its  price  must  be 
kept.  The  employer  buys  his  workman's  labor,  monopolizes 
his  time  and  strength,  cuts  him  off  from  other  revenues  of  sup- 
port, and  reduces  him  to  the  condition  of  wearing  out  his  life 
in  his  service.  In  all  fairness  the  workman  must  get  from 
his  employer  in  return  the  means  needed  to  sustain  his 
strength,  to  minister  to  his  declining  years,  to  repair  the 
waste  of  his  own  life  by  the  upbringing  of  children.  And 
this  is  practically  what  we  mean  by  a  living  wage,  a  minimum 
wage,  a  salary  enabling  the  workman,  no  matter  what  the 
nature  of  his  labor,  to  comfortably  support  and  educate  him- 
self, his  wife  and  several  children.  Causes  without  number 
operate  to  raise  and  lower  wages,  but  no  reason  can  per  se 
justify  wages  less  than  this  minimum  or  living  wage.  Jus- 
tice is  hurt  by  every  departure  from  this  rule,  and  the  em- 
ployer is  ordinarily  a  thief,  because  he  is  enriching  himself 
with  the  goods  of  others.  If  workmen  and  employers  could 
be  once  gotten  to  heed  these  demands  of  justice,  labor  trou- 
bles would  be  at  an  end;  and,  since  no  outside  agency,  like 
the  state  or  law,  seems  able  to  bring  about  this  happy  con- 
summation, the  solution  lies  with  the  workmen  and  employers 
themselves;  and  union  between  the  two  for  mutual  help  and 
support,  a  deeper  reverence  for  justice  and  charity  in  their 
mutual  dealings,  are  necessary  steps  in  the  process. 

B.  Unions  and  Trusts.  Sometimes  the  workman  is  to  blame 
for  strained  relations;  at  other  times,  the  employer;  and  in- 
stead of  getting  together  to  settle  their  differences,  they  stand 
farther  apart  with  the  help  of  labor-unions  on  the  one  hand, 
and  trusts  or  monopolies  in  trade  on  the  other.     Labor-unions 


UNIONS,  TRUSTS,  STRIKES  287 

are  meant  to  save  workmen  from  the  rapacity  of  employers, 
and  they  accomplish  their  purpose  by  regulating  wages  and 
the  hours  of  work  a  day.  Their  members  are  enjoined  from 
giving  their  services  to  such  employers  as  refuse  to  abide  by 
the  laws  of  the  union ;  and  thus  they  hope  to  put  employers 
of  the  kind  out  of  business.  Employers  hit  back  by  a  counter 
combination,  refusing  to  hire  union-labor,  or  maintaining  what 
is  called  the  open  shop,  where  union  and  non-union  labor  are 
indiscriminately  employed;  and  thus  they  hope  to  subject 
the  workmen  to  their  own  wishes,  and  nullify  the  hampering 
influence  of  labor-unions.  Labor-unions,  when  no  violence  or 
injustice  intervenes,  are  quite  legitimate,  and  ought  to  be 
countenanced  by  the  state.  What  is  true  of  labor-unions  is 
true  of  trusts  and  monopolies  in  trade.  "What  is  allowed  one 
workman  or  one  employer  is  allowed  a  multitude  of  either. 
But  certainly  one  workman  is  allowed  to  refuse  his  services 
to  whatsoever  employer,  and  one  employer  is  allowed  to  refuse 
employment  to  whatsoever  workman.  Ergo,  unions  and  trusts 
are  quite  legitimate.  The  whole  process  is  the  common  exer- 
cise of  a  common  right.  Neither  combination  hurts  the  rights 
of  individuals  in  the  other.  The  purpose  of  the  two  is  praise- 
worthy, disposal  of  their  property  to  best  advantage.  Be- 
sides, men  have  an  inborn  leaning  towards  organization  and 
consolidation  of  interests.  It  belongs  to  the  state  to  safe- 
guard the  rights  of  its  citizens,  and  control  of  these  unions 
is  within  the  province  of  government.  Labor  is  the  weaker 
party,  as  compared  with  capital,  and  deserves  fuller  protec- 
tion at  the  hands  of  the  state.  Capital  has  few  opponents 
among  writers  on  political  economy.  Opponents  to  labor 
complain  that  the  methods  it  employs  are  inefficacious  and 
productive  of  evils.  Individual  workmen,  they  think,  ought 
to  yield  to  the  good  of  the  community  at  large.  Hence,  with 
them,  labor-unions  ought  to  be  abolished.  They  ought  per- 
haps to  be  restrained,  but  not  abolished.  Facts  prove  the 
efficacy  of  labor's  methods.  Times  without  number  employ- 
ers have  yielded  to  the  just  demands  of  their  workmen,  when 
threatened  by  the  loss  attendant  on  a  walk-out.  It  is  no  argu- 
ment to  say  that  with  higher  wages  prices  will  be  raised  to 
offset  the  advantage.  The  raising  of  prices  is  no  necessary 
consequence.     The  employers  will  simply  have  to  be  satisfied 


288  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

with  smaller  profits,  and  enough  dealers  will  always  be  found 
to  maintain  lower  prices. 

C.  Strikes.  The  loss  sustained  by  workmen  in  course  of  a 
strike  is  their  own  private  affair,  and  no  concern  of  the  state. 
The  state  must  not  unduly  meddle  with  the  private  affairs  of 
its  citizens,  the  common  good  is  its  whole  purpose.  Strikes, 
no  doubt,  work  harm  to  employers  and  others  besides  the 
workmen ;  but  they  are  not  on  this  account  necessarily  wrong. 
When  harm  accrues  to  another  from  a  neighbor's  act,  no 
blame  attaches  to  the  neighbor,  when  he  has  a  perfect  right 
to  put  the  act  in  question.  The  injured  party  must  have  a 
clear  right  to  restrain  the  neighbor  from  said  act.  A  mer- 
chant is  certainly  allowed  to  divert  trade  from  his  rival  in 
business,  so  long  as  he  restricts  himself  to  honorable  methods. 
The  workman  is  clearly  within  his  right,  when  he  refuses  to 
barter  his  labor  for  unsatisfactory  wages;  and  a  strike  in  it- 
self means  nothing  more.  It  makes  small  difference  from  a 
moral  point  of  view  whether  one  man  strikes  or  a  whole 
union. 

"When  strikers  resort  to  wrong  methods,  the  whole  face  of 
the  question  is  changed;  and  they  ought  to  be  restrained, 
without  being  robbed  of  their  plain  right.  Their  demands 
must  not  be  unjust,  they  must  not  induce  others  by  force  or 
violence  to  quit  work,  they  must  have  recourse  to  no  lawless 
procedure,  they  must  not  with  violence  prevent  others  from 
taking  their  places.  These  evils  are  not  of  the  essence  of  a 
strike,  which  is  mere  refusal  to  work.  Strikes  must  not  be 
forbidden  because  they  are  sometimes  attended  with  evil  con- 
sequences. That  would  be  poor  logic.  Abuses  in  the  prose- 
cution of  a  right  must  be  checked  by  the  state,  but  the  right 
itself  must  be  respected.  Boards  of  arbitration  appointed  by 
the  state  might  prove  a  great  help  to  the  solution  of  this 
question.  But  the  one  effective  remedy  for  things  is  a  wider 
and  wider  diffusion  of  religion,  and  the  enthusiastic  cultiva- 
tion of  virtue. 


SECTION  II— DOMESTIC  SOCIETY  OR  THE  FAMILY 
THESIS  VII 

Marriage  is  honorable  and  in  harmony  with  man*s  dignity. 
Jouin,  160-172;  Eickaby,  263-270. 

QUESTION 

Society  in  General.  We  pass  now  from  man  as  an  individ- 
ual in  his  private  capacity  to  man  as  an  individual  unit  in 
society.  We  recognize  three  kinds  of  complete  societies. 
They  are  domestic,  civil  and  ecclesiastical,  known  as  family, 
state  and  Church.  Society  itself  in  the  general  acceptation 
of  the  word  means  a  union  of  two  or  more  persons  with  a 
common  aim  or  purpose.  Such  a  union  necessarily  supposes 
in  parties  to  it  an  intellect  capable  of  grasping  a  general 
good,  and  a  free  will  able  to  direct  the  agent's  energies.  So- 
ciety is,  therefore,  a  something  proper  and  limited  to  ra- 
tional creatures.  Instinct  guides  brute  creation  in  the  per- 
formance of  works  that  imitate  the  unity  of  design  apparent 
in  human  societj^  The  characteristic  difference  between  man 
and  brute  is  thus  tersely  and  beautifully  hit  off  by  Lytton  in 
''My  Novel" — ''The  herd  of  deer  shuns  the  stag  that  is 
marked  by  the  gunner,  the  flock  heedeth  not  the  sheep  that 
creeps  into  the  shade  to  die ;  but  man  has  joy  and  sorrow  not 
in  himself  alone,  but  in  the  joy  and  sorrow  of  those  around 
him." 

Society  is  made  up  of  two  elements.  Multitude  constitutes 
only  its  material  or  less  important  factor;  its  formal  being 
arises  from  that  unity  of  purpose  or  harmony  of  action  de- 
rived to  it  from  authority.  Another  item  of  consequence  in 
the  nature  of  a  society  is  its  completeness  or  incompleteness. 
The  only  valid  excuse  for  any  society's  existence  is  the  defi- 
nite end  or  scope  it  proposes  to  itself  to  compass;  and  this 

289 


290  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

end,  whatever  it  may  be,  furnishes  us  with  a  clew  to  the  rank 
it  can  with  justice  claim  in  the  order  of  societies.  Much,  too, 
depends  on  the  solution  of  the  question  of  a  society's  com- 
pleteness or  incompleteness.  If  complete,  it  can  vindicate  to 
itself  a  species  of  independence  in  its  own  sphere  of  activity, 
and  can  warn  off  all  intruders.  If  incomplete,  it  is  essen- 
tially dependent  on  the  complete  society  of  which  it  forms  a 
branch,  and  cannot  with  any  show  of  right  object  to  outside 
interference.  A  society  is  complete,  if  the  end  it  aims  at 
bears  a  universal  aspect,  or  at  least  claims  some  influence  over 
every  single  energy  exerted  by  members  of  the  society,  or  is  of 
such  a  nature  that  it  cannot  be  classified  under  any  of  the 
purposes  for  which  other  complete  societies  exist.  It  is  in- 
complete, if  the  good  aimed  at  is  restricted  to  certain  lines, 
appeals  not  to  all  a  man 's  energies  but  only  to  one  or  several, 
and  readily  ranges  itself  under  the  comprehensive  object  of 
some  known  and  complete  society.  Instances  of  incomplete 
societies  are  a  Literary  Club,  a  Reading  Circle,  a  Lyceum,  a 
Business  Partnership,  Knights  of  Labor.  These  several  bod- 
ies are  all  intended  solely  to  promote  the  intellectual,  financial 
and  social  interests  of  their  members;  and,  as  such,  fall  un- 
der the  jurisdiction  of  that  complete  society  denominated  the 
State. 

Only  three  societies  are  recognized  as  complete,  the  Family, 
the  State  and  the  Church.  All  three  are  man's  natural  guard- 
ians from  the  cradle  to  the  grave  in  different  spheres  of  ac- 
tivity. The  State  is  a  centre,  and  procures  for  a  man  goods 
pertaining  to  this  life,  and  apt  to  suffer  loss  in  his  intercourse 
with  his  fellows.  The  family  is  the  doorway  to  the  state,  it 
is  the  state  in  germ,  and  secures  to  a  man  the  splendid  gifts 
of  existence  and  an  education,  enabling  him  to  cope  with 
neighbors  in  the  state.  The  Church,  besides  promoting  peace 
and  civilization  in  the  state,  busies  itself  with  concerns  of 
vaster  importance,  the  business  of  souls  with  God,  the  con- 
summation of  a  happy  eternity.  The  family  can  be  best  de- 
scribed as  a  union  of  husband,  wife  and  children  for  mutual 
assistance,  the  procreation  and  education  of  offspring.  It  is 
an  institution  designed  first  and  foremost  for  the  perpetuation 
of  the  species  and  for  the  bestowal  of  that  home-training, 
which  rounds  out  a  man's  development,  without  which  in 


MARRIAGE  291 

spite  of  State  and  Church  future  citizens  will  necessarily  be 
unfinished  and  imperfect.  Its  second  scope  is  the  mutual 
help,  assistance  and  comfort  afforded  the  man  and  woman  thus 
united ;  a  help,  assistance  and  comfort  they  cannot  legitimately 
enjoy  in  any  other  condition  of  life.  The  State  is  a  complete 
collection  of  men  banded  together  for  the  purpose  of  safe- 
guarding their  rights  and  securing  their  common  good.  It 
secures  to  men  material  advantages  they  could  never  hope  to 
enjoy  in  their  individual  capacities,  advantages  altogether  dis- 
tinct from  such  as  Church  and  family  confer.  The  Church 
is  a  collection  of  men  banded  together  for  purposes  of  eternal 
salvation  by  profession  of  one  and  the  same  faith,  and  by 
participation  in  the  same  sacraments,  under  the  rule  of  duly 
accredited  superiors,  especially  the  Pope  of  Rome.  This  is 
an  exact  description  of  the  Roman  Catholic,  the  only  true 
Church,  as  propounded  by  Cardinal  Bellarmine.  We  strenu- 
ously maintain  that  no  other  body  of  men  is  truly  deserving 
of  the  name,  Church,  and  regard  all  the  sects  as  associations 
far  from  divine,  human  institutions  subject  to  the  jurisdic- 
tion of  the  several  states  that  countenance  their  establishment. 
Every  society  is,  morally  speaking  and  in  the  eyes  of  the 
law,  a  moral  person.  Community  or  singleness  of  aim  makes 
one  the  minds  and  the  wills  of  the  individuals,  and  in  the 
language  of  philosophy  a  person  is  a  being  possessed  of  mind 
and  will.  Every  society  is,  therefore,  from  this  point  of  view 
really  and  truly  vested  with  rights  and  amenable*  to  definite 
duties.  The  whole  difference  between  an  individual  and  a 
society  is  expressed  when  we  say  that  the  individual  is  a  phys- 
ical person,  the  society  is  a  moral  person. 

TERMS 

Marriage.  The  family  is  compounded  of  at  least  two  ele- 
ments, conjugal  society  and  paternal.  The  first  results  from 
union  of  man  and  wife,  and  takes  its  rise  from  marriage.  The 
second  supposes  the  advent  of  children,  and  regulates  the 
relations  between  parents  and  offspring.  Marriage  may  be 
considered  as  an  act  or  a  state.  Taken  as  an  act,  marriage 
is  a  contract  by  which  a  man  and  woman  mutually  surrender 
each  to  the  other  the  use  of  their  bodies  for  generative  pur- 


292 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


poses,  and  bind  themselves  to  live  together  in  unity.  Taken 
as  a  state,  marriage  is  a  union  between  man  and  wife  with 
aU  the  characteristics  of  a  life-partnership,  a  condition  of 
affairs  in  which  two  minds  have  but  a  single  thought,  two 
hearts  do  beat  as  one. 

Marriage  is  the  plan  divine  wisdom  hit  upon  for  the  propa- 
gation of  the  human  race,  and  the  traits  of  the  human  species 
are  so  admirably  adapted  to  the-  plan  that  extinction  is  a 
very  remote  possibility.  The  Creator  has  fitted  the  two  sexes 
with  physical  and  moral  qualities  such  that  one  sex  is  the 
complement  of  the  other,  one  fills  the  other's  needs,  and  the 
two  united  in  matrimony  come  near  the  perfection  of  an  ideal 
human  being.  To  secure  the  preservation  of  the  race,  God 
has  implanted  in  men  and  women  a  passionate  leaning  to- 
wards wedlock.  He  has  at  the  same  time  denied  man  char- 
acteristic virtues  that  can  be  borrowed  only  from  woman.  A 
woman  in  the  same  way  is  something  incomplete,  unless  a 
man's  companionship  contributes  new  perfections  to  her  life. 
Man  has  arms  and  limbs  stored  with  strength,  woman  is  of 
a  more  delicate  mould.  Man's  physical  force  makes  him 
impetuous  and  brave  even  to  rashness.  A  woman's  bodily 
weakness  renders  her  slow  to  violence  and  timid.  Woman's 
influence  curbs  man 's  fiery  spirit,  man 's  influence  raises  wom- 
an's  courage  and  allays  her  fears.  Man  is  quick  to  think, 
and  rushes  to  conclusions;  woman  is  slower,  and  by  her  de- 
liberateness  checks  man's  mistakes.  Man  is  rough  and  un- 
gentle, woman  is  smooth  and  mild-mannered ;  and  the  blend- 
ing of  these  opposite  qualities  results  in  commendable  hardi- 
hood and  strength  of  character.  ]\Ian  is  impatient  in  the 
face  of  obstacles  and  difficulties,  and  if  left  to  himself  would 
dash  out  his  life  against  them ;  but  woman  is  patient  and  long- 
suffering,  and  her  example  is  a  perpetual  incentive  to  that 
perseverance,  which,  combined  with  energy,  is  sure  to  win. 
Man  is  something  of  a  stranger  to  pity  and  only  extreme 
misery  appeals  to  his  attention;  woman  is  all  sympathy  and 
awake  to  every  cry  of  pain  or  wretchedness.  Man  is  easily  de- 
jected and  cast  down  by  adversity,  woman  never  parts  com- 
pany with  hope,  and  is  a  past  grand  master  in  the  art  of 
comforting  and  encouraging.  We  might  thus  go  on  indefi- 
nitely marking  off  the  traits  peculiar  to  one  sex  and  the 


MAN  AND  WOMAN  293 

other ;  but  from  the  few  hints  set  down  it  must  be  evident  that 
man  and  woman  were  meant  by  Heaven  for  mutual  help  and 
assistance.  When  they  combine  forces,  they  make  of  what 
would  be  two  imperfect  lives  one  single  power  for  happiness, 
good  and  blessedness.  Of  course,  this  desirable  turn  of  events 
is  had  only  when  man  and  woman  in  marriage  honestly  co- 
operate with  God's  designs.  If  His  plans  are  disregarded, 
marriage  can  become  a  positive  curse  and  a  heavy  misfortune. 
The  worst  evil  this  earth  knows  is  the  abuse  of  a  good  thing ; 
and  marriage  is  so  good  a  thing  that  Christ  Himself  went 
out  of  His  way  to  grace  a  wedding  with  His  presence,  and 
bless  it  with  His  first  miracle. 

Intellectual  acumen  of  very  ordinary  quality  can  readily 
understand  what  a  hell  on  earth  married  life  can  become  when 
accursed  of  God.  The  indissolubility  of  the  marriage-tie 
makes  escape  impossible.  Enforced  singleness  is  the  only 
alternative;  and,  if  offspring  has  blessed  the  union,  this  lone 
remedy  is  almost  out  of  the  question.  A  hundred  causes  are 
at  work  after  marriage  to  steal  away  the  allurements,  that 
before  the  event  seemed  destined  to  last  forever.  Its  joys  be- 
come humdrum  and  tiresome.  The  monotony  of  one  person's 
perpetual  company  is  killing.  The  partners  to  the  contract, 
like  all  mortals,  have  their  faults ;  and  these  faults  show  head 
with  amazing  rapidity.  Unforeseen  difficulties  arise,  and 
nothing  short  of  God's  grace  can  keep  man  and  wife  to  their 
duties  of  love,  affection  and  mutual  support.  If  religious 
need  grace  to  persevere  in  their  heroic  purpose,  their  brothers 
and  sisters  in  the  world  need  it  none  the  less  to  live  up  to 
th6ir  obligations  without  blame  and  without  reproach. 

Marriage  is  said  to  be  a  lottery.  Of  course,  the  risks  deter 
very  few  from  choosing  the  state,  and  to  be  unduly  influenced 
by  the  dangers  inseparably  connected  with  it,  would  be  rank 
cowardice.  To  adopt  the  profession  of  bachelor  from  baser 
motives,  would  be  a  crime.  About  celibacy  we  shall  have 
more  to  say  later.  With  God's  blessing  and  a  fair  measure 
of  good  will  these  dangers  can  be  reduced  to  mere  shadows, 
and  everyday  experience  is  standing  proof  that  they  need 
frighten  no  man  of  trust  and  courage. 

Neglecting  for  the  present  details  that  belong  rather  to  the 
province  of  spiritual  advice,  common  sense  vouches  for  the 


294  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

supreme  need  of  friendliness  and  love  in  the  man  and  woman 
contemplating  marriage.  Friendliness  is  the  entrance  court 
to  love's  shrine,  and  without  love  marriage  must  prove  a 
wretched  failure.  Kindred  tastes,  kindred  studies,  kindred 
pursuits,  may  indeed  produce  friendship  and  agreeable  com- 
panionship; but  without  genuine  love  they  cannot  serve  as 
solid  supports  for  marriage.  The  reason  is  evident.  Tastes, 
studies,  pursuits  are  concerns  of  the  head  and  hands,  they 
never  reach  the  heart.  It  is  a  union  that  must  endure  in 
spite  of  the  senses,  in  spite  of  crooked  reason,  in  spite  of 
every  conceivable  adversary.  It  is  an  amalgamation  of  wills, 
and  a  man's  will  is  under  control  of  his  heart  largely,  and 
love  is  only  another  term  for  the  heart 's  activity. 

This  love  is  an  elusive  thing  and  hard  to  analyze.  That 
love  lives  of  beauty  seems  certain,  and  beauty  is  of  all  degrees 
and  phases.  To  begin  with,  there  is  beauty  of  body  and 
beauty  of  soul,  and  the  two  are  independent  possessions. 
Very  few  of  God's  creatures  own  the  combination.  Beauty 
of  body  most  frequently  turns  the  head  of  its  possessor,  and 
makes  the  soul  hideous  with  pride,  unkindness  and  a  host  of 
other  vices.  Lack  of  bodily  charms  concentrates  the  unfor- 
tunate's attention  on  the  cultivation  of  inner  good  qualities, 
with  a  view  to  coyering  outward  deficiencies.  Since,  there- 
fore, this  twofold  beauty  is  of  rare  occurrence  in  one  and  the 
same  person,  men  and  women  who  rush  into  love  must  fasten 
their  hearts  on  one  or  the  other.  In  choice  of  an  anchor, 
endurance  and  strength  are  deciding  characteristics;  and  as 
between  beauty  of  body  and  beauty  of  soul  there  can  be  no 
quarrel.  Growth  in  years  is  a  condition  of  our  existence, 
and  age  develops  wrinkles,  prime  destroyers  of  fair  features. 
Age  bends  the  body  and  works  sad  havoc  in  its  shape.  The 
soul  is  beyond  the  reach  of  time 's  ravages,  and  improves  like 
wine  with  age.  Its  beauty  lasts  forever,  and  hopes  tied  to 
it  will  never  slip  their  moorings.  Of  course  facial  attractions 
are  seldom  altogether  wanting,  and  lovers  have  a  knack  of 
discovering  lines  and  curves  that  escape  the  untutored  and 
uninterested  eye. 

It  is  no  mistake  to  look  for  some  attractiveness  of  form  and 
figure  in  a  future  partner.  The  blunder  consists  in  being 
blind  to  everything  else,  and  foolishly  expecting  love  to  last 


LOVE  AND  MARRIAGE  295 

after  its  sole  motive  has  disappeared  with  the  progress  of 
years.  Lacordaire  has  some  very  striking  language  on  the 
topic.  ''Love,"  he  says,  ''has  but  one  cause,  and  that  cause 
is  beauty.  Whenever  man  is  in  presence  of  a  nature  in  which 
that  terrible  gift  shines,  if  he  be  not  sheltered  by  a  divine 
shield,  he  will  feel  its  power.  However  stubborn,  however 
proud  he  may  be,  he  will  come  like  a  child  to  bend  at  the 
feet  of  that  something  which  he  has  seen  and  which  has  sub- 
dued him  by  a  look,  by  a  hair  of  its  neck — 'in  uno  crine 
colli  sui' — according  to  the  admirable  language  of  Scripture. 
Beauty  which  is  the  source  of  love  is  also  the  source  of  the 
greatest  desolation  here  below,  as  if  Providence  and  nature 
repented  of  having  endowed  some  of  us  with  so  rich  and  rare 
a  gift."  Later  on,  adverting  to  the  beauty  rooted  in  virtue 
and  holiness  of  life,  he  says,  "Man  is  invested  with  a  beauty 
he  had  not  before.  But  what  beauty?  If  I  look  upon  you, 
I  see  no  change.  Your  face  is  the  face  I  knew  yesterday,  and 
you  have  even  lost  something  in  the  correctness  of  the  lines 
of  your  physiognomy.  "What  new  beauty  have  you  then  re- 
ceived? Ah,  a  beauty  which  leaves  you  man  and  is  never- 
theless divine.  Jesus  Christ  has  put  upon  you  His  own  image ; 
He  has  touched  your  soul  with  His  own ;  He  has  made  of  you 
and  Himself  one  single  moral  being.  It  is  no  longer  you; 
it  is  He  who  lives  in  you.  That  beauty  which  the  world  sees 
not,  we  Christians  perceive.  It  pierces  through  dishonored 
humanity.  We  feel  it,  we  seek  it.  It  attracts  us,  not  for  a 
day,  like  human  beauty;  but  with  the  indelible  charm  of 
eternity.  One  day,  and  perhaps  soon,  that  speech  which  an- 
nounces doctrine  to  you  will  grow  dull.  Decline  draws  near 
to  man  with  rapidity,  and  brings  with  itself  solitude  and 
oblivion.  When  that  time  comes,  there  will  remain  to  me 
in  your  souls  only  the  recollection  of  an  echo.  But  to  me, 
as  to  you,  in  life  as  in  death,  the  beauty  which  comes  from 
Christ  will  remain ;  His  visage  which  is  upon  us  and  the  love 
which  springs  from  it,  to  gladden  us  while  living  and  to 
embalm  us  in  the  tomb."     Conf.  25. 

Honorable  means  in  harmony  with  man's  dignity.  Because 
it  is  an  article  of  faith  with  us,  and,  therefore,  a  truth  con- 
tained in  revelation,  that  virginity  and  celibacy  are  prefer- 
able to  wedlock,  and  that  single  blessedness  is  better  and  hap- 


296  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

pier  than  marriage,  we  Catholics  are  accused  by  our  enemies 
of  belittling  matrimony,  a  great  sacrament  in  God's  Church. 
But  the  charge  is  wholly  unfounded.  In  fact,  matrimony  is 
nowhere  done  so  much  reverence  as  in  our  Church.  True, 
our  priests,  in  virtue  of  their  calling,  are  debarred  from  all 
the  comforts  and  solaces  of  the  wedded  state.  But  they  make 
free  choice  of  the  sacrifice  with  their  eyes  wide  open,  and  are 
by  no  means  forced  into  the  difficulty.  Long  before  ordina- 
tion they  are  made  acquainted  with  the  sternness  of  their 
vocation,  and  before  they  take  the  final  step  are  unrestrain- 
edly free  to  follow  any  easier  path  of  duty.  Far  from  dis- 
countenancing marriage,  priests  are  the  first  to  urge  its  ad- 
vantages on  young  men  and  young  women  so  inclined.  They 
certainly  maintain  with  the  Council  of  Trent  that  celibacy 
or  virginity  is  a  more  desirable  state;  but  prudently  warn 
away  from  these  higher  fields  of  virtue  souls  not  manifestly 
invited  by  Heaven.  They  can  appeal  to  the  following  facts, 
when  challenged  for  proof  that  Catholicity  entertains  a  higher 
and  more  sacred  esteem  for  matrimony  than  sects  outside  of 
the  true  Church.  First  of  all.  Catholicity  ranks  matrimony 
one  of  the  seven  sacraments.  It  counts  entrance  into  this 
holy  state  without  confession  and  a  clean  heart  a  sacrilege. 
It  so  vindicates  matrimony  from  everything  profane,  that  it 
forbids  the  civil  power  to  touch  it.  It  employs  the  magnifi- 
cence of  its  ritual  to  deck  with  all  possible  grandeur  the  sol- 
emn ceremony.  It  sets  apart  a  special  Mass,  special  prayers, 
special  blessings  for  the  occasion.  It  abominates  and  anathe- 
matizes that  plague-sore  of  modern  civilization,  that  foul 
wrong  to  Christ  and  His  Church,  that  menace  to  peace  of 
families  and  the  life  of  the  state,  absolute  divorce.  The 
Church  has  fought  many  a  battle  in  history  to  defend  mar- 
riage against  the  attacks  of  mad  fanatics  and  rebellious  here- 
tics. The  Manichees  were  among  the  first  to  attack  its  sacred- 
ness.  They  condemned  it  as  the  immediate  means  of  propa- 
gating and  multiplying  original  sin.  They  appealed  to  pas- 
sages in  St.  Paul  like  the  following : 

"  It  is  good  for  a  man  not  to  touch  a  woman. ' '  1  Cor.  7.  1. 
' '  That  they  also  who  have  wives  be  as  if  they  had  none. ' '  1 
Cor.  7.  29.  ''And  they  who  are  in  the  flesh  cannot  please 
God."    Rom.  8.  8. 


MARRIAGE  HONORABLE  297 

But  the  Church  for  the  insults  thus  offered  Christ's  doc- 
trine branded  them  heretics,  and  the  Church's  Doctors  rid 
the  faithful  of  uneasiness  and  doubt  by  interpreting  aright 
the  texts  called  into  question.  In  reference  to  the  above  ar- 
guments we  say  that,  regarding  the  first,  God  permits  the 
propagation  of  original  sin  to  avoid  extinction  of  the  human 
race.  Regarding  the  second  argument,  St.  Paul  refers  to 
women  who  are  not  the  wives  of  the  men  in  question.  In 
reference  to  the  third,  St.  Paul  refers  to  the  married  state 
as  being  short,  and  that  the  end  of  the  world  for  each  indi- 
vidual man  is  when  he  dies.  Regarding  the  last,  St.  Paul 
is  talking  about  the  spirit  and  the  flesh. 

PROOFS 

1.  That  is  honorable  and  in  harmony  with  man's  dignity, 
which  tallies  with  the  divine  decrees  and  with  an  inborn  in- 
clination rooted  in  the  senses  and  in  reason.  But  marriage 
is  such.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major.  Man's  true  honor  and  man's 
true  dignity  consist  in  perfect  harmony  with  his  Creator's 
wishes,  and  in  obedience  to  legitimate  instincts  implanted  in 
his  bosom.  These  wishes  of  the  Creator  are  distinctly  legible 
in  His  works,  these  legitimate  instincts  are  keen,  and  always 
commend  themselves  to  conscience. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  We  gather  God's  wishes  and 
designs  on  human  nature  from  arrangements  made  by  His 
wisdom  and  plain  to  the  senses.  Difference  of  sex,  the  whole 
physiological  structure  of  man  and  woman,  the  moral  char- 
acteristics of  the  one  and  the  other,  are  evident  signs  that 
God  wants  them  to  marry.  Man's  instinctive  inclination  to 
wedlock,  approved  and  encouraged  by  reason,  is  another  over- 
whelming motive.  The  desire  is  not  confined  to  the  lower 
or  sensile  faculties  of  man's  nature.  Marriage  with  men  is 
a  higher  and  more  ennobling  act  than  intercourse  between 
beasts,  than  union  for  mere  purposes  of  pleasure.  It  is  a 
want  which,  left  unfilled,  affects  a  whole  life,  and  makes  that 
nice  balance  of  qualities  already  referred  to  either  an  abso- 
lute impossibility  or  a  tremendous  difficulty.  Young  men  and 
young  women,  who  with  the  approval  of  God  and  religion 


298 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


do  violence  to  the  inclination,  and  sacrifice  on  the  altar  of 
God's  love  the  joys,  and  the  comforts,  and  the  hopes,  resident 
in  marriage,  are  nothing  short  of  heroes  and  deserve  monu- 
ments. They  have  at  the  hands  of  Catholics,  able  to  appre- 
ciate the  motive  and  the  measure  of  unselfishness  displayed,  a 
reverence,  a  respect  and  an  affection  denied  every  other  ac- 
quaintance. His  vow  of  chastity  is  the  secret  of  the  priest's 
success  with  men.  The  nun's  influence  on  the  street,  in  our 
homes,  on  the  battle-field,  everywhere,  is  due  to  the  same 
cause.  And  the  day  of  judgment  will  reveal  the  mag- 
nanimity of  many  a  man  and  woman  outside  of  religion,  who 
from  regard  for  parents  or  equally  high  incentives  underwent 
the  martyrdom  of  distasteful  singleness.  Many  an  old  maid 
would  challenge  our  admiration,  if  only  the  secrets  of  her 
heart  were  laid  bare. 

2°.  Whatever  is  necessary  to  the  right  increase  and  preser- 
vation of  the  human  race,  is  honorable  and  in  harmony  with 
man's  dignity. 

But  marriage  is  such.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  Man  is  the  pinnacle  of  crea- 
tion and  the  end  or  wherefore  of  the  whole  visible  universe. 
God,  therefore,  wishes  His  most  perfect  work  to  prosper  and 
continue  till  the  consummation  of  time. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor.  Marriage  is  the  method  by 
divine  law  appointed  for  the  propagation  and  continuance  of 
the  human  species.  Man's  offspring,  because  of  peculiar  con- 
ditions, needs  during  the  first  period  of  existence  and  child- 
hood the  fostering  care  of  a  mother  and  the  directive  energy 
of  a  father.  If  deprived  of  this  twofold  help,  children  would 
grow  up  too  weak  and  too  unable  to  perform  the  functions 
of  moral  and  physical  life.  The  race  would  go  to  ruin  and 
disappear  in  a  single  generation.  God  has  so  ordained  that 
the  young  of  other  animals  either  have  no  need  at  all  of 
parents  after  birth,  or  need  their  assistance  for  only  a  lim- 
ited period.  But  the  child's  helplessness  makes  the  presence 
of  a  father  and  a  mother  imperatively  necessary  for  years. 
It  is  a  remarkable  fact,  too,  that  the  progeny  of  the  nobler 
animals  in  brute  creation  imitate  more  or  less  in  this  par- 
ticular the  offspring  of  men. 

Other  proofs  for  believers : 


PROOFS  299 

Hebr.  13.4.    Marriage  honorable  in  all. 
Gen.  2.24.     Mark  10.7.     A  divine  institution. 
John  2.     Christ  at  Cana. 
Eph.  5.25.     Dignity  of  sacrament. 
Multiplication  of  souls  for  Heaven. 

Rickaby,  p.  264.  If  one  refuses  to  eat,  nobody  can  eat  for 
him.  If  one  refuses  to  propagate  race,  others  can  supply. 
Remote  obligation,  proximate  obligation.  If  race  threatened 
to  become  extinct,  law  against  bachelors.  Some  excused ;  en- 
tirely free ;  unable  to  find  or  to  win.  Foregoing  marriage  for 
purposes  of  travel,  study  or  devotion  can  be  a  good  thing. 
Self-preservation ;  old  without  young ;  winter  without  spring. 
The  two  ways  of  propagating  the  race  are,  marriage  and 
promiscuity  of  love. 

Promiscuity  of  love  is  rejected  because  eventually  it  would 
be  suicidal,  and  would  lead  to  infertility,  disease ;  it  has  been 
pronounced  physiologically  impossible  because  of  resulting 
barrenness. 

Furthermore,  promiscuity  of  love  is  against  the  two  ends 
of  marriage — fides,  rational;  proles,  animal. 

The  mother  imparts  love.  The  father  imparts  wisdom  and 
firmness.  Both  manifest  interest  in  the  child.  There  is  mu- 
tual faith.  Plato  and  Aristotle  insist  on  both,  on  account  of 
opposite  characteristics  already  noted. 


THESIS  vm 

Celibacy,  when  love  of  virtue  is  its  motive,  is  more  excellent 
than  matrimony.    Jouin,  172-174. 

TERMS 

Celibacy .  Word-meaning:  Coelibatus  or  coelebs  is  from 
KOLrq,  XctTTw)  ;  or  from  (coelum,  jSatvw)  ;  or  from  kolXiI3o's  = 
orbatus  =  orphaned.  The  two  first  derivations  mean  respec- 
tively to  forego  marriage  and  to  journey  towards  Heaven. 

Celibacy  and  virginity  compared.  Virginity  means  integ- 
rity, or  immunity  from  pleasures  of  the  flesh.  It  is  twofold, 
physical  and  moral. 

Moral,  or  integrity  of  mind,  is  purity,  chastity,  continency, 
or  a  habitual  state  of  opposition  to  thoughts,  desires  and  deeds 
connected  with  suggestions  of  the  flesh.  Physical  virginity  is 
a  corresponding  condition  of  body.  Celibacy  is  life  outside 
of  the  married  state,  and  its  patrons  are  commonly  entitled 
bachelors  and  maids.  God's  law  and  nature's  express  pro- 
hibition against  the  indulgence  of  pleasures  connected  with 
wedlock,  when  perpetrated  outside  of  the  holy  state  of  mar- 
riage, make  virginity  the  only  approved  course  compatible 
with  celibacy.  Any  departure  from  this  stern  law  constitutes 
sin,  and  any  other  view  of  celibacy  would  be  wicked.  Hence, 
though  celibacy  and  virginity  are  distinct  ideas,  and  of  very 
different  objective  value,  they  practically  coincide,  if  men 
and  women  want  to  lead  upright  lives,  in  strict  conformity 
with  God's  wishes  and  the  laws  of  morality. 

Outside  of  the  priesthood  and  religion,  or  dedication  to 
God's  service  by  vows,  celibacy  is  always  unstable,  and  re- 
mains a  matter  of  choice  up  to  the  latest  breath  of  the  man 
or  woman  preferring  the  condition.  But  aspirants  to  the 
priesthood,  or  to  the  perfection  of  the  religious  state,  must 
make  up  their  minds  once  for  all,  and  abide  forever  after  by 
the  decision.     Hope  of  relief,  after  the  step  has  been  once 

300 


CELIBACY  301 

taken,  would  rob  the  sacrifice  of  half  its  heroism.  The  ir- 
revocable nature  of  the  obligations  assumed  by  priests  and 
persons  consecrated  to  God  renders  their  conduct  to  people 
outside  of  the  Church,  and  unacquainted  with  the  workings 
of  God's  grace,  a  mystery  offering  to  their  shallow  ignorance 
one  only  solution,  that  of  broken  vows  and  damnable  hy- 
pocrisy. Indeed,  without  supernatural  assistance,  without 
the  strictest  kind  of  compliance  with  the  rigorous  precautions 
prescribed  by  the  Church,  there  would  in  many  instances  be 
no  other  avenue  of  escape  from  the  difficulties  encountered. 

Celibacy  in  the  Church  of  Christ  is  an  assured  institution. 
Since  that  memorable  day  the  Master  said  to  His  puzzled 
apostles,  ''He  that  can  take,  let  him  take  it,"  St.  Matt.  19.12, 
multitudes  of  men  and  women  have  heeded  the  hard  counsel, 
and  persevered  till  death  in  a  life  more  befitting  angelic 
spirits  than  bodies  of  flesh.  St.  Peter  is  the  only  one  of  the 
twelve  mentioned  in  the  Gospel  as  married,  and  tradition  is 
witness  that  after  his  call  to  the  ministry  he  lived  apart  from 
his  wife.  Certainly  the  custom  of  clerical  celibacy,  now  and 
for  the  past  1500  years  universal  in  the  Western  Church, 
dates  its  origin  back  to  the  times  of  the  apostles.  The  only 
legislation  on  this  point,  explicitly  laid  down  in  St.  Paul's 
letters,  is  a  rule  to  the  effect  that  bishops  be  men  of  one  wife, 
i.e.,  men  who  never  married  a  second  time.  But  hints  about 
the  discipline  in  use  are  manifest  in  Christ's  exhortation, 
]\ratt.  19.12,  in  St.  Paul's  letter,  1  Cor.  7.32,  in  the  Apocalypse, 
14.4,  "There  are  eunuchs  who  have  made  themselves  eunuchs 
for  the  kingdom  of  God."  ''He  that  is  without  a  wife  is 
solicitous  for  the  things  that  belong  to  the  Lord."  "These 
are  they  who  were  not  defiled  with  women,  for  they  are  vir- 
gins. ' ' 

The  primitive  Church  knew  well  the  secret  of  strength 
hidden  in  the  celibacy  of  the  clergy.  It  appreciated  the  value 
of  that  apostolic  freedom,  which  cannot  be  hampered  by  the 
cares  of  a  family,  and  took  it  for  granted  that  God  expects 
from  His  ambassadors  and  representatives  the  service  of  an 
undivided  heart.  The  early  Christians,  with  the  words  of 
Christ  still  ringing  in  their  ears,  must  have  regarded  con- 
tinence a  diviner  gift  than  marriage,  and  would  not  be  in- 
sensible to  the  desirableness  of  this  ornament  in  their  priests. 


302  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

Writers  teU  us  that  a  marked  difference  on  the  score  of 
celibacy  existed  in  the  Eastern  and  Western  Churches  from 
the  beginning.  The  Latins  always  betrayed  a  decided  lean- 
ing towards  strict  celibacy  as  a  profession.  We  have  records 
to  prove  that  in  the  fourth  century  celibacy  was  of  obliga- 
tion for  clerics  in  the  three  highest  orders  of  subdeacon,  dea- 
con and  priest.  In  the  year  305  a  council  of  Spanish  and 
African  bishops  held  at  Elvira  insisted  on  the  rule,  and  em- 
phasized its  enforcement  by  new  enactments.  About  the 
same  time,  325,  in  a  council  at  Nice  an  attempt  to  introduce 
the  same  law  into  the  Eastern  Church  was  defeated  by  the 
efforts  of  a  holy  abbot  named  Paphnucius.  There  always, 
however,  existed  in  the  East  a  tradition  to  the  effect  that  no 
cleric  should  marry  after  admission  to  orders,  and  this  law 
is  in  force  with  the  Greeks  to-day.  Pope  Siricius  in  the  4th 
century  under  pain  of  excommunication  forbade  priests  of 
the  Latin  communion  to  have  intercourse  with  their  wives,  and 
declared  the  children  of  such  intercourse  illegitimate.  At 
Tours  in  567  married  monks  and  nuns  were  visited  with  ex- 
communication, and  their  marriages  were  declared  null  and 
void.  Among  the  Greeks  the  ordinary  or  secular  clergy  are 
not  by  rule  celibates.  They  must,  however,  marry  before 
elevation  to  the  priesthood,  and  on  the  death  of  his  wife  the 
priest  must  become  a  monk.  Their  bishops  are  chosen,  not 
from  the  ranks  of  the  secular  clergy,  but  from  among  the 
monks  or  religious.  To  obviate  the  difficulty,  students  in 
Greek  seminaries  leave  the  house  of  studies  before  taking 
deacon's  orders,  and  return  married.  They  are  then  ready 
for  ordination  to  the  priesthood,  and  are  free  to  live  with 
their  wives  after  the  ceremony. 

Celibacy,  as  is  evident  from  this  circumstance,  is  a  matter 
of  Church  discipline,  not  a  restriction  imposed  on  the  min- 
isters of  the  altar  by  Christ  or  the  Gospel.  As  such,  the  law 
of  celibacy  could  for  sufficient  reasons  be  revoked  by  the  Pope 
to-morrow.  But  no  such  calamity  is  in  near  prospect.  The 
so-called  reformers  in  1520  agreed  among  themselves  to  preach 
down  celibacy  by  word  and  example,  as  a  thing  contrary  to 
the  natural  law;  and,  like  all  advocates  of  theories  grateful 
to  human  nature  and  luxury  of  sense,  soon  attracted  a  crowd 
to  their   standard.     Level  headed   students   of  the   impious 


CHURCH  AND  CELIBACY  303 

movement,  set  on  foot  by  these  rebels  against  Church  author- 
ity, are  of  opinion  that  Luther's  sensuality  had  more  to  do 
with  the  revolt  than  his  ambition.  It  would  be  sacrilegious 
and  contrary  to  common  sense  to  imagine  that  zeal  for  God's 
glory  had  anything  to  do  with  the  scheme.  Monks,  and  nuns, 
and  priests,  who  fretted  under  the  discipline  of  their  vows, 
were  only  too  glad  to  find  an  excuse  for  passion  in  reform's 
convenient  doctrine.  They  were  only  too  eager  to  enroll  them- 
selves with  these  slaves  to  passion.  Why,  even  in  old  Greece 
and  old  Rome,  the  priests  of  the  nation  were  exempt  from  the 
penalties  inflicted  on  celibates  in  every  other  walk  of  life. 
Vestal  virgins,  recreant  to  their  vow,  were  burnt  to  death. 
No  sacrifice,  no  act  of  religious  worship  was  considered  com- 
plete, unless  supplemented  with  a  virgin 's  prayers.  Celibacy 
with  Greeks  and  Romans  was  invariably  accounted  the  priv- 
ilege and  the  duty  of  the  priesthood.  The  consecration  of 
this  condition  to  persons  immediately  connected  with  the  serv- 
ice of  the  gods,  is  a  living  index  of  the  sacredness  of  celibacy, 
and  of  its  superiority  from  a  religious  and  moral  standpoint 
over  matrimony.  It  is  likewise  a  tribute  from  antiquity  to 
the  good  sense  displayed  by  the  Church,  in  imposing  the  obli- 
gation on  her  clergy,  a  sweeping  denial  of  Protestantism's 
pretensions  to  piety,  and  an  emphatic  proof  that  the  reform- 
ers of  the  sixteenth  century  were  sunk  lower  in  the  depths 
of  sensual  degradation  than  the  very  pagans. 

Virtuo'us  Motives.  Celibacy,  in  the  words  of  our  thesis,  is 
more  excellent  than  matrimony,  only  when  adopted  from  vir- 
tuous motives.  When  adopted  from  sinister  designs,  to  enjoy 
luxury  and  dissipation  with  more  freedom,  to  wallow  in  un- 
clean pleasure  without  the  care  attendant  on  the  raising  of  a 
family,  it  is  a  crime  in  the  eyes  of  God  and  men,  deserving 
of  eternal  chastisement  and  the  scorn  of  time.  This  reflec- 
tion, no  doubt,  induced  the  ancients  to  enforce  against  celi- 
bacy, outside  of  the  priesthood,  the  severe  penalties  in  evi- 
dence on  their  statute-books.  In  Sparta  bachelors  were  reck- 
oned infamous.  The  law  permitted  women  to  seize  and  tor- 
ture them  in  the  temple.  In  Rome  they  were  denied  the 
rights  of  witnesses,  their  last  wills  and  testaments  were  not 
respected,  and  they  were  threatened  with  horrible  torments 
in  the  future  life.    Plato  saw  fit  to  insert  in  the  code  of  law, 


304  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

framed  to  regulate  his  imaginary  republic,  a  clause  to  the 
effect  that  citizens  not  married  before  35  years  of  age  should 
ever  after  remain  ineligible  to  offices  of  whatever  sort.  Writ- 
ers remark,  however,  that,  with  progress  in  Greece  and  Rome, 
celibacy  became  daily  more  common.  Athletes,  scholars  and 
men  of  various  professions  were  accorded  the  privilege  of  en- 
joying single  blessedness  unmolested,  and  were  put  on  a  foot- 
ing with  the  priesthood  in  this  particular.  Philosophers,  like 
the  disciples  of  Pythagoras  and  Diogenes,  always  claimed  the 
right  to  forego  marriage  for  purposes  of  study,  and  had  their 
claim  allowed. 

And  now  a  word  about  modern  celibacy,  which  threatens  to 
become  so  serious  an  evil  that  some  legislators  have  debated 
the  advisability  of  imposing  a  yearly  tax  on  bachelors.  With- 
out wishing  to  range  ourselves  with  Horace's  "laudatores 
temporis  acti,''  we  feel  prone  to  acknowledge  that  marriage 
has  lost  on  the  affections  of  men  and  women  that  hold  it 
had  a  hundred  years  ago.  In  the  higher  walks  of  life  it  is 
infrequent  and  oftener  unhappy  than  of  yore.  In  the  lower 
levels  of  society,  barring  the  setbacks  consequent  on  extreme 
poverty,  marriage  holds  its  own ;  and,  because  of  the  strength 
locked  up  in  union,  will  forever  retain  its  charms  and  attrac- 
tiveness for  the  poor.  But  marriage 's  losses  are  perhaps  most 
noticeable  in  the  middle  ranks.  Men  and  women  comfortably 
well  off  and  able  with  ease  to  live  on  the  products  of  their 
own  labor,  are  daily  becoming  more  and  more  content  with 
themselves,  more  and  more  loath  to  enter  into  relations  of 
close  affinity  with  others. 

The  ''new  woman"  is  much  to  blame  for  the  sorry  pass  to 
which  things  are  come.  She  aspires  to  be  in  some  respects 
a  man.  She  joins  the  army  of  workers,  invades  the  profes- 
sions, and  intrudes  herself  into  employment  once  considered 
her  brother's  peculiar  property.  Timid  man  shudders  at 
her  energy,  and  is  conscious  of  a  lurking  suspicion  that  mar- 
riage would  mean  for  him  enthrallment.  He  knows,  and 
knows  instinctively,  that  God  mercifully  meant  him  to  be 
head  of  the  family  and  his  partner's  superior  in  matters  do- 
mestic. In  the  good  old  times  women  found  it  pleasant  and 
easy  to  acknowledge  the  supremacy  of  men,  and  trusted  to 
their  native  art  and  sweetness  to   cajole  husbands  into   a 


MODERN  CELIBACY  305 

slavery,  blissful,  because  gilded  with  ignorance.  But  now  the 
women  ambition  and  fill  with  more  or  less  success  the  parts 
of  men,  and  even  if  they  never  resort  in  matrimony  to  open 
handed  revolt,  are  always  in  a  position  to  unfurl  the  stand- 
ard. 

One  writer  contends  that  solicitude  for  the  support  of  a 
family  makes  marriage  particularly  injurious  to  the  profes- 
sions. Lawyers,  ministers,  judges,  statesmen,  will  be  in  con- 
tinual search  for  the  dollar.  They  will  in  a  mercenary  spirit 
pursue  methods,  preach  sermons,  hand  down  decisions  and 
frame  laws,  all  with  a  view  to  coin.  They  will  on  occasions 
yield  to  the  temptation  to  work  along  dishonest  lines,  to  do 
violence  to  the  gospel  in  reducing  Christianity  to  a  minimum 
of  hardship,  to  accept  bribes,  and  open  the  palm  for  lobby- 
ists' money.  Their  work  will  certainly  not  be  disinterested; 
and,  when  a  spirit  of  self-interest  dominates,  true  work  and 
good  results  are  next  to  impossible.  Domestic  felicity  is  nec- 
essarily selfish,  celibacy  is  in  the  nature  of  things  more  open 
to  generous  impulses.  Men  wedded  to  their  profession  solely, 
are  capable  of  larger  and  better  work  than  men  wedded  to 
their  profession  and  a  wife.  Married  men  must,  if  true  to 
their  obligations,  devote  no  inconsiderable  part  of  their  time 
and  attention  to  the  mistresses  of  their  homes.  These  sug- 
gest themselves  as  a  few  of  the  motives  calculated  to  nowa- 
days frighten  men  away  from  matrimony. 

Women  on  their  part  can  afford  to  be  more  exacting  than 
formerly  in  their  choice.  The  new  movement  in  their  favor, 
this  modern  emancipation  of  the  sex,  has  thrown  open  to 
them  many  and  various  avenues  for  a  livelihood.  They  are 
in  consequence  more  independent,  and  less  liable  to  be  dis- 
appointed, when  trusting  to  their  own  resources.  A  woman 
is,  besides,  never  at  a  loss  to  make  her  habitation  put  on  all 
the  appearance  of  a  home.  She  is  easily  man's  superior  in 
this  respect.  A  bachelor's  apartments  never  wear  anything 
but  the  semblance  of  a  den.  The  newspapers,  too,  make  the 
proceedings  of  the  divorce  court  public  property;  and  in 
nearly  every  case  the  woman's  wrongs  fill  a  large  part  of  the 
story.  From  the  sad  experience  of  her  sisters  every  woman 
knows  pretty  thoroughly  the  risks  she  takes  when  sealing  her- 
self over  for  better  or  worse  to  the  amiable  tyrant,  man. 


306  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

Thus,  the  two  parties  to  the  contract  are  thoroughly  well 
advertised  of  the  evils  attendant  on  matrimony,  and  their 
dread  of  the  relation  rises.  The  thought  robs  of  some  of  its 
humor  that  title  of  an  old  book,  "How  to  be  Happy,  though 
Married, '  ^  and  vindicates  to  Fenelon  's  description  of  marriage 
more  common  sense  than  was  first  granted  it,  **un  etat  de 
tribulation  tres  penible,  auquel  il  faut  se  preparer  en  esprit 
de  penitence,  quand  on  s'y  croit  appele."  **A  state  of  trib- 
ulation, painful  in  the  extreme,  for  which  he  who  thinks 
himself  called  to  it  must  prepare  himself  in  a  spirit  of  pen- 
ance. ^ '  But  marriage,  after  all,  is  an  institution  of  God ;  and 
religion  can  throw  round  it  a  halo  able  to  make  it  a  thing 
of  surpassing  beauty.  All  the  evils  hitherto  mentioned  are 
but  accidents.  They  are  not  inseparably  interwoven  with 
marriage.  They  all  take  their  rise  from  a  mistaken  notion 
of  things,  and  first  put  in  an  appearance  when  the  grace  of 
God  has  abandoned  the  hearts  of  man  and  wife.  The  sacra- 
ment, when  worthily  received  and  approached  with  the  proper 
dispositions,  can  store  two  souls  with  a  measure  of  heavenly 
strength  abundantly  able  to  tide  them  over  all  the  troubles 
and  trials  attached  to  their  station  in  life.  The  husband,  if 
docile  to  the  inspirations  of  grace,  will  continue  to  his  latest 
breath  what  God  wants  him  to  be;  the  wife  will  prove  for- 
ever a  real  helpmate,  not  a  stumbling  block;  and  marriage 
will  assume  all  the  proportions  of  a  magnificent  blessing. 

There  are  two  kinds  of  celibacy,  virtuous  and  vicious.  Mo- 
tives make  difference.  Virtuous  has  for  motive  the  honor  of 
God,  salvation  of  souls,  prayer,  study,  charity,  chastity.  Vi- 
cious has  for  motive  opportunity  to  sin  with  freedom;  no 
watchful  eye  of  wife,  wrong  company  possible,  excessive  ease 
and  leisure. 

More  Excellent.  The  excellence  of  celibacy  is  a  settled  ques- 
tion with  Catholics.  The  Council  of  Trent  defined  it  against 
the  reformers,  and  our  thesis  is  a  dogma  of  faith.  Here  are 
the  exact  words  of  the  definition:  **If  any  one  presumes  to 
say  that  the  state  of  marriage  is  to  be  preferred  before  the 
state  of  celibacy  and  virginity,  and  that  to  remain  in  celibacy 
or  virginity  is  not  better  and  happier  than  to  be  joined  in 
wedlock,  let  him  be  anathema."     Sess.  24.     Can.  10. 

Theologians  remark  that  the  goodness  and  happiness  here 


TRENT  AND  CELIBACY  307 

vindicated  to  celibacy  are  spiritual,  not  material,  not  the  re- 
sult of  sensual  pleasure.  They  describe  this  sort  of  goodness 
as  union  of  the  soul  with  God  in  love,  this  sort  of  happiness 
as  the  joy  resulting  to  the  soul  from  this  union. 

The  reformers  of  the  sixteenth  century  were  not  the  first 
heretics  to  attack  celibacy.  One  Jovinian,  a  writer  of  St. 
Jerome 's  time,  and  condemned  by  Pope  Siricius  in  363,  waged 
incessant  war  against  the  holy  custom.  Strange  to  say,  he 
never  himself  led  a  wife  to  the  altar,  and  lived  in  open  con- 
tradiction with  his  theories.  St.  Jerome  was  so  vehement  in 
fighting  down  the  influence  of  Jovinian 's  pernicious  doctrine 
that  his  zeal  sometimes  got  the  better  of  his  prudence,  and 
he  seems  to  inveigh  against  matrimony.  Luther  was  pleased 
to  denominate  virginity,  *  *  unholy  superstition,  because  a  man- 
ner of  worship  nowhere  countenanced  by  God."  He  like- 
wise called  it  * 'folly,"  imagining,  no  doubt,  that  every  man 
was  as  incontinent  as  himself.  The  rationalists  style  virgin- 
ity, ''A  horrid  monster,  destructive  of  nature." 

We  must  as  mere  philosophers  endeavor  to  make  good  our 
position  without  reference  to  the  Scriptures  as  inspired  writ- 
ings. Passages  will,  however,  be  cited  from  their  pages,  be- 
cause we  must  never  forget  that  we  are  merely  assuming  the 
role  of  philosophers,  without  ever  ceasing  to  be  in  reality 
children  of  Christ's  Church  and  Catholics.  The  perfection 
and  the  blessedness  of  union  with  God  are  not  notions  beyond 
the  reach  of  any  mind  acquainted  with  our  earlier  statements 
concerning  man's  last  end. 

PROOFS 

1°.  In  comparison  with  matrimony,  that  state  is  more  ex- 
cellent which  has  fewer  hindrances  to  union  with  God  and 
fewer  disquieting  desires.  But  celibacy,  when  love  of  virtue 
is  its  motive,  is  just  such  a  state.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  The  excellence  we  vindicate  to 
celibacy  in  this  present  proof  is  made  up  of  moral  rectitude 
and  resulting  happiness.  Union  with  God  is  the  acme  of 
morality;  and  desire  is  the  root  of  unrighteousness,  as  it  is 
the  destruction  of  union. 
'    With  Regard  to  the  Minor:    St.  Paul  urges  this  advan- 


308  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

tage — "He  that  is  without  a  wife  is  solicitous  for  the  things 
that  belong  to  the  Lord,  how  he  may  please  God.  But  he 
that  is  with  a  wife  is  solicitous  for  the  things  of  the  world, 
how  he  may  please  his  wife,  and  he  is  divided.''     1  Cor.  7.32. 

Another  writer,  the  author  of  ''Natural  Law  in  the  Spir- 
itual World,''  beautifully  shows  how  attachments  of  what- 
ever sort  are  obstacles  to  the  soul's  progress  towards  God. 
Taking  a  tree  or  plant  for  instance,  he  derives  lessons  from 
the  advantages  of  an  environment  free  from  neighboring  trees 
and  plants.  He  finds  that  the  sole  excuse  for  pruning  is  the 
circumstance  that  profitable  growth  is  developed  by  lopping 
off  superfluous  branches,  and  confining  energy  to  as  few  cen- 
tres as  possible.  Centralization  and  unity  of  endeavor  are 
the  secret  of  success  in  every  department  of  the  universe. 
Attachments  are  hindrances  in  the  matter  of  spiritual  de- 
velopment. Even  harmless  friendships  are  a  drain  on  the 
soul's  vitality,  and  great  saints  succeeded  where  others  failed, 
only  because  their  days  knew  many  a  sweet  hour  hidden  with 
God  alone. 

2°.  A  good  in  the  order  of  virtue  is  more  excellent  than  a 
good  in  the  order  of  nature.  But  celibacy  is  a  good  in  the 
order  of  virtue;  marriage  is  a  good  in  the  order  of  nature. 
Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  Virtue  is,  after  all,  the  only 
true  standard  of  man's  excellence.  Exercise  of  mind  and  will 
puts  him  on  a  plane  outside  of  and  above  brute  creation,  to 
which  he  is  half-brother. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  Even  naturally  speaking, 
celibacy,  when  prompted  by  virtue,  is  heroic ;  and  heroism  is 
the  badge  of  manhood.  It  is  the  crowning  effort  of  a  mind 
carried  to  the  highest  degree  of  cultivation,  of  a  will  schooled 
to  the  limit  in  mastery  of  self.  The  ancients  in  honoring  the 
Yestals,  and  setting  so  much  store  by  the  prayer  of  virgin- 
maidens,  paid  homage  to  the  excellence  resident  in  celibacy. 
Celibacy  is  altogether  an  affair  of  the  soul,  marriage  is  largely 
an  affair  of  the  body. 

3°.  Marriage  is  largely  a  process  common  in  effect  to  man 
and  brute,  it  is  prompted  by  the  animal  within  us.  Celibacy 
is  life  in  harmony  with  what  is  highest  and  best  in  us.  It  is 
a  reminder  of  the  angels.     In  the  words  of  our  Lord,  ' '  in  the 


PROOFS  309 

resurrectiojii  they  shall  neither  many,  nor  be  married;  but 
shall  be  as  the  angels  of  God  in  Heaven."    Mt.  22.30. 

4°.  Pleasures  and  cares  detract  from  higher  interests.  Con- 
stant endeavor  to  please  one  another.  Worry  and  hustle  to 
maintain  rank.  Education  of  children.  Eagerness  for  fat 
inheritances. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  St.  Thomas.    C.G. 

1.  Matrimony  for  good  of  race,  celibacy  for  good  of  indi- 
vidual.    Ergo. 

Answer:  What  is  for  good  of  race  need  not  be  executed  by 
each  individual.  Race  will  be  preserved,  even  if  some  re- 
frain from  marriage  and  adopt  celibacy,  to  better  pursue 
other  purposes  that  make  for  the  good  of  mankind. 

2.  Organs  fashioned,  inclinations  implanted  by  God.     Ergo. 

Answer:  This  provision  was  made  for  the  race  in  gen- 
eral. All  have  likewise  the  power  to  become  carpenters  and 
soldiers.  Only  a  certain  few  follow  these  employments. 
Enough  will  always  get  married.  Self-denial  quite  as  im- 
portant as  enjoyment.     Abstine  et  sustine. 

3.  Good  for  one,  better  for  many,  best  for  all.     Ergo. 
Answer:    The  eye  is  better  than  the  foot  and  yet  man  is 

not  perfect  without  the  foot.  Some  must  marry,  some  must 
remain  single. 

4.  Virtue  in  moderation,  celibacy  an  extreme.     Ergo. 
Answer:     Extreme  all  right  when  it  accords  with  reason. 

Celibacy  accords  with  reason,  though  angelic,  and  above  the 
common  measure  of  men. 

5.  Concupiscence  inflamed,  perpetual  struggle.     Ergo. 
Answer:    Struggle    not    so    perpetual    as    family    cares. 

Temptation  comes  and  goes.  Every  victory  weakens  passion. 
Self-denial  and  practice  deaden  desire.  Marriage  encour- 
ages the  animal  and  unfits  the  mind  for  contemplation.  Mar- 
riage may  be  better  for  this  or  that  individual.  Hence,  ''he 
that  can  take,  let  him  take  it." 

6.  ''Increase  and  multiply."     Gen.  1.28.     Ergo. 
Answer:    Obligation  for  race  in  general,  I  grant.     Obliga- 
tion for  individuals,  I  deny. 

N.B.     Christ  and  St.  John  with  many  a  saint  would  have 


310 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


broken  the  law.  The  saying  can  mean  a  benediction,  not 
order.  Marriage  more  necessary  at  the  beginning.  Hence 
virginity  reserved  for  Christians.  St.  Jerome:  Matrimony 
instituted  to  people  the  earth ;  virginity,  to  people  Heaven. 

B.  1.  Tim.  4.2.     Doctrine  of  devils,  forbidding  to  marry. 

Answer:  Church  never  forbids  to  marry.  Men  make  free 
choice  of  celibacy.  Church  encourages  to  marry.  Men  must 
abide  by  condition  of  society  they  enter. 

1  Cor.  7.2.     Let  every  man  have  his  own  wife. 

Answer:  Habeat  not  ducat,  keep  not  take.  Question  about 
men  already  married ;  27.     Seek  not  a  wife,  no  contradiction. 

1.  Cor.  7.26.     For  the  present  necessity,  virginity  good. 

Answer:  Necessity  means  family  cares,  not  end  of  world. 
St.  Paul  is  an  inspired  writer. 

1  Cor.  9.5.     Power  to  carry  about  a  woman  {aheXKfyqv  ywaiKd 

TrepuiyeLv) . 

Answer:  St.  Paul  carried  none.  Not  a  wife,  but  a  Chris- 
tian woman.  Holy  women  in  Christ's  company.  All  right 
among  Jews,  scandal  among  Gentiles.  Hence  St.  Paul  omitted 
it.    Douay  =  a  woman,  a  sister ;  like  viri  f ratres. 


THESIS  IS 

Polygamy,  though  not  against  strict  natural  law,  little  ac- 
cords with  the  same.    Jouin,  174-177 ;  Bickaby,  270-274. 

QUESTION 

The  wickedness  of  an  act  or  state  is  measured  by  its  de- 
parture from  right  reason.  When  marriage  defeats  the  pur- 
pose for  which  God  instituted  the  condition,  marriage  becomes 
harmful  and  morally  wrong.  In  the  light  of  our  knowledge, 
God  could  have  had  but  two  chief  ends  in  view  in  the  insti- 
tution of  marriage,  the  propagation  of  the  race,  and  the  mu- 
tual advantage  of  husband  and  wife.  The  first  of  these  mo- 
tives, far  and  away  the  more  important,  constitutes  the  pri- 
mary end  of  marriage ;  the  other,  quite  important  too,  consti- 
tutes its  secondary  motive.  Were  polygamy  opposed  to  the 
proper  increase  of  the  human  family,  we  should  not  hesitate 
to  brand  the  practice  a  crime  against  strict  natural  law.  It 
would  seem,  however,  to  fall  short  of  heinousness  so  grievous, 
inasmuch  as  it  nowise  operates  against  the  due  begetting  of 
offspring.  The  children  of  such  a  union  have  no  uncertain 
father,  and  the  responsibility  of  support  in  polygamy,  as  well 
as  the  responsibility  of  education,  attaches  to  some  definite 
individual.  The  absence  of  this  feature  in  polyandry,  or  life 
led  in  common  by  a  woman  with  several  men,  renders  it  pe- 
culiarly iniquitous,  an  open  violation  of  strict  natural  law. 
Another  particularly  obnoxious  circumstance  inseparable 
from  polyandry,  is  the  consequent  barrenness  of  the  woman. 
Such  a  state  of  affairs  is  nothing  short  of  prostitution;  and, 
while  it  would  be  the  inevitable  outcome,  if  polygamy  once 
became  universal,  it  would  be  the  logical  consequence  of  that 
equality,  supposed  to  be  in  force  between  man  and  wife. 
The  sexes  are  so  evenly  divided,  that  in  the  case  of  universal 
polygamy  there  would  not  be  enough  women,  and  sin  would 
be  the  only  recourse  for  men  strangers  to  restraint.    Besides, 

311 


312  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

women  in  this  matter  of  marriage  ought  to  be  on  an  equal 
footing  with  men.  If  the  husband  in  virtue  of  marriage  has 
exclusive  rights  over  the  body  of  the  woman,  the  wife  must 
be  understood  to  have  no  less  exclusive  rights  over  the  body 
of  the  man.  Polygamy,  however,  is  an  open  declaration  of 
the  contrary.  It  concedes  to  woman  no  right  of  the  kind, 
and  at  the  same  time  positively  forbids  her  the  measure  of 
liberty  granted  the  man.  She  is  bound  to  give  him  her  un- 
divided affection.  He  is  free  to  parcel  out  his  love  as  he 
sees  fit.  Only  women  lost  to  all  sense  of  decency  and  self- 
respect  could  for  a  moment  contemplate  such  degradation; 
and  polygamy,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  recruits  its  ranks  by 
yearly  inportations  of  fallen  women  from  large  centres.  But 
we  are  anticipating  our  proofs.  We  said,  when  discussing 
the  natural  law,  that  polygamy  was  one  of  the  vexed  ques- 
tions in  that  department  of  ethics.  We  then  chose  that  ex- 
planation of  the  natural  law,  which  distinguishes  three  classes 
of  sins  against  the  natural  law.  To  refresh  the  memory,  re- 
call what  was  then  said. 

TERMS 

Polygamy.  It  is  a  pretty  well  settled  fact  in  theology  that 
monogamy  was  matrimony 's  primitive  form.  An  explicit  law 
restricting  a  man  to  one  wife  occurs  nowhere  in  the  early 
pages  of  Holy  Scripture.  Pope  Innocent  III,  and  all  Cath- 
olics with  him,  find  an  implicit  declaration  of  such  a  law  in 
Gen.  2.24.  Adam  is  addressing  Eve,  and  he  says,  '^Where- 
fore a  man  shall  leave  father  and  mother,  and  shall  cleave  to 
his  wife;  and  they  shall  be  two  in  one  flesh."  Pope  Inno- 
cent sees  in  this  passage  a  condemnation  of  polygamy,  saying, 
**Adam  did  not  say  three  or  more,  but  two.  He  did  not  say, 
'shall  cleave  to  his  wives,  but  to  his  wife,'  nor  was  it  ever 
lawful  for  a  man  to  have  more  than  one  wife  at  a  time,  un- 
less God  by  express  revelation  allowed  him  the  privilege.'* 
Many  are  of  opinion  that  polygamy  before  the  deluge  was 
neither  practised  nor  lawful.  The  almost  fabulous  ages 
reached  by  men  of  that  period  rendered  the  practice  quite 
unnecessary.  God  withheld  the  permission,  because  fearful 
that  men  would  easily  come  to  regard  polygamy  thfe  natural, 


POLYGAMY  313 

not  the  exceptional  form  of  marriage.  Besides,  any  wide- 
spread increase  of  the  human  race  would  have  been  to  little 
purpose,  as  nearly  all  mankind  was  to  perish  in  the  deluge. 

Against  Calvin,  who  agreed  to  regard  the  patriarchs  of  the 
Old  Law  common  sinners,  all  Catholics  maintain  that  after 
the  deluge,  in  virtue  of  a  private  revelation  communicated  to 
Noah  and  his  sons,  polygamy  became  legitimate,  and  flour- 
ished among  the  chosen  people  with  God's  full  sanction.  The 
reason  assigned  by  St.  Chrysostom  and  St.  Augustine  for 
God's  departure  from  the  old  rule,  was  a  wish  to  have  the 
race  multiply  more  rapidly.  Some  find  an  objection  to  Cath- 
olic doctrine  on  this  score,  in  the  circumstance  that  with  the 
patriarchs  one  woman  was  called  wife,  the  others  were  called 
concubines.  But  our  answer  is,  that  the  woman  styled  wife 
was  singled  out  from  the  others  for  the  care  and  government 
of  the  house.  Her  children  were  the  father's  heirs.  The 
others  were  employed  altogether  for  purposes  of  generation. 
Their  children  were  never  regarded  heirs.  This  distinction 
is  evident  from  Gen.  25.6,  where  Abraham  gives  all  his  pos- 
sessions to  Isaac ;  and  to  the  children  of  the  concubines,  gifts. 
Another  objection  arises  from  the  rebuke  administered  to" 
Solomon  in  3  Kings  11.  for  surrounding  himself  with  a  mul- 
titude of  wives.  But  he  sinned  by  excess  in  having  a  thou- 
sand. He  likewise  allowed  them  to  call  away  his  heart  from 
God,  and  had  intercourse  with  strangers  and  idolaters,  against 
God's  express  command  to  the  contrary.  About  the  legiti- 
macy of  polygamy  among  the  gentiles,  or  nations  outside  of 
the  Hebrew  people,  writers  are  divided.  Some  are  of  opinion 
that  the  practice  in  their  regard  never  had  God 's  sanction  be- 
fore or  after  the  deluge.  Others  incline  to  the  theory  that 
God's  wishes  were  communicated  to  them  through  the  Jews, 
and  polygamy  became  their  privilege  after  the  deluge. 

Children  of  the  Catholic  Church  need  not  be  told  that 
Christ  instituted  a  thorough  reform  in  the  marriage  laws  of 
the  Old  Dispensation.  Whatever  may  have  been  the  view  en- 
tertained of  polygamy  before  His  coming.  He  not  only  de- 
clared sinful,  but  likewise  stamped  all  unions  of  the  sort  null 
and  of  no  force  as  marriage-contracts.  In  the  New  Law 
women  added  to  the  first  and  lawful  wife  deserve  only  one 
name,  and  submit  to  a  life  of  shame,  condemned  by  the  Gos- 


314  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

pel  and  common  decency.  The  Anabaptists  in  the  time  of 
Luther  openly  defended  polygamy  as  a  divine  institution. 
Luther  himself  encouraged  Philip  of  Hesse,  one  of  his  spir- 
itual children,  to  keep  a  second  wife  in  his  house  for  the 
fuller  satisfaction  of  his  passions.  Indeed,  Protestantism  of 
whatever  brand,  in  sanctioning  divorce,  lends  support  to  a 
species  of  polygamy  infinitely  more  damnable  and  revolting 
than  Mormonism  or  the  beastly  rites  of  Zululand.  Mormo, 
the  mythical  founder  of  Mormonism,  during  his  lifetime 
strenuously  forbade  polygamy.  One  Joseph  Smith,  a  suc- 
cessor and  real  founder,  introduced  the  doctrine  after  a 
dream,  which  he  dignified  with  the  title  of  a  revelation. 
There  are  in  our  statute-books  laws  against  polygamy;  but 
they  are  defeated  in  Utah  by  the  difficulty  of  procuring  un- 
prejudiced juries,  and  by  the  unwillingness  of  witnesses  to 
testify  against  offenders.  In  countries  like  Turkey,  where 
polygamy  is  the  rule  and  monogamy  supposed  to  be  the  excep- 
tion, men  with  more  wives  than  one  are  far  from  numerous. 
Only  the  very  rich  are  able  to  support  a  multitude  of  women ; 
and  poverty,  mercifully  coming  to  the  assistance  of  morality, 
checks  the  growth  of  this  shocking  crime. 

It  may  be  well  to  pause  here  for  a  moment,  and  set  down 
some  of  the  reasons  usually  alleged  in  favor  of  the  statement, 
that  monogamy  was  marriage's  primitive  form.  God  fur- 
nished Adam  with  only  one  Eve ;  He  employed  only  one  rib, 
not  several.  Gen.  2.21.  Adam  himself,  as  remarked  by  Pope 
Innocent,  voiced  God's  wishes  in  the  rule,  ''He  shall  cleave 
to  his  wife — they  shall  be  two  in  one  flesh. ' '  Gen.  2.24.  The 
Jews  themselves  always  reckoned  polygamy  a  thing  out  of 
harmony,  not  in  accordance,  with  the  law.  Noah  and  his  sons 
had  each  a  single  wife  when  entering  the  ark.  Job  was  a 
man  of  one  wife.  St.  Peter,  to  follow  Jesus,  left  his  wife, 
not  his  wives.  Nature  declares  for  monogamy,  inasmuch  as 
the  ratio  of  the  sexes  universally  and  invariably  keeps  close 
to  equality.  The  small  excess  of  male  births  observable  pre- 
serves a  balance  against  the  dangers  of  death  by  war  and 
accident,  to  which  men  are  almost  exclusively  exposed.  Car- 
dinal Bellarmine  finds  an  argument  in  favor  of  monogamy 
in  the  Scripture-narrative  of  Eve's  production  from  the  side 
of  Adam.     She  had  her  origin  not  in  his  head,  to  denote  her 


SCRIPTURE  AND  POLYGAMY  315 

subjection;  not  in  his  feet,  to  free  her  from  the  suspicion  of 
servitude;  but  in  his  side,  to  constitute  her  man's  peer  and 
companion. 

The  two  leading  texts  of  Scripture  advanced  by  the  Cath- 
olic Church  to  prove  polygamy  not  only  a  sin,  but  also  a  vain 
pretense  of  marriage,  a  species  of  adultery,  are  contained  in 
St.  Luke  16.18,  and  St.  Mark,  10.11.  The  passages  are  as 
follows,  ''Every  one  that  putteth  away  his  wife  and  marries 
another  committeth  adultery  against  her."  The  condition 
of  the  man  who  retains  his  wife  and  marries  another  should 
be  no  better  than  that  of  the  man  Scripture  declares  guilty 
of  adultery ;  because  in  the  one  case  and  the  other  the  founda- 
tion for  the  crime  is  the  same.  The  first  wife,  whether  put 
away  or  retained,  remains  his  lawful  wife;  and  adultery  is 
unchastity  between  one  married  and  a  person  not  his  or  her 
lawful  spouse.  If,  therefore,  Christ  is  authority  for  the 
statement  that  absolute  divorce  is  adultery.  He  none  the  less 
positively  declares  that  polygamy  is  adultery.  He  calls  things 
by  their  right  names.  He  emphatically  condemns  the  one  abuse 
and  the  other,  and  He  robs  of  all  veneer  the  revolting  crime 
peculiar  to  modern  fanatics,  who  seek  an  excuse  for  their 
beastliness  in  the  pages  of  Holy  Writ,  and  the  equally  re- 
volting crime  of  to-day 's  society,  countenanced  by  the  corrupt 
civil  law,  encouraged  by  greedy  and  unprincipled  lawyers, 
and  winked  at  by  creatures  of  money  and  fashion,  who  like 
to  look  forward  to  the  time  when  their  own  turn  to  apply  for 
a  divorce  will  come. 

PROOFS 

That  little  accords  with  natural  law,  which  violates  the 
secondary  ends  of  marriage.  But  polygamy  is  a  thing  of  the 
sort.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  Natural  law  is  the  manifesta- 
tion of  God's  eternal  law,  reason  is  its  herald.  Nature,  or 
reason,  the  voice  of  God,  wants  us  to  apply  things  to  their 
appointed  purposes ;  and  marriage  is  no  exception  to  the  rule. 
Marriage,  therefore,  when  used  at  all,  must  be  a  help  to  the 
accomplishment  of  whatever  designs  God  had  in  instituting 
the  condition.    Reason  acquaints  us  with  these  designs,  and 


316  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

draws  marked  lines  between  their  relative  importance.  It 
recognizes  two  distinct  intrinsic  and  inborn  purposes  insep- 
arable from  marriage,  because  essential  to  its  existence.  They 
are  the  contract  and  the  resulting  bond  or  obligation.  It 
recognizes  two  other  intrinsic  or  inborn  purposes,  separable, 
however,  from  marriage,  because  accidental  additions  to  the 
contract  and  the  resulting  bond,  marriage's  constituent  ele- 
ments. These  latter  purposes  are  children  and  mutual  com- 
panionship. The  extrinsic,  accidental  purposes  of  marriage 
are  too  numerous  to  mention.  A  few  of  the  most  important 
are  the  help,  the  comfort,  the  pleasure  derivable  from  an- 
other's labors,  consolation,  and  willingness.  These  extrinsic 
purposes  are  generally  entitled  the  secondary  ends  of  mar- 
riage, and  it  must  be  plain  that  any  wrong  done  marriage 
on  their  score  is  little  in  harmony  with  natural  law.  For 
natural  law  intends  agencies  or  institutions  not  only  to  pro- 
mote the  primary  and  principal  purposes  for  which  they  are 
designed,  but  also  to  refrain  from  putting  hindrances  in  the 
way  of  their  secondary  or  less  necessary  purposes. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  Polygamy  certainly  offends 
against  these  two  secondary  ends  of  marriage,  the  mutual 
comfort  and  assistance  of  husband  and  wife,  and  the  sensual 
gratifications,  that  act  as  a  remedy  for  the  stings  of  concupis- 
cence. Friendship  and  love  must  serve  as  the  foundation  for 
whatever  offices  of  kindness  have  place  between  the  man  and 
woman,  and  a  friendship  embracing  equally  all  the  wives 
is  an  utter  impossibility.  In  the  nature  of  things,  one  woman 
will  always  be  conspicuous  in  the  eyes  of  the  husband,  she 
will  be  more  loved  than  the  others,  her  children  will  be  more 
petted  than  those  of  the  others.  The  first  will  surely  grow 
old;  and,  when  ugly  and  cross,  will  be  transplanted  by  an- 
other. The  patriarchs,  no  doubt,  were  able  to  avoid  this  mis- 
take. But  nature  in  them  was  helped  by  the  abundant  grace 
of  God.  They  were  saints,  and  stood  constant  guard  against 
surprises  by  nature.  Their  love  for  their  wives  leaned  on 
supernatural  motives  for  support,  and,  as  these  motives  un- 
derwent no  change  with  growth  in  years  and  loss  of  physical 
beauty,  their  love  persevered  till  death.  Besides,  God  to 
prosper  His  own  institution  was  after  a  manner  obliged  to 
see  to  it  that  polygamy  among  the  patriarchs  worked  no  such 


SECONDARY  PURPOSES  OF  MARRIAGE   317 

evil  results.  Now,  however,  things  are  different.  Polygamy, 
far  from  inheriting  the  blessing  of  God,  rests  under  the 
shadow  of  God's  most  solemn  curse.  Small  wonder,  if  it  is 
attended  with  a  thousand  inconveniences;  small  wonder,  if 
corrupt  nature  wreaks  its  utmost  power  for  harm  on  the  men 
and  women  who 'embrace  the  condition  in  defiance  of  Heaven. 
Who  will  attempt  to  picture  forth  the  quarrels,  hates  and 
complaints  sure  to  occur  among  the  women  in  polygamy? 
Why,  envy  and  jealousy  at  the  present  time,  under  the  sav- 
ing rule  of  monogamy,  are  the  root  and  cause  of  family  dis- 
orders without  number.  Peace  and  quiet  can  hardly  take 
up  a  permanent  abode  under  a  roof  that  shelters  even  two 
jealous  women.  Durandus  urges  against  our  argument  the 
old  objection  derived  from  use  and  abuse.  Polygamy,  he 
says,  is  nowise  to  blame  for  the  evils,  because  they  are  no 
necessary  result  of  the  system,  but  only  an  accident.  Bellar- 
mine  makes  apt  answer  when  he  says  that  the  non-occurrence 
of  these  annoyances  in  polygamy  would  be  a  most  miraculous 
accident.  Polygamy,  besides,  reduces  woman  to  the  level  of 
a  servant  or  slave.  The  inferiority  it  of  necessity  imposes 
upon  her  contributes  largely  to  the  disappearance  of  true 
love.  When  a  man  is  blessed  with  but  one  wife,  he  is  em- 
inently careful  to  keep  in  her  good  graces.  His  wife  is  as 
independent  as  himself,  and  she  can  threaten  him  with  pun- 
ishment, if  he  persistently  misbehaves  or  refuses  point  blank 
to  conduct  himself  properly. 


THESIS  X 

Incomplete  divorce,  or  separation  without  any  attempt  to 
contract  a  new  marriage  is  sometimes  allowable.  Complete 
divorce,  or  separation  affecting  the  marriage  tie,  though  not 
evidently  opposed  to  strict  natural  law  in  every  conceivable 
case,  is  nevertheless  out  of  harmony  with  that  secondary  law 
of  nature  which  counsels  the  proper.  Jouin,  177-185;  Bick- 
aby,  274r-278. 

QUESTION 

When  we  deny  that  absolute  divorce  is  evidently  and  in 
every  case  opposed  to  strict  natural  law,  we  are  far  from  lend- 
ing favor  to  this  abomination  of  modern  crime  and  godless- 
ness.  We  merely  acknowledge  that  emergencies  can  occur, 
in  which  reason,  unaided  by  special  light  from  Heaven,  can 
discover  in  absolute  divorce  no  open  and  destructive  war  with 
marriage's  primary  purpose,  the  due  propagation  of  the 
species.  When  we  supplement  that  statement  with  the  other, 
that  it  is  out  of  harmony  with  a  secondary  law  of  nature, 
we  at  the  same  time  vindicate  to  God  sufficient  cause  for  Gos- 
pel legislation  against  it,  and  prove  human  lawmakers,  who 
dare  spread  its  sanction  on  their  statute-books,  enemies  to  the 
human  race  and  defiant  destroyers  of  morality.  For  it  is 
God's  business,  and  the  business  of  human  lawmakers,  to 
elucidate  points  just  like  the  present,  not  evidently  contained 
in  strict  natural  law,  but  clearly  enough  prescribed  by  reason 
to  rob  of  all  excuse  legislators  who  neglect  its  warnings.  Any 
attempt  on  the  part  of  civil  authority  to  run  counter  to  such 
counsels  of  nature,  is  open  rebellion  against  God  and  con- 
science, and  is  sure  to  have  for  result  the  anger  of  morality's 
avenger  and  political  ruin;  disaster  here,  and  hell  hereafter. 
Human  law  cannot  make  a  wrong  of  this  sort  right,  and 
statesmen  may  legislate  till  doomsday,  courts  may  forever 
continue  rendering  decisions  in  accordance  with  empty  stat- 

318 


DIVORCE  319 

utes,  without  ridding  of  responsibility  before  God  the  sly- 
scoundrels,  who  take  advantage  of  corrupt  and  vile  laws  to 
escape  marital  obligations ;  without  removing  from  the  hearts 
of  these  slaves  to  passion  a  lingering  dread  of  future  punish- 
ment for  violation  of  God's  most  sacred,  most  holy  institu- 
tion. Laws  conniving  at  thievery  and  murder  would  be 
hardly  more  hostile  to  reason,  more  ruinous  to  morality,  than 
the  divorce  laws  at  present  in  use  everywhere.  These  iniqui- 
tous devices  for  the  encouragement  of  evil  countenance  a 
polygamy  more  horrid  and  revolting  than  the  system  in  favor 
with  Mormonism.  They  foster  the  commission  of  crimes  un- 
fit even  for  chaste  ears,  and  promote  the  reign  of  injustice, 
cruelty  and  hardness  of  heart  among  men  and  women  alike. 
Their  very  existence  is  a  convincing  proof,  that  the  sacred 
condition  of  marriage  will  never  enjoy  the  security  it  ought 
to  possess,  until  placed  entirely  and  utterly  under  control  of 
Church  jurisdiction.  God  meant  it  to  be  subject  only  to 
the  couch  of  His  Church,  and  society  is  now  reaping  the  har- 
vest of  ills  sown,  when  misguided  zealots  first  taught  that 
marriage  was  a  department  into  which  the  state  could  in- 
trude itself.  The  sons  of  these  fathers  may  cry  out  as  loud  as 
they  will  against  the  dire  lengths  to  which  civil  authority 
seems  willing  to  go  in  the  destruction  of  the  marriage  bond. 
But  their  cries  will  prove  of  little  avail.  The  only  true  rem- 
edy for  the  disorder  lies  in  the  full  restoration  of  the  rights 
of  the  Church  over  all  the  details  of  this  great  sacrament. 
Politicians  and  lawyers  are  not  yet  grown  the  honest  and  God- 
fearing men,  privileged  to  handle  and  regulate  so  holy  a  con- 
cern as  this  great  sacrament;  and  their  sacrilegious  interfer- 
ence leaves  spots  like  the  smudge  of  hell-brands. 

TERMS 

Divorce.  Divortium,  the  derivative  of  our  English  word, 
is  plainly  from  divertere  or  divortere,  to  turn  aside;  and 
means  journey  in  a  different  direction.  Divorce  is  therefore 
a  parting  of  the  ways.  The  husband  and  wife  break  com- 
pany. He  goes  to  the  right,  she  to  the  left ;  and  there  is  an 
end.  Divorce  is  of  two  kinds :  incomplete  and  complete.  The 
former,  oftener  called  in  Church  and  law  language  separation 


320  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

or  divorce  a  mensa  et  toro,  from  bed  and  board,  is  freedom' 
from  the  obligation  of  support  and  cohabitation.  The  party, 
favored  with  such  a  decree,  while  not  at  liberty  to  contract 
a  new  marriage,  is  relieved  from  the  burden  of  expense  and 
disagreeable  company.  Such  a  condition  has,  of  course,  its 
drawbacks.  It  condemns  husband  and  wife  to  all  the  un- 
pleasantness of  enforced  singleness ;  and  often  influences  them 
to  patch  up  their  differences,  and  agree  to  forget  the  past. 
It  is,  when  cause  is  sufficient,  entirely  legitimate,  and  the  only 
species  of  divorce  sanctioned  by  the  Gospel  and  the  true 
Church  of  Christ.  Complete  divorce  pretends  to  declare 
null  and  void,  what  God  himself  by  the  mouth  of  Jesus  Christ 
declared  forever  inviolate.  It  pretends  to  loosen  a  bond  or 
knot  that  God  Himself  declared  forever  in  force.  It  pre- 
tends to  vest  a  man  or  woman,  in  virtue  of  a  decree  made  by 
an  irresponsible  judge,  a  usurper,  in  whom  no  proper  juris- 
diction resides,  with  leave  and  license  to  marry  two,  three, 
four,  twenty  times,  every  single  marriage  bond  remaining  in- 
tact. It  pretends  to  entrench  polygamy,  successive  if  not 
simultaneous,  behind  the  law;  and  would  make  of  society,  if 
the  instincts  of  decency  were  not  on  occasions  stronger  than 
temptation,  a  veritable  pest-house  of  moral  lepers.  Briefly, 
the  law  of  divorce  authorizes  husband,  or  wife,  or  both,  for 
causes  listed  with  a  mock  gravity  in  the  code,  some  serious, 
others  trivial,  all  different  in  different  countries  and  states, 
to  take  new  partners,  when  old  grow  tiresome,  or  offensive, 
or  injurious. 

History's  earliest  reference  to  divorce  is  contained  in  Deu- 
teronomy 24.1.  Moses  enumerates  among  the  laws  appointed 
to  govern  God's  people  the  following:  "If  a  man  take  a 
wife  and  have  her,  and  she  find  not  favor  in  his  eyes  for  some 
uncleanness:  he  shall  write  a  bill  of  divorce  and  shall  give 
it  in  her  hand,  and  send  her  out  of  his  house.  And  when  she 
is  departed  and  marrieth  another  husband,"  etc.  This  law 
admits  of  two  interpretations,  and  the  doctors  of  Israel  at  the 
time  of  our  Lord's  coming  were  divided  into  two  camps. 
Some,  identifying  themselves  with  the  school  of  Schamai  con- 
tended that  adultery  was  the  only  valid  excuse  for  a  divorce. 
Others,  belonging  to  the  school  of  Hillel,  maintained  that 
trivial  difficulties  and  disagreements  operated  to  justify  a 


DIVORCE  IN  HISTORY  321 

wife's  dismissal.  If  a  woman  let  the  broth  burn,  if  the  hus- 
band found  a  woman  fairer  or  more  to  his  liking,  he  was  at 
liberty  to  send  away  his  first  wife,  and  make  room  for  the 
second.  But  the  world  was  2500  years  old  when  Moses,  by 
reason  of  their  hardness  of  heart,  permitted  the  Hebrews  to 
put  away  their  wives ;  and  Christ  in  St.  Matthew  19.8  is  au- 
thority for  the  statement,  that  ''from  the  beginning  it  was 
not  so."  We  have  already  seen  that  God  sanctioned  poly- 
gamy among  the  patriarchs  without  at  all  doing  violence  to 
the  natural  law.  He  surrounded  the  exceptional  condition 
with  safeguards  that  effectively  hindered  the  abuses  other- 
wise inseparable  from  it.  God  was  certainly  at  liberty  to 
grant  the  further  privilege  of  divorce  to  His  chosen  people, 
and  He  was  certainly  powerful  enough,  and  had  enough  expe- 
dients at  His  service  to  render  the  favor  innocuous.  In  fact, 
divorce  is  not  far  removed  from  polygamy,  and  it  would  be 
quite  natural  to  expect  one  permission  to  follow  fast  on  the 
heels  of  the  other. 

An  old  historian,  Valentinian,  dates  the  first  decree  of  di- 
vorce in  Roman  annals  520  years  after  the  foundation  of  the 
city.  All  through  the  time  of  the  Empire  the  abuse  steadily 
grew  with  the  decline  of  morals,  that  eventually  hastened  the 
downfall  of  imperial  Rome.  Caesar  and  Pompey  availed  them- 
selves twice  of  the  right  conferred  by  law.  Cicero  put  aside 
his  first  wife,  to  marry  a  woman  of  great  wealth,  and  speed- 
ily got  rid  of  her  also.  The  advent  of  Christianity  changed 
the  whole  face  of  things.  The  Mosaic  Law  was  abolished, 
and  with  it  polygamy  and  divorce  disappeared  from  among 
the  people  of  God.  Christ  condemned  the  two  practices  in 
no  uncertain  terms.  Christian  princes  naturally  experienced 
great  difficulty  in  rooting  out  of  the  minds  of  their  people 
prejudices  in  favor  of  the  old  order.  They  had  necessarily 
to  proceed  with  slow  caution,  and  gradually  introduce  into 
the  laws  of  their  kingdoms  laws  subversive  of  paganism  and 
in  full  harmony  with  Gospel  morality.  But,  whatever  the 
nature  of  their  enactments,  no  argument  can  be  borrowed 
from  them  against  the  assertion,  that  absolute  divorce  from 
the  very  foundation  of  the  Church  became  a  matter  of  an- 
cient history  and  fell  into  disuse.  Certainly,  no  one  could 
for  any  cause  whatever,  in  the  face  of  Christ's  declaration 


322  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

against  divorce,  appeal  to  its  protection  and  retain  the  name 
of  Christian. 

And  so,  down  to  our  own  times  Catholicity  has  unflinch- 
ingly kept  its  arm  raised  against  this  relic  of  Judaism's  per- 
verseness,  this  taint  on  the  escutcheon  of  pagan  Rome's  gran- 
deur. One  of  her  Popes  could  have  saved  an  empire  to  the 
faith  by  weak  concession  in  the  matter;  but,  like  Horace's 
hero,  he  preferred  rather  to  have  the  world  at  his  feet  in 
ruins  than  join  hands  with  iniquity.  Surely,  the  grace  of 
God,  and  that  grand  promise  made  him  in  the  person  of  St. 
Peter,  could  alone  carry  Pope  Clement  VII  safe  through  the 
temptation.  The  difficulty  between  Napoleon  and  Pius  VII 
might  also  be  here  discussed.  Luther,  the  head  and  front  of 
the  so-called  Reformation,  had  no  such  support,  and  no  won- 
der attaches  to  his  indorsement  of  the  abuse.  He  had  to 
appeal,  in  common  with  the  other  Reformers,  to  the  Gospels 
for  arguments  that  gave  dubious  color  to  his  theories;  and, 
like  all  false  philosophers  in  a  similar  position,  was  not  long 
finding  them.  He  condoned  polygamy  in  Philip  of  Hesse, 
*'to  provide  for  the  welfare  of  this  monster's  body  and  soul, 
and  to  bring  greater  glory  to  God. ' '  He  quieted  the  scruples 
of  priests,  monks  and  nuns,  who  tired  of  their  vows  and 
sought  in  matrimony  release  from  their  self-imposed  bond- 
age. Small  wonder,  then,  if  he  granted  the  ordinary  faith- 
ful, who  clamored  for  recognition  in  the  general  distribu- 
tion of  favors,  the  freedom  and  license  native  to  absolute 
divorce. 

Protestantism,  because  without  a  supreme  spiritual  head, 
logically  handed  over  the  management  of  marriage  to  the 
tender  mercies  of  the  state.  Kings,  and  statesmen,  and  poli- 
ticians of  every  degree  of  depravity  conspired  to  rob  this 
divine  institution  of  its  sacredness;  and  in  Protestant  coun- 
tries marriage  is  a  mockery  of  the  beautiful  thing  God  made 
it.  It  is  become  with  them  a  bare  business  contract,  removed 
from  the  jurisdiction  of  God's  visible  representative  on  earth, 
and  subject,  like  other  commercial  transactions,  to  the  pas- 
sions and  prejudices  of  the  uninitiated  and  the  profane.  The 
result  is  that  marriage  is  become  an  affair  of  no  stability 
whatever,  a  companionship,  altogether  dependent  on  the 
shifting  whims  of  men  and  women.     In  Prussia,  for  instance. 


DIVORCE-LAWS  323 

as  late  as  1870,  drunkenness,  extravagance,  and,  where  no 
children  blessed  the  union,  mutual  consent,  were  some  among 
the  trivial  causes  justifying  absolute  divorce.  Till  1857  Eng- 
land acknowledged  no  absolute  divorce.  In  that  year  adultery 
and  certain  other  crimes  of  great  enormity  were  decreed 
lawful  grounds  for  action.  The  Civil  Code  of  France  exacted 
no  more  serious  condition  than  mutual  consent  of  husband 
and  wife.  The  legislation  was  changed  in  May,  1815,  and 
up  to  1870  no  absolute  divorce  was  recognized  in  France. 

America  is  a  veritable  paradise  for  discontented  couples. 
Each  State  has  its  own  catalogue  of  excuses  for  the  sin  of 
divorce,  and  the  Federal  government  allows  each  to  go  its 
own  chosen  way.  As  matters  stand,  we  are  the  laughing 
stock  of  the  nations.  Some  enthusiasts  are  of  opinion  that 
improvement  would  result  from  limiting  divorce-legislation 
to  Congress  at  Washington.  Of  course,  such  a  procedure 
would  procure  uniformity  in  our  marriage-laws;  but  if  this 
uniformity  were  based,  for  instance,  on  the  loose  morality  that 
now  obtains  in  Maine,  Connecticut,  Montana  and  Illinois,  it 
would  prove  more  of  a  curse  than  a  blessing.  Besides,  the 
individual  States  are  too  jealous  of  their  rights  to  yield  with- 
out reluctance  the  advantages  pecuniary  and  otherwise,  ac- 
cruing to  them  from  this  traffic  in  sin.  In  Maine  a  divorce 
may  be  granted,  ''when  the  judge  deems  it  reasonable,  and 
proper,  and  consistent  with  peace  and  morality."  In  Con- 
necticut, from  1849  to  1878,  divorce-law  included  ''general 
misconduct."  In  the  latter  year  the  rather  vague  and  un- 
certain term  was  removed  from  the  list  of  causes.  In  Mon- 
tana divorce  may  be  granted,  if  the  party  "leaves  the  peti- 
tioner and  the  Territory  without  intention  of  returning." 
Utah  grants  divorce,  "when  it  is  proved  that  parties  cannot 
live  together  amicably  and  separation  is  desired. ' '  In  Illinois 
the  whole  question  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  the  Court. 
Indiana  follows  in  her  footsteps.  New  Hampshire  decrees 
divorce,  when  petitioner  proves  three  years'  absence,  not 
heard  from.  New  Jersey,  adultery  and  desertion  for  three 
years.  New  York,  adultery  alone.  South  Carolina  is  the 
only  State  in  the  Union  that  recognizes  no  absolute  divorce. 
A  law  to  this  effect  was  enacted  in  1878.  After  a  glance  at 
divorce  legislation  in  the  different  States,  one  is  impressed 


324  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

with  the  fact  that  New  England  and  the  Northern  States  are 
most  lax  in  this  regard,  while  the  South  leans  towards  se- 
verity. But  in  virtue  of  the  principle,  generally  adopted  in 
courts  throughout  the  country,  that  divorces  decreed  in  one 
State  hold  good  in  every  other  State,  the  strictness  displayed 
by  this  or  that  State  is  of  very  little  effect  as  a  hindrance 
to  the  spread  of  divorce  and  its  attendant  evils.  A  bona-fide 
residence  in  any  State  empowers  a  person  to  sue  for  divorce 
in  the  name  of  its  particular  laws,  no  matter  where  the  crime 
charged  was  committed,  no  matter  where  the  party  against 
whom  proceedings  are  taken  chances  to  be.  The  majority 
of  States,  New  York  among  others,  insist  on  a  residence  of 
one  year  before  filing  petition.  Some  few  prescribe  two 
years.  Others,  like  New  Jersey  in  the  case  of  desertion,  re- 
quire three.  In  other  cases  New  Jersey  is  satisfied  with  resi- 
dence at  the  time  of  application.  Six  months  suffice  in  Ari- 
zona, California,  Idaho,  Nebraska  and  Wyoming.  When 
other  notification  of  defendant  is  impossible,  publication  in 
the  newspapers  is,  as  a  rule,  valid  in  law. 

The  blighting  influence  of  the  system  on  our  families  and 
society  is  bound  to  grow  under  the  fostering  care  of  greedy 
lawyers  and  unprincipled  politicians.  It  is  already  become 
a  veritable  scourge,  and  honest -minded  men  of  every  shade 
of  belief  recognize  that  a  halt  must  soon  be  called.  A  writer 
in  the  Princeton  Review  10.39  brands  the  practice  as  New 
England  polygamy ;  and,  much  to  the  disadvantage  of  divorce, 
draws  a  striking  contrast  between  it  and  the  polygamy  of 
Utah.  Divorce  is,  in  sooth,  nothing  short,  of  a  species  of 
polygamy.  The  polygamy  of  Utah  is  continuous  or  simul- 
taneous, that  of  New  England  is  successive  or  interrupted. 
But  the  one  as  well  eis  the  other  is  nothing  short  of  sinful 
intercourse  with  a  plurality  of  wives.  In  Utah  the  mode  of 
life  is  banned  by  law,  and  men  convicted  of  adopting  it  are 
liable  to  fine  and  imprisonment.  In  New  England  it  is  not 
only  lawful,  but  courts  of  law  devote  much  of  their  time  to 
rendering  decisions  in  its  favor.  Citizens  of  Utah  contract 
alliances  of  the  kind  in  secret,  behind  doors  locked  and  barred 
against  officials  and  unfriendly  witnesses.  Divorced  men  and 
women  wed.  in  the  public  eye,  with  a  solemnity  surpassing 
in  grandeur  that  which  surrounds  the  weddings  of  common 


NEW  ENGLAND  POLYGAMY  325 

folk.  Church  and  State  lend  their  august  presence  to  the 
mock  ceremony.  The  minister  is  there  in  robes  of  office  to 
bless  what  God. in  the  same  instant  curses.  The  court,  the 
highest  judicial  authority  in  the  land,  lends  its  seal  and  sig- 
nature to  grace  the  occasion,  and  arms  the  principals  with  a 
lengthy  document  setting  forth  their  emancipation  from  mari- 
tal disabilities.  In  Utah  the  polygamist  considers  himself 
bound  in  conscience  to  display  some  little  affection  towards 
deposed  rivals  for  his  love,  to  keep  them  under  his  roof,  care 
for  their  children,  and  decently  inter  them  when  dead.  But 
polygamy  in  New  England  imposes  no  such  burdens.  It 
vests  the  man  with  full  prerogative  to  heartily  hate  the 
spumed  and  abandoned  wife,  to  cast  her  into  the  street,  and 
make  what  disposition  he  likes,  or  is  able  to  make,  of  the 
children.  Of  course,  the  women  in  Utah  are  constant  suffer- 
ers from  the  pangs  of  jealousy;  but  their  pain  is  lessened, 
because  spread  out  over  a  long  stretch  of  time.  New  Eng- 
land would  seem  to  behave  in  a  tenderer  and  more  merciful 
way  towards  the  poor  victims.  The  blow  is  inflicted  in  a 
moment,  and  all  is  over.  If  despair  and  •  dejection  succeed 
to  the  hope  and  prospective  cheerfulness  that  never  abandon 
the  Mormon  woman,  New  England  is  not  to  blame.  That 
misfortune  lies  with  the  deluded  fool,  who  ought  to  sprinkle 
her  woes  with  patience  and  cultivate  stoutness  of  heart.  She 
can,  besides,  derive  comfort  from  the  thought  that  New  Eng- 
land is  far  more  impartial  than  Utah.  The  Mormons  con- 
cede to  men  alone  the  right  to  marry  often.  Their  women 
are  as  much  bound  to  rest  satisfied  with  one  marriage  venture 
as  women  in  monogamy.  Mormonism  advocates  polygamy; 
it  tolerates  no  polyandry.  But  the  Puritans  distribute  their 
favors  with  a  more  even  and  more  open  hand.  Their  sense 
of  fairness  and  justice,  no  doubt,  influences  them  to  include 
woman  in  the  general  amnesty.  Women,  therefore,  are  in 
New  England  as  free  to  exchange  husbands  as  men  are  to 
exchange  wives;  and  polyandry  is  the  crumbling  foundation 
of  tottering  Puritanism.  Polygamy  is,  besides,  a  cheap  mar- 
ket-commodity in  New  England.  In  Turkey  the  privilege  is 
so  much  a  luxury  that  very  few  are  able  to  avail  themselves 
of  it.  In  Utah  it  is  surrounded  with  almost  the  same  dis- 
advantages.    No  inconsiderable  sum  of  money  is  needed  to 


ITHICS 

defray  the  expenses  of  a  large  household  of  wives  and  chil- 
dren. But  in  New  England  ten  dollars  or  even  fewer  will 
tide  a  man  over  each  new  matrimonial  venture.  A  license, 
a  ring  and  the  auspicious  presence  of  a  minister  or  magis- 
trate can  be  procured  for  even  five  dollars. 

Another  very  objectionable  feature  of  divorce-law  is  the 
encouragement  it  offers  to  crime.  Where  adultery  is  the  only 
admissible  plea  for  separation,  the  man  or  woman  is  not  long 
committing  the  crime.  After  the  necessary  sin  is  committed, 
he  or  she  rises  in  open  court  and  unblushingly  acknowledges 
the  deed.  Witnesses  are  summoned  to  narrate  all  the  revolt- 
ing details  of  shame,  and  the  court,  instead  of  throwing  the 
self-confessed  criminal  into  jail,  makes  out  for  him  or  her  a 
bill  of  divorce.  Where  cruelty  must  be  proved  to  have  the 
bonds  loosed,  the  dissatisfied  party  straightway  proceeds  to 
make  things  hot  for  the  other;  and,  instead  of  being  pun- 
ished according  to  deserts,  is  rewarded  with  a  release.  Thus, 
by  a  strange  perversion,  law  becomes  the  aider  and  abettor 
of  crime,  adultery  and  cruelty  go  unpunished  in  courts  of 
justice,  and  a  reward  is  put  on  things  sinful  in  the  eyes  of 
God  and  in  the  eyes  of  men. 

The  children  of  divorced  parents  start  on  the  journey 
through  life,  equipped  with  grand  ideas  of  human  nature. 
The  two  beings  by  God  appointed  to  introduce  them  into  life, 
and  store  their  minds  by  maxim  and  example  with  principles 
calculated  to  guide  their  future  years,  teach  them  from  the 
very  outset  the  doctrine  of  devils  and  iniquity.  From  them 
these  tender  and  confiding  children  learn  that  quarrels,  strife 
and  bitterness  are  the  normal  condition  of  human  nature. 
They  learn  that  marriage  is  a  contract  of  convenience,  of 
binding  force  only  as  long  as  it  subserves  the  ends  of  luxury 
and  sensuality.  The  result  oftentimes  is,  that  these  children, 
following  in  the  footsteps  of  their  parents,  rush  into  hasty 
marriages,  satisfied  that  matters  can  be  mended  when  the 
emergency  arises.  And  so  the  evil  is  propagated;  and  so  the 
foundations  of  the  family  and  of  society  are  being  gradually 
loosened.  Parental  affection  is  losing  its  hold  on  the  youth 
of  the  land.  Mothers  are  inculcating  as  a  first  duty  on  their 
daughters  hatred  of  their  father.  Fathers  are  impressing 
their  sons  with  the  supreme  importance  of  despising  their 


IMPEDIMENTS  327 

mother.  Parental  authority  is  fast  becoming  a  by-word. 
Children  can  hardly  learn  obedience  from  masters,  whose 
example  is  a  continual  incentive  to  unease  and  rebellious- 
ness. 

The  Catholic  Church,  the  pillar  and  ground  of  truth,  recog- 
nizes no  ground  for  absolute  divorce.  Its  authorities  have 
sometimes  decreed  the  dissolution  of  apparent  marriages,  and 
allowed  the  parties  to  the  false  contract  to  enter  new  alli- 
ances. But  its  decisions  are  always  based  on  reasons  ante- 
cedent to  the  marriage  in  question,  not  consequent  on  the 
same.  With  God  for  guide  and  with  the  immediate  assist- 
ance of  the  Holy  Spirit,  it  counts  no  marriage  at  all  a  union 
vitiated  by  any  one  of  the  fifteen  impediments  reckoned  in- 
validating.    They  are : 

1    M'  i  Tc    /substantial — person  \ 
*  L  accidental — qualities  i 
natural  law. 

2.  Condition — slave  and  free — ecclesiastical  law. 

3.  OrcZers— priest,  deacon,  subdeacon — ecclesiastical  law. 
Natural — same   blood — direct  line,   in- 
definitely— collateral  line,  to  4th  de- 
gree. 

Spiritual — Baptism   and   Confirmation 

— minister  and  sponsors  with  child. 
Legal — perfect  adoption. 
Adultery  only — real,  formal,  consummated — 

promise — during*  life  of  both. 
Homicide  only — conspiracy,  intention,  death. 
^  Both  together. 

6.  Different   worship — baptized   and   unbaptized.     Mixed 
marriage,  hindering,  not  invalidating. 

7.  Violence — serious,    not   light — external   and   free — un- 
just, intention. 

8.  Bond — no  mere  rumor — moral  certainty. 

9.  Decency — betrothed  to  1st  deg. — ratified  marriage  to 
4th. 

10.  Age— 12  and  14. 

11.  Affinity — sexual  relation  with  relative.    Licit  to  4th; 
illicit  to  2nd. 


4.  Relationship. 


5.  Crime. 


328 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


12.  Clandestinity- 

13.  Impotence. 

14.  Abduction. 

15.  Vow — solemn. 


-Trent — priest  and  two  witnesses. 


1.  Church  law: 


Four  lesser  impediments,  hindering,  not  invalidating: 

particular — priest    or   bishop — betrothed 
with  another — suspicion — quarrels. 

general — consent  of  parents — banns — 
mixed. 

2.  Time — open  and  closed — solemnities — Advent  to  Christ- 

mas— ^Ash  Wednesday  to  Easter. 

3.  Betrothal. 

4.  Vow — simple,  not  solemn — vow  of  no  marriage,  chastity, 

entering  religion,  priesthood. 
Dispensations : 

Pour  of  fifteen  from  natural  law  and  divine  prohibition — 

no  dispensation. 
They  are: 

Relationship,  1st  degree  in  direct  line,  father,  mother, 
brother,  sister;  marriage-bond;  impotence;  mis- 
take. 


Other  eleven  admit  of  dispensation — difficulties  of  procur- 
ing innumerable. 

Many  Protestants,  lost  to  all  sense  of  shame,  consider  mar- 
riage an  affair  of  the  State  exclusively,  and  pretend  to  re- 
gard divorce  granted  on  whatever  plea  a  legitimate  proceed- 
ing, that  frees  the  two  married  persons  in  the  sight  of  God 
from  all  mutual  obligations,  and  empowers  them  to  form  new 
alliances.  Dean  Mansel,  p.  102,  says:  **The  Church  of  Eng- 
land has  never  authoritatively  sanctioned  any  other  separa- 
tion than  that  a  mensa  et  toro;  and  this  with  an  express 
prohibition  of  remarriage  (Canon  107)."  "In  practice  this 
legislation  is  neglected."  Knabenbauer,  in  Matthaeum,  229. 
Others  among  them  recognize  only  one  legitimate  excuse  for 
divorce,  and  that  is  adultery.  They  profess  to  found  their 
doctrine  on  words  contained  in  St.  Matthew  5.32  and  19.9. 
"Whosoever  shall  put  away  his  wife,  excepting  the  cause  of 
fornication,  maketh  her  to  commit  adultery."     "Whosoever 


SCRIPTURE  AND  DIVORCE  329 

shall  put  away  his  wife,  except  it  be  for  fornication,  and  shall 
marry  another,  committeth  adultery."  Before  discussing 
these  two  passages,  it  may  be  well  to  set  down  St.  Mark 's  and 
St.  Luke's  renderings  of  the  same  doctrine  and  St.  Paul's 
references  to  the  same.  ''Whosoever  shall  put  away  his  wife 
and  marry  another,  committeth  adultery  against  her."  St. 
Mark  10.11.  "Every  one  that  putteth  away  his  wife  and 
marrieth  another,  committeth  adultery;  and  he  that  marrieth 
her  that  is  put  away  from  her  husband,  committeth  adultery. ' ' 
St.  Luke  16.18.  ''Therefore,  while  her  husband  liveth  she 
shall  be  called  an  adulteress,  if  she  be  with  another  man." 
Rom.  7.3.  "Not  I,  but  the  Lord  commandeth  that  the  wife 
depart  not  from  her  husband.  And  if  she  depart,  that  she 
remain  unmarried  or  be  reconciled  to  her  husband."  1  Cor. 
7.10.  The  words  of  St.  Mark  and  St.  Luke  certainly  make 
no  allusion  to  adultery  or  anything  else  as  motive  for  abso- 
lute divorce.  They  are  nevertheless  as  reliable  witnesses  to  the 
truth  as  St.  Matthew ;  and  could  not  possibly  have  omitted  so 
important  a  point  in  Christ's  doctrine.  St.  Paul  is  likewise 
no  authority  for  absolute  divorce.  He  is  plainly  for  the  per- 
petual indissolubility  of  marriage,  and  hints  at  only  one  spe- 
cies of  lawful  separation,  imperfect,  or  partial  divorce,  with- 
out any  attempt  to  contract  new  alliances.  Whatever  diffi- 
culty, therefore,  attaches  to  the  words  of  St.  Matthew  ought 
to  be  settled  without  injury  to  the  expressions  contained  in 
the  other  Evangelists  and  in  St.  Paul's  Epistles.  A  recon- 
ciliation of  the  various  texts  is  quite  possible,  and  that  recon- 
ciliation is  had  in  the  doctrine  propounded  by  the  Catholic 
Church.  According  to  this  doctrine,  St.  Matthew  introduces 
adultery  as  a  seeming  exception  to  the  indissolubility  of  mar- 
riage, but  only  as  a  legitimate  plea  for  partial  divorce,  or 
separation  a  mensa  et  toro.  In  this  sense,  the  man  who 
lives  apart  from  his  wife  for  any  reason  save  that  of  adultery 
or  its  equivalent,  is  responsible  before  God  for  the  sins  she 
will  almost  surely  commit  because  of  the  violent  temptations 
to  which  in  consequence  of  past  habits  she  will  necessarily 
be  exposed.  He  will  be  the  indirect  cause  of  her  crimes,  and 
will,  therefore,  be  guilty  of  her  adultery  in  cause  or  indi- 
rectly. Whoever  attempts  to  marry  a  wife  thus  put  away 
commits   adultery  formally.    Whoever  after  dismissing  his 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 

wife,  even  for  adultery,  attempts  to  marry  another,  commits 
adultery  formally. 

All  tradition  is  with  Catholicity  in  this  interpretation  of 
the  text,  and  absolute  divorce  properly  so  called  was  an  abuse 
introduced  into  the  Scriptures  by  the  so-called  reformers. 
The  different  stands  taken  by  Catholicity  and  Protestantism 
in  this  matter  of  divorce,  due  entirely  to  the  sense  laid  on  a 
sentence  in  St.  Matthew's  Gospel,  are  only  another  proof  of 
how  necessary  a  requisite  for  religion  is  the  establishment  of 
a  final  court,  beyond  which  in  the  settlement  of  Scriptural 
disputes  there  can  be  no  appeal.  The  large  part  that  tradi- 
tion must  likewise  play  in  the  formation  of  belief  is  also 
brought  into  conspicuous  notice.  The  text  in  question,  be- 
sides the  interpretation  forced  upon  it  by  Protestanism,  ad- 
mits of  at  least  seven  others,  all  decidedly  opposed  to  the 
theory  of  absolute  divorce.  Of  these,  the  first  four  can  be 
with  difficulty  defended.  We  prefer  to  reject  them.  Two 
others  we  admit,  without  adopting.  The  last  or  seventh  we 
prefer,  as  most  in  accordance  with  the  context,  and  the  sur- 
roundings in  which  Christ  gave  utterance  to  the  words. 

The  first  opinion  maintains  that  Christ  busied  Himself 
on  this  occasion  in  explaining  the  Old  Law  for  the  benefit 
of  the  Jews  present.  The  New  Law  was  not  yet  in  full  force, 
and  He  availed  Himself  of  chances  to  explain  it  in  private. 
According  to  the  Old  Law,  when  adultery  intervened,  no 
difficulty  presented  itself,  because  the  woman  was  sentenced 
to  immediate  death  by  stoning,  and  death  of  course  dissolves 
the  marriage  bond. 

The  second  opinion  holds  that  Christ  wished  the  old  per- 
mission concerning  absolute  divorce  to  continue  during  the 
short  period  of  transition  from  Judaism  to  Christianity. 

Dix  and  Dollinger  are  authority  for  the  third  opinion,  that 
Christ  called  attention  to  an  impediment,  considered  invali- 
dating among  the  Jews,  viz.,  sins  of  impurity  committed  be- 
fore marriage. 

The  fourth  opinion,  adopted  by  no  less  learned  a  person 
than  Pope  Innocent  III,  has  more  weight  in  its  favor.  It 
makes  Christ's  declaration  a  withdrawal  of  the  ancient  priv- 
ilege enjoyed  by  the  Jews,  that,  namely,  of  issuing  to  their 
adulterous  wives  a  bill  of  divorce.     This  opinion,  therefore. 


INTERPRETATIONS  OF  ST.  MATTHEW        331 

makes  the  words  of  Christ  as  recorded  by  St.  Matthew  read 
as  follows,  "Whosoever  shall  put  away  his  wife,  excepting 
even  the  cause  of  fornication,  and  shall  marry  another,  com- 
mitteth  adultery,"  etc. 

The  fifth  opinion  is  ascribed  to  a  pupil  of  Cardinal  Pa- 
trizi,  himself  an  eminent  exponent  of  Holy  Scripture.  This 
pupil  communicated  his  lights  to  the  cardinal,  who  at  once 
adopted  the  explanation  offered,  and  made  it  his  own.  It 
makes  the  seeming  exception  introduced  by  Christ  turn  on 
the  concubinage  of  Herod  and  Herodias.  This  Herod  had 
taken  to  wife  Herodias,  the  spouse  of  his  brother;  and  St. 
John  the  Baptist,  the  Lord's  precursor,  had  met  his  death 
for  upbraiding  the  prince  with  his  incestuous  marriage. 
Christ  was  at  the  time  of  the  discourse  in  Herod's  dominion, 
and  took  advantage,  according  to  the  opinion,  to  administer 
another  rebuke  to  his  sinfulness.  He  says,  therefore,  in  as 
many  words,  *'I  except  the  case  of  Herod  and  Herodias. 
They  ought  to  be  separated,  because  they  are  living  in  open 
concubinage. ' ' 

St.  Augustine  (de  adult,  conj.  lib.  1,  cc.  9.11)  adopts  and 
strenuously  advocates  the  sixth  opinion,  and  his  authority  is 
of  the  utmost  weight  in  matters  Scriptural.  He  takes  the 
exceptional  clause  for  an  intimation  that  Christ  wishes  to 
altogether  prescind  from  the  question  of  an  adulterous  wom- 
an's dismissal.  He  knew  the  Jewish  prejudices  in  favor  of 
the  Mosaic  bill  of  divorce.  He  knew  the  determination  of  His 
questioners,  the  Pharisees,  to  entrap  Him,  if  possible,  in  a 
statement  at  open  variance  with  the  Mosaic  Law,  and  to  avoid 
danger  He  answers  that  divorce  is  nowise  permissible  out- 
side of  adultery.  The  case  of  adultery,  for  reasons  of  pru- 
dence. He  declines  to  discuss.  In  this  opinion.  He  was  asked 
if  divorce  was  at  all  permissible.  He  makes  direct  answer 
with  regard  to  every  conceivable  plea,  adultery  alone  ex- 
cepted. About  adultery  He  preserves  silence.  Protestantism 
can  derive  no  comfort  from  this  interpretation.  It  would  be 
highly  wrong  to  argue  thus,  ''Outside  of  adultery  divorce  is 
unlawful.     Ergo  in  case  of  adultery  divorce  is  lawful." 

Our  interpretation,  in  most  general  use  nowadays,  sup- 
poses Christ  to  distinguish  between  perfect  and  imperfect 
divorce,  and  to  lay  down  the  whole  Catholic  law  concerning 


332  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

each  species.  With  regard  to  imperfect  divorce,  He  allows 
separation  from  bed  and  board  only  in  the  event  of  adultery 
or  its  equivalent,  and  burdens  with  the  woman's  consequent 
sin  the  conscience  of  whatever  man  sends  his  wife  away  for 
any  lesser  cause.  With  regard  to  perfect  divorce,  or  abso- 
lute dissolution  of  the  marriage  tie,  He  denies  its  existence, 
and  proclaims  every  union  founded  on  such  divorce  sheer 
adultery.  The  words  contained  in  St.  Matthew  5.32,  hardly 
admit  of  doubt,  "Whosoever  shall  put  away  his  wife,  except- 
ing the  cause  of  fornication,  maketh  her  to  commit  adultery, 
and  he  that  shall  marry  her  that  is  put  away  committeth 
adultery."  The  words  contained  in  St.  Matthew  19.9  are  a 
little  less  obvious,  and  the  dispute  generally  centres  round 
them.  ''Whosoever  shall  put  away  his  wife,  except  it  be  for 
fornication,  and  shall  marry  another,  committeth  adultery; 
and  he  that  shall  marry  her  that  is  put  away  committeth 
adultery."  Protestants  want  the  exceptive  clause  to  be  re- 
peated, so  that  the  text  may  read  thuswise,  ''Whosoever  shall 
put  away  his  wife,  except  it  be  for  fornication,  committeth 
adultery;  and  whoever  shall  marry  another,  unless  she  has 
been  put  away  for  fornication,  committeth  adultery."  Prot- 
estants have  for  this  arbitrary  repetition  of  the  exceptive 
clause  no  conceivable  authority  in  grammar,  or  logic,  or  con- 
text. In  a  proposition  of  the  kind,  when  a  double  subject 
enters,  the  exception  does  not  necessarily  affect  the  second 
of  the  two  members.  Instances  without  number  could  be 
cited  in  proof  of  the  exact  contrary.  "Whoever  kills  an- 
other, except  in  case  of  self-defense,  and  whoever  robs  his 
victim  is  guilty  of  sin."  "Whoever  strikes  another,  unless 
unjustly  attacked,  and  whoever  blasphemes  his  assailant  is 
guilty  of  sin."  "The  executioners  of  Jesus,  unless  excused 
by  ignorance,  and  His  blasphemers  were  guilty  of  sin. ' '  The 
whole  context  bearing  on  the  passage  under  consideration, 
the  circumstances  of  time  and  place  and  the  characteristics 
of  the  listeners,  are  emphatically  in  favor  of  our  interpreta- 
tion. Christ  expressly  revokes  the  Mosaic  privilege,  con- 
ferred on  the  woman  by  the  bill  of  divorce.  The  bill  of  di- 
vorce was  granted  solely  vnth  a  view  to  rendering  her 
eligible  for  future  marriage.  In  declaring  that  the  man 
who  marries  a  woman  put  away  commits  adultery.  He  clearly 


RIGHT  INTERPRETATION  333 

maintains  that  she  still  remains  the  lawful  wife  of  her  first 
husband.  Adultery  can  have  no  other  meaning.  If  the  mar- 
riage were  dissolved  by  her  sin  of  adultery,  and  Christ  wished 
to  deprive  her,  by  way  of  punishment,  of  the  freedom  granted 
her  wronged  husband,  He  would  call  her  second  attempt  at 
marriage  by  some  other  name  than  that  of  adultery.  Adul- 
tery means  impurity  in  married  persons. 

Returning  again  to  theology's  views  on  the  indissolubility 
of  marriage,  we  can  enunciate  everything  in  this  short  thesis, 
*'By  divine  law  matrimony,  whether  between  believers  or  un- 
believers, whether  consummated  or  not,  is  in  every  case  in- 
trinsically indissoluble,  i.e.,  dissolution  or  divorce  is  abso- 
lutely outside  the  power  of  the  contracting  parties.  Matri- 
mony between  believers,  if  consummated,  and  between  un- 
believers as  long  as  neither  husband  nor  wife  receives  Bap- 
tism, is  besides  extrinsically  indissoluble,  i.e.,  dissolution  or 
divorce  is  outside  the  power  of  any  being  or  authority  under 
Heaven,  and  adultery  makes  no  change  in  the  law."  Matri- 
mony's intrinsic  indissolubility  is  evident  from  St.  Mark 
10.11— St.  Luke  16.18— Rom.  7.3—1  Cor.  7.11.  St.  Matthew 
is  likewise  a  witness  to  the  same  truth  in  5.32  and  19.9 ;  but 
his  testimony  is  somewhat  obscure.  Church  writers  say  that 
he  introduced  the  exceptive  clause,  permitting  partial  or  in- 
complete separation,  i.e.,  from  bed  and  board,  out  of  defer- 
ence to  the  Hebrews  for  whom  he  composed  his  Gospel. 
These  Hebrews,  accustomed  as  they  were  to  the  bill  of  divorce, 
naturally  looked  for  some  loophole  of  escape  from  matrimony's 
iron-bound  indissolubility  in  the  New  Law.  St.  Matthew 
with  Christ's  sanction  offered  them  the  alleviation  of  partial 
or  incomplete  divorce.  The  other  two  Evangelists,  St.  Mark 
and  St.  Luke,  writing  for  the  Gentiles,  men  without  Jewish 
prejudices,  thought  the  concession  of  too  small  moment  to 
mention  it.  If  Christ  had  in  mind  absolute  divorce,  St. 
Mark  and  St.  Luke  would  have  done  the  Gentiles  a  heavy 
wrong  in  hiding  from  them  so  sweeping  and  so  all  important 
a  permission. 

From  the  passages  cited  it  must  be  plain  that  matrimony 
is  so  indissoluble  that  new  nuptials  cannot  be  contracted 
without  adultery,  and  union  with  -a  second  partner  during 
the  lifetime  of  the  first  is  adultery,  only  in  the  supposition 


334  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

that  the  first  partner  forever  remains  husband  or  wife,  as  the 
case  may  be.  Nothing  short  of  the  clearest  evidence,  gathered 
from  the  context  or  some  different  Scripture,  or  the  nature 
of  things,  will  justify  the  establishment  of  an  exception  to 
this  universal  law.  The  entire  context  of  the  three  Evangel- 
ists is  plainly  against  any  such  exception.  Christ  in  every 
neighboring  line  is  talking  of  the  unity  of  marriage,  its  obli- 
gation of  inseparability,  e.g.,  St.  Mark  10.9—10.8—10.6—10.7 
— 10.5.  The  murmur  of  discontent  or  disapproval  is  a  re- 
markable indication  in  St.  Matthew  19.10.  It  is  a  well  known 
fact  that  there  were  two  schools  among  the  Hebrews,  each 
entertaining  its  own  views  with  regard  to  reasons  justifying 
the  issuance  of  a  bill  of  divorce.  One  school,  that  of  Schamai, 
rated  adultery  alone  or  its  equivalent  justifiable  excuse.  The 
other,  that  of  Hillel,  rated  any  trivial  cause  of  discontent 
ground  sufficient.  It  is  more  than  probable  that  the  apostles 
belonged  to  the  school  of  strict  rigidity,  and  would  have  had 
little  fault  to  find  with  Christ's  new  legislation,  unless  it  de- 
creed adultery  itself  no  valid  pretext  for  divorce. 

In  the  opinion  current  among  Protestants  Christ  left  the 
indissolubility  of  marriage  just  where  He  found  it,  and  did 
nothing  to  provoke  a  murmur  among  the  followers  of  Schamai. 
About  different  Scriptures,  it  would  be  absurd  to  think  that 
St.  Mark  and  St.  Luke  composed  their  Gospels  in  such  a  way 
that  their  readers  to  understand  would  have  to  consult  St. 
Matthew.  In  matters  less  important  they  might  of  course 
have  omitted  here  and  there  points  that  seemed  to  them  su- 
perfluous ;  but  this  privilege  of  absolute  divorce  could  hardly 
appear  to  them  too  insignificant  a  thing  to  be  neglected.  Be- 
sides, all  the  verses  preceding  and  following  the  disputed 
verse  in  St.  Matthew  leave  no  room  for  the  exception  in  favor 
of  adultery  read  into  Scripture  by  Protestantism.  Such  an 
exception  is  justifiable  only  when  the  passage  in  question  ad- 
mits of  no  other  possible  meaning.  We  have  already  seen 
seven  different  meanings,  each  of  which  admirably  fits  th,e 
words  and  admits  of  defense.  Last  of  all,  everybody  admits 
that  St.  Matthew  in  these  particular  passages  is  obscure  and 
hard  to  understand.  St.  Mark  and  St.  Luke  are  on  the  con- 
trary clear  as  crystal,  and  impress  the  mind  with  their  sim- 
plicity.    It  is  against  all  rules  of  interpretation  to  endeavor 


RIGHT  INTERPRETATION  335 

to  fix  the  meaning  of  simple  and  straightforward  statements 
by  reference  to  statements  that  are  intricate  and  involved. 
St.  Matthew  should,  therefore,  be  elucidated  with  light  bor- 
rowed from  St.  Mark  and  St.  Luke ;  and  any  contrary  method 
merits  the  contempt  of  scholars. 

In  the  nature  of  things,  or  viewing  the  matter  in  the  light 
of  common  sense,  the  weight  of  argument  is  with  Catholicity 
and  overwhelmingly  against  Protestantism's  flimsy  pretext 
for  divorce.  Reason  rebels  against  any  enactment  liable  to 
promote  the  spread  of  adultery.  And  Christ  would  be  pro- 
mulgating just  such  an  enactment,  if  He  sanctioned  absolute 
divorce  in  the  case  of  even  so  detestable  an  evil  as  marital 
unfaithfulness.  The  divorced  woman,  often  the  guilty  part- 
ner, would  be  free  to  marry  again,  and  would  thus  enjoy  a 
privilege  denied  some  pious  sister,  deserted  by  a  worthless 
husband.  The  result  of  such  legislation  could  inevitably  be 
nothing  short  of  the  multiplication  of  unlawful  attachments 
and  sinful  intercourse.  Divorce  would  be  a  reward  reserved 
exclusively  for  adulterous  women.  Dissatisfied  mates  would, 
and  dissatisfied  mates  do,  commit  adultery  with  the  openly 
avowed  purpose  of  rendering  the  law  of  divorce  operative. 
The  law  of  Christ  would  be  more  favorable  to  the  growth  of 
adultery  than  the  Mosaic  Law.  Moses  visited  the  adulteress 
with  death  by  choking  or  stoning.  Were  Christ's  law  what 
Protestantism  makes  it,  sho  would  be  at  liberty  after  her 
crime  to  seek  comfort  in  new  nuptials. 

St.  Paul,  in  1  Cor.  7,  treats  in  detail  and  explicitly  the 
subject  of  marriage,  and  therefore,  we  can  trust,  •  delivers 
himself  of  the  whole  truth.  In  verse  10  he  says,  ''the  Lord 
commandeth  that  the  wife  depart  not  from  her  husband. 
And  if  she  depart,  that  she  remain  unmarried  or  be  recon- 
ciled to  her  husband."  Plainly,  there  is  question  here  of 
separation  founded  on  a  solid  title,  on  the  adultery  of  the 
husband.  Were  the  woman's  departure  justified  by  no  such 
reason,  St.  Paul  would  be  the  first  to  urge  her  immediate 
return.  When,  therefore,  he  counsels  her  to  remain  unmar- 
ried, and  solemnly  declares  that  singleness  or  reconciliation 
is  the  only  course  sanctioned  by  God's  law,  he  necessarily  un- 
derstood adultery  to  be  no  ground  at  all  for  absolute  divorce. 
If  the  husband's  adultery  destroyed  the  marriage  bond,  the 


336  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

wife  could  with  perfect  freedom  contract  a  new  alliance. 
Again,  in  Rom.  7.3,  St.  Paul  gives  advice  wholly  incompatible 
with  modem  notions  of  divorce.  "Whilst  her  husband  liv- 
eth,  she  shall  be  called  an  adulteress,  if  she  be  with  another 
man."  This  rule  is  absolute,  hedged  round  about  with  no 
conditions  or  exceptions;  and  is  only  another  index  of  how 
Christ  wants  the  exceptive  clause  in  St.  Matthew  to  be  in- 
terpreted. Death,  and  death  alone,  can  invest  the  surviving 
partner  with  the  right  to  enter  a  second  marriage. 

The  Catholic  Church,  therefore,  can  never  recognize  the 
validity  of  an  absolute  divorce,  decreed  by  the  civil  court. 
It  forever  considers  divorced  men  and  women  as  truly  mar- 
ried, as  much  husband  and  wife  as  they  were  before  the  State 
interfered;  and  never  reckons  them  capable  of  receiving  this 
sacrament  anew.  The  customs  and  laws  of  our  country  make 
it  more  or  less  necessary  for  Catholic  judges  and  Catholic 
lawyers  to  conduct  business  on  lines  opposed  to  the  spirit  and 
principles  of  their  Church. 

About  judges,  obliged  by  their  office  to  decree  absolute  di- 
vorce, there  can  be  no  great  difficulty.  They  are  chosen  or 
appointed  to  decide  according  to  evidence  and  the  law  of  the 
land,  and  if  unfaithful  to  their  duty  would  have  to  relinquish 
their  position.  They  can  without  scruple  of  conscience  issue 
such  decrees,  though  they  inwardly  know  that  before  God 
their  decision  is  far  from  annulling  the  marriage  contract. 
All  this  is  true,  even  if  the  judge  knows  to  a  certainty  that 
the  parties  concerned  are  determined  to  avail  themselves  of 
all  the  privileges  allowed  by  the  law.  Such  a  judge  lends  no 
formal  cooperation  to  the  sinful  acts  liable  to  result  from 
his  judicial  action.  He  brings  no  influence  to  bear  on  the 
iniquitous  intentions  of  the  divorced  parties.  On  the  con- 
trary, he  deprecates  their  conduct,  and  sincerely  hopes  that 
they  will  consider  the  divorce  mere  separation  from  bed  and 
board,  and  act  acc^ordingly.  Even  Catholics  are  at  liberty  to 
take  advantage  of  whatever  temporal  benefits  may  accrue 
from  what  the  State  calls  an  absolute  bill  of  divorce  a  vinculo ; 
but  this  must  be  done  always  with  the  understanding  that  be- 
fore God  the  marriage  remains  intact  till  death,  and  precludes 
all  possibility  of  wedding  another  during  the  lifetime  of 
either. 


CATHOLIC  JUDGES  AND  LAWYERS  337 

Catholic  lawyers  are  more  open  to  blame  in  this  matter  of 
divorce  than  Catholic  judges.  The  lawyer  enters  more  ac- 
tively into  the  designs  of  his  client  than  the  judge;  and  is, 
therefore,  permitted  only  what  the  client  himself  can  with  a 
safe  conscience  attempt.  He  can  without  sin  push  a  divorce 
case,  when  aware  that  the  marriage  attacked  was  never,  on 
account  of  some  invalidity,  a  marriage  at  all,  or  when  the 
person  he  aids  intends  to  seek  only  the  temporal  redress 
derivable  from  incomplete  divorce.  If  he  knows  for  certain 
that  his  client  is  set  on  marrying  anew,  after  the  decree  is 
secured,  he  cannot  with  a  safe  conscience  handle  the  case. 
Only  certain  and  sure  knowledge  of  the  client's  unholy  in- 
tention can  create  in  the  lawyer  this  serious  obligation  of  non- 
interference. Mere  rumors,  guesses,  suspicions  are  of  no 
weight. 

No  one  can,  of  course,  deny  that  our  Church's  refusal  to 
acknowledge  absolute  divorce  is  attended  with  many  evils  for 
unhappy  couples.  It  is  a  law  opposed  apparently  to  human 
liberty,  to  the  principal  end  of  marriage,  and  to  the  happi- 
ness of  many  a  man  and  many  a  woman.  And  yet  all  laws 
are  framed  with  a  view  to  that  principle  held  holy  and  sacred 
in  legislation,  ''Law  has  for  primary  object  the  good  of  the 
whole  community  or  multitude,  not  the  particular  good  of 
this  or  that  individual."  Whilst  peremptory  denial  of  the 
legality  of  absolute  divorce  hurts  few  or  many  individuals,  it 
nevertheless  operates  as  a  salutary  check  on  evils  innumer- 
able in  the  community.  Husbands  and  wives  are  bound  to 
swallow  their  griefs  in  silence  and  make  little  of  ordinary 
difficulties,  when  they  know  that  they  are  hopelessly  de- 
barred from  relief,  offered  by  the  State's  loose  enactments 
concerning  divorce.  Besides,  law  of  its  very  nature  restricts 
human  liberty,  and  keeps  it  within  the  bounds  that  separate 
it  from  license.  Whatever  injury  Church  legislation  does 
marriage's  principal  end,  the  propagation  of  children  or  hu- 
man happiness,  is  merely  accidental,  indirect  and  confined 
to  a  small  number  of  individuals.  Its  beneficial  effects,  on 
the  contrary,  are  inestimable,  and  far  in  excess  of  the  incon- 
veniences it  occasions;  and  in  the  field  of  legislation  general 
or  public  good  is  the  thing  of  importance. 


338  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

DIVISION 

Three  Parts— I,  II,  III 

I.     Incomplete  divorce,  allowable. 

II.     Complete  divorce,  not  evidently  and  in  every  conceiv- 
able case  against  strict  natural  law. 
III.     Complete  divorce,  always  against  secondary  law  of  na- 
ture. 

PROOFS 

I.  In  marriage  that  is  allowable,  which,  resulting  in  no 
permanent  or  undeserved  evil,  procures  peace  for  the  inno- 
cent, punishes  the  guilty,  and  promotes  contentment.  But 
incomplete  divorce,  or  temporary  separation,  is  sometimes  a 
thing  of  the  sort.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  A  lasting  and  unbroken  union 
is  of  course  very  desirable  in  marriage ;  but  disagreements  are 
likely  to  arise  in  married  life,  and  render  such  a  union  quite 
out  of  the  question.  One  party  to  the  contract  may  behave 
so  scandalously  that  the  severest  sort  of  punishment  must  be 
employed  against  him.  In  such  circumstances  every  legiti- 
mate channel  of  relief  must  be  available,  and  every  penalty 
short  of  dissolution  must  be  put  at  the  disposal  of  the  inno- 
cent. Dissolution  itself,  were  it  not  for  higher  reasons  con- 
demned by  God  Himself,  would  not  be  too  severe  a  measure 
in  certain  emergencies. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  Love  may  grow  cold  and  fall 
to  intensest  hate.  Husband  and  wife  cannot  in  this  sad  turn 
of  events  safely  live  together  under  the  same  roof.  Tem- 
porary separation  may  work  a  change  in  their  dispositions, 
and,  when  out  of  one  another's  sight  for  a  while,  the  old  love 
may  be  renewed  and  former  relations  may  be  resumed  with 
pleasure  and  content.  Reconciliations  and  lifelong  happiness 
are  often  the  consequences  of  temporary  separation.  Adul- 
tery, continued  abandonment  and  persecution  are  grievous 
crimes  against  the  innocent  partner,  and  no  penalty  short  of 
temporary  separation  is  commensurable  with  the  wrong  done. 


PROOFS  S39 

II.  Complete  divorce,  not  evidently  against  strict  natural 
law. 

Evils  forbidden  by  strict  natural  law  are  threefold : 

(a)  things  wrong  in  themselves,  and  on  their  own  account. 

(b)  things  wrong  in  themselves,  not  on  their  own  account, 
but  on  account  of  some  violated  right. 

(c)  things  wrong  in  themselves,  not  on  their  own  account, 
but  on  account  of  danger  connected  with  them. 

But  complete  divorce  is  not  evidently  and  in  every  con- 
ceivable case  evil  in  any  of  these  three  ways.     Ergo. 

(a)  No  one  contends  that  divorce  is  as  much  an  evil  as 
blasphemy.  We  have  historical  evidence  of  the  fact  that  God 
once  sanctioned  absolute  divorce.  His  approval  of  blasphemy, 
if  such  a  thing  were  possible,  would  not  relieve  the  act  of  its 
inherent  sinfulness. 

(b)  The  right  violated  by  divorce  would  belong  to  God, 
or  husband  and  wife,  or  children  of  the  marriage,  or  society. 
God's  right  in  the  premises  would  be  made  manifest  by 
revelation,  and  natural  philosophy  is  a  stranger  to  revela- 
tion. Husband  and  wife  could  agree  to  forego  whatever 
rights  divorce  would  jeopardize.  Some  unions  are  never 
blessed  with  children,  and  divorce  would  not  act  against 
children  already  grown  up  and  freed  from  parental  authority. 
Society  could  likewise  surrender  all  rights  endangered  by 
the  practice,  and  to-day  society  practically  surrenders  these 
rights.  Therefore,  the  wickedness  of  divorce  is  not  evidently 
and  in  every  case  derivable  from  a  violated  right. 

(c)  Dangers,  likely  to  arise  from  abuse  of  the  privilege, 
could  be  reduced  to  mere  shadows,  by  restricting  its  use  to 
such  exceptionally  rare  accidents  as,  for  instance,  barren- 
ness, leprosy,  impotence.  Danger,  then,  is  not  an  element 
everywhere  and  evidently  apparent  in  the  institution  of  di- 
vorce. 

III.  Complete  divorce  is  out  of  harmony  with  that  second- 
ary law  of  nature,  which  counsels  the  proper.  Everything 
opposed  to  the  best  interests  of  marriage  and  a  hindrance  to 
the  easy  accomplishment  of  marriage's  purpose  is  out  of  har- 
mony with  that  secondary  law  of  nature  which  counsels  the 
proper.     But  absolute  divorce  is  a  thing  of  the  sort.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:    Nature  is  a  jealous  guardian 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 

of  the  right ;  and  reason,  her  herald,  is  loud  against  not  only 
open  violations  of  her  plainest  laws,  but  also  those  lesser  evils 
that  threaten  harm  to  her  beneficent  plans.  Absolute  divorce 
hurts  marriage  in  four  very  vital  particulars,  and,  apart  even 
from  the  heavy  condemnation  of  God,  has  nothing  to  recom- 
mend it  to  the  mind  of  the  philosopher. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  These  four  vital  particulars 
are: 

a.  Mutual  friendliness  between  husband  and  wife. 

b.  Education  of  their  offspring. 

c.  Woman's  happiness. 

d.  The  good  of  society. 

a.  The  mere  possibility,  the  remote  danger  of  one  day  dis- 
solving partnership,  weakens  and  robs  of  its  chief  charm,  the 
friendship  peculiarly  characteristic  of  wedded  life.  Friend- 
ship is  measured  by  its  lasting  qualities,  and  divorce  is  an 
enemy  to  conjugal  steadfastness.  Distrust  is  sure  to  poison 
every  marriage  contracted  with  the  understanding  that  di- 
vorce is  feasible.  The  woman  will  labor  under  a  continual 
suspicion  that  the  man  is  casting  glances  in  another  direction, 
and  that  freedom  of  confidence  so  essential  to  the  happiness 
of  married  life  will  be  entirely  wanting.  Some  wives  have 
been  known  to  accumulate  hidden  wealth  in  preparation  for 
emergencies  created  by  the  iniquitous  law  of  divorce.  Faith- 
fulness which  should  be  above  suspicion  is  endangered. 
Wicked  companionship  with  loose  friends  is  rendered  easy 
and  possible.  Unholy  liberties  are  encouraged,  and  forbidden 
loves  spring  up  in  the  hearts  of  the  dissatisfied.  Kent,  a  man 
of  world-wide  reputation  in  the  domain  of  law,  is  authority 
for  the  statement,  that  adultery  is  full  often  committed  to 
secure  a  decree  of  divorce.  Mutual  forbearance  and  patience 
with  one  another's  faults  have  small  or  no  ground  for  exer- 
cise. Absolute  divorce  provides  the  quarrelsome  with  a  read- 
ier and  more  sweeping  remedy.  That  prudence  and  caution, 
absolutely  necessary  for  guidance  in  so  serious  and  solemn  a 
step,  are  utterly  neglected.  Young  men  and  young  women 
rush  into  marriage,  satisfied  that  they  can  call  the  bargain 
off,  if  unforeseen  difficulties  arise. 

b.  The  education  of  children  bom  to  divorced  couples  must 
be  sadly  defective.     To  be  complete,  this  education  must  be  at 


COMPLETE  DIVORCE  HURTS  MARRIAGE      341 

the  same  time  intellectual,  moral,  and  physical.  To  be  well 
balanced,  it  must  be  managed  by  father  and  mother  alike. 
When  this  education  is  finished,  the  woman  is  so  far  on  in 
years  that  divorce  must  prove  for  her  injurious  in  the  extreme 
and  peculiarly  aggravating.  Children  should,  besides,  learn 
from  their  parents  that  love  and  respect  for  father  and 
mother,  which  are  the  crowning  glory  of  childhood.  Divorced 
fathers  and  mothers  can  hardly  inspire  their  children  with 
any  such  feelings  of  love  and  reverence.  The  child  will  neces- 
sarily side  with  either  father  or  mother,  and  entertain  a  deadly 
hatred  for  one  of  the  two  or  both. 

c.  In  divorce  woman  is  the  sufferer.  Dread  of  the  untoward 
event  can  haunt  her  like  a  gaunt  spectre.  And  when  the 
step  is  taken,  she  is  more  at  the  mercy  of  fortune  than  the 
man.  He  is  hale,  hearty  and  accustomed  to  work.  He  can, 
besides,  find  new  admirers  with  much  more  facility  than  the 
abandoned  woman.  A  divorced  woman,  as  some  writer  says, 
has  far  fewer  attractions  than  a  widow.  Marriage  on  this 
account  ceases  to  be  a  fair  and  equal  contract.  The  woman, 
when  divorce  ensues,  necessarily  starts  on  an  inferior  footing. 
She  has  lost  her  virginity,  her  youth,  her  beauty,  her  reputa- 
tion and  good  esteem.  Men  are  slower  to  lose  their  attractive 
qualities  than  women.  This  unfair  advantage  procured  by 
divorce  to  men,  moved  another  writer,  no  doubt,  to  say  that 
marriage  is  a  partnership  entered  into  for  the  exclusive 
utility  of  one  of  the  partners. 

d.  One  of  the  happy  consequences,  resulting  to  society  from 
marriage,  is  the  union  and  harmony  promoted  among  families 
and  their  different  members.  St.  Augustine  is  of  opinion 
that  nature  forbids  marriage  between  relatives  primarily  to 
tighten  the  bonds  of  friendship  between  individuals  of  the 
race,  not  otherwise  united.  Relatives  are  already  close 
enough  together  without  the  addition  of  any  further  ties  of 
union.  Divorce  breaks  up  families.  It  nourishes  lasting 
hatred  between  the  principals  and  all  connected  with  them. 
It  disgraces  men  and  women  of  good  reputation,  who  happen 
to  bear  the  names  of  the  divorced  persons,  and  always  spreads 
the  reign  of  enmity  and  discord. 


THESIS  XI 

Education  of  children  belongs  to  parents  first;  to  state,  last. 
Jouin,  1S5-19S;  314-321. 

QUESTION 

Parents  are  in  strict  duty  bound  to  procure  the  physical 
and  moral  education  of  their  children.  As  between  state  and 
parents,  the  parents  have  prior  rights  to  the  child.  They, 
not  the  state,  are  its  makers,  and  to  the  maker  belongs  what 
he  makes.  Education  means  development,  and  a  child's  edu- 
cation means  development  of  the  whole  child,  body  and  soul. 
It  means,  therefore,  development  of  body,  food,  raiment  and 
preservation  of  health;  it  means  instruction,  or  training  of 
mind;  it  means  morality,  or  training  of  will.  The  state's 
duty  to  train  the  child's  mind  and  to  train  the  child's  will, 
to  administer  schools  and  inculcate  virtue,  is  of  a  kind  with 
the  state's  duty  to  supply  the  child  with  proper  food  and  rai- 
ment, and  safeguard  its  health.  Its  obligation  in  these  sev- 
eral respects  is  to  keep  the  parents  to  their  duty,  and  sup- 
plement their  weakness,  when  means  or  good  will  fail  them. 
When  parents  are  willing  and  able  to  proffer  their  children 
by  themselves  or  others  a  measure  of  instruction  suited  to 
their  rank  in  life,  when  they  equip  their  children  with  a  brand 
of  morality  above  suspicion,  the  state's  duty  is  at  an  end 
with  respect  to  knowledge  and  virtue;  and  it  has  no  more 
right  to  interfere  with  parents  in  the  education  of  their  chil- 
dren than  it  has  to  prescribe  the  cut  of  clothes  they  shall 
wear,  the  food  they  shall  eat,  or  the  rules  of  hygiene  they 
shall  follow. 

TERMS 

Education.  Marriage  bases  a  triple  society,  conjugal, 
parental  and  servant.     Marriage  is  primarily  between  hus- 

342 


INSTRUCTION  AND  OBEDIENCE  343 

band  and  wife.  Viewed  this  way,  it  constitutes  conjugal 
society.  Children  are  the  natural  outcome  of  marriage,  and 
at  their  advent  the  family  becomes  parental  society.  Serv- 
ants are  needed  helps  to  domestic  management,  and,  when  in- 
serted as  members  in  the  family,  constitute  it  servant-society. 
Education  presupposes  children,  and  becomes  a  duty  only 
when  the  family  grows  to  the  proportions  of  parental  society. 
Education  is  impossible  without  obedience;  and  this  is  true, 
whether  there  is  question  of  developing  the  body,  or  the  mind, 
or  the  will.  It  is  a  kindness  their  elders  do  the  young,  sup- 
posedly unable  to  care  for  their  bodies  and  distinguish  be- 
tween true  and  false,  good  and  evil.  Apropos  of  this  it  is 
well  worth  remarking  that  father  and  mother  in  their  rela- 
tions with  children  are  called  parents,  not  parients.  They  are 
people  to  obey,  not  people  who  beget  or  produce;  and  usage 
itself  lays  more  stress  on  the  fact  of  obedience  than  on  the 
fact  of  origin. 

Instruction  is,  of  course,  a  branch  of  education ;  but,  when 
applied  to  children,  instruction  must  not  be  confounded  with 
mere  information.  And  this  would  seem  to  be  the  difference 
between  the  two.  Instruction  in  the  case  of  children  always 
connotes  in  the  pupil  obedience  or  submission  of  mind  to  the 
teacher's  superior  mind.  Mere  information  carries  no  such 
obligation,  it  is  altogether  a  transaction  between  equals,  and 
no  disorder  results  from  its  rejection.  Between  man  and  man 
information  is  the  regular  process,  and  it  rests  entirely  with 
the  person  informed  to  accept  or  spurn  aside  his  informant's 
views.  No  mere  man,  without  some  accompanying  preroga- 
tive, is  allowed  to  impose  his  views  on  others;  and  nobody 
can  feel  hurt,  when  the  world  refuses  to  adopt  a  theory  or 
statement  he  is  unable  to  prove  to  evidence.  A  teacher,  with- 
out the  authority  needed  to  ratify  his  lesson,  is  no  more  a 
teacher  than  the  morning-paper  or  a  theatrical  bill-board; 
and  to  endeavor  to  teach  children  after  this  manner,  is  to 
put  them  on  an  equality  with  grown  men  and  grown  women. 
Education  of  the  kind  would  be  a  denial  of  education  suited 
to  children,  and  would  make  education  the  child's  exclusive 
duty,  and  nobody  else's. 

Obedience,  therefore,  is  an  essential  feature  of  education, 
and  to  say  that  the  state,  as  compared  with  the  parents,  has 


344  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

prior  rights  in  the  child 's  education,  is  to  assert  that  a  child 's 
obedience  is  first  due  the  state  and  then  his  parents.  States 
themselves  take  no  such  view  of  the  thing.  They  deal  with 
adults,  not  with  children.  They  reach  children  through  their 
parents.  They  hold  parents  responsible  for  their  children, 
and  by  the  very  fact  proclaim  parents  their  children's  imme- 
diate superiors,  entitled  first  and  foremost  to  their  obedience. 
Citizens  are  the  state's  proper  subjects,  and  children  are  only 
incipient  citizens.  They  are  on  the  way  to  full  and  complete 
citizenship,  a  fact  accruing  to  them  only  when  in  large  meas- 
ure emancipated  from  the  authority  of  their  parents,  and 
done  with  the  process  called  education. 

Of  course,  parents  and  children  alike  owe  the  state  a  meas- 
ure of  obedience  in  virtue  of  authority,  without  which  govern- 
ment is  an  impossibility.  But  it  would  be  folly  to  contend 
that  the  obedience  owed  the  state  is  as  sweeping  as  the  obedi- 
ence a  child  owes  his  parents.  State  authority  is  just  as 
sacred  as  parental  authority,  but  it  is  necessarily  more  limited. 
In  both  cases  it  is  a  means  to  an  end ;  and  its  extent  must  be 
gathered  from  the  purpose  it  is  meant  to  secure.  The  state's 
solemn  purpose  is  to  promote  the  common  good  of  its  citizens ; 
and  it  sins  by  excess,  when  by  superfluous  and  harassing  en- 
actments it  aspires  to  undue  control  of  individual  liberty  and 
private  rights.  This  is  especially  the  case  when  it  invades 
the  domain  of  education  or  religion,  because  they  are  dis- 
tinctively the  concern  of  family  and  Church. 

PROOFS 

Education  of  children  belongs  to  parents  first;  to  state, 
last.  Rights  are  based  on  duties;  and  priority  of  duty  fixes 
priority  of  right.  Viewed  as  a  duty,  the  education  of  chil- 
dren touches  parents  first,  the  state  afterwards.  Therefore, 
in  the  education  of  children  a  parent's  rights  are  prior  to 
those  of  the  state. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  Parents  were  meant  by  nature 
to  educate  as  well  as  produce  children. 

1°.  For  a  long  stretch  of  years  after  birth  children  are 
absolutely  helpless  with  regard  to  the  development  of  their 
bodies,  their  minds  and  their  wills.     This  being  the  case,  God 


I 


PROOFS  AND  PRINCIPLES  345 

must  have  appointed  fixed  and  definite  persons  capable  of 
carrying  on  the  work  of  their  education. 

2°.  Care  of  children  involves  hardship  of  the  sternest  sort, 
and  men  are  not  minded  to  embrace  hardships  except  from  a 
sense  of  duty.  If  the  duty  to  educate  children  fell  to  the  lot 
of  no  God-appointed  person,  everybody  would  shirk  the  re- 
sponsibility, children  would  go  without  an  education,  and 
God's  negligence  would  contribute  to  the  destruction  of  the 
race. 

3°.  God  has  appointed  either  parents  or  the  state  to  edu- 
cate children,  and  we  know  from  unmistakable  signs  that  par- 
ents, not  the  state,  are  His  choice.  These  signs  are  the  nat- 
ural love  of  parents  for  their  children,  the  title  of  ownership 
vested  in  their  very  birth,  and  the  child's  tendency  to  look 
to  his  parents  for  help  and  support. 

4°.  The  experience  of  ages  and  parallel  conduct  in  the  no- 
bler specimens  of  brute  creation  strengthen  our  argument. 

5°.  It  is  preposterous  to  think  that  God  exempts  parents 
from  the  duty  of  education  to  impose  it  on  a  collection  of 
strangers  denominated  the  state.  It  would  be  far  easier  to 
believe  that  God  wanted  farmers  to  sit  in  idleness,  while  neigh- 
bors with  fatuous  generosity  worked  their  fields  and  handed 
them  the  profits. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  The  arguments  alleged  for  state  control  of  education  are 
chiefly  these. 

1°.  Children  are  born  members  of  the  state;  and,  therefore, 
subject  to  its  control. 

2°.  The  common  good  is  involved  in  the  education  of  future 
citizens. 

3°.  A  good  education  in  the  case  of  every  child  is  a  neces- 
sary requisite  for  society. 

4°.  Parents  get  the  right  to  educate  their  children  from  the 
state. 

A7iswer:  1°.  Members  of  the  state  are  not  subject  in  every 
particular  to  the  control  of  the  state.  As  individuals,  they 
have  prior  and  independent  rights ;  and  these  rights  must  be 
respected,  not  absorbed  by  the  state.     Children  are  citizens 


346  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

not  immediately,  but  mediately,  in  virtue  of  membership  in 
a  family,  and  care  of  children  devolves  first  on  parents,  then 
on  state. 

2°.  In  the  state  many  particulars  are  conducive  to  the  com- 
mon good ;  and  yet,  because  of  personal  and  antecedent  rights, 
they  must  be  left  to  private  initiative.  Instances  are,  eugenic 
marriages,  clothing,  food,  residence. 

3°.  This  good  education  can  be  secured  without  delivering 
up  education  to  the  state.  In  this  matter  the  state  enjoys 
only  an  indirect  right ;  it  can  help  parents  by  the  erection  of 
schools,  by  rewards  and  penalties;  but  it  must  not  take  from 
the  parent  what  belongs  to  the  parent. 

4°.  It  is  wholly  wrong  to  think  that  parents  get  the  right 
to  educate  their  children  from  the  state.  The  family  is  prior 
to  the  state,  and  enjoys  prior  rights,  that  the  state  must  safe- 
guard, but  never  absorb  or  usurp. 

B.  The  State  and  Education.  The  word  education,  ex- 
pressive of  a  parent's  duty  to  his  children,  is  a  comprehen- 
sive term.  It  means  support  of  body,  food,  raiment,  and 
sanitary  precautions.  It  means  wise  provision  for  his  chil- 
dren's future.  It  means  the  bestowal  of  opportunities  to 
acquire  all  the  human  knowledge  necessary  for  success  in  life. 
It  means  incentives  to  morality  in  the  shape  of  good  example, 
rewards  and  punishments.  It  means  early  acquaintance  with 
God  and  the  things  of  God.  Rousseau  wants  no  mention  of 
God  till  the  child  is  twelve,  and  sufficiently  grown  to  select 
his  own  religion;  but  that  is  only  another  tribute  to  the  man's 
godlessness,  and  to  his  desire  to  make  the  world  atheistic. 

Regularly,  then,  and  in  the  natural  order,  the  right  to  di- 
rectly and  immediately  educate  their  children  belongs  to 
parents  alone.  They  have  the  right  to  say  what  branches 
their  children  shall  learn,  what  teachers  their  children  shall 
follow,  what  books  they  shall  use,  how  many  years  they  shall 
spend  at  school,  and  whatever  minor  details  are  connected  with 
their  education.  If  they  object  to  state-schools  on  any  of 
these  several  heads,  they  are  at  perfect  liberty  to  withdraw 
their  children  and  send  them  elsewhere. 

Parents  have  duties  towards  their  children  in  this  matter 
of  education;  and,  if  they  notably  fall  away  from  them,  the 
state  has  a  right  to  interfere  to  the  extent  of  safeguarding  the 


I 


COMPULSORY  AND  MONOPOLY      347 

common  good.  It  is  of  prime  importance  to  the  state  to  have 
educated  citizens,  and  its  own  welfare  is  menaced  when  par- 
ents grossly  abuse  their  prerogative,  and  deny  their  children 
all  opportunity  for  intellectual  improvement.  In  self-defense 
the  state  is  obliged  on  such  occasions  to  interfere,  and  by  wise 
enactments  arouse  unnatural  parents  of  the  kind  to  a  sense 
of  their  duty.  Besides,  it  is  the  state's  duty  to  safeguard 
individual  rights;  the  child  has  rights  in  education  against 
his  parents,  and  the  state  is  held  to  assist  the  child  in  the 
prosecution  of  his  rights.  These,  however,  are  exceptional 
cases,  scattered  instances,  and  rare  enough  to  leave  unchal- 
lenged our  statement,  that  regularly  the  right  to  educate 
their  children  belongs  to  parents  alone. 

Moreover,  the  state's  rights  in  the  matter  remain  always 
indirect  and  mediate.  Its  power  is  over  the  parent,  not  over 
the  child's  education.  It  has  no  right  to  educate  the  child, 
it  has  the  right  to  hold  the  child's  parents  to  their  duty.  It 
is  to  the  state's  own  interest  to  help  parents  acquit  them- 
selves of  their  duty,  to  build  schools  everywhere,  to  equip 
them  with  capable  teachers,  to  encourage  study  among  the 
young  by  rewards  in  the  shape  of  degrees,  diplomas,  certifi- 
cates and  political  honors.  But  in  last  resort  it  rests  with 
parents  to  use  these  state-schools  or  not,  as  they  like.  They 
have  no  duty  towards  state-schools,  save  payment  of  taxes; 
and  the  state  has  no  power  over  the  family's  internal  con- 
cerns. Their  single  duty  is  to  educate  their  children,  with 
the  help  of  the  state  or  without  it.  If  the  brand  of  educa- 
tion offered  by  the  state  is  a  serious  menace  to  religion  and 
morality,  the  parents  enjoy  no  freedom.  They  are  bound  in 
conscience  to  reject  all  such  instruction,  and  no  law  of  God 
or  man  can  compel  them  to  subject  their  growing  children  to 
danger  of  eternal  damnation. 

C.  Compulsory  Education  and  State  Monopoly.  Hence  we 
Catholics  are  uncompromisingly  opposed  to  anjrthing  like 
government  monopoly  of  education,  reserving  to  the  State  the 
exclusive  right  to  open  schools,  as  to  a  thing  against  the  nat- 
ural law;  and  the  sin  is  all  the  more  grievous,  when  parents 
are  compelled  by  law  to  send  their  children  to  these  state- 
schools  for  a  fixed  period.  More  than  this,  we  contend  that 
the  State  has  no  right  to  compel  parents  to  send  their  chil- 


348  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

dren  a  certain  number  of  years  to  any  school  whatever,  even 
if  the  school  frequented  be  left  to  their  own  choice. 

Monopoly  in  education  is  wrong  on  these  several  counts. 
It  robs  parents  of  their  natural  right  to  educate  their  chil- 
dren, and  transfers  it  to  the  State;  especially  when  parents, 
unequal  themselves  to  the  task,  must  perforce  send  them  to 
some  school.  Instruction  and  education  cannot  possibly  be 
kept  apart.  Instruction  has  to  do  with  the  training  of  the 
mind;  and  moral  education  is  bound  to  be  imperfect,  if  the 
mind  from  the  beginning  is  developed  along  wrong  lines,  if 
a  teacher's  crooked  notions  regarding  religion  and  morality 
are  authoritatively  impressed  on  the  minds  of  the  young. 
Moral  education  means  more  than  the  mere  inculcation  of 
right  principles,  it  means  the  reduction  of  these  principles  to 
act;  and  pupils  must  be  helped  in  this  particular  by  the  ad- 
vice and  example  of  their  teachers. 

Monopoly  is  an  uncalled  for  restriction  of  the  right  to  im- 
part and  receive  instruction,  viewed  as  mere  information,  im- 
plied in  the  gift  of  a  tongue  and  ears,  made  every  member 
of  the  race.  In  the  natural  order,  the  propagation  of  false- 
hood is  the  one  limit  to  this  freedom  of  instruction.  In  the 
supernatural  order,  the  Church  is  of  course  supreme;  and  a 
profession  of  faith  can  with  justice  be  exacted  by  the  Church 
from  the  teachers  of  even  profane  sciences.  Pius  IX  and 
Pius  X  insist  with  much  vehemence  on  this  right  of  the 
Church.  The  gtate  has  a  right  to  only  such  measures  as  make 
for  the  common  good,  and  the  arbitrary  exclusion  of  private 
instruction  in  the  field  of  education  is  no  such  measure.  On 
the  contrary,  it  is  the  most  deleterious  of  measures,  because 
it  kills  all  progress  in  letters. 

Monopoly  would  make  education  dependent  on  some  fac- 
tion in  government.  Nobody  could  teach,  unless  approved 
of  and  educated  by  this  particular  faction;  and  all  competi- 
tion between  teachers,  so  helpful  to  improvement,  would  be 
no  more.  Certainly,  the  Church  would  have  no  voice  in  the 
department  of  education,  and  supernatural  truth  would  suffer. 

Compulsory  education  is  of  two  kinds;  one  with,  the  other 
without  monopoly.  Compulsory  with  monopoly  is  wrong, 
because  it  is  the  usurpation  of  parental  rights,  assuming  di- 
rect and  immediate  control  of  the  child's  education,  already 


CHURCH  AND  EDUCATION  ^9 

proved  the  exclusive  privilege  of  the  parents.  Besides,  every 
such  system  savors  of  socialism.  If  the  state  is  once  allowed 
control  of  the  child's  education,  nothing  can  prevent  it  from 
assuming  control  of  family,  property,  and  of  the  whole  in- 
ternal administration  of  the  home. 

Compulsory  without  monopoly  is  beside  the  power  of  the 
state,  unless  we  maintain  that  a  school  education  of  a  fixed 
kind  belongs  as  a  necessary  right  to  the  child,  or  that  the 
common  good  demands  such  a  course,  inasmuch  as  defective 
education  would  contribute  harm  to  the  republic,  or  would 
prevent  children  from  enjoying  political  and  civic  advan- 
tages. A  school  education  is  useful,  not  necessary.  Even  if 
necessary,  children  as  such  have  no  right  in  the  name  of  rigor- 
ous or  commutative  justice  against  parents.  Even  if  they  had 
such  right,  reading,  writing  and  arithmetic  would  be  enough 
for  the  poor,  without  robbing  parents  of  their  children's  help 
during  long  years. 

D.  The  Church  and  Education.  Religion  and  morality  are 
not  an  affair  of  the  state  in  direct  sense,  but  of  the  Church; 
and  the  Church  must  manage  for  children,  with  help  from 
the  state.  The  Church  has  paramount  rights  in  this  business 
of  education.  It  was  established  by  Christ,  to  teach  religion 
to  the  nations,  and  its  authority  bears  equally  on  children, 
parents  and  state.  According  to  the  will  of  Christ,  nobody 
in  the  world  is  exempt  from  its  jurisdiction.  In  the  super- 
natural order,  in  the  order  of  faith  and  morality,  it  is  regu- 
larly the  direct  and  immediate  teacher  of  all  mankind,  the 
one  teacher  vested  with  active  and  passive  infallibility,  em- 
powered to  control  parents  in  the  education  of  their  children, 
and  dictate  terms  to  the  state  whenever  and  wherever  the 
profane  sciences,  like  history,  physics,  chemistry  border  on 
its  domain. 

Up  to  the  time  of  the  Reformation,  it  was  educator  to  the 
world.  That  revolution  substituted  the  state  for  the  Church ; 
and  ever  since  history  has  been  one  long  attempt  to  exaggerate 
state  prerogatives  at  the  expense  of  parental  and  ecclesiastical 
rights.  Our  public  schools  are  but  a  baneful  substitute  for 
the  cathedral  and  monastic  institutions,  established  for  chil- 
dren centuries  before  the  appearance  of  Luther  and  the  spread 
of  his  pernicious  and  destructive  doctrines.     Over  these  ca- 


350  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

thedral  and  monastic  schools  the  Church  exercised  full  and 
complete  control.  It  was  supreme  arbiter  in  the  field  of 
education,  sacred  and  profane.  In  sacred  matters,  with  a 
direct  bearing  on  faith  and  morality,  it  recognised  no  su- 
perior or  rival.  Whatever  religion  parents  or  state  taught 
children,  they  had  to  take  from  the  Church.  In  profane 
matters,  considered  apart  from  religion  and  morality,  it  viewed 
parents  and  state  in  the  light  of  agents  or  helpers,  attribut- 
ing a  fuller  right  to  parents  than  to  state.  And  all  this, 
because  profane  matters  are  subservient  to  sacred  interests. 
Parents  were  always  reckoned  agents  born  such  and  irremov- 
able. It  rested  with  them  to  choose  teachers  for  their  chil- 
dren, the  branches  of  knowledge  they  were  to  pursue,  the 
years  they  were  to  spend  at  school;  and,  as  long  as  the  child's 
eternal  interests  were  not  jeopardized,  the  Church  confided 
everything  to  the  prudence  of  parents. 

It  recognised  no  such  sweeping  power  in  the  state,  forbid- 
ding it  to  unduly  interfere  with  parents  in  the  conduct  and 
management  of  their  children.  It  welcomed  with  gladness 
every  move  made  by  the  state  in  favor  of  right  education,  but 
consistently  opposed  every  attempt  on  the  part  of  the  state  to 
usurp  prerogatives  belonging  to  Church  and  parents.  The 
Church  can  oblige  parents  to  send  their  children  to  schools 
where  religion  is  taught,  can  forbid  them  schools  where  reli- 
gion is  separated  from  instruction,  because  the  Church's  su- 
pernatural right  weighs  against  the  natural  right  of  parents. 
The  Church  can  likewise  empower  the  state  to  insist  on  at- 
tendance at  religious  schools,  and  in  this  emergency  the  voice 
of  the  state  is  the  voice  of  the  Church,  and  the  state  as  vested 
with  the  power  of  the  Church  is  superior  to  parents.  But 
without  such  authorization  from  the  Church  the  state  always 
ranks  lower  than  parents  in  the  education  of  children. 

Hence  the  state  is  guilty  of  tyrannical  usurpation  against 
the  Church,  when  it  compels  parents  to  send  their  children 
to  neutral  or  mixed  schools,  condemned  by  the  Church  as  hurt- 
ful to  faith  and  morals.  With  certain  restrictions  Catholic 
parents  are  allowed  to  avail  themselves  of  such  schools,  though 
they  are  solemnly  exhorted  to  everywhere  build  and  maintain 
parochial  schools,  where  knowledge  of  religion  and  knowledge 
of  letters  keep  equal  pace  together.     Certainly,  no  Catholic 


BOUQUILLON  AND  HOLAIND  351 

can  with  a  safe  conscience  help  to  the  enactment  of  a  law 
making  the  attendance  of  Catholic  children  at  mixed  or  neu- 
tral schools  obligatory.  In  countries,  where  Catholics  must 
choose  between  compulsory  education  in  godless  schools  and 
unlimited  freedom  in  education,  the  latter  alternative  is  the 
lesser  evil  and  the  more  commendable  course.  It  is  another 
case  of  choosing  between  dogmatic  toleration  and  political 
toleration. 

Before  the  Reformation,  state-schools  were  always  under 
the  direct  supervision  and  control  of  the  Church.  After  the 
Reformation,  denominational  schools  came  into  use,  and  the 
Church  had  to  be  satisfied  with  the  conduct  and  management 
of  such  schools  as  Catholic  children  frequented.  Then  came 
non-sectarian  or  mixed  schools,  in  which  religion  was  sup- 
posedly taught  in  such  a  way  as  to  give  no  just  offense  to 
any  pupil  of  whatsoever  creed;  and  this  would  seem  to  be 
the  complexion  of  our  public  schools.  State-schools  are  rap- 
idly becoming  entirely  lay  or  irreligious,  with  no  concern  for 
religion,  teaching  at  most  the  broadest  kind  of  humanitarian- 
ism,  and  the  lay  or  independent  morality  introduced  into 
philosophy  by  Kant. 

E.  Controversy  between  Bouquillon  and  Eolaind,  S.J. 
Education — To  whom  does  it  belong? 

Bouquillon  gives  it  to  state  first,  to  parents  last. 

Holaind,  S.J.,  gives  it  to  parents  first,  to  state  last. 

Holaind,  S.J.  It  is  wrong  to  leave  the  Church  out  of  the 
comparison.  Its  supernatural  end  ranks  it  above  state  and 
parents.  Morality  is  an  integral  part  of  education,  revela- 
tion is  exclusively  under  Church  control,  and  the  moral  im- 
possibility of  morality  without  revelation  puts  all  education, 
in  full  and  complete  sense,  at  the  mercy  of  the  Church;  makes 
state  and  parents  subject  to  her  jurisdiction  in  matters  educa- 
tional. The  Church  is  empowered  to  teach  human  as  well  as 
divine  science,  at  least  in  an  indirect  way,  inasmuch  as  the 
human  sciences  are  useful  or  necessary  to  religion  and  moral- 
ity. Faith  cannot  hurt  science,  because  its  exponent,  the 
Church,  is  infallible;  the  sciences  can  hurt  faith,  because 
their  exponents,  mere  men,  are  not  infallible. 

The  Church  can  share  her  prerogative  as  educator  with 
state  and  parents;  and,  when  they  work  under  her  control. 


352 

they  are  her  agents,  and  they  enjoy  rights  that  are  far  from 
belonging  to  them  in  their  own  private  capacity.  The  Church 
counts  state  and  parents  her  agents  after  a  different  man- 
ner. A  father  in  virtue  of  paternity  has  rights  over  his 
child,  that  cannot  be  disputed  by  any  claimant  with  a  lesser 
title  than  paternity;  and  the  Church,  taking  this  fact  into 
account,  reckons  parents  her  agents,  born  such  and  irre- 
movable. The  state's  control  of  the  child  is  based  on  no  such 
intimate  relation  as  paternity,  and  whatever  educational  pre- 
rogatives it  enjoys,  it  gets  by  favor  of  the  Church.  The 
Church  cannot  be  supposed  to  do  favors  to  her  enemies,  to 
reckon  agents  her  deadliest  foes;  and  non-Catholic  states,  be- 
cause they  work  outside  her  control,  are  usurpers  when  they 
attempt  to  educate  children. 

With  these  few  needed  remarks,  we  leave  the  Church.  Our 
question  is  between  parents  and  state.  We  maintain  that 
education  belongs  to  parents  first,  to  state  last.  Our  op- 
ponents are  of  opinion  that  it  belongs  to  state  first,  to  parents 
last.  They  recognize  the  right  to  educate  in  individuals,  in 
the  family,  in  the  state,  and  in  the  Church;  and  the  order 
they  follow  would  lead  one  to  think  that  they  subordinate 
family  to  state  in  the  matter  of  educational  rights.  It  is  sim- 
ple nonsense  to  talk  about  the  individual's  right  to  educate. 
All  individuals  have  the  power  to  teach,  to  give  useful  infor- 
mation to  others;  but  the  others  are  free  to  accept  or  reject 
the  information.  The  power  to  teach  gives  rise  to  no  posi- 
tive duty  of  a  kindred  color  in  the  listener;  and  a  power  in 
me,  that  creates  no  such  duty  in  others,  can  hardly  be  called 
a  right.  Education  means  more  than  mere  teaching ;  it  means 
teaching  with  authority.  It  embraces  all  those  functions, 
which  promote  not  only  the  preservation  and  development 
of  the  body,  but  also  the  perfection  of  the  mind,  and  the 
evolution  of  intellectual  and  moral  powers.  To  educate  is  to 
exercise  jurisdiction,  it  supposes  authority  in  the  educator, 
submission  in  the  pupil.  Nobody  has  the  right  to  educate  the 
children  of  anybody  else,  unless  their  parents  give  him  that 
power.  Paternity  is  the  foundation  of  jurisdiction  in  parents, 
and  paternity  can  be  found  nowhere  outside  of  parents.  The 
Church  can  educate,  because  divine  command  is  a  higher  title 
than  paternity. 


BOUQUILLON  AND  HOLAIND  353 

And  this  is  the  mistake  Bouquillon  makes  in  all  the  quo- 
tations from  Catholic  philosophers  and  theologians  he  urges 
to  prove  the  right  of  the  state  to  educate  the  young.  They 
have  in  mind  a  state  with  the  Church  at  its  back;  the  state, 
whose  claims  he  advocates,  has  no  such  support.  The  king 
they  talk  about  is  no  mere  king,  he  is  a  Charlemagne,  with 
the  unction  of  the  Church  on  his  forehead;  a  most  dutiful 
son,  actuated  in  all  his  conduct  by  childlike  obedience  to  the 
Church's  wishes.  The  king  Bouquillon  talks  about  is  a  non- 
Catholic,  and  therefore  a  non-Christian  state,  whose  rulers 
would  count  it  profanation  to  be  touched  by  the  Church's 
unction,  with  whom  word  from  a  Mexican  rebel  weighs  about 
the  same  as,  or  even  more  than,  word  from  a  Pope.  The 
truth  may  as  well  be  told,  our  country  is  no  truly  Christian 
Country  in  the  full  and  complete  sense  of  the  word,  because 
it  is  not  a  Catholic  country.  ''Extra  Catholicism um  non  da- 
tur  verus  Christianismus. "  There  can  be  no  true  Christian- 
ity without  Christ,  the  Son  of  the  living  God.  True  Chris- 
tianity means  the  profession  of  Christ's  doctrine  in  its  en- 
tirety, not  in  parts ;  it  means  membership  in  the  Church  Christ 
established,  not  mere  toleration  of  its  members. 

F.  Holalnd,  SJ.,  on  Family,  State,  Church  and  Education. 

Family.  Duty  and  right  of  the  parent.  Education  be- 
longs to  the  parents  first,  to  the  state  last.  It  belongs  to  the 
parents  regularly,  directly,  and  immediately;  it  belongs  to 
the  state  in  exceptional  cases,  indirectly,  and  mediately. 
Blackstone  makes  the  duty  of  parents  threefold,  support,  pro- 
tection and  education.  Four  reasons  to  prove  that  this  three- 
fold duty  flows  directly  from  natural  law. 

1°.  Children  result  from  free  act  of  parents,  and  every 
moral  agent  is  responsible  for  consequences  of  his  free  acts. 
Life  would  be  a  curse,  and  no  blessing,  without  support,  pro- 
tection and  education.  Ergo,  parents  are  held  to  this  three- 
fold duty,  and  the  obligation  is  independent  of  all  positive 
law. 

2°.  Nature's  chief  purpose  in  marriage  is  the  continuance 
and  perfection  of  the  race.  This  purpose  would  be  defeated, 
if  parents  neglected  this  threefold  duty.  Ergo,  the  obliga- 
tion is  imposed  by  nature  itself. 

3°.  A  universal  impulse,  rational,  human,  reproduced  in 


354  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

instinct  of  animals,  is  unmistakable  token  of  natural  law. 
But  the  accomplishment  of  this  threefold  duty  is  such  an 
impulse.     Ergo,  it  is  imposed  by  natural  law. 

4°.  A  special  and  natural  fitness  indicates  a  special  and 
natural  duty.  Parents  have  a  special  and  natural  fitness  to 
educate  their  children.  Ergo,  it  is  their  special  and  natural 
duty.  Nothing  can  replace  the  love  of  a  mother,  the  mild 
firmness  of  a  father.  Sparta  never  produced  a  single  poet, 
orator  or  statesman  of  superior  ability.  Rome  gave  even  too 
much  authority  to  fathers,  and  had  a  long  line  of  great  men. 

State.  In  parents  this  duty  of  education  is  a  perfect  duty, 
demanded  by  rigorous  or  commutative  justice;  not  merely 
an  imperfect  duty,  based  on  mere  fitness  and  unenforcible  by 
children.  Government  takes  this  latter  view,  because  it  wants 
to  absorb  individual  and  family.  The  state  has  right  to  keep 
education  clear  of  moral  poisoning;  but  it  has  no  right  to 
invade  privacy  of  the  home.  Sphere  of  state's  activity  is 
fixed  by  its  end  or  purpose,  to  maintain  peace,  protect  rights, 
supply  insufficiency  of  individuals.  Its  direct  object  is  not 
individual,  but  social  good.  Wrong  must  be  exterior  and 
must  visibly  attack  society,  before  state  can  invade  the  home. 

Seven  points  to  be  kept  well  in  mind. 

1°.  The  family  is  a  true  and  complete  society. 

2°.  The  family  is  exterior  to  the  state,  with  rights  and  du- 
ties prior  to  those  of  the  state,  and  closer  in  their  origin  to 
nature. 

3°.  Education  is  one  of  these  rights,  inalienable,  suffering 
no  abridgement  or  destruction. 

4°.  The  state  cannot  at  will  invade  the  home. 

5°.  The  state  must  help  the  family  in  case  of  extreme  need. 

6°.  The  state  must  ensure  rights  in  family,  when  great  dis- 
turbance arises. 

7°.  The  state  must  do  all  this  without  absorbing  rights  of 
the  family.  It  must  oblige  parents  to  educate  their  children, 
it  must  not  itself  educate  them. 

Church.  Docete  omnes  gentes,  fixes  the  Church's  mission 
as  a  teacher.  Its  jurisdiction  extends  to  human  sciences,  at 
least  indirectly.  Certainly,  it  has  direct  control  of  such 
natural  moral  truths  as  are  morally  impossible  to  unaided  in- 
telligence. 


BOUQUILLON  355 

G.  Bouquillon^s  Argument.  Bouquillon  seems  to  claim  di- 
rect control  of  education  for  the  state.  Here  is  his  argument, 
his  apodictic  syllogism.  Major — ''Civil  authority  has  the 
right  to  use  all  legitimate  temporal  means  it  judges  necessary 
for  the  attainment  of  the  temporal  common  welfare,  which 
is  the  end  of  civil  society.  Minor — Now,  among  the  most 
necessary  means  for  the  attainment  of  the  temporal  welfare 
of  the  commonwealth,  is  the  diffusion  of  human  knowledge. 
Conclusion — Therefore  civil  authority  has  the  right  to  use 
the  means  necessary  for  the  diffusion  of  such  knowledge,  that 
is  to  say,  to  teach  it,  or  rather  to  have  it  taught  by  capable 
agents,"  p.  12. 

About  the  Major — If  the  parents  refuse  to  agree,  the  means 
are  not  legitimate,  because  the  rights  of  the  family  are  in- 
vaded. If  the  parents  agree,  state  education  is  not  compul- 
sory and  the  state's  right  to  education  is  indirect,  not  direct, 
getting  all  its  validity  from  the  consent  of  parents. 

About  the  Minor — The  diffusion  of  human  knowledge  to 
such  as  are  willing  to  receive  it,  is  not  education  in  strict  sense. 
Jurisdiction  is  wanting.  To  teach  or  instruct  the  willing,  is 
not  to  educate,  excepting  perhaps  in  part,  because  independ- 
ent of  revelation,  without  which  morality  is  impossible. 
Revelation  cannot  be  received  or  rejected  at  will. 

About  the  Conclusion.  To  teach  or  instruct  children  against 
the  will  of  their  parents,  is  an  illegitimate  means  to  the  diffu- 
sion of  knowledge,  because  it  is  an  invasion  of  family  rights. 
The  state's  one  legitimate  way  to  diffuse  human  knowledge, 
is  to  build  schools,  employ  capable  teachers,  furnish  suitable 
text-books,  all  at  the  discretion  and  with  the  consent  of  par- 
ents; to  help  parents  perform  their  duty,  without  robbing 
parents  of  their  sacred  right;  and  all  this  makes  the  state's 
power  over  education  indirect,  not  direct.  The  Church  is 
educator  by  divine  command,  parents  are  educators  by  nature, 
the  state  is  educator  by  favor  of  Church  and  parents. 

H.  Bcniquillon  and  History.  Bouquillon 's  arguments  from 
history  prove  nothing,  because  princes  in  question  got  their 
morality  from  Church,  acknowledged  right  of  inspection  in 
bishops,  and  obeyed  the  Pope.  The  state  has  no  more  right  to 
found  mixed  or  neutral  schools  than  agnostic  schools.  Such 
a  state  ignores   revelation,   and  is  incapable  of   education. 


356  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

Pope  Leo  condemns  all  such  schools,  as  well  as  Syllabus,  48. 
Our  rulers  have  on  their  hands  a  bad  bargain,  and  they  try  to 
meet  conditions  without  hurting  anybody.  We  condemn,  not 
our  rulers,  but  the  Catholics  who  send  their  their  children 
to  such  schools  without  need  and  without  precautions. 

The  state  has  no  authority  to  set  aside  parents  in  educa- 
tion. Injustice  is  not  compatible  with  authority.  The  state's 
rights  are  therefore  limited  to  the  repression  of  immoral 
or  treasonable  teachers,  and  to  the  promotion  of  learning  by 
supplementing  private  enterprise,  and  encouraging  letters ;  to 
substituting  for  parents,  when  they  are  dead  or  notoriously 
vicious,  and  when  nobody  is  bound  to  the  child  by  closer 
ties  of  relationship.     This  control  is,  of  course,  indirect. 

Church  control  is  higher  and  more  complete  than  even 
parental.  Her  mission  is  supernatural,  the  mission  of  par- 
ents is  natural.  The  state,  in  union  with  the  Church,  has 
completer  rights  than  when  alone. 

Education  is  not  in  state  control,  simply  because  the  growth 
of  learning  is  conducive  to  the  common  good.  Every  such 
argument  proves  too  much,  common  ownership  of  property, 
supervision  of  the  kitchen,  and  the  like.  The  state  must 
promote  the  common  welfare  by  social  means,  without  short- 
ening individual  activity  or  invading  the  home.  Education 
is  an  individual  good,  and  the  state  has  only  indirect  influ- 
ence over  it.  Power  over  cases  of  neglect  implies  no  power 
to  fix  a  minimum  of  education,  except,  perhaps,  for  neglected 
children.  Power  to  punish  parents  who  starve  their  children, 
implies  no  power  to  settle  the  number  of  ounces  a  child  must 
get.  These  matters  are  undefinable  a  priori,  and  must  be 
settled  in  each  particular  case  by  a  competent  judge. 

I.  Bouquillon  and  Authority.  Authors  Bouquillon  quotes 
are  opposed  to  his  theory,  Costa-Rossetti ;  Jansen;  Hammer- 
stein. 

Costa-Rossetti  has  this  thesis,  '*  Considering  natural  law 
only,  parents  cannot  be  compelled  by  civil  authority  to  send 
their  children  to  an  elementary  school,  but  they  may  be 
obliged  to  do  so  in  particular  cases. ' ' 

Three  Theses  of  Jansen.  (1)  Parents  alone  have  right; 
(2)  Lawful  for  nobody  to  instruct  without  authority  from 
parents;  (3)  Parents  not  subject  to  state-control. 


BOUQUILLON  357 

Hammerstein  says,  Parents  are  before  Church  and  state 
in  concept  and  in  fact,  and  without  either,  parents  would 
have  to  educate.  State  has  indirect  right,  namely  to  sup- 
ply what  is  wanting  in  family,  to  found  and  endow  schools 
where  needed,  to  compel  negligent  parents,  to  take  place  of 
parents  for  orphans  and  abandoned  children.  State  has  no 
direct  right,  and  therefore  no  compulsory,  no  monopoly,  no 
minimum.  Some  wrongly  hold  that  children  belong  to  state 
before  parents;  and  this  is  worse  than  Eminent  Domain  and 
conscription;  it  is  Socialism.  State  can  insist  on  necessary 
education  some  way;  and  this  is  not  compulsory  education. 
Church  has  direct  power  over  religion;  indirect  power  over 
natural  knowledge. 


SECTION  III— CIVIL  SOCIETY,  OR  THE  STATE 
THESIS  XII 

Man  is  hy  very  nature  a  social  heing.  Jouin,  204r-212; 
Bickahy,  297-310. 

QUESTION 

Family,  or  domestic  society,  is  not  equal  to  man's  full  evo- 
lution.    State  or  civil  society  is  a  further  need. 

State,  or  civil  society,  means  a  complete  multitude  of  men, 
banded  together  to  safeguard  their  rights  and  promote  their 
common  good. 

It  means  new  relations,  a  new  bond,  new  duties,  new  rights. 

Origin,  scope  and  structure  of  State  are  our  topics. 
TERMS 

By  Very  Nature.  Protestants  in  general  derive  origin  of 
civil  society  from  compact.  They  contend  that  there  was  no 
civil  society  in  the  primitive  state  of  nature.  Hobbes  and 
Rousseau  are  their  standard-bearers. 

Hohhes  (1588-1679),  instructor  to  Charles  II. 

Man's  highest  faculty,  sensation.  Its  object,  pleasure; 
opposed  to  society,  and  favorable  to  egoism  or  selfishness. 
Hence,  solitude,  not  society  in  strictest  accord  with  primitive 
state  of  nature.  Might,  the  only  claim  to  possession;  war 
and  quarrels,  natural  condition.  Interminable  disputes,  be- 
cause strength  was  met  by  trickery,  fraud.  Theory  proved 
by  conduct  of  two  boys  on  first  acquaintance.  Fear,  there- 
fore, led  to  establishment  of  civil  society;  and  passage  from 
state  of  nature  to  political  society  had  fear  for  motive.  Au- 
thority needed,  to  repress  turbulent.  This  authority  without 
bounds  or  limit ;  the  more  sweeping,  the  better. 

358 


HOBBES  AND  ROUSSEAU  ON  STATE  359 

Multitude  transfers  individual  rights  and  forces  to  rep- 
resentative. 

Authority  absolute  and  beyond  law;  unimpeachable,  irre- 
sponsible, superior  to  justice  itself;  disobedience,  invariably 
a  crime ;  became  Church  and  revelation  for  subjects. 

With  Rousseau  (1712-1778),  man's  natural  state  is  a  wan- 
dering and  solitary  life,  like  that  of  wild  beasts.  Strength 
and  ferocity  from  encounters  with  beasts.  Imitate  instinct 
of  brute  creation  for  herding  together.  No  higher  knowledge 
than  that  of  sense.  No  worship,  no  notions  of  duty.  Free 
will  and  intelligence  acquired  only  after  the  lapse  of  many 
ages.  Solitary  life  more  in  accord  with  human  nature,  be- 
cause more  favorable  to  freedom.  Social  contract  fixed  every- 
thing. Therefore,  society  accidental,  no  improvement,  a  mis- 
take, a  curse. 

Absurdities  of  Hobbes  and  Rousseau: 

Hohhes: 

Man  inferior  to  brutes;  lions  fight  with  other  animals,  not 
among  themselves. 

Example  of  small  boy  proves  the  contrary. 

Nature  and  man's  inclination  counsel  peace,  not  war;  order 
is  nature's  first  law,  and  peace  is  order. 

Wars  are  fought  to  establish  peace,  and  settle  disturbed 
relations. 

Hobbes'  entire  system  is  death  to  morality;  petrified, 
adamantine  tyranny. 

Rousseau  : 

Some  refuse  to  take  Rousseau  seriously,  and  regard  his 
theory  an  elegiac  poem  in  memory  of  his  times'  abuses. 

Man  has  no  reason  and  is  limited  to  sensation. 

Man  enjoys  freedom  without  intellect,,  freedom's  founda- 
tion. 

All  mankind  departed  from  man's  natural  and  proper 
condition. 

Absolutely  no  foundation,  able  to  render  the  theory  likely. 

PROOFS 

1.  From  facts. 

2.  From  man's  natural  needs. 


360  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

3.  From  speech. 

4.  From  inborn  kindness. 

5.  From  notion  of  perfectibility. 

6.  From  dictate  of  reason. 

1.  The  oldest  history  at  our  disposal,  monuments  and  kin- 
dred remains,  testify  that  man  always  lived  in  society.  Na- 
ture alone  is  motive  for  a  fact  so  universal,  so  enduring,  so 
constant. 

2.  The  young  of  animals  are  bom  equipped  for  life 's  strug- 
gles, and  little  dependent  for  support  on  parents  or  others; 
the  children  of  men  are  bom  absolutely  helpless.  St.  Thomas 
compares.  Food  ready  for  animals;  garments,  teeth,  horns, 
claws,  wings,  for  defense  or  flight.  Man  has  reason  instead, 
to  direct  work  of  equipment ;  a  man  is  not  sufficient  unto  him- 
self in  the  work  of  equipment ;  he  needs  others.  Instinct  helps 
animals  to  choose  things  beneficial,  and  avoid  things  danger- 
ous or  harmful ;  young  sheep  and  wolf.  Man  knows  in  only  a 
general  way;  many  heads  are  required  to  reduce  general 
knowledge  to  practical  utility. 

3.  Man  enjoys  the  gift  of  speech,  an  accomplishment  denied 
the  rest  of  animal  creation.  Dogs  bark,  to  express  passions 
in  a  general  sort  of  way.  Man  alone  is  able  to  express  him- 
self with  distinctness  and  precision.  Speech  is  the  bond  of 
society,  and  can  have  for  design  nothing  short  of  communi- 
cation between  man  and  man.  This  communication  of  ideas 
can  have  for  result  nothing  short  of  the  formation  of  families 
and  societies. 

4.  Man  is  by  nature  prone  to  spend  himself  on  others,  and 
let  them  into  his  joys  and  griefs.  The  learned  like  to  share 
their  knowledge  with  friends.  The  fortunate  add  to  their 
store  by  manifesting  to  others  their  success.  The  wretched 
derive  comfort  from  the  company  and  commiseration  of  their 
neighbors.  In  a  word,  man  wants  others  to  rejoice  and  be 
sad  with  him;  and  nothing  more  provokes  uneasiness  and 
dissatisfaction  than  distressing  solitude  and  the  privation  of 
mutual  intercourse. 

5.  Man  is  essentially  perfectible.  He  is  always  on  the  road 
with  progress,  employing  his  energies  to  add  to  whatever 
wealth  preceding  ages  have  bequeathed.     His  sense  of  a  want 


PROOFS  361 

of  finish  prevents  him  from  ever  resting  or  accumulating 
moss  or  rust.  Condemned  to  the  task  of  working  out  his 
plans  alone  and  unaided,  his  lot  would  be  a  sorry  one,  in- 
viting disappointment  and  despair.  He  must  face  a  world 
of  difficulties ;  and,  to  win  in  the  end,  must  necessarily  apply 
that  age-old  principle  of  successful  generals,  ''Divide  and 
conquer."  No  one  man  can  hope  to  advance  far  into  the 
secrets  of  a  multitude  of  arts  or  occupations.  Human  weak- 
ness and  limitations  force  us  to  devote  our  energies  to  some 
particular  line  of  work,  and  trust  to  the  activities  of  others 
for  the  rest.  Progress  would  be  practically  impossible,  unless 
the  sons  took  up  the  task  where  the  fathers  left  off;  unless 
succeeding  generations  held  fast  to  and  improved  on  the  re- 
sults achieved  by  the  men  of  old.  Harmony  of  effort  is  a 
prime  requisite  for  anything  like  remarkable  success  in  hu- 
man industry.  And  society  is  the  most  powerful  engine  of 
war  put  at  man's  disposal  by  nature. 

6.  Eeason  clamors  for  order  in  the  various  activities  of 
men.  And  order  without  society  is  impossible  in  the  matter 
of  duties,  rights,  propagation  of  knowledge  and  the  arts,  and 
the  exercise  of  all  the  virtues  peculiar  to  humanity. 

P.S.  All  six  arguments  indisputably  prove  man's  mem- 
bership in  family,  state  and  Church  natural  in  strict  sense, 
whether  immediately  or  mediately;  and  we  note  in  passing 
that  this  present  thesis  has  a  very  important  bearing  on 
Thesis  XIII  and  Thesis  XIV,  where  authority  is  the  topic 
discussed.  Membership  in  society  makes  man  a  social  being, 
and  society  is  threefold,  domestic,  civil,  ecclesiastical,  or  fam- 
ily, state  and  Church.  Man  is  by  very  nature  a  social  being, 
if  these  three  societies  are  natural  to  man  in  strict  sense. 
Recall  what  we  said  in  General  Ethics,  Thesis  II,  about  desire 
of  complete  happiness  and  desire  of  marriage.  Natural  in 
strict  sense  means  inborn,  prompted  and  imposed  by  nature, 
independent  of  man's  choice  and  consent,  unavoidable.  Nat- 
ural in  wide  sense  means  not  inborn,  not  imposed  by  nature, 
not  independent  of  man's  choice  and  consent,  not  unavoid- 
able; but  in  harmony  with  man's  dignity  as  a  human  being. 

All  three  societies  are  strictly  natural  to  man,  but  in  differ- 
ent ways.  Costa-Rossetti,  page  409,  distinguishes  three  ways, 
immediately  natural,  mediately  natural  and  remotely  natural. 


362  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

A  society  immediately  or  mediately  natural  is  naturalin 
strict  sense,  a  society  remotely  natural  is  natural  in  wide 
sense.  A  society  is  immediately  natural  when  its  purpose  and 
character  flow  immediately  from  man 's  nature ;  and  the  fam- 
ily is  an  instance.  Every  man  is  bom  into  a  family,  he  is 
always  a  son  of  some  parents,  nature  wants  parents  to  be  mar- 
ried, marriage  constitutes  family,  children  born  out  of  mar- 
riage are  against  nature,  branded  by  the  world  as  things 
of  shame,  no  free  will  about  entering  family.  A  society  is 
mediately  natural,  when  immediately  natural  societies  are  its 
constituent  parts,  when  its  purpose  and  character  flow  from 
man's  nature  in  such  a  way  that  the  man's  free  choice  has 
something  to  do  with  its  organization;  and  the  state  and 
Church  are  instances.  Man  is  bom  into  a  state,  he  is  always 
a  member  of  some  family,  family^  is  always  a  unit  in  some 
state.  Church  is  as  natural  a  society  as  state,  because  as 
needful  for  spiritual  prosperity  as  state  is  for  temporal ; 
men  are  born  into  it,  nature  wants  all  men  to  belong  to  the 
true  Church,  nature  wants  all  men  to  be  Catholic ;  it  is  against 
nature  to  be  anything  else,  wrong  churches  are  from  compact 
and  civil  law,  not  true  Church;  God  and  nature  settle  that, 
no  moral  freedom  is  left,  physical  stands;  too  important  to 
leave  to  men's  choice,  eternal  salvation  is  at  stake.  A  so- 
ciety is  remotely  natural,  when  not  at  variance  with  man's 
nature,  though  its  purpose  and  character  are  fixed  not  by 
man's  nature  but  by  his  free  choice,  not  imposed  by  nature, 
not  unavoidable;  and  a  business-partnership  is  an  instance. 
A  society  is  unnatural  when  its  purpose  and  character  are 
wicked,  when  it  is  without  moral  union  based  on  duties,  when 
it  is  in  reality  no  society  and  ought  to  be  dissolved ;  and  the 
Freemasons  are  an  instance. 

Nature  definitely  settles  the  family  to  which  a  man  must 
belong,  no  man  ever  ceases  to  be  the  son  of  his  parents.  In 
definitely  settling  his  family,  nature  definitely  settles  the 
state,  into  which  he  is  born,  without  definitely  settling  the 
state,  in  which  he  must  live.  Though  born  into  a  fixed  state, 
a  man  can  change  his  allegiance  from  one  country  to  another ; 
though  he  cannot  change  his  nationality,  he  can  change  his 
citizenship,  but  always  in  such  a  way  that  nature  wants  him 


PRINCIPLES  363 

to  be  always  a  citizen  of  some  state,  leaving  the  determination 
of  the  particular  state  to  his  own  free  choice. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Bousseau  says:  a.  To  get  down  to  man's  natural  con- 
dition, we  must  strip  him  of  whatever  ornaments  and  advan- 
tages the  civilization  of  centuries  added  to  his  original  per- 
fections. Stripped  of  these  ornaments,  man  is  nothing  more 
noble  than  what  Rousseau  paints  him,  a  wandering  beast, 
without  reason,  and  without  social  aspirations. 

b.  Universal  ideas  are  the  immediate  effects  of  language, 
and  language  is  not  at  all  natural  to  man,  but  the  result  of 
art  and  study.  It  would,  therefore,  seem  that  in  the  state  of 
nature  man  was  wholly  destitute  of  universal  ideas. 

c.  America  and  Africa  are  inhabited  by  tribes  of  human 
beings  more  like  beasts  than  men,  with  no  religion,  no  laws, 
no  customs. 

Answer:  a.  Man  must  not  be  stripped  of  his  essence;  and, 
as  long  as  he  remains  in  possession  of  that,  he  is  the  owner  of 
a  higher  faculty  than  sense,  viz.,  reason.  He  is  by  nature  a 
rational  animal,  a  species  of  being  entirely  and  utterly  dis- 
tinct from  brute  creation. 

b.  In  the  supposition  of  the  Nominalists  Rousseau's  theory 
about  universals  would  be  true ;  but  that  supposition  is  long 
since  exploded.  Universal  ideas  are  independent  of  words, 
and  owe  their  being  to  a  process  of  abstraction  founded  on 
the  reality  of  things.  Language  is  no  work  of  art,  it  is  the 
product  of  nature,  which  fits  men  with  organs  nicely  ar- 
ranged and  admirably  intended  for  the  production  of  articu- 
late sounds.  This  language  or  that  language  in  particular 
is,  of  course,  a  work  of  art ;  but  nature  evidently  had  in  view 
the  use  of  some  language  or  other,  subject  to  the  choice  of 
different  peoples. 

c.  No  barbarous  nation  is  so  poor  as  not  to  possess  and 
employ  reason  in  the  ordinary  affairs  of  life.  Rousseau  may 
endeavor  to  deceive  his  readers  into  believing  that  rude  rea- 
soning and  dense  ignorance  are  no  higher  essays  at  knowl- 
edge than  sensation;  but  the  man  capable  of  such  folly  is, 


364  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

either  unacquainted  with  the  first  rudiments  of  philosophy^ 
or  dishonest  enough  to  impose  on  the  credulity  of  others  by 
downright  lying.  Neither  is  any  nation  so  barbarous  as  not 
to  acknowledge  a  deity  and  worship  him  in  some  way  suited 
to  its  false  and  imperfect  notions.  The  mistakes  of  barbar- 
ism in  the  matter  of  religion  and  laws  are  not  a  gift  of  nature, 
but  an  addition  made  to  nature  by  the  depravity  and  ^vicked- 
ness  of  free  agents.  Nature  even  in  barbarians  rebels  against 
the  wrong  done  her,  but  she  is  kept  in  check  by  the  species  of 
omnipotence  resident  in  liberty's  tyranny. 

B.  Hohhes  says:  In  state  of  nature  everything  common, 
no  private  property.  Therefore  wrongs  and  universal  quar- 
reling. The  arrogant  and  strong  always  adding  to  their 
stores  by  oppression  and  robbery;  the  mild  and  gentle  in  con- 
tinual strife,  to  protect  themselves  and  their  goods.  Differ- 
ences of  disposition  beget  hatred  and  contempt.  Men  travel 
laden  with  weapons,  citizens  lock  their  doors,  the  state  sup- 
ports policemen,  sheriffs,  troops. 

Answer:  Hobbes'  whole  mistake  consists  in  foolishly  sup- 
posing that  human  nature  proceeds  from  the  hands  of  the 
Creator  with  all  the  imperfections  resulting  to  it  from  man 's 
perverseness.  Man's  power  for  harm  is  immense,  and  the 
wicked  are  no  true  exponents  of  human  nature.  To  form  a 
fair  estimate  of  what  man  would  be  in  a  state  of  nature,  we 
must  take  the  virtuous  for  standard;  and  surely  their  dispo- 
sitions and  methods  of  behavior  tally  exactly  with  the  require- 
ments of  society.  Individual  defects  ought  not  to  be  laid  to 
the  account  of  human  nature,  and  saddled  on  the  back  of  all 
mankind.  Nature  is  not  to  blame  for  the  precautions  taken 
by  citizens  against  danger  to  life  and  property,  but  the  pas- 
sions of  men,  greed  of  gain,  anger,  quarrelsomeness  and  qual- 
ities loudly  condemned  by  nature.  Even  the  wicked  cannot 
shake  off  this  inclination  towards  society,  precisely  because  it 
is  from  nature. 

C.  If  society  is  a  dictate  of  reason,  monks  and  solitaries 
are  out  of  harmony  with  nature,  and  guilty  of  a  grievous 
wrong. 

Answer:  Society  is  a  dictate  of  reason  meant  for  mankind 
as  a  collection,  and  as  a  help  to  the  race's  betterment.  It  is 
not  a  dictate  meant  for  each  and  every  individual,  as  an  end 


PRINCIPLES  365 

of  absolute  and  supreme  importance.  For  higher  purposes 
and  motives  a  man  can  with  praise  abandon  society  and  live 
apart  from  his  fellows.  Naturally  speaking,  however,  and 
apart  from  the  supernatural  advantages  accruing  to  the  her- 
mit, it  must  be  said  that  normally  life  in  solitude  is  far  in- 
ferior to  life  in  society. 

D.  Differences  between  Hobbes  and  Rousseau: 

Hobbes,  natural  state  opposed  to  society ;  Rousseau,  natural 
state  outside  of  society. 

Hobbes,  society  bettered  man's  condition;  Rousseau,  so- 
ciety, a  downright  injury  to  mankind. 

Hobbes,  natural  state,  universal  warfare ;  Rousseau,  natural 
state,  good,  peaceful,  happy. 

Hobbes,  society  founded  on  egoism  and  fear.  From  egoism, 
universal  war,  because  everything  in  common;  fear  of  death 
and  want  of  security,  desire  of  society.  Each  transferred  his 
will  to  one  man  or  body  of  men ;  hence,  Regal  Absolutism. 

Rousseau,  man  in  natural  state  happy  with  the  happiness 
of  brutes,  oaks,  rivulets,  trees.  No  need  of  society,  but  by  de- 
grees compacts  were  made  at  the  expense  of  liberty.  Hence, 
"Social  Contract.'' 


THESIS  xm 

A  multitude  and  authority,  or  subjects  and  a  ruler,  are  ele- 
ments essential  to  civil  society,  or  the  State.    Jouin,  212-214. 

QUESTION 

The  Staters  Pxtrpose.  The  State  has  for  object  external 
order,  actuated  by  internal  righteousness,  and  all  for  com- 
mon good  of  the  citizens.  Kant  has  another  theory  about 
the  guiding  purpose  of  political  society.  He  assumes  that 
man's  freedom  is  nothing  worth,  unless  it  implies  absolute 
independence  of  all  restraint,  moral  as  well  as  physical,  de- 
pending solely  on  itself  and  on  whatever  reason,  unbiassed 
by  any  outside  recommendations  or  impressions,  decrees. 
These  impressions  serving  to  destroy  freedom  are  twofold  in 
his  hypothesis,  inner  and  outer.  The  former  have  their 
origin  in  the  mind's  appetites  and  desires.  The  latter  are 
due  to  outside  forces  at  work  against  an  agent's  free  choice. 
The  first  class  of  impressions  are  subject  matter  for  what  he 
styles  moral  law;  the  second  class,  subject  matter  for  what 
he  chooses  to  designate  juridical  or  judicial  law.  Moral  law 
is  therefore  a  restraint  on  nature  and  inborn  factors  of  dis- 
order. Juridical  law  holds  in  check  what  enemies  threaten 
an  attack  on  freedom  from  without.  To  bring  order  out  of 
the  chaos  liable  to  result  from  the  conflict  between  will  and 
will  in  the  field  of  outward  agencies,  reason  and  nature  made 
the  establishment  of  the  State,  or  political  society,  impera- 
tively necessary.  In  establishing  the  State  it  imposed  on  the 
same  the  obligation  of  seeing  to  it  that  each  man's  freedom 
be  confined  within  such  limits  as  not  to  interfere  with  the 
freedom  of  others.  The  principle,  therefore,  of  coexistence 
of  individual  liberties  lies  at  the  root  of  civil  society,  and 
constitutes  civil  society's  sole  purpose  and  aim.  This  theory 
of  Kant  is  built  from  turret  to  foundation-stone  on  false  prin- 

366 


ELEMENTS  AND  PURPOSE  OF  STATE         367 

ciples.    We  call  attention  to  these  three  statements  in  par- 
ticular : 

a.  Man  is  absolutely  independent,  responsible  to  no  one 
save  himself. 

b.  Morality  is  an  affair  of  abstractions,  outside  the  sphere 
of  concrete  realities. 

c.  Human  liberty,  viewed  externally,  is  illimitable  and  un- 
confined. 

We  beg  leave  to  think  that  all  three  statements  are  un- 
founded and  untrue. 

a.  Man  is  God's  creature,  and  essentially  dependent  on  his 
Creator,  essentially  responsible  before  God  for  his  every  act. 

b.  Morality's  principles,  though  abstract  in  themselves,  are 
founded  on  concrete  relations,  existent  not  in  the  mind  solely, 
but  alive  and  at  work  in  the  beings  that  surround  us.  Kant, 
it  may  be  remarked,  would  blasphemously  rate  love  of  God 
unmoral,  because,  forsooth,  God  its  object  is  outside  the  agent 
eliciting  the  act,  and  because  love  is  accomplished  not  by  rea- 
son, but  by  the  will. 

c.  In  the  abstract,  human  liberty  may  be  considered  a 
thing  without  bound  or  limit;  but  in  the  concrete,  in  the 
everyday  affairs  of  men,  liberty  is  decidedly  restricted.  The 
object  matter  on  which  it  exercises  itself,  the  duties  incumbent 
on  the  free  agent  in  the  use  of  his  liberty,  certainly  operate 
to  render  human  liberty  anything  but  illimitable  and  unre- 
strained. 

In  Kant's  system  society  would  procure  to  mankind  noth- 
ing higher  than  a  negative  good,  the  curbing  of  wicked  vio- 
lence and  cessation  of  quarrels  between  man  and  man.  If  it 
once  set  about  accomplishing  any  positive  effect,  it  would  at 
once  degenerate  to  either  individualism,  or  selfishness  and 
despotism.  It  would  either  oblige  every  man  to  work  for  him- 
self solely,  or,  relieving  the  State  of  all  moral  responsibility 
in  its  arbitrary  enactments,  would  rob  subjects  of  the  protec- 
tion now  afforded  by  the  salutary  restraints  morality  exer- 
cises over  even  the  State.  The  abuses  arising  from  Kant's 
system  are  manifold: 

a.  All  public  morality  would  perish  from  the  earth.  The 
State  would  be  able  to  prohibit  only  what  actions  of  mine 
interfere  with  the  full  liberty  of  my  neighbor.     Suicide,  bias- 


368  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

phemy,  sacrilege,  unholy  contracts,  public  scandals,  if  done 
with  the  full  consent  of  parties  concerned,  would  be  no  crimes 
at  all. 

b.  Religious  indifference,  political  atheism  would  be  men's 
rights;  and  the  Church  would  have  no  voice  whatever  in  the 
affairs  of  men. 

c.  Finally,  government,  when  closest  to  its  end's  fulfilment, 
would  lose  its  usefulness,  its  very  reason  for  existence.  The 
State  would  slowly  work  out  its  own  destruction,  and  would 
ever  tend  towards  self-annihilation.  Harmony  once  secured, 
men  would  have  no  further  need  of  the  State's  directive  and 
saving  influence.  In  our  theory,  even  with  this  harmony  se- 
cured, the  State  would  still  be  a  need.  Righteousness  and 
common  good  demand  state.  State  has  indirect  control  of  our 
thoughts  and  wishes. 

Right  System.  The  State  has  for  object  external  order, 
actuated  by  internal  righteousness,  and  all  for  the  common 
good  of  the  citizens.  The  end  or  object  of  a  thing  is  that 
for  which  it  exists,  that  towards  which  its  energies  must  tend. 
We  have  already  described  the  various  classes  of  ends.  To 
now  apply.  God's  glory  is  the  absolutely  last  end  of  society, 
as  it  is  of  everything  else  in  the  universe  of  existences.  The 
relatively  last  end  of  society  is  external  order,  procured  with 
a  view  to  the  common  welfare  of  its  members,  and  actuated 
by  morality  or  rectitude.  Society  accomplishes  this  end,  when 
it  secures  to  citizens  means  to  fully  exercise  their  rights. 
The  means  themselves  are  said  to  be  society's  proximate  or 
nearest  end.  Actual  possession  by  the  citizens  of  these  means, 
or  prosperity  in  first  act,  is  society's  remote  or  more  distant 
end.  The  actual  evolution  of  faculties  and  exercise  of  rights 
constitute  civic  prosperity  in  second  act,  or  in  its  complete- 
ness. Order  is  taken  in  its  philosophic  sense,  and  means  a 
becoming  disposition  of  things,  such  as  allots  to  each  its  own 
proper  place.  Righteousness  is  harmony  with  reason  or  ob- 
jective order.  If  external  order  were  not  actuated  with 
righteousness,  society  would  be  ethically  wrong,  and  would 
be  in  direct  opposition  with  man's  natural  tendencies.  That 
society  has  no  other  purpose  than  the  purpose  we  assign,  is 
evident  from  the  fact  that  men  enter  society  with  no  other 
end  in  view.     They  regard  it  as  an  institution  designed  for 


PROOFS  AND  PRINCIPLES  369 

the  relief  of  individual  deficiencies,  an  aid  to  the  full  and 
peaceful  enjoyment  of  their  rights;  and,  therefore,  intended 
to  establish  external  order,  actuated  by  internal  righteousness, 
for  the  common  good  of  the  citizens. 

The  scope  of  society  determined,  we  can  now  proceed  to 
discuss  its  elements  or  structure.  By  multitude  we  under- 
stand any  large  or  small  collection  of  individuals.  Authority 
in  the  State  is  a  moral  right  independent  of  every  other  right 
in  its  own  order,  to  direct  or  guide  the  actions  of  citizens 
towards  the  common  good.  Scholastics,  applying  their  theory 
of  matter  and  form,  regard  the  multitude  its  matter,  the  au- 
thority its  form.  Society  is  therefore  a  compound  reality, 
and  these  two  parts  are  indispensably  necessary  to  its  being. 

PROOFS 

Society,  or  the  state,  is  an  individual  body,  not  physically, 
but  morally  speaking.  It  is  likewise  a  peaceable  and  well 
ordered  assembly  of  many.  But  we  must  recognize  in  every 
individual  body  parts  blended  together,  and  a  principle  ef- 
fecting the  union  sufficient  to  constitute  the  body  one.  In 
the  same  way  every  peaceable  and  well  ordered  assembly 
necessarily  involves  the  idea  of  individuals  making  up  the 
assembly,  and  some  principle  capable  of  maintaining  peace, 
and  holding  the  different  wills  to  harmony.  Multitude 
means  the  persons  forming  the  state.  Authority  means  prin- 
ciple procuring  unity  and  preserving  order.     Ergo. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Subjects  are  the  concrete  expressions  of  multitude ;  rul- 
ers, the  concrete  expression  of  authority. 

B.  Difference  between  authority  and  dominion,  or  prop- 
erty :  Dominion  turns  on  things ;  authority,  on  persons.  Use 
of  dominion  is  a  free  act ;  exercise  of  authority,  a  duty.  Do- 
minion has  for  object  the  owner's  private  profit;  authority 
is  for  good  of  community. 

Difference  between  a  subject  and  a  slave:  A  slave  as  such 
is  more  like  a  thing  or  chattel  than  a  person,  in  point  of  serv- 
ice; a  subject  as  such  has  all  the  qualifications  of  a  person. 


370 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


and  enjoys  a  person's  free  rights  and  privileges.  A  slave  is 
a  person  and  a  chattel,  a  subject  is  a  person  and  no  chattel. 
A  slave  is  absolutely  dependent  on  the  wishes  of  his  master, 
in  point  of  service ;  a  subject  is  moved  to  act  not  by  the  su- 
perior's will  precisely,  but  by  the  authority  it  represents  and 
by  the  appointment  of  reason.  A  slave  works  unto  his  mas- 
ter's gain;  a  subject  aims  at  the  advancement  of  the  whole 
community. 

C.  It  is  a  duty  incumbent  on  the  State  to  procure  the  pros- 
perity of  every  single  citizen,  whether  rich  or  poor,  learned 
or  ignorant,  noble  or  plebeian.  Any  legislation  aiming  at 
the  aggrandizement  of  a  certain  few  to  the  injury  of  certain 
others,  is  against  the  first  elements  of  political  morality,  and 
grievously  wrong.  To  procure  signifies  to  furnish  means,  the 
citizen  himself  must  apply  them. 

D.  Only  admissible  form  of  society,  that  in  which  liberty 
and  equality  are  guaranteed,  meaning  equality  of  opportuni- 
ties. 


I 


THESIS  XIV 

Authority  proceeds  immediately  from  God.  In  the  nature 
of  things,  and  ordinarily,  authority  is  not  conferred  on  the 
people.  Ordinarily,  and  in  the  nature  of  things,  the  consent 
of  the  people  fixes  or  determines  the  person  in  whom  author- 
ity resides.  This  consent  may  he  implied  or  expressed,  im- 
mediate or  gradual,  and  cannot  always  he  withheld.  Jonin, 
214^226;  Bickahy,  310-338. 

QUESTION 

Two  questions: 

A.  Whence  comes  authority? 

B.  How  is  authority  conferred? 

One  deals  with  the  origin  of  authority;  the  other,  with  its 
recipient. 

A.  All  Catholics  are  agreed  about  the  origin  of  authority. 
Catholics  are  not  a  unit  on  the  second  question.  Rousseau 
and  Hobbes,  on  account  of  the  theories  already  alluded  to, 
are  logically  obliged  to  invent  a  false  theory  about  authority's 
origin. 

The  word,  immediately,  needs  explanation.  Two  ways: 
Cause  immediate,  when  no  other  cause  intervenes.  Election, 
never  a  cause.  It  is  a  condition.  The  two  ways  are  posi- 
tive enactment  and  law  of  nature.  Moses  and  Aaron  in  Holy 
Scripture  received  their  authority  from  God  in  first  way, 
because  chosen  and  appointed  by  God  without  any  free  act 
on  part  of  people.  Positive  enactment  is  likewise  the  method 
in  force  in  case  of  the  Sovereign  Pontiff.  God  in  revelation 
instituted  the  office  in  such  sort  that  men  are  forbidden  the 
liberty  of  changing,  limiting  or  lessening  the  Pope's  author- 
ity, though  they  are  allowed  the  privilege  of  electing  or  choos- 
ing an  individual  for  the  office.  Authority  can  spring  from 
a  law  of  nature,  and,  therefore,  from  God  as  its  immediate 
cause,  in  a  threefold  manner. 

371 


372 


•ECIAL  ETHICS 


a.  It  can  belong  to  a  subject  by  very  force  of  creation,  and 
in  virtue  of  the  natural  order  of  things.  A  father's  author- 
ity in  the  family  is  an  instance. 

b.  It  can  be  bestowed  by  God  on  a  person  determined  by 
some  such  accidental  fact  as  acquiescence  or  inheritance.  The 
accidental  fact  is  by  no  means  a  cause  of  the  acquired  au- 
thority, but  at  most  an  indispensable  condition. 

c.  Finally,  it  can  result  from  the  free  choice  of  a  people, 
expressed  by  suffrage.  Nature  in  this  case  advises  and  coun- 
sels the  act,  it  gives  the  act,  all  its  force.  It  renders  the  act 
such  a  medium  that  in  the  event  of  its  absence  no  authority 
would  accrue  to  any  individual.  And  yet,  because  of  the  in- 
fluence nature  exerts  in  the  performance  of  the  act,  and  be- 
cause of  the  circumstance  that  the  act  operates  merely  to 
designate  the  person,  on  whom  God  afterwards  bestows  au- 
thority, God  remains  the  immediate  cause  of  political  su- 
premacy in  even  a  republic. 

B.  The  second  question  about  the  recipient  of  authority  is 
more  delicate  and  harder  to  settle.  Apart  from  certain 
openly  false  opinions,  the  Scholastics  themselves  are  divided 
on  this  topic,  and  proffer  apparently  different  solutions. 
Everybody  is  agreed  that  a  multitude,  or  the  people  as  such, 
cannot  exercise  authority.  It  would  be  quite  out  of  the 
question,  and  simply  impossible,  for  each  person  to  issue 
orders  to  his  neighbor,  and  be  in  turn  ordered  by  the  neigh- 
bor. It  would  be  impossible  in  the  tumult  of  opinions  to 
decide  what  person  was  invested  with  the  prerogatives  en- 
titling him  to  the  obedience  of  others.  A  multitude  of  the 
kind  would  be  matter  without  form;  and,  therefore,  no  so- 
ciety at  all.  Everyone  would  have  to  know  everything,  and 
everyone  would  have  to  pass  sentence  on  every  measure  and 
detail  of  government.  Therefore,  even  if  authority  were  first 
bestowed  by  God  on  the  multitude  or  whole  people,  an  indi- 
vidual ruler,  in  whom  this  authority  would  be  centred,  would 
be  a  necessity  of  nature,  and  as  such  indispensably  necessary. 
By  ruler  we  mean  any  person  or  body  of  persons  legitimately 
constituted  to  exercise  full  dominion  of  jurisdiction.  A  mul- 
titude is  a  collection  of  individuals.  A  people  is  a  multitude 
of  citizens  living  under  the  same  government.  State  au- 
thority is  social  power  existent  in  particular  and  determined 


AUTHORITY  AND  ITS  RECIPIENT  373 

individuals.  There  can  be  no  difficulty  in  understanding  that 
no  mere  multitude,  no  people  separated  from  its  ruler,  is  a 
fit  subject  for  authority.  In  fact,  a  multitude  as  such  can 
never  become  the  actual  exponent  and  agent  of  authority. 
All  the  difficulty  lies  in  determining  whether  a  people  can  in 
first  act,  as  they  say,  retain  authority,  immediately  bestowed 
on  the  people  by  God  and  wielded  by  the  sovereign  in  the 
State.  To  compare,  state  is  the  whole  man,  body  and  soul. 
Authority  in  ruler  is  the  soul,  multitude  is  the  body. 

Philosophy  discusses  four  different  systems,  advocating 
each  its  own  theory  about  the  manner  of  authority's  bestowal 
by  God.  Their  authors  are:  ^'  James  I,  ^'  Taparelli,  ^'  the 
Scholastic  in  general,  *•  Hohhes  and  Rousseau. 

1.  James  I,  supported  for  a  long  time  in  his  opinion  by 
the  University  of  Oxford,  contended  that  kings  and  Popes 
were  on  a  level.  Men,  therefore,  as  he  thinks,  are  as  unable 
to  tamper  with  the  authority  of  secular  princes  as  they  are 
to  tamper  with  that  of  the  Sovereign  Pontiff.  They  cannot 
in  justice  lessen  or  change  the  prerogatives  of  kings.  They 
cannot  frame  laws  setting  bounds  to  royal  wishes,  nor  can 
they  with  any  show  of  right  object  when  their  rulers  override 
the  limitations  of  law.  James  appeals  to  the  instances  of 
Saul  and  David ;  but  his  appeal  is  vain,  since  revelation  made 
their  claims  good.  No  modern  king  has  revelation  on  his 
side.  The  divine  right  of  kings  is  authority's  only  defense, 
in  the  opinion  of  James,  against  factions  and  rebellious  sub- 
jects. Against  James  we  maintain  that  apart  even  from 
the  divine  right  of  kings,  a  people  is  not  at  liberty  to  limit 
at  will  power  once  transferred  to  the  ruler.  It  is  far  less  able 
to  abolish  such  power,  unless  the  ruler,  abusing  his  trust, 
descends  to  the  meanness  and  injustice  of  open  tyranny. 
This,  too,  is  the  case,  in  Bellarmine's  opinion,  though  he  fa- 
vors the  supremacy  of  the  people  to  something  of  an  excess. 
He  thinks  that  a  people  never  completely  hands  over  its  au- 
thority to  a  king ;  but,  always  retaining  it  in  habit  or  potency, 
can  in  certain  cases  actually  recover  it  and  administer  things. 

2.  The  second  system,  that  of  Taparelli  and  many  modern 
writers  among  Catholics,  advocates  God's  immediate  bestowal 
of  authority  on  the  ruler,  and  denies  to  consent  of  the  people 
everything  higher  than  accidental  necessity  or  importance. 


374 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


The  ruler,  according  to  these  writers,  is  determined  either 
by  some  antecedent  concrete  fact  or  by  the  free  consent  of  the 
people.  Hence  they  count  consent  of  the  people  necessary 
only  by  accident,  when  the  antecedent  concrete  fact  is  want- 
ing. Ordinarily  this  fact  settles  succession,  and  dissent  on 
the  part  of  the  subjects  is  out  of  the  question.  The  all  im- 
portant fact  is  described  as  superiority  from  the  standpoint  of 
domestic  headship.  The  state  is  in  its  first  origin  an  out- 
growth of  the  family.  The  father,  from  ruler  in  household 
eoncerns,  grew  by  degrees  to  exercise  political  sovereignty 
over  his  own  immediate  family,  and  families  connected  with 
it.  As  he  holds  from  nature  the  authority  to  govern  his  wife 
and  children,  so  from  nature  he  holds  his  right  to  manage 
the  State.  These  authors,  therefore,  consider  God's  gift  of 
authority  immediate,  inasmuch  as  it  proceeds  from  a  law  of 
nature.  They  contend  that,  in  the  ordinary  course  of  events, 
a  people's  consent  is  not  absolutely  necessary;  admitting  at 
the  same  time  that  contingencies  can  happen  in  which  this 
consent  becomes  a  reason  why  God  vests  some  set  person  with 
authority.  Different  from  doctrine  of  James  I,  who  derives 
authority  from  positive  divine  enactment.  Kings,  therefore, 
are  on  a  level  with  the  Pope.  People  cannot  establish,  can- 
not change  authority,  because  it  is  a  divine  institution. 

3.  The  system  proposed  hy  Scholastic  philosophy  is  compli- 
cated, and  offers  among  others  these  characteristic  points: 

1.  Authority  universally  considered  comes  immediately  from 
God. 

2.  This  authority  rests  immediately  in  the  whole  multi- 
tude. 

(N.B.  To  at  once  refute  this  theory,  we  answer  the  three 
reasons  alleged  in  its  support. 

X.  Because  it  is  of  divine  right  and  granted  by  God  to  no 
one  in  particular. 

Answer:  Impossible,  because  multitude  unfit  to  govern. 
It  is  granted  to  ruler  chosen  by  people. 

y.  Because  no  one  is  born  a  king.     All  are  bom  equal. 

Answer:  True  in  the  abstract,  but  circumstances  sur- 
rounding birth  make  some  infants  kings.  In  this  Scholastic 
sense  no  man  could  own  property  by  law  of  nature.  The 
ruler  selected  by  the  people  is  not  bom  selected. 


SCHOLASTIC  SYSTEM  375 

z.  Because  Society  ought  to  be  a  perfect  government,  with 
prerogatives  enabling  it  to  protect  itself  and  punish  disturb- 
ers of  its  tranquillity. 

Answer:  This  is  true  enough  of  a  perfect  society,  consist- 
ing of  ruler  and  people ;  not  true  of  a  half -society,  consisting 
solely  of  subjects  without  a  ruler.  It  is  the  ruler's  business, 
not  the  business  of  separate  individual  citizens  to  protect  the 
state  and  punish  its  disturbers). 

3.  The  multitude  can  and  must  make  over  its  authority  to 
some  king  or  governing  body,  with  no  vestige  of  a  right  to 
retain  it. 

4.  The  law  of  nations  rules  men's  choice  of  form  of  govern- 
ment, because  prior  to  government  they  are  without  other 
law. 

5.  Political  power  is  from  God,  but  through  human  counsel 
as  a  medium,  not  through  multitude  as  medium,  in  which 
authority  first  resides. 

(N.B.  Difference  between  civil  and  ecclesiastical  power. 
In  general,  civil  power  is  from  God  by  divine  law;  in  par- 
ticular, from  God  through  the  law  of  nations.  Ecclesiastical 
power  is  always  and  in  every  case  God's  immediate  gift,  and 
positive  divine  law  is  its  foundation.  Political  power  is  vested 
in  the  multitude ;  ecclesiastical  power  belongs  to  one  man.  In 
political,  multitude  controls  prerogatives;  in  ecclesiastical, 
multitude  is  without  control.) 

6.  Men  dispose  the  material  for  the  reception  of  the  form 
infused  by  God,  i.e.,  men  designate  the  ruler,  God  vests  him 
with  authority.  Suarez  says  as  much  in  De  Legibus,  Bk.  3, 
c.  3,  n.  2. 

7.  A  people  never  makes  complete  surrender  of  its  authority 
to  the  king.  It  always  retains  the  authority  by  way  of  a 
habit,  or  capacity,  or  in  quiet.  After  the  appointment  of  a 
king,  no  two  authorities  remain  capable  to  pass  into  act. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  safe  to  say  that  two  remain,  one  in  the  king, 
the  other  in  his  people;  understanding  always  that  the  au- 
thority, resident  in  the  people,  is  merely  habitual,  debarred 
from  activity,  as  long  as  the  king's  authority  endures.  When 
the  king's  authority  falls,  then  that  of  the  multitude  asserts 
itself.     The  people  resumes  its  right  to  designate  a  ruler. 

8.  Suarez  on  the  authority  of  Ulpian  and  St.  Augustine  in- 


376  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

troduces  the  ''Royal  Compact,"  in  virtue  of  which  subjects 
are  considered  to  transfer  all  their  rights  to  the  king,  the 
king  at  the  same  time,  or  in  return  for  the  favor,  assuming 
all  the  responsibility  attaching  to  government. 

9.  A  Dominican,  Father  Victoria,  thus  sums  up  the  doctrine 
of  the  Scholastics:  "By  divine  decree  the  government  holds 
its  power.  This  power  resides  by  divine  and  natural  right 
in  the  government  itself,  since  it  devolves  on  the  government 
to  rule  and  manage  itself,  and  direct  all  its  energies  to  the 
common  good.  Nature  makes  no  difference  between  individ- 
uals in  a  community,  before  the  assignment  of  a  head.  When 
the  king  is  once  established  on  his  throne,  he  must  be  said 
to  have  his  authority  immediately  from  God  alone,  not  from 
the  people  at  all."  These  statements  sound  like  a  contradic- 
tion in  terms;  but  a  distinction  may  serve  to  reconcile  the 
two  Catholic  schools  of  thought  represented  by  Suarez  and 
Victoria  respectively.  Victoria  contends  that  the  people  cre- 
ate their  king,  not  his  royal  authority ;  Suarez  maintains  that 
the  people  make  some  person  ready  and  fit  for  authority. 
Molina  admits  that  the  king  is  above  his  people,  even  col- 
lectively taken. 

To  reconcile  apparent  contradictions  in  Suarez  and  others, 
we  must  only  suppose  that  they  view  authority  and  society 
at  one  time  in  the  abstract ;  at  another,  in  the  concrete.  Ab- 
stractly considered,  like  that  vague  ownership  denominated 
common  and  everybody's  title  before  occupancy,  authority 
exists  in  every  member  composing  a  society  or  state.  Con- 
cretely speaking,  and  taking  the  state  for  an  established  in- 
stitution made  up  of  a  king  and  subjects,  authority  exists 
again  in  every  member  comprised  in  the  society  or  state,  but 
only  after  such  a  manner  that  the  people  dispose  or  make 
ready  the  matter,  choose  a  ruler,  and  God  in  turn  impresses 
on  the  object  of  their  choice  the  form  of  authority. 

Resemblances : 

a.  Civil  power  comes  immediately  from  God  through  nature, 
and  what  comes  through  nature  comes  from  God. 

b.  Certain  human  acts  are  necessary  to  invest  one  man 
rather  than  another  with  authority. 

c.  When  no  prior  right  exists,  when  no  right  is  endangered 
by  such  action,  a  people  has  from  very  nature  the  right,  it  is 


HOBBES  AND  ROUSSEAU  ON  AUTHORITY      377 

in  fact  bound,  to  specify  its  own  form  of  government  and 
appoint  its  own  ruler. 

Differences : 

a'.  Authority  passes  immediately  from  God  to  the  people  = 
abstract. 

Authority  passes  immediately  from  God  to  the  state  =  con- 
crete. 

b'.  Ordinarily,  and  of  itself,  authority  is  the  result  of 
"Royal  Compact";  of  a  variety  of  causes  by  accident  =  no 
ruler  fixed,  choose  ruler. 

Ordinarily,  and  of  itself  authority  has  its  origin  in  family 
authority  or  a  preceding  right ;  by  accident,  in  agreement  = 
ruler  fixed,  no  choice. 

c'.  No  authority  can  accrue  to  a  king  without  some  sort  of 
consent  on  the  part  of  his  people.  Such  consent  may  be  im- 
mediate or  gradual,  implied  or  expressed.  When  a  prior 
right  is  the  foundation  of  the  king's  claim,  no  consent  of  the 
people  is  needed ;  but  the  people  can  in  some  cases  be  obliged 
to  give  consent. 

4.  A  fourth  system  is  that  introduced  hy  Rousseau  and 
Hohhes. 

Rousseau  conceives  authority  as  the  result  of  a  surrender 
of  free  will  and  rights,  made  by  every  member  of  the  state 
or  society.  By  this  surrender  every  individual  deeds  over 
to  the  whole  community  his  person,  and  puts  under  the  di- 
rection and  control  of  a  general  or  universal  will  all  his  pow- 
ers and  faculties.  Public  or  social  authority  is,  therefore, 
with  him  a  sum  total  of  individual  wills  and  liberties,  and 
this  sum  total  constitutes  a  general  or  universal  will,  which 
is  authority,  the  state.  The  very  act  of  alliance  immediately 
produces,  in  place  of  the  single  persons  closing  and  sealing 
this  contract,  a  moral  body,  a  collective  group,  composed  of 
as  many  parts  as  the  suffrages  or  votes  represented  at  the 
meeting.  This  moral  body  assumes  at  the  same  time,  and  by 
the  self-same  act,  its  proper  oneness,  its  personality,  its  life, 
its  will. 

,  Hohhes  establishes  a  like  compact,  made  out  of  fear  and 
from  sense  of  danger.  He  then  vindicates  to  the  state  a 
power  that  puts  it  above  conscience  and  all  law,  human  and 
divine. 


378 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


Against  Rousseau  and  Hohhes: 

1..  Contradiction.  2.  Liberty  inalienable.  3.  Leaves  no 
liberty  in  individual.  4.  Transfer  in  favor  of  individuals; 
no  society  yet;  same  would  command  and  obey.  5.  Man 
would  obey  man — real  slavery.  6.  Authority  would  vary 
with  sum  of  votes — arithmetical  progression. 

DIVISION 

Four  Parts— I,  II,  III,  lY 

I.  Authority  from  God. 

II.  Not  conferred  on  people. 

III. .  People  fix  ruler. 

IV.  Consents. 


PROOFS 

I.  Authority  immediately  from  God. 

1°.  God  makes  to  society  immediate  gift  of  that  without 
which  society  cannot  be  even  conceived  of  in  thought,  of  that 
which  belongs  to  the  very  essence  of  social  order.  But  au- 
thority is  a  thing  of  the  kind.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  The  essences  of  things  moral, 
as  natural  to  man  as  society,  are  supplied  immediately  by 
God. 

Wilh  Regard  to  the  Minor:  A  thing's  essence  is  made  up 
of  its  matter  and  form;  and,  of  these  two  elements,  form  is 
always  considered  the  superior  and  more  important.  Au- 
thority, we  have  seen,  is  the  form;  multitude,  the  matter  of 
society.  Man  is  made  up  of  body  and  soul;  state,  of  multi- 
tude and  authority. 

2°.  The  state  receives  authority  either  immediately  from 
God  or  from  the  individuals  composing  the  state.  But  the 
second  member  of  this  dilemma  is  absurd.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  St.  Thomas  says,  and  the 
world  agrees  with  him,  that  nobody  is  bom  by  very  nature 
a  king,  because  otherwise  everybody  would  be  born  a  king, 
since  nature  is  the  same  in  all  men.  Some  men  are  bom 
kings  by  accident  of  birth  from  royal  parents.  By  birth  or 
nature  they  are  mere  human  beings,  and  no  better  than  com- 


AUTHORITY  AND  MULTITUDE  379 

mon  children.  By  royal  birth  they  are  kings,  and  royal  is 
an  accident  or  quality  superadded  to  birth  or  nature.  It  is 
no  escape  from  this  argument  to  say  that  men  transfer  to  the 
king  not  authority  properly  so-called,  but  dominion  over  their 
own  acts.  The  transaction  is  nowhere  recorded.  Besides,  it 
would  bind  only  parties  to  the  contract,  not  their  descendants. 
Apart  from  the  man  himself,  God  alone  is  master  of  a  man's 
dominion  over  his  own  acts.  The  men  of  1776  could  never 
transfer  to  Wilson  dominion  over  the  acts  of  men  living  in 
1918.  And  they  never  attempted  the  thing.  They  could 
transfer  dominion  over  their  own  acts  to  Washington,  and  the 
obligation  of  obedience  would  bind  only  such  men  of  1776  as 
actually  made  the  transfer,  and  Washington  would  have  no 
authority  over  recalcitrants  in  the  country. 

Obedience  to  Washington  like  obedience  to  Wilson,  is  not 
rooted  in  any  authority  given  them  by  the  people,  but  in 
authority  given  them  immediately  by  God.  Authority  is  do- 
minion over  the  conduct  or  free  acts  of  others.  No  man  of 
himself  enjoys  this  dominion  over  others,  God  enjoys  it  over 
all.  And  God  shares  this  dominion  of  His  with  the  ruler, 
to  make  the  state  an  established  fact.  Just  as  Washington 
in  virtue  of  the  dominion  or  authority  immediately  conferred 
on  him  by  God,  ruled  all  the  men  in  America  during  his  presi- 
dency, recalcitrants  as  well  as  friends,  so  Wilson  rules  all  the 
men  in  America  in  1918,  dissatisfied  republicans  as  well  as 
satisfied  democrats.  Men  of  themselves  have  no  right  to  im- 
pose obedience  on  others  against  their  wishes.  God  has  the 
right  to  impose  obedience  on  all,  whether  they  are  willing  or 
unwilling.  In  itself  a  majority  has  no  more  right  in  this 
matter  than  an  individual.  The  thing  is  plain  in  the  case  of 
a  king  and  his  successors.  The  makers  of  a  king  could  never 
transfer  dominion  over  the  free  acts  of  their  descendants  to 
the  king's  successors.  God  alone  has  that  power,  and  there- 
fore God  alone  gave  the  king's  successors  authority. 

Besides,  God  never  gives  authority  to  a  ruler  for  his  own 
personal  advantage,  but  for  the  advantage  of  the  state.  The 
gift  therefore  endures  as  long  as  the  state  endures,  and  au- 
thority belongs  as  much  to  successors  as  to  the  original  king. 
The  state  as  such  never  transfers  authority  to  the  ruler,  be- 
cause no  state  exists  till  after  the  ruler  is  invested  with  au- 


S80 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


thority  by  God.  When  members  of  a  firm  give  its  president 
certain  powers,  they  give  him  what  they  first  possessed. 
When  individuals  attempt  to  give  authority  to  a  ruler,  they 
attempt  to  give  what  they  never  possessed,  namely,  dominion 
over  wills  different  and  distinct  from  their  own. 

S°.  Positive  divine  law  can  be  alleged  to  strengthen  the 
position  we  take.  ''There  is  no  power  but  from  God,  and 
those  that  are  ordained  of  God.  Therefore,  he  that  resisteth 
the  power,  resisteth  the  ordinance  of  God."  Rom.  13.1.  If 
authority  came  from  the  people,  disobedience  would  be  direct 
resistance  to  an  ordinance  of  the  people,  not  to  an  ordinance 
of  God. 

II.  Authority  is  not  conferred  on  the  people. 

1°.  Because  such  bestowal  is  not  evident  from  nature.  The 
only  bestowal  evident  from  nature  is  bestowal  on  the  complete 
state,  multitude  and  ruler  together ;  and  this  bestowal  is  veri- 
fied, whether  immediate  gift  is  made  to  ruler  or  people.  Im- 
mediate bestowal  on  the  ruler  is  not  evident  from  the  nature 
of  the  state,  but  it  is  evident  from  the  nature  of  authority. 
From  its  very  definition,  authority  cannot  be  exercised  by 
the  people  as  such,  it  can  be  exercised  by  the  ruler. 

When  Bellarmine  says  that  authority  as  a  divine  and  posi- 
tive right  is  bestowed  on  no  man  in  particular,  and  there- 
fore on  the  multitude,  he  means  that  no  man  in  particular 
has  a  natural  right  to  authority,  that  no  man  is  born  by  very 
nature  a  king,  that  by  the  nature  of  the  state  authority  is  in 
the  multitude,  meaning  multitude  and  ruler  together,  not 
separately ;  and  with  Bellarmine  we  stand  for  the  same  state- 
ment. We  deny,  however,  that  authority  is  in  the  multitude 
apart  from  the  ruler,  and  contend  that  the  very  nature  of 
authority  demands  that  it  be  in  the  ruler.  Intellect  is  in 
the  man  without  being  in  his  body,  it  is  in  his  soul. 

2°.  It  is  absurd  to  consider  the  recipient  of  authority  an 
agent  wholly  unfitted  and  unable  to  exercise  it. 

But  the  people  are  such  an  agent.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  Adversaries  admit  the  people's 
incapability  to  exercise  authority ;  and,  to  meet  the  argument, 
distinguish  between  ability  in  first  act  or  radically,  and  abil- 
ity in  second  act.  But  ability  in  first  act  always  implies  the 
remote  possibility  of  passing  from  a  present  state  of  inac- 


AUTHORITY  AND  MULTITUDE  381 

tivity  to  a  future  state  of  full  activity.  No  such  possibility 
can  be  recognized  in  the  multitude.  If  the  distinction,  ' '  rad- 
ically," means  ability  to  choose  the  king,  or  determine  the 
form  of  government,  we  readily  grant  to  the  people  posses- 
sion of  such  a  power.  The  people^  therefore,  and  this  is  our 
doctrine,  have  a  full  right  to  create  the  ruler.  They  have 
no  right  to  create  or  transfer  the  authority  lodged  in  the  ruler 
selected. 

A  power  in  a  person  that  the  person  himself  cannot  exer- 
cise is  a  contradiction  in  terms  =  power  and  not  power.  Au- 
thority in  a  multitude  that  the  multitude  itself  cannot  exer- 
cise is  the  same.  If  the  king  exercises  authority  only  as  the 
agent  or  instrument  of  the  multitude,  he  is  completely  at  the 
mercy  of  his  subjects,  and  has  no  real  authority  at  all. 

3°.  According  to  adversaries,  e.g.,  Suarez,  De  Legibus, 
Bk.  3,  c.  3,  n.  2 — men  make  ready  the  material,  they  furnish 
a  subject  for  the  reception  of  authority.  God  adds  the  form, 
confers  authority  on  this  subject.  But  he  that  merely  pre- 
pares the  material,  cannot  be  said  of  himself  to  possess  the 
form.  Ergo,  authority  is  not  of  itself  and  immediately  in 
men  or  the  multitude. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  This  argument  may  be  of  little 
force  to  any  but  Scholastics,  who  are  familiar  with  the  theory 
of  matter  and  form,  current  in  the  Schools.  We  introduce  it, 
however,  because  of  its  peculiar  strength  and  cogency,  when 
used  against  such  as  admit  the  theory  and  accept  the  phrase- 
ology. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  Form  is  always  absent,  until 
the  matter  is  fully  equipped  and  ready  for  its  advent.  As 
soon  as  it  approaches  the  matter,  complete  substance  results. 
If  the  supposition  of  our  adversaries  were  correct,  society 
or  the  state  would  exist  long  before  they  conceive  it  to  be- 
gin. For  the  two  elements  would  be  a  long  while  present 
together,  and  no  obstacle  would  stand  in  the  way  of  their 
union. 

4°.  Catholics  all  admit  that  the  republic  is  not  the  essen- 
tial and  only  natural  form  of  government. 

But  whoso  lodges  authority  in  the  multitude,  and  then  in 
the  ruler,  must  necessarily  adopt  this  attitude.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:    Many  writers,  influenced  by 


382 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


Aristotle's  opinion,  hesitate  not  to  affirm  with  him  that  re- 
publics are  in  some  respects  inferior  to  other  forms  of  govern- 
ment. In  point  of  stability  history  is  emphatically  in  favor 
of  monarchy.     Witness  the  following  table. 


Monarchies: 

Assyria, 

1449 

years 

Constantinople, 

1121  years 

Egypt, 

1675 

England, 

1071      " 

Persia  and  Media, 

417 

France, 

1373      « 

China, 

2000 

Germany, 

1000      « 

Roman  Empire, 

344 

Spain, 

1426      " 

Rome, 

853 

Rome, 

525      " 

Republics: 

Carthage, 

647 

years 

United  States, 

125  years 

Venice, 

1346 

u 

Athens, 

397      " 

Genoa 

855 

(( 

Rome, 

290      " 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  A  republic  is,  in  a  few  words, 
a  state  conceding  to  the  people  or  multitude  the  largest  pos- 
sible measure  of  influence  in  political  affairs.  If  authority 
is  first  vested  in  the  people,  to  be  afterwards  transferred  by 
them  to  the  ruler,  a  republic,  or  better  still  a  democracy  pure 
and  simple,  is  the  only  form  of  government  certain  to  com- 
mend itself  to  the  mind  of  the  philosopher.  No  man  can 
fairly  give  what  is  not  his  own,  and  the  principle  holds  good 
when  applied  to  a  people.  The  people,  therefore,  must  be 
considered  rightful  owners  of  all  the  authority  resident  in 
the  ruler,  before  its  transmission  and  acceptance.  Absolute 
democracy,  or  pure  republicanism,  is  that  manner  of  govern- 
ment which  vindicates  all  authority  to  the  people  in  joint 
assembly.  Whatever  different  forms  of  government  may  now 
be  in  use,  it  is  quite  certain,  according  to  our  adversaries' 
way  of  thinking,  that  absolute  democracy  ought  to  have  been 
the  original  form,  because  the  form  most  in  accord  with  the 
dictates  of  reason. 

It  is  difficult,  besides,  for  us  to  see  why,  if  the  people  were 
so  minded,  they  could  not  retain  authority  and  lend  it  to  no 
individual  in  particular.  For,  if  in  the  moment  preceding 
the  loan,  they  were  really  capable  of  possession,  nothing 
could  possibly  occur  afterwards  to  divest  them  of  that  right. 
An  attempt  to  wield  power  by  the  whole  multitude  in  com- 
mon might  certainly  be  attended  b}^  innumerable  and  dis- 
agreeable  inconveniences;   but   right   would   nevertheless   be 


AUTHORITY  AND  MULTITUDE  383 

on  their  side,  and  reason  is  loud  against  any  spoliation  of 
rights.  If  the  people  were  incapable  of  authority  in  the  mo- 
ment preceding  the  loan,  then  they  attempted  to  give  what 
was  not  their  own,  and  were  little  better  than  thieves  or  rob- 
bers. It  was  easy  for  primitive  peoples  to  see  the  need  of 
submitting  to  the  patriarch,  because  nature  taught  them  that 
the  ruler  got  his  authority  immediately  from  God,  not  from 
the  people. 

To  reconcile  the  two  seemingly  opposite  schools  of  Catholic 
thought,  it  is  necessary  to  merely  examine  these  two  state- 
ments made  by  Victoria,  one  of  our  principal  opponents,  and 
see  how  well  they  can  be  made  fit  with  our  own  doctrine: 
''Monarchy  is  not  only  just  and  legitimate  rule,  but  kings 
have  their  authority  in  virtue  of  a  divine  decree,  and  by  a 
natural  right.  They  are  not  dependent  for  it  on  the  govern- 
ment taken  collectively,  they  are  not  dependent  for  it  on 
men  at  all."  (No.  8.)  In  No.  7  he  has  the  following :  ''A 
government,  therefore,  has  power  by  divine  appointment. 
The  material  cause,  or  subject  in  which  this  power  dwells, 
is  by  law  of  God  and  law  of  nature  the  government  itself, 
because  it  belongs  to  the  government  to  administer  and  man- 
age itself  and  turn  all  its  forces  to  the  common  good. ' '  Vic- 
toria certainly  never  intended  to  contradict  himself.  When, 
therefore,  in  his  second  statement  he  maintains  that  authority 
is  vested  in  the  government,  he  cannot  mean  the  people  sep- 
arated from  the  ruler.  When  writers  of  his  opinion  come 
to  explain  themselves,  they  contend  merely  that  authority 
resides  in  the  people  in  root,  and  consists  entirely  in  their 
being  able,  speaking  philosophically,  to  prepare  the  matter 
and  get  ready  the  subject.  They,  that  with  us  deny  author- 
ity to  the  people,  readily  grant  the  people  all  the  privileges 
contended  for  by  the  opposite  side.  We  willingly  recognize 
in  the  people  the  right  to  even  determine,  and  appoint,  and 
choose  by  election,  the  person  on  whom  God  will  afterwards 
bestow  the  authority.  But  we  emphatically  deny  that  the 
people  are  on  this  account  the  immediate  recipients  of  au- 
thority, we  deny  that  authority  properly  so  called  rests  in 
the  multitude.  The  motive  uppermost  with  writers  of  the 
school  opposed  to  our  view,  is  the  fact  that  God  never  passes 
authority  to  the  ruler  without  the  intervention  in  some  way 


3^4 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


of  popular  will,  human  consent,  or  some  other  equally  just 
cause.  We  certainly  pay  due  deference  to  the  fact,  denying 
at  the  same  time  to  such  intervention  the  causalty  claimed 
for  it  by  these  others,  and  allowing  it  only  the  influence  proper 
to  the  designation  or  appointment  of  the  candidate  for  au- 
thority. We  follow  Suarez,  Victoria  rightly  understood  fol- 
lows Suarez ;  and  we  are  all  one. 

To  settle  disputes  about  the  title  to  authority  in  a  state,  and 
decide  between  the  rival  claims  of  a  lawful  sovereign  and  a 
usurper,  these  various  opinions  are  advanced.  Suarez  insists 
on  his  Royal  Compact  or  Contract.  Zigliara  leaves  everything 
to  election  or  choice,  direct  or  indirect.  Taparelli  notes  a 
difference  between  three  several  classes  of  societies.  Some 
he  calls  natural,  others  free,  others  obligatory.  In  societies 
of  the  first  class,  and  the  family  is  an  instance,  nature  itself 
appoints  the  ruler  or  head.  In  those  of  the  second  class, 
consent  is  the  all  important  factor.  In  those  of  the  third 
class,  everything  depends  on  preexisting  rights.  It  must  be 
at  first  sight  evident  that  consent  of  some  sort  or  other  is  a 
characteristic  common  to  all  three  classes.  In  obligatory  so- 
cieties, such,  for  instance,  as  result  from  the  subjugation  of  a 
people  by  just  process  of  war,  this  consent  is  an  obligation 
freely  assumed  by  the  conquered  people  at  the  beginning  of 
hostilities.  They  took  up  arms  with  the  undestanding  that 
ultimate  victor^^  was  to  decide  supremacy,  and  in  agreeing 
to  preliminaries  they  agreed  to  the  result.  In  like  manner, 
consent  is  an  element  entering  into  the  family.  Consent, 
however,  is  here,  as  in  the  former  case,  obligatory  and  exacted 
by  a  law  of  nature. 

Morally  necessary  consent  is  as  physically  free  as  morally 
free  consent;  and  one  kind  is  as  much  consent  as  the  other. 
Consent,  therefore,  has  place  in  natural  and  obligatory  so- 
cieties as  well  as  in  free  societies.  In  all  three  societies  con- 
sent of  the  governed  is  title.  In  natural  and  obligatory  so- 
cieties this  consent  is  physically  free,  morally  necessary;  in 
free  societies  it  is  physically  free  and  morally  free. 

Our  position  then  is  that  taken  by  Zigliara.  We  simply 
change  the  word,  ** choice  direct  or  indirect"  to  ''consent  of 
the  people,  whether  implied  or  expressed,  immediate  or  grad- 
ual."    And  first,   a  word  about  these   consents.     They  are 


CONSENT  OF  GOVERNED  385 

implied  and  expressed,  immediate  and  gradual,  direct  and 
indirect. 

Implied,  manifest  not  from  words,  but  from  acts,  that  suflfir 
ciently  declare  the  will  of  parties  to  the  consent. 

Expressed,  manifest  from  words  whether  spoken  or  writ- 
ten. 

Immediate,  accomplished  at  once,  without  delay  or  inter- 
ruption. 

Gradual,  given  in  parts,  by  some  members  of  the  community 
to-day,  by  others  to-morrow. 

Direct,  willed  in  itself,  not  through  the  agency  of  a  second 
event. 

Indirect,  not  willed  in  itself,  but  in  a  cause  freely  assumed 
and  working  out  the  event  as  a  consequence. 

Thus  a  murderer,  though  at  first  sight  far  from  consent- 
ing to  or  wishing  his  execution  on  the  gallows,  really  makes 
deliberate  choice  of  that  manner  of  death,  when  he  slays  an- 
other. In  the  same  way,  a  nation  rushes  into  unjust  war 
with  a  hatred  for  defeat  and  subjugation.  But  to  wish  the 
cause  is  to  wish  at  the  same  time  the  effect.  And,  if  the  event 
of  the  war  is  defeat,  the  nation  in  the  wrong  must  be  said 
to  have  accepted  defeat  or  consented  to  it,  when  it  made 
ready  to  march  against  the  enemy.  At  the  dawn  of  history, 
children  of  the  patriarchs,  by  the  very  fact  of  residence  in 
territory  occupied  by  their  fathers,  yielded  implied  and  in- 
direct consent  to  be  politically  controlled  by  them.  These 
children  after  attaining  their  majority  were  by  the  law  of 
nature  constituted  free  to  move  off,  settle  elsewhere,  and 
establish  their  own  distinct  government.  Hence,  even  in  pa- 
triarchal times,  though  the  family  or  domestic  society  was  in 
reality  the  origin  of  the  state  or  civil  society,  that  very  free- 
dom to  withdraw  from  the  patriarch's  political  influence  ren- 
dered consent  necessary  to  the  constitution  of  individual  au- 
thority. Families,  intent  on  remaining  within,  the  bounds  of 
a  patriarch's  kingdom,  had  their  origin,  of  course,  at  different 
intervals  of  time,  and  paid  him  the  homage  of  what  we  call 
gradual  consent. 

III.  Consent  of  people  determines  person  in  whom  authority 
resides. 

1°.  Moral  obligations  of  obedience  to  another  arise  either 


386 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


from  nature  or  from  free  choice.  We  omit  contingent  facts, 
because  they  are  reducible  to  nature  or  free  choice.  But 
man's  moral  obligations  towards  authority,  vested  in  some 
set  person,  arise  not  from  nature.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  Were  the  Minor  false,  some 
individuals,  apart  from  accidental  circumstances  of  heredity 
or  election,  would  be  born  princes,  and  no  such  statement  is 
borne  out  by  sound  philosophy.  St.  John  Chrysostom  on 
the  text,  ''All  power  is  from  God,"  Romans,  13.1,  says, 
''Not  the  king,  but  his  power."  He  means  that  authority  is 
from  God,  king  is  from  people,  by  act  of  selection  and  free 
consent. 

2°.  A  people  has  the  natural  right  to  organize  itself  into 
a  society.  But  this  right  would  mean  nothing,  unless  the 
people's  consent  were  necessary.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  Some  see  an  answer  to  this 
argument  in  the  distinction  between  a  free  people  and  a  peo- 
ple already  held  to  preexistent  obligations.  But  the  distinc- 
tion is  vain.  For  the  people  surrendered  their  liberty  by 
free  consent.  If  they  were  unjustly  and  unwillingly  deprived 
of  their  liberty,  no  rights  of  authority  accrued  to  the  despoil- 
ers. 

3°.  Taparelli's  division  of  societies  into  natural,  free  and 
obligatory  is  complete  and  in  harmony  with  Logic.  But  con- 
sent is  a  necessary  element  in  each  class.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  Natural  society  is  that  which 
arises  from  the  family  by  the  ordinary  process  of  evolution. 
Without  at  least  implied  and  gradual  consent,  no  family,  no 
number  of  families,  can  ever  coalesce  into  a  perfect  and  com- 
plete civil  society.  Without  such  consent,  the  children  after 
attaining  their  majority  are  certainly  free  to  migrate  from 
the  domains  of  their  fathers,  and  cut  entirely  loose  from  an- 
cestral authority.  The  fact  that  they  remain  at  home,  neces- 
sarily betokens  an  act  of  free  consent.  Free  societies  of  their 
very  nature  suppose  consent  of  the  people,  and  offer  no  spe- 
cial difficulty.  Obligatory  societies  arise,  either  like  natural 
societies  from  the  evolution  of  families,  or  from  the  vicissi- 
tudes of  war;  and  in  each  case  consent  is  essential. 

4°.  Were  consent  unnecessary,  every  family  would  by  the 
very  fact  form  a  state  or  civil  society. 


CONSENT  OF  GOVERNED  387 

But  this  is  absurd.     Ergo  consent  is  necessary. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  All  the  needed  elements  are 
present,  multitude  and  authority,  at  least  parental  authority. 
If  civil  authority  is  independent  of  consent,  the  members  of 
a  family  owe  its  head  due  and  full  obedience.  Civil  author- 
ity is  absent  from  family  precisely  because  consent  is  needed. 
Children  never  consent  to  father's  authority  as  civil  ruler, 
and  nature  imposes  no  such  obligation  on  them. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  Domestic  society  is  specifically 
different  from  civil  or  political.  Their  scopes,  constitutions 
and  methods  are  quite  distinct,  and  it  would  be  a  fatal  mis- 
take to  endeavor  to  apply  to  the  two  the  same  rules  for  gov- 
ernment. Civil  society,  for  instance,  is  endowed  with  the 
right  to  inflict  capital  punishment,  wage  war,  raise  taxes, 
privileges  never  even  imagined  in  domestic  society.  The 
difference  between  the  two  conditions  is  more  than  that  of 
mere  degree,  it  is  specific. 

IV.  Consent  may  be  implied  or  expressed,  immediate  or 
gradual,  and  cannot  always  be  withheld. 

1°.  The  people  are  obliged  by  nature  to  adopt  government, 
without  which  order  in  the  State  is  an  impossibility. 

But  it  sometimes  happens  that  one  certain  ruler  and  one 
certain  form  of  government  are  alone  feasible.     Ergo. 

2°.  The  people  are  not  allowed  to  use  their  freedom  to  the 
detriment  of  preexisting  rights.  But  to  refuse  consent,  is 
often  to  make  such  a  use  of  their  freedom.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  The  lawful  heir  has  antecedent 
rights  to  the  throne,  and  any  violation  of  them  is  injustice. 

3°.  To  wage  unjust  war  with  a  neighbor,  is  to  assume  a 
lower  position  in  the  moral  scale,  and  disturb  the  balance  of 
morality. 

But  it  can  often  happen  that  morality  is  impossible  of  ad- 
justment, unless  the  wrong-doer  accepts  the  rule  of  the  in- 
jured party. 

Ergo,  consent  is  of  obligation  and  morally  necessary. 

With  Regard  to  the  Major:  The  unjust  aggressor  indi- 
rectly chooses  the  punishment  meted  out  to  him,  and  the 
nation  in  the  wrong  worsted  in  a  conflict  of  the  kind  has 
no  ground  for  complaint,  if  subjected  to  the  winner's  juris- 
diction. 


THESIS  XV 

Woman  suffrage^  though  legitimate  in  exceptional  cases,  is 
fraught  with  dangers.    Jouin,  209-212;  Cathrein,  415-419. 

QUESTION 

Family,  State  and  Church  are  the  only  complete  societies  in 
the  world.  Society  is  a  moral  and  lasting  union  of  two  or 
more  persons  pledged  to  promote  a  common  aim  or  purpose. 
Multitude  is  matter;  moral  union  or  authority,  the  bond  se- 
curing union,  is  form.  Nature  is  efficient  cause,  and  this  is 
plain  in  family,  from  which  nobody  can  escape.  The  same 
is  true  of  state  and  Church,  though  the  question  calls  for 
profounder  study.  Whatever  multitude  tallies  with  the  above 
description  is  a  true  society.  To  be  a  complete  or  perfect 
society,  the  common  aim  or  purpose  must  be  peculiar  and 
proper  to  the  society  in  question,  outside  the  domain  of  other 
societies,  and  requisite  means  must  be  within  the  society's 
reach.  Family,  state  and  Church  are  commonly  regarded  as 
complete  and  perfect,  though  the  family  of  its  very  nature 
grows  towards  the  state,  and  though  state  and  Church  must 
work  together  in  mutual  harmony.  Their  distinctive  domains 
make  them  free  and  independent.  They  are  mutual  assist- 
ance of  man  and  wife,  the  procreation  and  education  of  off- 
spring; temporal  prosperity  of  people;  and  spiritual  welfare 
of  faithful.  This  whole  question  of  woman  suffrage  has  to 
do  with  the  woman's  place  in  the  state,  and  it  can  be  most 
expeditiously  settled  by  determining  her  place  in  the  family. 
Again  we  pause  to  define  things. 


TERMS 

Family  is  a  moral  and  lasting  union  of  husband,  wife  and 
children  for  mutual  assistance,  the  procreation  and  educa- 

388 


WOMAN  SUFFRAGE  389 

tion  of  offspring.  Its  main  purpose  is  domestic  order  and 
the  education  of  children. 

State  is  a  moral  and  lasting  union  primarily  of  families, 
secondarily  of  individuals,  banded  together  for  the  purpose 
of  safeguarding  their  rights  and  securing  temporal  pros- 
perity. Its  main  purpose  is  the  suppression  of  injustice  by 
law,  and  the  procurement  of  opportunities  for  mental,  moral 
and  bodily  improvement,  hard  or  impossible  in  family  and 
Church. 

Church  is  a  moral  and  lasting  union  of  men  banded  together 
for  purposes  of  eternal  salvation  by  profession  of  the  same 
faith,  and  by  participation  in  the  same  sacraments,  under  the 
rule  of  duly  accredited  superiors,  especially  the  Pope  of 
Kome. 

Like  everything  else,  the  state  has  four  causes,  efficient, 
final,  material  and  formal.  Though  the  State's  material 
cause,  multitude  or  citizens,  is  the  thing  of  vital  importance 
in  this  question  of  woman  suffrage,  it  will  be  no  waste  of 
time  to  glance  at  the  other  three  causes.  They  furnish 
Ethics  with  all  the  topics  discussed  in  its  treatment  of  civil 
society  or  the  state.  We  give  only  the  briefest  summary  of 
things. 

Efficient  cause  is  nature,  not  agreement  among  men.  Op- 
ponents are  Hobbes  and  Rousseau.  Hobbes  makes  war  man's 
natural  condition,  men  surrendered  all  to  king,  absolutism 
of  monarchy.  Rousseau  makes  peace  and  individualism  man's 
natural  condition;  people  cheated  into  State,  absolutism  of 
democracy. 

Final  cause  is  public  prosperity,  security  in  rights,  oppor- 
tunity to  improve  mind  and  body  beyond  private  activity. 
Opponents:  Some  minimize,  coexistence  of  individual  liber- 
ties; Kant,  Fichte,  Darwinists.  Some  exaggerate,  public 
good  in  itself;  Pantheists,  Schelling,  Hegel.  Plato,  State  a 
superior  man;  Leibnitz,  Hartmann,  Ahrens,  culture  and  civ- 
ilization. 

Kant's  autonomy,  despotism,  atheistic  state;  consequences. 

Material  cause  is  people  and  implicitly  territory;  not  in- 
dividuals, but  families  compose  state;  state  supposes  family 
and  ministers  to  its  needs;  only  heads  are  citizens,  men. 
Others  are  citizens  mediately  through  head,  women  and  chil- 


390 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


dren.  Only  heads  can  have  part  in  legislative,  executive  and 
judicial  functions.  Church  follows  nature.  State  is  organ- 
ism like  plant,  made  up  of  heterogeneous,  not  homogeneous 
parts.  Hence  woman  suffrage  is  unnatural  and  wrong; 
women  are  not  citizens  in  immediate  sense.  Fixed  territory 
is  not  of  essence,  but  complementary  and  contributes  to  per- 
fection of  state. 

Formal  cause  is  authority.  Questions:  Origin,  extent, 
titles,  kinds,  functions. 

Extent:  morals,  religion,  Church  and  state;  education,  eco- 
nomic and  social  matters;  Liberalism. 

Titles:  inheritance,  election,  war  or  conquest,  purchase;  loss 
of  title. 

Kinds:  monarchy,  aristocracy,  democracy. 

Functions:  legislative,  executive,  judicial. 

Returning  now  to  the  state's  material  cause,  or  multitude, 
the  family  is  the  seed  of  the  republic.  From  history  it  is 
plain  that  the  first  state  had  its  origin  in  a  group  of  families 
acknowledging  the  authority  of  Adam.  His  sons  settled  in 
his  neighborhood,  and  nature  prompted  them  to  do  their 
father  this  honor.  The  first  state  was,  therefore,  a  species  of 
patriarchal  government;  and  can  be  best  described  as  a  per- 
fect union  of  several  families  banded  together  for  the  pur- 
pose of  safeguarding  their  rights  and  securing  their  common 
good.  In  process  of  time  these  families  became  a  village,  a 
town,  a  city,  and  country;  and  the  various  other  titles  to 
authority  successively  came  into  play,  inheritance,  election, 
conquest  and  purchase.  But  all  through  history  states  never 
lost  sight  of  their  primary  origin.  Nature  prevented  that. 
They  were  made  up  of  men,  women  and  children ;  but  each 
class  had  its  own  fixed  function  in  government.  Because 
the  state  had  its  rise  in  families,  not  in  individuals,  the  func- 
tions of  man,  woman  and  child  in  government  were  settled 
by  the  role  they  played  in  the  family.  Children  have  as 
much  right  to  claim  the  suffrage  as  women,  and  the  average 
boy  is  a  better  politician  than  his  mother. 

Woman's  place  in  the  family  settles  her  place  in  the  re- 
public, and  nature  is  clear  about  woman's  place  in  the  fam- 
ily. Nature  vests  parents  with  power  over  their  children. 
This  power  is  a  necessary  consequence  from  marriage's  pur- 


STATE  FROM  FAMILIES  391 

pose,  the  education  of  children ;  and  from  the  fact  that  fam- 
ily is  impossible  without  authority,  an  essential  element  of 
every  society.     Besides,  children  get  their  being  and  support 
from  their  parents,  and  the  circumstance  bases  a  relation 
of  dependence.     This  power  resides  in  father  and  mother. 
One,  however,  must  be  first,  husband  or  wife.     As  a  general 
rule  the  husband  has  qualities  of  mind  and  body  entitling 
him  to  the  dignity.     As  compared  with  the  wife,  he  is  less 
dependent  on  others,  he  is  more  prudent,  braver,  stronger 
and  firmer.     Occasionally  a  wife  surpasses  her  husband  in 
these  respects,  but  such  wives  and  husbands  are  exceptions, 
and  in  questions  of  natural  ordinances  exceptions  are  neg- 
lected.    The  husband  chooses  the  wife,  and  so  starts  the  fam- 
ily.    The  wife  is  a  man's  companion,  not  his  slave,  nor  yet 
his  equal,  excepting  in  her  possession  of  a  human  nature. 
Husband  and  wife  ought  to  work  together  in  mutual  har- 
mony.    Home  is  the  wife's  proper  sphere,  her  kingdom.     The 
father's  power  is  limited  to  family's  twofold  purpose,  educa- 
tion of  children  and  the  preservation  of  domestic  order.     He 
is  empowered  to  use  the  rod,  not  to  mutilate  or  kill  his  chil- 
dren.    Education  and  order  can  be  secured  without  recourse 
to  the  extreme  measures  legitimately  employed  by  the  state. 
In  this  matter  of  paternal  authority,  nature  recognizes  three 
distinct  periods  in  a  child 's  life : 

Children  of  unripe  and  imperfect  judgment  owe  their  fa- 
thers full  and  entire  obedience  in  every  respect,  save  sin. 

Children  of  ripe  and  perfect  judgment^  as  long  as  they  stay 
at  home,  owe  their  fathers  full  and  entire  obedience  in  matters 
touching  domestic  order. 

Children  of  ripe  and  perfect  judgment,  emancipated  or 
married,  owe  their  fathers  no  obedience,  though  bound  to 
love,  reverence,  respect  and  support  them.  Man's  supremacy 
in  the  family  is  clear  from  these  passages  in  St.  Paul  and  St. 
Peter: 

The  head  of  every  man  is  Christ,  and  the  head  of  the  woman 
is  the  man.     1  Cor.  11.3. 

Let  women  be  subject  to  their  husbands,  as  to  the  Lord. 
Eph.  5.22. 

Wives,  be  subject  to  your  husbands  as  it  behooveth  in  the 
Lord.     Coloss.  3,  18. 


392 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


Let  wives  be  subject  to  their  husbands.     1  Peter  3.1. 

And  as  Catholics  we  must  not  disdain  borrowing  wisdom 
from  the  Scriptures.  Scripture  is  word  from  God,  the  au- 
thor of  nature;  and  Scripture  is,  therefore,  a  safe  source  of 
information  regarding  natural  and  unnatural  practices.  In 
this  sense  the  law  of  faith  is  the  law  of  nature. 

And  now  to  resume,  for  the  purpose  of  fixing  woman's 
place  in  the  state.  The  material  cause  of  the  state  is  com- 
posed not  of  individuals  as  such,  but  of  families.  Citizens, 
therefore,  are  not  individuals  as  such,  but  heads  of  families, 
actually  such  or  such  in  capacity,  men.  Women  and  chil- 
dren are  citizens  mediately  through  husband,  and  must  vote 
and  govern  through  husband.  The  State  was  meant  from  the 
start  to  minister  to  the  needs  of  the  family,  not  to  the  needs 
of  the  individual  as  such.  Like  the  human  body  the  state 
is  an  organic  whole,  not  made  up  of  individuals  on  the  same 
footing  but  of  families,  and  families  in  turn  are  made  up  of 
husband,  wife  and  children.  State  supposes  the  family  al- 
ready constituted  and  mends  its  needs.  Ergo,  not  all  indi- 
viduals in  the  state  are  citizens,  but  only  family  heads,  and 
they  alone  have  capacity  to  govern,  the  very  essence  of  citi- 
zenship according  to  Aristotle.  The  state  is  as  much  an 
organism  as  the  human  body,  and  consists  of  heterogeneous, 
not  homogeneous  parts,  men,  and  women  and  children.  The 
man  is  the  head,  the  woman  is  the  heart;  and  the  heart  must 
never  govern  the  head. 

This  whole  question  of  woman  suffrage  is  only  one  branch 
of  a  larger  question,  the  emancipation  of  women.  The  slav- 
ery of  women  current  with  pagans  and  Turks  was  long  ago 
abolished  by  Christianity,  and  that  kind  of  emancipation  is 
an  accomplished  fact,  though  Socialism  purposes  restoring 
the  old  order,  and  suffragettes  are  Socialism's  helpers.  The 
emancipation,  that  would  make  woman  man's  equal  in  fam- 
ily or  state,  is  an  utter  impossibility,  ruled  against  by  nature 
and  destined  to  forever  remain  an  empty  dream,  unless  the 
whole  world  turns  monster,  and  men  forget  to  think.  Work 
away  from  home  for  a  living  is  a  species  of  emancipation  now 
on  trial,  and  with  certain  restrictions  it  is  quite  natural  and 
right.  Not  all  women  can  be  wives,  because  adult  women  in 
the  world  are  more  numerous  than  adult  men.     Some  women 


POLITICAL  EQUALITY  393 

must  therefore  support  themselves.  Modem  machinery  less- 
ens the  value  of  work  at  home,  and  the  one  remedy  is  work 
abroad.  As  things  stand  at  present,  even  married  women 
must  leave  home  to  help  support  the  family,  and  the  new 
woman  is  much  to  blame  for  this  sad  condition  of  affairs. 

Restrictions:  Woman's  virtue  must  not  be  endangered; 
time  and  place  can  be  menaces.  Woman's  weak  strength 
must  not  be  overtaxed.  With  the  married,  care  of  home  must 
be  first  consideration.  Studies  and  the  professions  are  a  new 
field  open  to  the  activity  of  women.  Medicine  is  not  without 
its  own  peculiar  dangers  for  women.  Women  entering  the 
professions  ought  to  submit  to  the  same  tests  as  men.  Co- 
education is  wrong  in  principle  and  regularly  productive  of 
harm.  When  woman  enters  the  professions  to  compete  with 
men,  she  steps  down  from  her  high  pedestal.  Our  thesis, 
omitting  the  other  phases  of  emancipation,  declares  emanci- 
pation in  a  political  sense  unnatural  and  wrong.  Suffrage 
or  the  right  to  vote  is  the  heart  of  the  question.  The  right  to 
hold  office,  to  act  as  lawmaker,  executive  and  judge  is  a 
logical  consequence  of  the  right  to  suffrage.  In  a  man  the 
right  to  vote  is  natural,  in  virtue  of  his  capacity  for  headship 
in  the  family.  In  woman  the  same  right  is  wholly  unnat- 
ural. An  unnatural  right  can  be  acquired  with  the  conniv- 
ance of  wrong-headed  law,  and  the  exercise  of  every  such 
right  is  bound  to  have  disastrous  consequences.  Such  conse- 
quences may  be  a  long  or  short  while  working  themselves  out, 
but  they  must  eventually  show  head. 

Liberalism  favors  woman  suffrage ;  but,  with  our  knowledge 
of  Liberalism's  other  wild  notions,  its  advocacy  of  the  cause 
produces  no  worry,  and  strengthens  us  in  our  position.  The 
strongest  conceivable  argument  against  a  theory,  is  its  accept- 
ance and  championship  by  wrong  pholosophy.  John  Stuart 
Mill  is  on  the  side  of  woman  suffrage,  and  we  know  from  Utili- 
tarianism what  importance  attaches  to  his  opinion.  Now  and 
then  a  Catholic  priest  or  layman  raises  his  voice  in  its  favor. 
Catholics  are,  of  course,  free  to  take  one  side  or  other  in  the 
controversy.  Our  Church  has  made  no  doctrinal  decision 
in  the  matter,  even  though  the  spirit  of  Catholicity  revolts  at 
the  idea,  and  all  our  history  is  opposed  to  the  practice.  The 
Blessed  Virgin  Mary  is  our  ideal  woman,  and  nothing  in  her 


394  SPECIAL  ETHICS 

sublime  life  countenances  conduct  of  the  sort.  Some  of  these 
CathoUcs  live  in  corners  of  the  world  where  woman  suffrage 
is  hy  law  established,  and  in  these  circumstances  common 
wisdom  advises  Catholic  authorities  to  urge  Catholic  women 
to  avadl  themselves  of  the  unnatural  prerogative,  and  so  neu- 
tralize the  harm.  It  would  be  decidedly  wrong  for  Catholic 
women  in  countries  of  the  kind  to  allow  their  wrong-headed 
sisters  to  control  affairs,  and  turn  the  government  topsy-turvy. 
Other  Catholic  advocates  of  woman  suffrage  among  clergy 
and  laity  are  few  in  number,  and,  while  truth  on  rare  occa- 
sions fails  the  majority,  it  seldom  or  never  rests  with  the 
minority. 

PROOFS 

We  divide  women  into  (a)  married,  and  (b)  single.  Our 
thesis  is  clear  with  regard  to  the  married,  and  only  a  little 
less  clear  with  regard  to  the  single. 

(a)  (b)  We  argue  from  custom.  There  ought  to  be  no 
departure  from  universal  custom  of  long  standing  without 
good  reason.    Woman  suffrage  is  such  a  departure.     Ergo. 

With  Regard  to  the  Minor:  The  reasons  alleged  assume 
the  shape  of  objections,  and  we  meet  them  in  our  Principles. 
Reasons  against  woman  suffrage:  Women,  whether  married 
or  single,  are  not  citizens  immediately,  but  through  family; 
and  man  is  head  of  the  family.  Wife  would  be  exempt  from 
husband's  jurisdiction,  quarrels  would  be  multiplied,  rights 
would  collide,  man's  authority  would  go,  and  peace  would 
disappear. 

(a)  Family  would  be  hurt.  Woman's  place  is  home,  care 
of  household  and  children  her  special  charge.  Devotion  to 
politics  would  be  as  much  a  duty  with  women  as  with  men. 

(a)  (b)  Woman's  native  modesty  would  suffer,  and  pro- 
priety would  be  offended.  Witness  suffragette  meetings, 
parades,  campaigns,  polls,  journeys  from  home,  absence  from 
family.  Woman  has  no  head  for  business  of  the  sort.  State 
affairs  are  weighty,  and  call  for  deep  thought  and  far  reaching 
foresight.  Women  are  proverbially  changeable,  more  open 
to  sentiment  than  to  reason. 

Suffrage  is  not  an  inborn  right,  but  a  means  of  govern- 
ment.    Natural  has  two  senses,  inborn  and  becoming.     In- 


PROOF  AND  PRINCIPLES  395 

bom  in  neither  man  nor  woman ;  becoming  in  man,  unbecom- 
ing in  woman.  It  is  an  acquired  right  even  in  man.  It  is 
a  question  of  expediency,  of  the  proper.  Not  that  woman  is 
inferior  to  man,  but  different  from  man.  Men  adapted  by 
nature  to  some  functions,  women  to  others.  Hurts  woman, 
politics  is  modified  war,  strife,  contention,  bitterness.  Duty 
and  right  of  protection  rest  with  the  male.  True  government 
in  family.-  Woman's  true  functions  superior  to  man's,  to 
form  conscience  of  child,  influence  will,  control  impulses. 
Cardinal  Gibbons  says:  ''Mary  model  of  women,  not  Ama- 
zon, not  Spartan,  not  Venus,  not  Juno. ' '  Spiritually,  woman 
is  same  as  man.  Equal  rights,  not  similar  rights.  Suffrage 
alienates  from  home.  To  debar  woman  from  vote  is  not  to 
degrade,  to  restrict  her  to  home  is  not  to  fetter  her  aspira- 
tions to  higher  and  better  things.  Home  is  more  a  factor  in 
republic  than  court  or  congress.  Mothers  mould  presidents, 
legislators  and  judges;  woman's  noblest  work  is  to  care  for 
children. 


PRINCIPLES 

A.  "Women  have  same  right  as  men  to  good  government. 
Ergo,  right  to  suffrage  and  office. 

Answer:  Argument  proves  too  much.  Infants  have  same 
right.  Pure  democracy  would  be  only  legitimate  rule.  Right 
to  be  well  governed  is  different  from  right  to  govern.  Woman 
suffrage  would  be  worst  government  in  world,  because  un- 
natural and  wrong. 

B.  Women  are  burdened  with  taxes  and  other  obligations 
same  as  men.     Ergo. 

Answer:  Equality  of  burdens  is  different  from  equality 
of  rights.  Women  are  not  soldiers,  sailors.  Women  are  in- 
dependent and  sui  juris  by  accident.  They  ought  to  be  mem- 
bers of  a  family  and  subject  to  its  head.  Exceptions  never 
count  in  ethics. 

C.  Women  have  been  queens.     Ergo. 

Ansiver:  Cases  are  rare  and  exceptional,  and  happen 
without  harm  to  family.  Women  queens  for  common  good, 
to  keep  succession  in  family  and  smother  ambition.  Queens 
govern  through  men. 


396 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


D.  No  argument  against  voting  for  candidate  sel( 
men.     Ergo,  suffrage  at  least. 

Answer:  Suffrage  means  universal  rights  of  citizenship. 
With  suffrage  women  could  extend  privilege  to  selection  of 
candidates  and  every  other  function  of  government. 

E.  Women  make  good  doctors,  lawyers,  managers.  Ergo, 
they  can  vote. 

Answers  Nothing  follows.  Professions  are  different  from 
suffrage.  In  the  professions  men  make  contracts  with  them, 
and  are  content  to  use  their  services.  Universal  suffrage  is 
different  and  open  to  blame ;  it  is  unnatural  and  wrong. 

F.  Unclean  houses,  impure  food,  risk  of  disease,  immorality 
on  street,  bad  plumbing,  fire  escapes. 

Answer:  Woman  must  leave  something  for  the  man  to  do. 
If  she  is  much  away  from  home,  the  house  must  take  care  of 
itself,  or  the  man  must  turn  housekeeper.  In  her  eyes  the 
man,  with  no  care  of  home  to  distract  him,  is  unable  to  regu- 
late outside  conditions.  Will  she  be  able  to  manage  things 
inside  and  outside?  Division  of  labor.  Let  her  urge  the 
husband  to  manage  neighbors,  grocers,  plumbers,  inspectors, 
policemen.  Men  are  responsible  for  outside  abuses,  only  when 
women  stay  at  home  and  mind  their  own  concerns.  Every 
woman  has  her  own  house  to  care  for.  No  woman  is  house- 
keeper to  the  city.  Men  are  the  city's  housekeepers,  its  citi- 
zens. 

G.  Women  are  eitizens,  mediately,  not  immediately;  and 
they  ought  to  do  their  civic  duty  mediately  through  men.  In 
civic  matters  women  must  be  protected  by  the  men.  Men 
have  the  interests  of  their  mothers,  sisters,  wives  and  daugh- 
ters at  heart.  Men  must  regulate  the  city's  sanitary  condi- 
tions, not  women.  Men  are  as  much  opposed  to  unsanitary 
conditions  as  women.  Men  are  as  fond  of  their  children  as 
women.  Other  and  better  ways  than  woman  suffrage  to 
remedy  abuses,  more  natural,  less  damaging.  Independent 
women  are  exceptional;  no  father,  no  brother,  no  husband, 
no  son. 

H.  No  taxation  without  representation. 

Answer:  Representation  is  possible  without  vote.  Heads 
of  families  represent  women.  Representation  is  not  personal 
and  immediate  management.     The  colonists  never  wanted  to 


PRINCIPLES  397 

enter  parliament  and  vote.  They  wanted  an  agent  on  the 
ground  to  present  their  views.  Women  have  such  agents  in 
men.  Nature,  not  election,  fixes  their  agents.  Men  who  im- 
posed taxes  on  colonies  did  not  have  to  pay  them.  Men  who 
impose  taxes  on  women  have  to  pay  them. 

The  above  principle  is  per  se  wrong.  In  case  of  law  or 
custom  it  can  happen  to  be  right;  and  this  is  true  of  Eng- 
land. 

I.  Woman  must  help  man  in  civic  matters  by  her  advice, 
not  by  ballot.     Suffrage  is  none  of  her  civic  duties. 


THESIS  XVI 

The  State  enjoys  full  Legislative,  Executive  and  Judicial 
rights,  the  prerogative  of  Eminent  Domain  and  the  War 
Power.    Jouin,  265-284;  351-362;  Bickahy,  338-355. 

DIVISION 

Three  Parts.  I,  Legislative,  Executive,  Jud/icial;  II,  Do- 
main; III,  War  Power. 

I.  Legislative,  Executive,  Judicial. 

TERMS 

Legislative  rights  are  the  power  to  make  laws  and  fix  penal- 
ties in  general. 

Executive  rights  are  the  power  to  enforce  laws,  to  punish 
and  pardon. 

Judicial  rights  are  the  power  to  decide  between  right  and 
wrong,  and  fix  penalties  in  particular. 

Judicial  rights  are  civil  and  criminal. 

Civil,  to  render  decision  in  civil  suits,  determine  to  which 
of  two  parties  a  right  belongs. 

Criminal,  to  render  decision  in  criminal  cases,  determine 
the  nature  of  a  fact  at  variance  with  law,  and  settle  the  pen- 
alty. 

Penalty  is  the  pain  or  privation  inflicted  on  the  criminal 
to  avenge  the  wrong  done  law,  and  establish  anew  the  dis- 
turbed reign  of  justice.  In  wrong  might  does  violence  to 
right;  in  punishment  right  asserts  its  supremacy,  and  brings 
might  to  grief. 

Punishment  ought  to  be,  as  far  as  possible,  reparative,  me- 
dicinal, corrective. 

Reparative  is  calculated  to  mend  disturbed  relations  and 
reestablish  order. 

Medicinal  is  calculated  to  cure  men  and  reform  them. 

Corrective  is  calcuJated  to  act  as  a  deterrent  from  evD. 

398 


LEGISLATIVE,  JUDICIAL,  EXECUTIVE        399 


PROOF 

All  three  rights  are  necessary  means  to  state's  end  or  pur- 
pose. Confusion  would  reign  in  state  without  Legislative. 
Legislative  would  be  a  dead  letter  without  Executive  and 
Judicial. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  For  three  reasons  Aristotle  thinks  it  better  to  rule  by 
written  laws  than  by  judge  merely. 

1°.  Fewer  wise  men  are  needed.  A  few  lawmakers  would 
be  enough,  many  judges  would  be  needed. 

2°.  Lawmakers  have  plenty  of  time  to  study  and  reflect; 
judges  must  decide  in  a  hurry. 

3°.  Lawmakers  deal  with  future  and  universal  contingen- 
cies; judges,  with  present  facts  and  particular  cases.  No 
chance  for  greed,  hatred,  anger,  revenge  with  lawmaker; 
judges,  open  to  all  these  emotions. 

B.  Rules  for  lawmakers:  1°.  Let  your  laws  be  as  few  in 
number  as  possible.  2°.  An  unjust  law  is  no  law.  3°.  An 
impossible  law  is  no  law. 

C.  Capital  punishment  is  just : 

1°.  Right  to  amputate  limb  that  threatens  harm  to  whole 
body.  S.T.2.2.q.64.a.2.  State  is  the  body,  a  bad  citizen,  like 
a  murderer,  is  such  a  limb.     Ergo. 

2°.  Right  to  inflict  penalty  in  proportion  with  harm  done 
or  attempted,  e.g.,  treason,  arson,  murder. 

3°.  All  civilized  peoples,  God  Himself  in  laws  of  Hebrews, 
sanction  capital  punishment,  e.g.,  Exodus  22.18.  Wizards 
thou  shalt  not  suffer  to  live.  Ps.  100.8,  In  the  morning  I  put 
to  death  all  the  wicked  of  the  land.     David. 

4°.  It  is  lawful  to  kill  animals  for  man's  use.  By  abuse 
of  free  will,  the  criminal  virtually  though  not  formally  loses 
the  dignity  of  a  man,  descends  to  the  low  level  of  an  animal, 
and  ceases  to  be  sui  juris. 

5°.  God  takes  life  when  state  takes  life,  because  God  arms 
state  with  the  prerogative. 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 
II.  Eminent  Domain. 

TERMS 

Eminent  Domain  means  power  to  make  whatever  use  of 
citizens'  property  the  existence  and  welfare  of  the  govern- 
ment demand.  Hobbes  vests  in  the  state  thorough  ownership 
of  its  citizens'  goods.  He  makes  citizens,  viewed  as  pro- 
prietors, like  sons  with  regard  to  their  father.  Sons  have  no 
ownership  against  father,  citizens  have  none  against  state. 
Hobbes  is  wrong,  ^'  because  state  can  claim  only  what  is  neces- 
sary, and  mere  use  without  full  ownership  is  sufficient ;  ^'  be- 
cause state-ownership  of  everything  would  create  indiffer- 
ence, and  hurt  prosperity  and  progress ;  ^'  because  the  state 
is  altogether  different  from  the  family;  citizens  get  only 
well-being  from  the  state;  sons  get  being  from  their  father; 
citizens  are  less  dependent  on  the  state  than  sons  are  on  their 
father. 

PROOF 

State  enjoys  Eminent  Domain,  because  it  is  a  means  neces- 
sary to  the  state's  end  and  a  means  not  otherwise  available. 

PRINCIPLES 

A.  Taxes  are  contributions  made  the  state  by  citizens  or 
subjects  to  advance  common  interests  and  defray  public  ex- 
penses. Instances  are  property  tax,  customs,  revenues,  per- 
sonal tax  and  the  like. 

B.  State  is  vested  with  the  right  to  impose  taxes,  1°,  be- 
cause they  are  necessary  means  to  state's  end;  without  taxes 
revenue  would  be  uncertain  and  precarious,  while  debts  would 
be  fixed,  certain  and  steady;  2°,  because  citizens  ought  to  pay 
for  advantages  the  state  secures  to  them. 

C.  Only  the  supreme  power  in  the  state  can  lawfully  im- 
pose taxes,  1°,  because  means  belong  to  him  alone,  who  pro- 
cures end;  2°,  because  private  citizens  would  otherwise  enjoy 
others'  goods. 

D.  This  power  is  limited  to  strict  necessity,  because  other- 
wise a  perversion  and  abuse  of  means. 


WAR  AND  SEDITION  401 

E.  No  taxation  without  representation.  Per  se,  this  saying 
is  wrong.  Per  aecidens,  in  case  of  law  or  custom  it  can  be 
right.  Charles  I  and  Parliament.  American  Colonies  and 
England. 

III.  War  Power.    Four  parts,  a,  1),  c,  d. 

a.  War  Power  vested  in  state  extends  to  offensive  as  well  as 
defensive  war. 

b.  Right  to  declare  war  is  prerogative  of  supreme  power. 
e.  Sedition  is  intrinsically  wrong. 

d.  Precautions  before,  during  and  after  war. 

TERMS 

War  Power  is  power  to  protect  the  commonwealth  against 
enemies. 

War  is  state  or  condition  of  nations  forcibly  contending  for 
right. 

Defensive  war  is  war  waged  to  keep  off  an  enemy.  Offen- 
sive war  is  war  waged  to  avenge  wrong  and  establish  security. 

N.B.     War  without  any  real  or  apparent  right  is  murder. 

Sedition  is  a  rising  in  arms  as  between  people  and  ruler,  or 
as  between  factions  among  the  people. 

N.B.  The  belligerency  of  rebels  is  recognised  only  after 
they  have  by  certain  signs  proved  themselves  capable  of  au- 
tonomy. International  law  is  obscure  and  unsettled  on  this 
point. 

Sedition  is  offensive  warfare  of  people  against  legitimate 
ruler.     Two  kinds  of  tyranny  are  of  rule  and  of  title. 

Tyranny  of  rule  is  abuse  of  power,  title  intact ;  and  it  is  no 
legitimate  excuse  for  offensive  warfare,  which  would  be  sedi- 
tion. 

N.B.  It  is  legitimate  excuse  for  defensive,  if  ruler  attacks, 
because  citizens  have  same  rights  as  individuals. 

Tyranny  of  title  or  right  means  no  title,  no  legitimate  ruler ; 
and  it  is  legitimate  excuse  for  offensive  warfare,  which  is 
then  no  sedition.  Tyranny  of  rule  leads  to  loss  of  title,  with- 
out being  actual  forfeiture. 


402  SPECIAL  ETHICS 


PROOFS 


a.  Defensive  war: 
1°.  Nations  enjoy  rights  of  individuals  and  self-defense  is 

a  personal  right. 

2°.  Often  it  is  the  only  means  of  securing  safety  to  the  re- 
public. 

Offensive  War: 

1°.  Justice  among  nations  is  necessary.  Otherwise  natural 
law  as  between  nations  would  be  without  sanction ;  no  future 
life  for  nations;  international  law  of  no  force,  because  na- 
tions are  sovereign.  Often  war  is  only  available  means;  or- 
der must  be  reestablished  by  its  violators  or  by  the  wronged. 

2°.  Safety  insecure,  if  defensive  war  is  alone  legitimate; 
wrongs  could  never  be  repaired;  wicked  would  prosper  and 
grow  in  power  after  each  attack. 

3°.  Enemy  must  often  be  attacked  in  midst  of  preparations ; 
otherwise  defeat  is  certain. 

b.  War  is  prerogative  of  supreme  power.  Order  demands 
as  much. 

1°.  If  private  citizens  exercised  war  prerogative,  nations 
would  be  kept  busy  settling  feuds  and  personal  quarrels. 

2°.  Individuals  are  prone  to  exaggerate  their  petty  griev- 
ances. 

3°.  Jurisdiction  over  people  belongs  to  ruler,  not  to  indi- 
viduals ;  call  for  volunteers  belongs  to  supreme  power. 

c.  Sedition  is  intrinsically  wrong. 

1°.  Against  common  good;  it  attacks  the  very  form  of  so- 
ciety, authority. 

2°.  Done  without  right;  war  prerogative  belongs  to  ruler. 

N.B.  Same  arguments  hold  for  factions.  Defensive  war 
is  not  wrong — because  subjects  have  same  rights  as  individ- 
uals. 

d.  Precautions  before,  during  and  after  war. 

Before  war,  three  things,  1°.  Grave  and  just  cause.     2°. 
Just  motive.     3°.  Probable  success. 
1°.  Some  grave  and  just  causes: 
Puff endorf  mentions : 


WAR  AND  PRECAUTIONS  403 

1.  Protection  of  self  and  property  against  attempts  at  in- 
jury and  destruction; 

2.  Insistence  on  clear  rights  denied  by  others ; 

3.  Recompense  for  wrongs  suffered  at  the  hands  of  an 
enemy ; 

4.  Demand  of  pledges  against  future  insult  and  injury. 
Suarez  mentions: 

1.  A  nation 's  refusal  to  observe  the  common  law  of  nations. 
N.B.     Refusal  to  promote  commerce  is  no  good  excuse. 

2.  Serious  wrong  done  a  nation 's  reputation  and  good  name. 
N.B.     Indignity  done  an  ambassador. 

3.  Danger  threatening  an  allied  nation,  when  that  nation 
has  a  right  to  wage  war  and  intends  to  do  so. 

Some  iveak  and  insufficient  reasons: 

1.  Suspicions  founded  on  no  external  facts,  and  wholly  des- 
titute of  moral  certainty. 

2.  Violations  of  natural  law  perpetrated  at  home,  with  citi- 
zens for  victims. 

3.  Monarch's  religion,  if  without  oppression  and  tyranny. 

4.  Zeal  for  true  religion  and  progress  of  civilization. 

5.  Desire  to  seat  a  certain  family  on  throne,  even  to  the 
advantage  of  other  nations. 

2°.  Motive  must  he  right — Suarez  assigns  two.  a,  to  maJ^e 
good  injuries  done  by  another,  and  b,  to  punish  offenders. 
If  offender  stands  ready  to  make  satisfaction,  war  is  out  of 
the  question. 

N.B.     The  ruler  of  the  wronged  republic  fixes  the  penalty. 

3°.  Hope  of  success — Necessary  for  offensive  war,  of  less 
moment  for  defensive.  Reason  is  evident.  Otherwise  nation 
would  be  exposed  to  certain  danger. 

Precautions  during  war: 

1.  Plots  are  legitimate;  lies  and  violations  of  treaties  are 
not  legitimate.  Plots  involving  lies  are  wrong.  Deception 
is  quite  possible  without  a  lie. 

2.  International  law  must  be  respected. 

3.  The  innocent  must  never  suffer  direct  injury,  indirect 
injury  can  be  legitimate. 

4.  Evils  not  calculated  to  help  along  the  cause  must  be 
avoided. 


404 


SPECIAL  ETHICS 


5.  Poisoning  of  water,  death  by  treachery  and  the  like  are 
forbidden  by  international  law. 

Precautions  after  war: 

By  strict  right  the  winner  can  inflict  on  the  loser  whatever 
punishment  is  necessary  to  repair  his  losses,  secure  himself 
against  the  recurrence  of  difficulties,  and  establish  himself  in 
peace.  The  instinct  of  Christianity  has  done  much  to  moder- 
ate the  cruelties  formerly  practised  in  the  name  of  strict 
right.  Certainly  the  victor  is  not  now  allowed  to  slay  the 
defenseless  or  sell  captives.  The  law  of  nations  sets  salutary 
limits  to  the  right  of  conquest. 


THE  END 


INDEX 


Abhorrence,  84. 

Abraham,  and  Isaac,  and  murder, 
52. 

Abraham,  and  Lot,  and  ownership, 
252. 

Absence  of  pain  and  sorrow,  39. 

Absolute  ownership,  247. 

Absolutism,  58. 

Abstract  ownership,  251,  258. 

Acquired  desire,  21. 

Acts  good  and  bad  in  themselves, 
160,  161. 

Adam  and  Eve  and  ownership,  251, 
252. 

Aequiprobabilism,   102. 

Agents,  three  classes,  10. 

Ahrens,  on  worship,  185. 

Allen,  on  pleasure,  158. 

Alphonsus,  St.,  on  probabilism, 
102,  107;  on  reservation,  237, 
240 

Altruism,  154,  155;  and  ethical 
end  of  life,  159. 

American  duels,  212. 

Appetite,  sensitive  and  rational, 
81,  82. 

Aristippus  and  Hedonism,  168. 

Aristotle  and  happiness,  21,  23, 
24;  on  virtues,  112;  on  habits, 
110;  on  prudence,  114;  on  art, 
114;  on  pleasure,  157. 

Augustine,  St.,  on  happiness,  20; 
on  religion,  178. 

Austin,  152. 

Authority,  371-388;  two  questions, 
origin  and  recipient,  371;  imme- 
diate by  positive  divine  law  and 
by  law  of  nature,  372;  Scholas- 
tics on  recipient,  372;  four  sys- 
tems on  recipient,  374;  Moses, 
Aaron  and  Pope,  371;  parents 
and  rulers,  372;  multitude  not 
recipient,  372,  380;  James  I, 
373;  Taparelli,  374,  384,  386; 
Scholastics  in  general,  374,  375, 
376;  Hobbes  and  Rousseau,  377; 
in  multitude  in  root,  383;  mul- 


405 


titude  unfitted  to  exercise,  380. 

Autonomy  of  Reason,  170-175; 
Kant's  categorical  imperative  is 
subjective,  171,  172;  autonomy 
of  will  as  opposed  to  heteron- 
omy,  172. 

Averling,  Dr.,  274,  276. 


Bain  on  pleasure,  158. 

Ballerini,  on  interest,  148. 

Barter,  147. 

Basic  truths,  5,  6. 

Bax,  274,  276. 

Beatific  vision,  21. 

Bebel,  274,  275. 

Becoming,  agreeable,  useful  good, 
155. 

Bellarmine,  on  authority,  380. 

Bentham,  152;  on  ownership,  254. 

Blackburn,   on  contracts,    139. 

Blamelessness  and  blessedness,  3. 

Boethius,  on  happiness,  19,  20. 

Bonum   ex   Integra   causa,   74,   94. 

Bouquillon,  Dr.,  on  education,  351; 
his  argument,  355;  and  history, 
356;  and  authority,  357. 

Brown,  W.  T.,  273. 

Butler,  152;  168. 

Buying  and  selling,  137,  140. 


Cabet,  and  colony,  253. 

Capital  Sins,  Seven,  113. 

Capital,  a  natural  right,  241  ;| 
permanent  ownership,  248;  with 
Socialism,  261;  in  olden  times, 
144. 

Categorical  imperative,  38;  of 
Kant,  170;  subjective,  171; 
natural  law,  the  one  true,  172. 

Catholic  Church,  and  celibacy,  301, 
302;  recognizes  no  complete  di- 
vorce, 336. 

Catholic  country  and  mixed,  200; 
and  Protestant,  200. 


406 


INDEX 


Catholicity,  more  rational  than 
Rationalism,  4. 

Cathrein,  on  contracts,  140. 

Cause,  definition  and  division  of, 
11;  eflficient  and  final,  12. 

Celibacy,  300-311;  definition,  300; 
and  virginity,  300;  more  excel- 
lent than  marriage,  Trent,  306, 
307,  308;  clerical,  301;  in  East 
and  West,  302,  303;  Elvira, 
Nice,  Paphnutius,  Pope  Sirieius, 
and  Tours,  302 ;  and  Luther,  303, 
307;  and  St.  Thomas,  309;  and 
St.  Paul,  308,  310;  increase  and 
multiply,  310;  Jovinian  and  St. 
Jerome,  307;  good  in  order  of 
virtue,  308 ;  virtuous  and  wicked, 
303,  306;  heroism  and  influence, 
298;  with  Greeks  and  Romans, 
303;  Vestals,  303,  308;  Trent, 
on,  306;  apostolic  labors,  301; 
modern,  304. 

Certainty,  objective  and  subjective, 
76;  kinds,  103. 

Chance,  and  Epicurus,  9. 

Character  and  Habits,  122-127. 

Character,  122;  temperament  and 
habits,  122;  and  parents,  122; 
and  free  will,  122. 

Cicero,  on  religion,  178,  197;  on 
suicide,  206. 

Circumstances,  73,  74,  75,  96. 

Citizen,  man  immediately,  woman 
and  child  mediately,  389,  394; 
Aristotle  on,  392. 

Civil  law,  and  natural  rights,  130; 
without  natural  law,  131,  132; 
division  of,  135;  definition  of, 
44,  54;  requisite  conditions  of, 
57,  58. 

Clement  VII,  Pope,  and  Henry 
VIII,  322. 

Conmiunism,  241,  243;  restricted, 
243;  Fourier,  Owen,  Cabet,  and 
colonies,  253. 

Commutative,  distributive,  legal 
justice,   115,   116,   117,  149. 

Complete  happiness,  definition,  19 ; 
a  natural  desire,  20,  22;  pos- 
sible of  fulfilment,  21,  23;  pos- 
session of  God,  20,  21,  22,  24; 
last  in  series  of  wish-factors, 
18;  implicit  and  explicit  influ- 
ence of,  22;  objectively  and  sub- 


jectively taken,  20;  no  created 
good,  21,  23,  24. 

Compulsory  education,  347,  348, 
350. 

Condition  is  no  cause,  12. 

Conscience,  and  subjective  moral- 
ity, 76;  and  kinds,  104,  105, 
106;  and  objective  order,  104. 

Consent  of  governed,  374,  377;  no 
authority  without,  386;  deter- 
mines ruler,  386;  in  monarchy, 
in  conquest,  385;  morally  neces- 
sary, is  physically  free,  384; 
kinds  of  consent,  385,  387;  in 
patriarchal  state,  385;  St.  Chry- 
sostom  on,  386. 

Contracts,  and  quasi-contracts,  137, 
138. 

Contracts,  137-144;  unilateral  and 
bilateral,  137;  gratuitous  and 
onerous,  140;  buying  and  sell- 
ing, 140,  137 ;  causes  and  condi- 
tions in,  140;  consent,  mistake, 
violence,  fear,  138;  quasi-con- 
tracts, 138;  Savigny,  Pollock, 
Blackburn,  Holland  on,  139; 
Cathrein  on  division  of,  140. 

Control,  and  character,  124;  and 
family  discipline,  125;  and  high 
ideals,  125;  Horace  on,  125. 

Costa-Rossetti,  on  common  owner- 
ship, 249;  on  strictly  natural 
society,  362. 

Courts  and  duel,  223. 

Cranmer  and  lie,  233. 

Cronin,  on  Stoic  Formalism  and 
Hedonism,  167,  168. 

Cudworth,  152,  168. 


D 


Deliberate  and  intentional,  7. 

Deliberate  acts,  13. 

Delight,  84. 

Dependence,  extrinsic  and  intrinsic, 
81. 

Descartes,  on  pleasure,  158. 

Desire,  84;  psychical,  84;  knowl- 
edge measures,  22;  not  accom- 
plishment, 21;  natural,  two 
kinds,  20. 

Despair,  84. 

Despotism  and  law,  58. 

Destiny  in  this  life,  28-33 ;  36,  37 ; 


INDEX 


407 


incomplete  happiness,  virtue,  28 ; 
definition,  30;  three  qualities, 
36. 

Determinism,  82. 

Dictates  of  reason,  38. 

Diogenes,   154;   and  celibacy,  304. 

Displeasure,  84. 

Divorce,  318-342;  definition,  319; 
complete,  a  vinculo;  incomplete, 
a  mensa  et  toro,  320 ;  in  history, 
320,  321,  322,  323,  324,  325; 
Catholic  Church,  against  com- 
plete, 322,  327;  grounds  for  law 
against,  318;  Deuteronomy,  320; 
schools  of  Schamai  and  Hillel, 
320,  334;  Old  Law  and  New, 
321;  with  Protestants  Christ 
never  changed  Old  Law,  334 ;  St. 
Paul  condemns  complete,  335; 
Catholic  judges  and  lawyers, 
336;  unhappy  couples,  337; 
strict  natural  law,  and  second- 
ary law  of  nature,  339,  340,  341 ; 
and  Scripture,  328,  329,,  330, 
331,  332,  333,  334,  335;  New 
England  polygamy,  324,  325; 
Caesar,  Pompey,  Cicero,  321; 
adultery,  no  cause  for  complete, 
justifies  incomplete,  329;  St. 
Mark  and  St.  Luke  clearly 
against,  329 ;  wrote  for  Gentiles, 
333;  in  Scripture  clear  passages 
explain  obscure,  not  vice-versa, 
334. 

Divorce-laws,  wrong,  encourage 
crime,  319,  326;  in  different 
States,  323,  324. 

Doubt,  and  its  qualities,  107,  108. 

Doubtful  law  has  no  binding  force, 
lOG. 

Duel,  210-214;  216-218;  222-225; 
in  history,  210;  barbarians,  211; 
in  France,  in  America,  211,  212; 
false  notions,  212;  in  modern 
times,  213;  prize-fight,  213; 
wrong  means,  216,  217;  Lom- 
bards, Greeks,  Romans,  216;  su- 
perstition, revenge,  courts,  217; 
innocent  and  guilty  equal,  217; 
murder  and  suicide,  217;  de- 
fense of  property,  222 ;  challenge 
and  cowardice,  213;  honor,  224. 

Dunzi,  on  worship,  185. 

Duty,  127,  128;  definition,  182;  to 


God,  201;  to  self,  202;  religion, 
firsi:  and  essential,  183,  184,  191, 
192;  to  accept  revelation,  192, 
193;  to  seek  revelation,  194;  rea- 
son manifests,  never  makes,  196 ; 
of  prayer,  197;  one  religion  for 
all,  188,  189,  194,  198;  results 
from  relation,  175;  for  duty's 
sake,  166,  167. 


E 


Education  of  Child,  342-358;  duty 
and  right  of  parents  prior  to 
state's;  duty  and  right  of  state, 
when  parents  fail,  342;  parents, 
not  parients,  343;  instruction, 
not  mere  information,  it  con- 
notes obedience,  343;  obedience 
to  parents  first,  344 ;  family  prior 
to  state,  344;  signs  that  God 
appointed  parents  educators, 
345 ;  God  never  exempts  parents, 
345;  state  must  safeguard,  not 
absorb  independent  rights,  346; 
state's  right  to  educate,  indirect, 
346,  347 ;  functions  of  education, 
346 ;  Rousseau,  and  young  child, 
and  God,  346;  monopoly  of,  and 
compulsory,  347,  348,  349; 
Church  and,  349,  350,  351,  354; 
state  and,  350,  351;  state  with 
and  without  Church,  351,  352, 
353;  state  and  common  good, 
355;  Bouquillon  and  Holaind, 
on,  351-358;  Costa-Rossetti, 
Jansen,  Hammerstein,  on,  356; 
without  consent  of  parents,  il- 
legitimate, 355. 

Eight  Beatitudes  and  happiness, 
19. 

Elicited  and  ordered  acts,  78. 

Emancipation  of  mankind,  1. 

Eminent  Domain,  400. 

Employer  and  Workman,  280-289; 
labor-problem  and  Church,  its 
solution,  280;  rights  and  duties 
of,  281,  283,  284;  contract,  root 
of  trouble,  141,  281;  reasons  for 
troubles,  282;  wrong  remedies, 
socialism,  liberalism,  malthusi- 
anism,  282;  right  remedy,  union 
between  both,  283;  exaggerated 


•40« 


INDEX 


individualism,  283;  wives  and 
children,  284. 

End,  definition  and  division  of,  10, 
11;  a  cause,  7,  11,  15;  last  end 
and  deliberate  act,  7,  13,  14,  15; 
and  intention,  7 ;  and  destiny, 
9;  absolutely  and  relatively  last, 
10,  15,  16;  proximate  and  inter- 
mediate, 1 1 ;  which,  for  which, 
in  which,  11;  of  doer  and  of 
deed,  operis  and  operantis,  11, 
74,  75,  76 ;  every  effect  is  agent's 
end,  15;  end  contributes  more 
than  saw  or  hammer  to  house, 
15;  mediate  and  immediate  in- 
fluence of,  15 ;  never  justifies 
bad  means,  17,  99;  efficacy, 
moral,  not  physical,  17;  an  ef- 
fect, in  order  of  execution,  17;  a 
determinant  of  morality,  162;  in 
Scripture,  163. 

Engels,  F.,  275. 

Epicurus,  and  finality,  9;  and 
chance,  9;  and  happiness,  21, 
23,  154. 

Epikeia,  or  equity,  118,  149. 

Equality  of  men,  265;  of  man  and 
woman,  natural,  domestic,  in- 
dustrial, political,  392. 

Essential  difference,  and  accidental, 
34,  35,  37. 

Ethics,  definition  of,  1 ;  important, 
1;  practical,  2;  division  of,  3, 
4;  novelties  in,  2. 

Ethical  Duty,  self-imposed,  164, 
165. 

Ethic  and  Nomology  of  Kant,  133, 
134,  165. 

Evolution,  materialistic,  265,  266, 
267. 

Extrinsic  glory  of  God,  151. 


Faith,  and  pagans,   179. 

Family,  woman's  place  in  state  set- 
tled by  woman's  place  in,  390; 
parents  and  children  in,  391; 
Scripture  on,  391. 

Fear,  and  kinds,  90. 

Ferri,  275. 

Finality,  8,  9;  Epicurus,  and,  9. 

Finis  operis  and  operantis,  75,  96. 

Formally,  eminently,  virtually,  25. 


Fortitude,  118;  Cicero,  on,  118. 
Fourier  and  colony,  253. 
Freedom  of  will,  85,  86,  87;  from 

necessity  and  from  violence,  86. 
Free  will,  6. 
Freemasons,     unnatural      society, 

362. 


George,  Henry  on  ownership,  254; 
on  Land-Socialism,  270,  271,  272. 

Gibbons,  Cardinal;  Mary,  model 
of  women,  395. 

God;  existence,  dominion,  6;  im- 
plicitly last  end  of  every  wish, 
16;  laiown  whole,  not  wholly, 
26;  not  a  means,  26,  167;  alone 
able  to  fill  mind,  25;  as  material 
and  formal  object  of  mind,  27; 
wisdom  and  goodness  of,  36; 
a  noumenon,  ruled  out  by  Kant, 
172. 

Good  and  evil,  distinguishable,  30; 
difference  between.  34,  35,  36, 
37;  good  and  kinds,  155,  156. 

Greatest  Happiness;  virtue,  not 
pleasure,  153,  154,  168;  knowl- 
edge clear  of  pleasure,  159;  not 
Altruism,  159,  169;  Christ  and 
martyrs,  164. 

Greeks  Vnd  duel,  210,  216. 

Grote,  152. 

Grotius,  on  lie,  228;  on  ownership, 
254. 


Habit,  with  Aristotle,  110;  with 
Suarez,  111. 

Hamilton,  on  pleasure,   158. 

Hammerstein,  on  education,  357. 

Happiness,  man's  search,  3. 

Harm  and  injury,  different,  163. 

Harmony  and  discord  with  ob- 
jective order,  37,  38. 

flartmann,  on  standard,  34. 

Hate,  84. 

Head,  servant  to  heart,  2. 

Hedonism,  153,  154,  155,  Cronin 
on,  168;  St.  Thomas,  on,  168; 
Hobbes  and  Aristippus  on,  168. 

Hegel,  on  standard,  34;  on  law,  58. 

Hell,  compatible  with  God's  good- 


INDEX 


409 


ness,  63,  64;  no  imperfect  mo- 
tive, 68;  proportion  with  sin, 
68;   and  natural  law,   166. 

Herron,  G.  D.,  273,  276. 

Heyne,  on  ownership,  254. 

Hobbes,  on  standard,  34;  on  law, 
58;  on  Hedonism,  168;  on  state, 
359,  364,  365;  on  authority,  377; 
on  ownership,  254. 

Holaind,  on  education,  351,  352, 
353,  354. 

Holland,  on  right,  128;  on  natural 
law,  132,  on  theology,  133;  on 
contracts,  139. 

Hope,  84. 

Human  acts  and  their  elements, 
13. 


Ignorance,  and  kinds,  89;  vincible, 
invincible,  32. 

Incomplete  Happiness,  virtue,  20, 
28,  29. 

Inditi'erentism,  199. 

Individual  ownership,  248;  God 
and  nature  want,  250,  256,  257; 
potential  and  actual,  250;  for- 
mal compact  and  law,  253;  not 
from  law,  254,  255 ;  from  nature, 
256,  257;  and  Christianity,  267. 

Individualism  and  Utilitarianism, 
161. 

Intensity  and  extent,  25,  28. 

Intention,  kinds,  17,  88. 

Intentional  and  deliberate,  7. 

Interest,  144-149;  a  loan,  144;  St. 
Thomas  on,  144,  148;  titles  to, 
extrinsic,  145;  intrinsic,  146; 
law  regulates  rates,  nature  gives 
right,  146;  Ballerini  on,  148; 
and  Church,  140. 

Intrinsic  diflFerence  and  extrinsic, 
34,  37. 


James  I,  on  authority,  373. 
Jansen,  on  education,  356. 
Jerome,  St.,  on  celibacy,  307. 
Jovinian,  and  celibacy,  307. 
Judaism  and  Christianity,  198. 
Juridical  Positivism,  130,  131,  132. 
Juridical  rights  and  ethical,  131. 


Justice,  115;  St.  Thomas,  on,  115, 

116,  117,  118;  commutative,  116, 

117,  118;  distributive  116,  117, 
118;  legal,  116,  117,  118;  Cicero 
on,  118;  and  kinds,  149. 


K 


Kant,  and  categorical  imperative, 
38;  and  autonomy  of  reason, 
170-175,  62;  and  Stoic  Formal- 
ism, 164,  165,  166;  and  coexist- 
ence of  individual  liberties,  366, 
367;  on  moral  obligation,  38; 
reason,  its  own  law,  42;  sanc- 
tion of  natural  law,  42;  philo- 
sophic sin,  42;  on  juridical 
rights  and  ethical,  131;  on 
Ethic  and  homology,  133,  134; 
on  preceptive  rights  and  do- 
minion rights,  134,  on  pleasure, 
158;  on  prayer,  197. 

Kemmerichius,  on  worship,  185. 

Knabenbauer,  on  divorce,  328. 


Labor-problem,  and  Church-plan, 
140,  141;  charity  and  justice  in, 
142. 

Labor-unions,  286,   287. 

Lactantius,  on  religion,  178. 

Lambert,  on  standard,  34. 

Last  end,  first  cause,  15. 

Last  extrinsic  and  intrinsic  end,  9. 

Law,  diagram  and  definitions,  43, 
44,  strict  and  wide  sense,  43,  44 ; 
its  causes,  44;  in  doubt,  44,  45; 
not  precept,  45;  promulgation, 
45;  ignorance  no  excuse,  45; 
divine,  45 ;  human,  45 ;  eternal, 
45 ;  natural,  46-53 ;  positive 
divine,  53,  54 ;  ecclesiastical,  54 ; 
civil,  54;  differences  between 
positive  divine  and  natural,  53, 
54;  matter  and  form,  57;  re- 
sistance to  unjust  law,  59;  Des- 
potism and  Absolutism,  58;  law- 
maker, 45 ;  necessity  of,  42 ;  law 
and  conscience,  43,  59;  natural 
and  positive.  64,  65. 

Law  of  General  Consequences,  152, 
IGl. 

Laxism,  101. 


410 


INDEX 


Leatham,  J.,  274. 

Leo  XIII,  Pope,  Encyclical  on  La- 
bor, synopsis,  276-280. 

Legislative,  judicial,  executive,  398. 

Leibnitz,  on  pleasure,  158. 

Liberalism,  199. 

Lie,  225-233;  definition,  225;  St. 
Thomas  on  deception  in,  226, 
227;  material  and  formal,  226; 
abuse  of  speech,  and  malice  of, 
228,  238;  Grotius  on,  228:  Mil- 
ton on,  229 ;  privation  of  truth 
due,  229;  procuring  good,  231; 
for  few  grave  reasons,  231 ; 
homicide  and  lie,  231 ;  no  mortal 
sin,  232. 

Liebnecht,  275. 

Life,  present  and  future,  36;  a 
responsibility,  203,  219;  for 
God's  glory,^203. 

Living  wage,  142,  143. 

Loan,  and  kinds,  144. 

Lombards  and  duel,  216. 

Love,  84;  love  and  beauty,  Lacor- 
daire  on,  294,  295. 

Luther  and  good  works,  179;  and 
celibacy,  303,  307. 

Lynching,  wrong,  34. 


M 


Machiavelli,  on  law,  58. 

Maher,  on  feeling,  156;  on  pleasure 
and  pain,  157. 

Man,  the  microcosm,  81. 

Mansel,  and  divorce,  328. 

Marriage,  289-300;  act  and  state, 
291;  plan  of  Creator,  292,  297; 
man  and  woman,  292,  297;  right 
increase  of  race,  298;  friendli- 
ness and  love,  294;  with  Catho- 
lics, 296;  honorable,  296,  297, 
298;  not  preferable  to  celibacy, 
Trent,  296;  Scripture  for,  299; 
Rickaby,  299;  Manichees  and, 
296;  St.  Paul  on,  297;  and 
woman,  304,  305;  and  the  pro- 
fessions, 305;  Fenelon  on,  306; 
evils  are  but  accidents,  306 ;  im- 
pediments invalidating  and  hin- 
dering, 327,  328;  dispensations, 
328;  Church  must  manage,  not 
politicians    and    lawyers,     318; 


hurt  by  divorce  in  four  particu- 
lars, 340,  341. 

Marx,  Karl,  260 ;  values,  260,  264 ; 
atheist,  274. 

Matthew,  St.,  seven  interpreta- 
tions of,  19,  9;  329,  330,  331, 
332;  wrote  for  Hebrews,  333. 

Means,  17. 

Mental  Reservation,  233-241 ;  se- 
crets to  keep,  233,  239 ;  pure  and 
broad,  232,  233,  238,  239;  not 
guilty,  not  at  home,  235,  238 ; 
Cranmer,  233;  priest,  lawj-er, 
doctor,  235,  236;  evasions, 
equivocations,  236,  237;  unkind- 
ness  of,  234;  St.  Alphonsus  on, 
237,  240;  effect  of,  238;  no  abuse 
of  language,  238. 

Merit  and  Demerit,  149-152;  im- 
putability  and  freedom,  150; 
with  God,  with  men,  de  con- 
digno,  150,  151;  subjective 
morality  and,  32. 

Meyer,  on  natural  law,  50;  on 
sanction,  56. 

Midwives  of  Israel,  and  theft,  51. 

Might  and  right,  129,  181. 

Mill,  J.  S.,  152,  154,  168;  on  suf- 
frage, 393. 

Milton,  on  lie,  229. 

Molina,  on  authority,  376. 

Money,  fruitful,  144;  a  species  of 
seed,  146;  medium  of  exchange, 
metals,  coinage,  147. 

Monopoly  in  education,  347,  348, 
349. 

Montesquieu,  on  ownership,  254. 

Moral  notions,  70-92. 

Moral  acts  and  good  acts,  31. 

Morality,  its  causes,  final,  70;  ma- 
terial .and  formal,  71;  model, 
79;  efficient,  79;  generic  and 
specific,  71,  92,  97,  98;  specific 
determinants,  71 ;  objective  and 
subjective,  76,  77,  78,  31;  sub- 
jective and  conscience,  76;  ig- 
norance and,  76,  77 ;  internal  and 
external  acts,  78,  96;  indifferent 
acts,  78;  of  man  and  his  acta, 
32. 

Moral  obligation,  and  Kant,  38; 
from  objective  order  and  divine 
command,  38. 

Moral  Positivism,  129,  130. 


INDEX 


411 


Motives  of  men,  18,  19;  for  obedi- 
ence, with  Kant,  173. 
Murder,  49,  50. 


N 


Natural  Law,  41-70;  definition, 
46;  division,  47;  objectively 
and  subjectively,  46,  47;  and 
Decalogue,  47;  and  polygamy, 
47,  50,  52;  three  classes  of  prin- 
ciples, 46;  principles  are  prac- 
tical judgments,  48,  49;  ignor- 
ance of,  49 ;  three  classes  of  acts 
forbidden,  50;  change  of  matter, 
50,  51;  four  schools  of  inter- 
preters, 50,  51,  52;  Meyer's 
classification,  50;  Thomists  and 
Suarez  on  dispensations,  50;  in- 
trinsically wrong  acts,  and  their 
three  classes,  midwives  of  Israel, 
51;  dangerous  reading,  51; 
strict  enactments,  and  recom- 
mendations, 52;  choice  between 
diff'erent  schools,  52;  knowledge 
of,  54;  unchangeable,  universal, 
eternal,  54,  55 ;  sanction  of,  in 
this  life  and  in  next,  55,  56; 
foundation  of  civil  law,  59;  ex- 
istence proved,  60,  61;  qualities 
proved,  61 ;  sanction  proved,  62, 
63;  sanction  and  Kant's  auton- 
omy, 42,  62;  foundation  of  civil 
law  proved,  65,  66;  not  reason, 
66;  application  of,  67;  subjects 
before  creation,  66;  infants  and 
insane,  66;  principles,  67;  na- 
tions astray,  67;  physical  law 
and  exceptions,  67;  Abraham 
and  Isaac,  67. 

Necessity,  and  four  kinds,  257. 

Negatively  common  ownership, 
249 ;  a  natural  right,  250. 

Neutral  schools,  and  mixed,  351. 

No  taxation  without  representa- 
tion, 396,  401. 

Noumena,  phenomena,  and  natural 
law,  165. 


O 


Object,   72,   93;    end   of   deed,   75, 
76,  96,  97. 


Object,  end  and  circumstances,  72- 
78;   93-101. 

Objective  morality,  32. 

Objective  order,  and  subjective,  35, 
72. 

Order  of  execution  and  of  inten- 
tion, 7. 

Owen  and  colony,  253. 

Ownership,  241-260;  in  capital, 
with  socialism,  241,  242;  and 
communism,  243,  245;  and  so- 
cialistic commonwealth,  242 ;  and 
natural  law,  243;  and  civil  law, 
258;  and  jurisdiction,  245;  and 
production,  245;  elements  of, 
245;  exaggerated  individualism, 
245;  and  occupancy,  246,  259; 
God  and  charity,  246;  State  and 
Eminent  Domain,  247;  kinds  of, 
247,  248 ;  Costa-Rossetti  on  com- 
mon, 249;  Adam  and  Eve,  251, 
252;  primitive  innocence  and, 
252 ;  Abraham  and  Lot,  252 ;  re- 
ligious, 253,  258. 


Paley,  152,  155. 

Paphnutius,  on  celibacy,  302. 

Paradox,  end  and  beginning,  7. 

Particular  good  tends  to  universal, 
16. 

Passions,  83,  84;  diagram  and 
definitions,  84. 

Paul,  St.,  on  celibacy,  308,  310. 

Penal  laws,  and  conscience,  134. 

Perfect  ownership,  247. 

Personal  indulgence  at  expense  of 
neighbor,  163. 

Pius  VII,  Pope,  and  Napoleon,  322, 

Plato,  63;  on  suicide,  205;  on 
bachelors,  303. 

Pleasure  and  pain,  156;  Aristotle, 
St.  Thomas,  Plato,  on,  156,  157 ; 
Spinoza,  Kant,  Schopenhauer, 
Descartes,  Hamilton,  Bain,  Al- 
len, Spencer  on,  158;  faculty 
for,  158;  feeling,  156;  laws  of, 
157;   processes,   157. 

Plutarch,  on  religion,  197. 

Pollock,  on  contracts,  139. 

Polygamy,  311-318;  monogamy 
primitive  form  of  marriage. 
Pope    Innocent    III    on    Adam, 


412 


INDEX 


312,  314;  patriarchal  and  Cal- 
vin, St.  Chrysostom  and  St. 
Augustine,  313;  Solomon,  Abra- 
ham and  concubines,  313;  and 
gentiles,  313;  and  Church  in 
New  Law,  313,  315;  Anabaptists 
and  Luther,  314;  compared  with 
divorce,  314,  315;  in  Utah  and 
Turkey,  314;  Noah,  Job,  and  St. 
Peter,  314;  modern,  316;  woman 
in,  317;  Durandus  on,  317; 
hurts  secondary  purposes  of  mar- 
riage, 315;  in  Old  Law  and  New, 
47,  50,  52,  53. 

Positivism,  moral  and  juridical, 
129,  130,  131. 

Positively  common  ownership,  249 ; 
from  compact,  254;  use  of 
things,  259. 

Price,  140. 

Pride  and  wickedness,  5. 

Principle  of  utilitv  refuted,  160, 
161,  162,  163,  164. 

Probabilism,  101,  102,  103;  law- 
fulness not  validity,  108. 

Probabiliorism,  102. 

Proudhon,  on  wages,  285. 

Prudence,  111,  112,  114,  115;  func- 
tions of,  114;  and  wisdom,  114; 
Christ  in  the  temple,   114,   115. 

Public  ownership,  248. 

Pythagoras,  and  celibacy,  304. 

Q 

Quelch,  H.,  273. 

Quotations  from  Socialists,  272, 
273,  274,  275. 


Cicero  on,  197;  Scripture  for 
one,  198;  remedy  for  suicide, 
207. 

Remorse  implies  hell,  166. 

Republic  and  monarchy  compared, 
382. 

Responsibility,  33. 

Resurrection  of  body,  25. 

Revelation,  definition,  186;  chan- 
nels of,  186;  Bible  and  Tradi- 
tion, 186;  Church,  custodian  and 
interpreter  of,  186;  miracles  and 
prophecies,  seals  of,  187;  funda- 
mentals and  non-fundamentals, 
more  important  and  less  im- 
portant, 187,  188;  must  accept, 
192,  103;  must  seek,  194;  mys- 
teries in,  198. 

Rights  and  Duties,  127-137,  179, 
180;  animals  have  none,  180; 
personal  and  real,  181;  collision 
of,  181;   courts  to  settle,  182. 

Right,  and  its  three  meanings, 
127;  Suarez  on,  128;  of  owner- 
ship, 128;  Holland  on,  128; 
precedence  in  right  and  duty, 
128,  182;  surrender  of,  129;  and 
might,  129. 

Rigorism,  101. 

Rolling  stones  over  a  precipice, 
108. 

Romans  and  duel,  210. 

Rousseau,  on  standard,  34;  on  law, 
58;  on  child  and  God,  346;  on 
state,  359.  363,  364,  365;  on  au- 
thority, 377;  social  contract, 
377. 


S 


Rationalists  defy  reason,  4,  5. 

Reading,  dangerous,  51. 

Real  good  and  apparent,  155. 

Reason,  weak  without  revelation, 
4,  5. 

Religion,  definition,  178,  179;  ob- 
jective and  subjective,  178,  179; 
dogmatic  and  practical,  179; 
natural  and  supernatural,  179; 
man's  first  duty,  183,  191;  essen- 
tial necessity,  183,  191;  and 
state,  184;  Schiff  on,  196;  end 
of  religion,    197;    Plutarch   and 


Sanction  and  kinds,  55. 

Savigny  on  contracts,  139. 

Scepticism,  6. 

SchifT,  on  religion,  196. 

Scholastics,  on  authority,  374,  375, 
376;  resemblances  and  differ- 
ences, 377. 

Schopenhauer  on  pleasure,  158;  on 
duty,  202. 

Secrets,  natural,  of  promise,  of 
contract,  239,  240. 

Sedition,  401,  402. 

Self-defense,  208-210,  215,  221, 
222;  conditions  for  lawful,  209, 


INDEX 


413 


210;  means  to  preserve  right, 
215;  chastity  and,  220;  unjust 
assailants,  221 ;  drunken  assail- 
ant, 221;  honor,  221;  end  and 
means,  222;  duty  to  kill,  222; 
love  of  enemy,  222. 

Self  and  state  sole  lawmakers,  164. 

Seneca  on  sanction,  56 ;  on  suicide, 
205. 

Senses  and  supreme  good,  39. 

Senses  of  words,  240. 

Shakespeare  on  money,  145;  on 
suicide,  208. 

Siricius,  Pope,  on  celibacy,  302, 

Socialism,  260-280;  and  Marx, 
260;  and  millionaires,  242;  and 
Heaven,  242 ;  and  industry,  242 ; 
restricted  Socialism,  244 ;  danger 
to  republic,  244;  wages  of  em- 
ployers, 261;  religion,  remedy, 
261 ;  evolution  and  propaganda, 
262;  from  leaders  and  their 
writings,  262,  272,  273;  and 
municipal  ownership,  263;  and 
atheism,  262,  264;  consumer, 
263;  Church  and,  202,  264; 
clergy  and,  262,  264;  state,  free 
love,  family,  children,  262,  264; 
commonwealth,  263,  264;  un- 
natural, 266;  morally  impos- 
sible, 268,  269. 

Socialistic  commonwealth  fea- 
tures, 263,  264. 

Society,  complete  and  incomplete, 

289,  290;  family,  state,  Church, 

290,  291;  brutes,  289;  matter 
and  form  of,  289;  origin  is  na- 
ture, 358-366;  family  leads  to 
state,  358;  Hobbes  and  Rousseau 
on,  359,  363,  364,  365;  origin 
from  nature  proved,  360,  361; 
monks  and  nuns,  364;  Free- 
masons, 362;  St.  Thomas  on, 
360. 

Socrates,  154;  on  suicide,  205. 

Soul,  immortal,  6. 

Spargo,  275. 

Sparta,  on  bachelors,  303. 

Special  Ethics,    175-404;    division 

of,    175;     Individual,    177-289; 

Family,    289-358;     State,    358- 

404. 
Species  in  moral  acts,  72,  73. 
Spencer  on  pleasure,  158. 


Spinoza  on  law,  58;  on  pleasure, 
158. 

Spontaneous  acts,  86. 

Standard  of  morality,  immediate 
and  mediate,  35,  36,  39,  38;  not 
law,  not  public  opinion,  34,  35, 
39;  objective  order  grasped  by 
intellect,  35,  36,  38,  39. 

State,  its  structure,  366-371;  its 
purpose,  Kant,  and  right  system, 
366,  367,  368;  its  inatter  and 
form,  369,  381;  subject  and 
slave,  369;  causes  of,  389;  ef- 
ficient, formal,  final,  389;  ma- 
terial, 389,  390;  heterogeneous, 
392;  and  prerogatives,  398-404; 
legislative,  judicial,  executive, 
398;  Aristotle  on  rule  by  law 
and  by  judge,  399;  St.  Thomas 
on  capital  punishment,  399 ;  Em- 
inent Domain  and  Hobbes,  400; 
War-Power,  401,  402,  403;  taxes, 
400 ;  end,  material  and  spiritual, 
196,  197. 

Stoic  Formalism,  164-168;  Cronin 
on,  167,  168. 

Strikes,  288. 

Suarez,  natural  law,  50;  on  coun- 
sel and  law,  58;  on  right,  128; 
on  authority,  375;  and  Royal 
Compact,  376,  377 ;  and  Victoria, 
376,  383,  384;  matter  and  form, 
381. 

Subjective  morality,  31,  32. 

Substance,  complete  and  incom- 
plete, 81. 

Suff'rage,  inborn  right  in  nobody; 
natural  in  man,  unnatural  in 
woman,  395. 

Suicide,  self-defense  and  duel,  201- 
225. 

Suicide,  203-209;  213-216;  218- 
221;    crime    and    cowardice    of, 

204,  statistics,  205 ;  Seneca,  Pla- 
to,  Socrates,   Cicero,   Virgil,  on 

205,  206;  state  and  lunacy,  206  j 
religion,  one  remedy,  207; 
Shakespeare,  208;  against  God, 
213;  against  self,  214;  against 
society,  215;  indirect  killing, 
218;  instinct,  218;  no  permis- 
sion of  God,  218;  mutilation, 
218;  saints  rushing  to  death, 
218;  drimkard  after  confession. 


414 


INDEX 


218;  rejecting  a  gift,  219;  Hume 
and,  219;  escape  from  greater 
evil,  219;  volenti  nulla  injuria, 
219;  hunters  kill  birds,  219; 
criminal  killing  himself,  220 ;  op- 
erations, 220 ;  exposure  of  self  to 
death,  220. 
Synderesis  and  conscience,  80. 


Taparelli,  on  consent  of  people, 
374,  384,  386,  387. 

Temperance,  120,  112;  and  absti- 
nence, 120,  121. 

Tenuiter   probabile,    101. 

Thanksgiving  Day,  184. 

Theft,  49. 

Thomas,  St.,  on  law's  causes,  44; 
on  specific  morality,  73,  74;  on 
society,  360;  on  virtues.  111;  on 
cardinal  virtues,  112;  on  in- 
terest, 148,  144;  on  lie,  226,  227; 
celibacy,  309;  nobody  born  a 
king,  378;  on  prayer,  197. 

Thomasius  and  Holland  on  theol- 
ogy, 133;  on  duty,  202;  on  wor- 
ship, 185. 

Toleration,  Constitution  and,  188; 
political  and  dogmatic,  189,  190; 
Samaritans  and,  189;  political, 
by  accident  lawful,  189;  dog- 
matic, absurd,  190,  194;  Indif- 
ferentism.  Liberalism  and,  199, 
200. 

Tongiorgi  division  of  Ethics,  4. 

Transient  ownership,  248. 

Trial  by  Ordeal,  211. 

Truce  of  God,  211. 

Trusts,  287. 

Truth  and  its  kinds,  226. 

Tutiorism,  101. 


U 


Vice  and  formal  object,  113. 

Virgil  and  suicide,  206. 

Violence  and  kinds,  91. 

Virtues  and  Vices,  110-122;  in 
general,  110;  with  St.  Thomas, 
112;  with  St.  Augustine,  112; 
with  Aristotle,  112. 

Virtue  and  preponderance  of  bless- 
ings, 37. 

Volitum  and  praecognitum,  13. 

Voluntary  acts,  and  kinds,  14,  87, 
88. 

Vow,  obligation  from  natural  law, 
not  from  man,  173. 


W 


Wages,  Proudhon  on,  285;  no 
partnership,  buying  and  selling, 

285,  286;  law  and  conscience  on, 

286.  . 

Wage-trouble  and  religion,  141. 

War,  definition  and  kinds,  401; 
legitimate,  402;  precautions  be- 
fore, during,  after,  402,  403. 

Will  and  appetite,  13,  82. 

Woman  suffrage,  388-398;  argu- 
ments against,  394;  arguments 
for,  395,  396;  unnatural,  393; 
Catholics  and,  393;  J.  S.  Mill 
and,  393. 

Worship  and  natural  law,  48 ; 
definition  of,  184;  division  of, 
184;  external  and  internal,  pub- 
lic and  private,  184,  185;  Thom- 
asius, Dunzi,  Kemmerichius, 
Ahrens  on  external,  185;  latria, 
hyperdulia,  dulia,  192;  God's 
due,  192;  acts  morally  on  God, 
195;  needed  by  God,  196;  so- 
ciety owes,  196;  in  spirit  and 
truth,  196;  freedom  of,  199,  200. 


Usury  and  Church,  145. 
Utilitarianism,  152-170. 


Value,  140. 


Zeno   and   happiness,   21,    23,   24; 

and  wealth,  154. 
Zigliara,  on  consent  of  people,  384, 

385. 


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